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Cooperation or Compromise? Understanding the Farm Bill 
as Omnibus Legislation
Professor Margaret Sova McCabe*
“Since the early days of the revolution, the founding fathers had 
fought together for the future of their country. But . . . divisions 
had slowly begun to form between them that, once hardened, 
would lead to the formation of the United States of America’s 
first political parties. Key to their emergence were fundamental 
differences in what the revolutionaries believed ought to be the 
fabric of American society – the dream of a nation of farmers 
versus the vision of a merchant and trader elite.”1
I. Introduction: Making Food Law with Omnibus 
Legislation
Is the development of American food law and policy 
benefited or burdened by a Farm Bill (“the Bill” or “Bill”) that 
sets appropriations and policy for commodities, conservation, 
trade, nutrition, credit, rural development, forestry, and energy?2 
On one hand, a broad Bill that ties together many pieces of the 
food system under one legislative process could be a brilliant 
way to infuse systems thinking and alignment into a complex, 
politicized realm. On the other, the Bill, as omnibus legislation, 
could simply represent a classic case of logrolling3 that does little 
* Professor of Law; Faculty Fellow, Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership & Public 
Service, University of New Hampshire School of Law. Professor Sova McCabe has 
been selected as Dean of the University of Arkansas School of Law and assumed her 
duties on July 1, 2018.
1  Andrea Wulf, Founding Gardeners: The Revolutionary Generation, 
Nature, and the Shaping of the American Nation 83 (Vintage Books 2011).
2  See generally Agriculture Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014).
3  Ted A. Donner & Brian L. Crowe, Attorney’s Practice Guide to Negotiations 
§ 12:46 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2009) (“Logrolling is often described as a concession 
tactic that is difficult to utilize in competitive negotiations because it involves one side’s 
conceding his or her lesser concerns for the other side’s more substantial concerns, in 
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to promote a deeply coordinated, systematic approach to one 
of the most important components of stable democracy and the 
economy: food and its production.
The distinction between urban and rural agendas in U.S. 
food law and policy stretches back to the country’s political roots, 
as the introductory quote captures.4 As time has passed, the issues 
and demographics have evolved to shift dominance from agrarian 
interests to the urban agenda.5 However, one thing remains 
constant: producing and consuming affordable, accessible food 
is essential to all Americans. Given that the Bill represents our 
nation’s traditional process for setting food law and policy, this 
essay explores the modern influence of the urban-rural divide 
and how omnibus legislation has bridged that gap. That bridging 
remains essential to developing balanced food law and policy, 
but with each Bill it becomes increasingly apparent that without 
overarching, bi-partisan goals for the American food system the 
process will continue to be bogged down in divisive politics that 
are fueled, in part, by the Bill’s omnibus nature.
Omnibus legislation is typically “[a] single bill containing 
various distinct matters, usu[ally] drafted in this way to force the 
executive either to accept all the unrelated minor provisions or 
to veto the major provision.”6 By definition, omnibus legislation 
produces compromise.7 But, should the American food system be 
a compromise? Are there ways that the policy tensions sought to 
be resolved with omnibus legislation could instead be made more 
transparent to law makers and citizens with the goal of aligning 
order to encourage a ‘high joint benefit.’ Logrolling has also been, perhaps more often 
described as a tactic that involves a process of ‘aggregating dissimilar provisions in 
one [proposal] in order to attract the support of diverse groups.…’ Logrolling is thus 
a common tactic for legislators to employ although there is considerable disagreement 
over whether walking from one log to another in such a manner is an appropriate or 
even ethical practice in government.”).
4  See Wulf, supra note 1, at 83.
5  See Christopher Bosso, Framing the Farm Bill: Interests Ideology, and the 
Agricultural Act of 2014 35-43 (University of Kansas Press 2017) (discussing the 
policy evolution in U.S. agriculture from the 30s to modern day).
6  Bill, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
7  Glen S. Krutz, Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress, 45 Am. J. of 
Pol. Sci. 210, 211 (2001).
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interests to spur innovation, rather than simply positioning for 
compromise? 
This essay wants readers to consider whether we should 
reimagine the Bill as an opportunity to set rural and urban 
policy in ways that maximize economic supports in both areas. 
This essay emphasizes that such a reimagining would align the 
American population’s interest in a reliable, affordable, and 
healthy food supply rather than settling for the Bill to be an every-
five-year opportunity to simply logroll support for commodities 
and nutrition programs.  While the latter scenario clearly has had 
its benefits for both titles over the years, the political dynamics 
of the 2014 Farm Bill illustrate that the simplistic tension may no 
longer be useful. However, that possibility should not lead us to 
conclude that continuing to use the omnibus vehicle is not in the 
interests of farmers and consumers. 
II. The Farm Bill 1949 – 2014: Slowly Changing 
Traditions
In 1933, as President Roosevelt moved to address 
the devastation the Dust Bowl wrought on many farmers and 
the agricultural markets, he acknowledged that “free-market 
agricultural economics [were] over for good.”8 Congress first 
moved to control markets with the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933.9 And, five years later, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 became the first omnibus farm bill.10 It offered payments to 
farmers, price supports, and crop insurance among other tools that 
represented government management of agricultural markets.11 
The Act also authorized the use of these tools for five years so 
that Congress could shape agricultural market management 
8  Timothy Egan, The Worst Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who 
Survived the Great American Dust Bowl 133 (2006) (discussing the origins of 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act as well as describing, in detail, the devastation the 
Dust Bowl wrought on its landowners and farmers).
9  Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
10  Bosso, supra note 5, at 35, 37 (discussing the origins of the farm bills in the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933 and 1938).
11  Agriculture Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938); see Bosso, supra 
note 5, at 37-38.
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in response to economic shifts.12 As 2014 would illustrate, the 
1949 Congressional revision to the 1938 market management 
techniques – known as the ‘permanent law’ – remains highly 
relevant to the success of each Bill.13 If no Bill passes, then the 
commodity programs set by these laws once again become ‘the 
law of the land.’14 Thus, the procedural mechanism of omnibus 
legislation has been part of American food law and policy nearly 
from the inception of government intervention in agricultural 
markets.15 And, the existence of the ‘permanent law’ is a powerful 
tool to prompt Congressional action, lest it let farm policy supports 
revert to 1949 levels.
Through the 50s and 60s, the American economy would 
shift dramatically, moving from rural to urban.16 President 
Kennedy’s victory has been identified as one starting point for 
seeing the shift in influencing food policy from rural interests to 
urban ones.17 This is because Kennedy’s victory was propelled by 
urban and suburban voters – signaling that support for rural issues 
and interest was set to decline.18 And, it did. By 1973, it was 
necessary for the ‘farm bloc’ to accept that “no bill supporting 
commodity programs would ever get enough votes beyond 
the Agriculture Committees unless it also did something for 
nutrition.”19 This marriage survives today, even following a 2014 
attempt at separation, as discussed below. Significantly, nutrition 
12  Bosso, supra note 5, at 37. 
13  Kate Giessel, On the Permanence of Permanent Law: An Argument for the 
Continued Presence of the Permanent Law Provisions in the Farm Bill, 13 Cardozo 
Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 765, 767 (2015).
14  See Neil Hamilton, The 2014 Farm Bill: Lessons in Patience, Politics, and 
Persuasion, 19 Drake J. of Agric. L. 1, 23 (noting that the 2014 effort to replace the 
1949 permanent law to ease future pressures to pass a Farm Bill failed); see Bosso, 
supra note 5, at 38 (emphasizing that though an arcane point, the suspension of the 
permanent law in each farm bill creates an incentive for Congress to pass a new Bill).
15  See Giessel, supra note 13, at 766.
16  Miranda N. Smith et al., Nat’l Info. Mgmt. & Support Sys., How Migration 
Impacts Rural America 1 (2016), http://w3001.apl.wisc.edu/pdfs/b03_16.pdf. 
17  Bosso, supra note 5, at 58.
18  Id. 
19  Id. at 59.
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appropriations accounted for 80% of 2014 spending.20
There are several excellent analyses of the political 
dynamics surrounding the details of 2014 Farm Bill.21 The 
richness of the political process is beyond the scope of this essay, 
but readers are encouraged to review some of those analyses as the 
2018 votes approach. For the purposes of this essay’s discussion 
of whether omnibus legislation is helpful or harmful to the Bill, 
three key attributes of the 2014 Bill are relevant:
•	 The Farm Bill at one point was split into two bills in the 
House – removing nutrition provisions from the remainder 
of the Bill.22 This break from the tradition set in 1973 is 
the reflective of some politicians’ desire to decouple food 
system interests to push for more radical changes in the 
law.
•	 In the final outcome, neither party could claim political 
victory and the omnibus process served to secure many 
compromises in important areas such as conservation, 
crop insurance, dairy, and SNAP.23
•	 Innovation and food system change continued to advance 
as evidenced by funding of ‘progressive’ programs such 
as support for fruits, vegetables, organics, and significant 
initiatives to fund healthy food financing and food and 
agriculture learning.24
20  Projected Spending Under the 2014 Bill, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/projected-
spending-under-the-2014-farm-bill/ (last updated Jan. 16, 2018).
21  See, e.g., Bosso, supra note 5; see, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 14; see, e.g., Stephen 
Ansolabehere & Kattalina Berriochoa, Why does the American Public Support 
Redistributive Logrolls? An Analysis of Policy Preferences for the 2014 Farm Bill 
(May 2016), https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Ansolabehere05122016/Draft-
Ansolabehere-Berriochoa-Who-Benefits_-v2.pdf. 
22  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 5.
23  See Bosso, supra note 5, at 156 (“In some ways, and all the noise aside, passage 
of the Agricultural Act of 2014 resembled the normal Farm Bill process. It was just 
messier than usual, to be sure, but Congress ultimately got the job done, and in the 
end, it did so with bipartisan majorities.”); see Hamilton, supra note 14, at 35 (“[f]or 
the Tea Party members who believed the farm bill process could be used to gain major 
reforms, the final bill was a disappointment.”).
24  See Agriculture Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, §4209, 128 Stat. 649, 829; see, e.g. 
Food and Agriculture Service Learning Program, 7 U.S.C. §7633 (2014).
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All three points have a common denominator. They are, 
in part, a product of the omnibus process. The first – the splitting 
of the bill – was a direct attack on the benefits of the omnibus 
approach and could signal that a contentious 2018 process will 
again cause peeling off of major issues to achieve particular 
outcomes or political victories. The second two illustrate that 
omnibus legislation both protects ‘the middle’ by requiring 
compromise (which is likely where most citizens’ interest are 
represented) and creates space for cross-aisle and cross-sector 
dialogue to advance the food system. 
With the protective effect of omnibus legislation in mind, 
we should also consider how food law and policy benefit from 
an expansive bill. Marion Nestle has described the Bill this way:
There isn’t anything in American agriculture, 
farming, and health that this bill doesn’t touch, 
but there is no overarching agenda. The Farm Bill 
is simply a collection of government-supported 
programs, each with its own collection of 
lobbyists, proponents, and opposing forces. You 
get the sense that everyone said, “Let’s just throw 
this program in.” There is nothing rational in the 
Farm Bill.25
While some would find rationality in the Bill, it is simply 
not coherently designed based on a common understanding of the 
goals of the American food system. Regardless of its rationality 
or design, the Bill has played a critical role in maintaining a 
stable food system by supporting farmers and eaters with federal 
dollars deployed in the way that its titles’ subject matter experts 
have determined optimal.26 However, because there are disparate 
and broad ranging areas of expertise and seemingly no political 
25  Interview by Louisa Kasdon with Marion Nestle, Paulette Goddard Professor of 
Nutrition, Food Studies, and Public Health, N.Y.U., in New York, New York (Jan. 16, 
2012), http://23.23.183.38/2012/01/16/5-courses-with-marion-nestle#.Wtup8IjwbIU 
[hereinafter Nestle Interview]. 
26  See Austin Igleheart & Arthur Scott, Nat’l Ass’n of Counties, Farm Bill 
101: An Overview of NACo Priorities Throughout the Farm Bill 4-6 (2018), 
http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/FARM%20BILL%20101_0.pdf. 
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process designated to align the desired outcomes of each title with 
a coherent, overarching food policy, the Farm Bill falls short of 
synthesizing many important components of the food system. 
And, in that sense, omnibus legislation, without clear underlying 
values is a blunt instrument ill-suited for the challenges facing the 
American food system domestically and internationally. 
The Farm Bill is the principal driver of U.S. food law and 
policy. It is also economic legislation that subsidizes the American 
food system – either in the way it stabilizes agricultural markets 
with a variety of economic tools or by providing means for needy 
Americans to purchase foods through feeding programs such 
as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”).27 
Since 1973, when ‘food stamps’ were added to the Farm Bill, it 
has been characterized as a legislative tool to promote economic 
security for rural communities and the farmers who live in them 
by ensuring that elected officials, who are principally from urban 
and suburban areas, will vote for their needs because they are 
inextricably linked to the need for the food security offered 
by SNAP.28 Senators McGovern and Dole are credited with 
creating this strategy,29 but 45 years later the question is whether 
the oversimplification of the rural-urban logroll and the rise of 
partisan politics threatens to stagnate or stymy future Bills. 
III. Farm Bill 2018: Reframing the Omnibus as 
Opportunity
Food is political. But, under the politics are some universal 
truths that reveal why continuing an expansive Bill creates 
27  See Inst. of Med., Nat’l Res. Council of the Nat’l Acad., Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program: Examining the Evidence to Define the 
Benefit Adequacy 44 (Julia A. Caswell & Ann L. Yaktine eds., National Academies 
Press 2013). 
28  See Rich Morin, The politics and demographics of food stamp recipients, Pew 
Research Center (July 12, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/12/
the-politics-and-demographics-of-food-stamp-recipients/ (demonstrating party 
constituents’ participation in SNAP motivates support of program by that party’s 
elected officials). 
29  See Dorothy Samuels, There Was a Time When Ending Hunger Was a National 
Goal for Republicans and Democrats, New York Times (May 20, 2013), https://www.
nytimes.com/2013/05/21/opinion/food-stamp-politics.html. 
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opportunities for a better food system for all, if politicians and 
stakeholders are willing to see it that way. First, America needs a 
rural population to support agricultural production and to steward 
natural resources. Second, America needs an urban population 
to support commerce and to create broad economic activity. 
The two domains – even considered in tension by Jefferson and 
Hamilton30 – are not mutually exclusive or independently viable. 
Thus, lawmakers who see the benefit in providing a safety net 
to both farmers and eaters do their constituents a great service 
because they adopt a food system approach. Of course, the size of 
the safety nets and market controls will likely always be fodder 
for vociferous debate, but delinking nutrition titles from farm 
supports does little to advance that debate in a principled manner.
Food system thinking is critical because food is critical to 
economic, human, and environmental health. Food is obviously a 
human need. Food production is also key driver of environmental 
and human health. For example, agriculture contributes 
significantly to water pollution and air quality.31 Similarly, links 
between eating patterns and environmental health are emergent 
principals for developing nutritional guidance.32 Additionally, 
human health conditions such as obesity, diabetes, and heart 
disease are linked to diet.33 Finally, food production and processing 
creates important economic activity.34 In different regions of 
the country and across different demographics, production and 
30  See Wulf, supra note 1, at 82-84 (discussing the philosophical differences between 
the two and analyzing how those differences manifest in political approaches to 
federalism and Constitutional powers).
31  See Javier Mateo-Sagasta et al., Food and Agric. Org of the U.N., Int’l 
Water Mgmt. Inst., Water Pollution from Agriculture: A Global Review 
1 (2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7754e.pdf; see Agriculture: Agriculture and Air 
Quality, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agriculture-agriculture-and-air-
quality (last updated  Mar. 23, 2018).
32  See Margaret Sova McCabe, Eating for the Environment: The Potential of Dietary 
Guidelines to Achieve Better Health and Environmental Health Outcomes, 47 Envtl. 
L. 741, 755-59 (2017).
33  See, e.g., Alice Lichtenstein et al., Diet and Lifestyle Recommendations Revision 
2006: A Scientific Statement From the American Heart Association Nutrition 
Committee, 114 Circulation 82 (2006).
34  See Comm. for the Econ. Dev. of the Conference Bd., Economic Contribution 
of the Food and Beverage Industry 6, 28-30 (2017), https://www.ced.org/pdf/
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consumption needs vary. And, while the Bill has long served to 
connect disparate parts of the food system, its lack of intentional 
systems design does little to build a permanent bridge among 
them.
When I began thinking about the effect of omnibus 
legislation on the Bill in 2008, it did not strike me that the 
procedural tool was beneficial to a better food system. In fact, 
it seemed to me that many years of logrolling had done little to 
advance the food system. And, Marion Nestle identifies why: 
“there is no overarching agenda.”35 To be sure, there are agendas 
and plenty of lawmakers, lobbyists, and special interests who 
check as many items on their agendas as possible as they trade, 
shape, and compromise.  But, what if there were an explicit, 
transparent unifying, overarching agenda? Then, the collection 
of disparate programs is articulated through that agenda and the 
benefits, synergies, and opportunities to leverage rural and urban 
contributions to a functional food system is more possible. The 
pieces of a unified agenda already exist –
o American food policy rests on the fundamental goal of 
providing abundant, affordable food to all of its people.36
o Urban areas rely on the rural population for food 
production.37
o Rural areas produce raw materials and there must be 
adequate infrastructure in those areas to support the rural 
population.38
o All Americans should have access to a food safety net that 
permits them to access nutritious food. Good nutrition is 
also fundamental, but more controversial.
o Agricultural production methods have profound impacts 
on environmental health, including top soil, water quality, 
Economic_Contribution_of_the_Food_and_Beverage_Industry.pdf. 
35  Nestle Interview, supra note 25.
36   Cong. Research Serv., An Overview of USDA Rural Development 
Programs 21 (2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20160210_
RL31837_d27aabf3a20b5e31f4203c3c7307e6ce1cdd6649.pdf. 
37  See id. at 1.
38  See id. at 26.
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and air quality39 and producers may need incentives to 
sustainably steward the environment. 
There are other ideas that are likely more controversial, 
but given that they have been raised in the public discourse over 
the last two Bill cycles, they are included here. They should at 
least be recognized as representative of significant voter interest 
by legislators.
•	 Producing food that is affordable, healthy, environmentally 
sustainable, and economically viable is the common goal 
of federal farm and nutrition policy.
•	 The food system should include, and will benefit from, 
a variety of producers – from large mono-cropping 
operations to diverse family farms. Access to capital and 
to farm supports should be equitable and designed to 
promote farming viability across all sectors of production.
•	 Farm and food law and policy should align with 
environmental and public health goals.
•	 Though there may be disagreements concerning the 
amount and method of supporting farm and food programs, 
their importance to the overall security and well-being of 
the American people transcends partisanship.
There is no formal requirement that Congress articulate 
the values that inform any legislation. However, given the 
unique traditions of the Bill and the profound influence it has on 
all citizens, the Congressional Committees and the leadership 
responsible for them would make a significant contribution 
to American food law and policy if they undertook this task. 
Without a more transparent, bi-partisan agenda the Bill will 
likely be vulnerable to contentious political wrangling that does 
little to advance a food system that supports farmers and eaters in 
achieving economic, environmental, and human health.
Conclusion
39  See Mateo-Sagasta et al., supra note 31; see Agriculture: Agriculture and Air 
Quality, supra note 31.
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The Farm Bill is the mechanism for setting American 
food law and policy. Since 1938, the use of omnibus legislation 
has been used to effectively secure compromise amongst 
disparate economic (and political) interests. However, as political 
discourse becomes more divisive and Congress less functional 
in the use of its legislative power,40 the Farm Bill process would 
benefit from a greater articulation of the overarching values that 
inform American farming and food lawmaking. Without such an 
organizing principle, the organic compromise that is inherent to 
omnibus legislation will likely be lost resulting in either failed 
Farm Bills or further polarization around food issues. Such 
polarization does little to serve farmers or eaters and also inhibits 
our ability to create economic and policy conditions that support 
a functional, healthy, and prosperous food system. 
40  Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the 
Separation of Powers 1 (Yale University Press 2017) (“Observers call Congress ‘the 
broken branch’ and lament that, ‘[g]ripped by stalemate, America’s chief lawmaking 
body can barely muster the ability to make law.’”) (quoting Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, 
Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 2217, 2217).
The Fate of Industrial Hemp in the 2018 Farm Bill – Will 
Our Collective Ambivalence Finally Be Resolved? 
Marne Coit
I.  Introduction 
As a nation, we are at a crossroads in the regulation of 
industrial hemp, and the 2018 Farm Bill is the time to decide 
which path we will choose. Congress has an opportunity to clear 
the path for farmers in the United States (“US”) to participate in 
this burgeoning market. With an estimated 25,000 uses, industrial 
hemp is one of those rare crops that has both food and agricultural 
uses.1 There is undoubtedly a market for hemp products.2 The 
Hemp Industries Association (“HIA”) estimates that US retail 
sales of hemp-based products was $688 million in 2016 – up from 
$573 million in 2015.3 By 2020 the industry is estimated to grow 
to $1.8 billion.4
Considering the projected market growth, one could 
conclude that growing industrial hemp has a lot of potential 
for farmers in the US.5 However, the biggest impediment to 
farmers doing so is the current state of the law that regulates this 
crop.6 There is a discrepancy between what Congress seemingly 
1  Logan Yonavjak, Industrial Hemp: A Win-Win For The Economy And The 
Environment, Forbes (May 29, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2013/05/29/industrial-hemp-a-win-win-for-the-economy-and-the-environment/2/#67b029736f9a. 
2  See id.
3  Harvest New York, Industrial Hemp From Seed To Market 6 (Cornell University 2017), http://allegany.cce.cornell.edu/resources/industrial-hemp-from-seed-to-market.
4  Market Size: Hemp Industry Sales Grow To $688 Million in 2016, Hemp 
Business Journal (2017), https://www.hempbizjournal.com/market-size-
hemp-industry-sales-grow-to-688-million-in-2016/. 
5  Yonayjak, supra note 1.
6  See H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted),  https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2642/text?overview=closed); 21 C.F.R. § 1308 (1970), 
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/cfr/1308/1308_11.htm. 
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mandated in the 2014 farm bill and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s (“DEA”) interpretation of the language of the 
Controlled Substances Act, a statute from 1970.7 
Under the 2014 Farm Bill, Congress seemingly paved 
the way for industrial hemp to once again be grown in the US, 
as it granted authority for states to create industrial hemp pilot 
programs.8 However, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) of 1970 
still precludes farmers from fully participating in these programs.9 
The DEA claims that it has authority to regulate all species of 
Cannabis sativa under the CSA, and does not distinguish between 
marijuana and industrial hemp.10
In the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill, Congress has the 
opportunity to clarify that the definition of marijuana does not 
include industrial hemp, and by doing so simultaneously clarify 
(and limit) the scope of DEA’s authority. In order for farmers, 
processors, and retailers to move forward, Congress must take this 
action, and, therefore, restrict DEA’s jurisdiction to marijuana. 
This is the only path forward for a thriving industrial hemp 
industry in the US.
II.  Background 
For context, there has been an increasing demand for 
industrial hemp products in recent years11. However, industrial 
hemp is not a new crop in the US. From the 1800s through the 
early 1900s it was grown widely, and was used in a variety of 
everyday products such as fabrics, twine, and paper.12 During 
7  See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.
8  Renee Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., Hemp as Agricultural Commodity 1 (2017).
9  Id. 
10  Id. at 18.
11  Market Size: Hemp Industry Sales Grow to 688 Million in 2016, Hemp Bus. J., 
https://www.hempbizjournal.com/market-size-hemp-industry-sales-grow-to-
688-million-in-2016/  (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Hemp Industry 
Sales Grow]. 
12  Johnson, supra note 8, at 11.
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this time period, it was treated the same as other commonly 
grown crops.13 For example, the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) published crop reports, compiled statistics, 
and provided assistance to hemp producers with production and 
distribution.14 
Peak production of industrial hemp in the US was about 
1943, when approximately 150 million pounds were produced.15 
Due to a combination of changes in both the law and societal 
attitudes,16 production dropped after this time, until 1958 when 
the last known crop of industrial hemp was grown in the US.17 
As stated earlier, though, there is a resurgence of interest in 
this crop.18 Market growth in the retail sector is increasing, which 
means increased opportunities for producers, manufacturers, and 
retailers.19 However, industry growth is hampered by the current 
confusing and conflicted state of the law. 
III.  State of the Law – Historical 
The heart of the problem is how industrial hemp is defined 
– and who is defining it. In order to understand the present day 
complexities of the law, it is important to understand the historical 
context. 
As stated above, up until the mid-1900s, industrial 
hemp was commonly grown in the US.20 In 1937, Congress 
passed the Marijuana Tax Act. 21 This was the first legislative 
attempt to regulate marijuana in the US, and came about, in 
part, because of shifting societal attitudes regarding drugs and 
drug use.22 Although it did not prohibit production outright, it 
13  Id.
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 12.  
16  Id.
17  Johnson, supra note 8, at 12.
18  See Hemp Industry Sales Grow, supra note 11.
19  Id.
20  Johnson, supra note 8, at 12.
21  Id. 
22  Id. at 11-12.
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did make production much more difficult.23 The Marijuana Tax 
Act prohibited individual possession and sale of marijuana.24 
It permitted medicinal use, but under this law it became highly 
regulated.25 In addition to requiring extensive documentation, 
it also imposed a tax if marijuana was bought, sold, imported, 
cultivated, or prescribed.26 
It is very important to note that the Marijuana Tax Act 
specifically regulated marijuana.27 It recognized a distinction 
between marijuana and industrial hemp, and it did not prohibit 
the production of industrial hemp.28 In fact, during World War II, 
the federal government encouraged production of hemp for fiber 
and oil.29 
In 1970, there was a significant shift in the law when 
the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) was passed.30 Under 
the CSA, certain plants and drugs were placed under federal 
jurisdiction.31 Specifically, the DEA was given jurisdiction over 
Cannabis sativa.32 The critical piece here – and what has created 
complexities through the present day – is that the CSA does not 
specifically distinguish between marijuana and industrial hemp.33 
The impact of not distinguishing between these two varieties is 
what causes the most issues for producers, manufacturers, and 
retailers today.34 
Under the CSA, drugs are placed into what is known as 
“schedules” based on a combination of acceptable medical use 
23  Id.
24  Id.
25  Johnson, supra note 8, at 12
26  Id.
27  Id.
28  Id.
29  Id.
30  Johnson, supra note 8, at 12
31  See id.
32  See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-513 
33  Johnson, supra note 8, at 32
34  Id. at 31-32.
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and abuse potential.35 Marijuana has been identified as a Schedule 
I drug,36 which means that it is considered to be in the tier with the 
most dangerous drugs, and has a high potential for abuse and no 
currently accepted medical use.37 Technically, the CSA does not 
prohibit the production of industrial hemp outright, but it does 
implement strict controls.38 For example, if one were to import or 
grow cannabis seed, one must register with the DEA and obtain a 
permit to do so.39 
Notably, the CSA states that “[t]he term ‘marihuana’ 
means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing 
or not; the seeds thereof;…and every compound, manufacture, 
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds 
or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such 
plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the 
seeds of such plant…or the sterilized seed of such plant which 
is incapable of germination” (emphasis added).40
The language in the above definition is not clear and has 
led to arguments about whether industrial hemp is excluded. If 
this were the case, then it leads to the conclusion that marijuana 
is regulated by the DEA, but that industrial hemp is not. For 
example, hulled hemp seeds, or hemp seed hearts, are sold as a 
food product.41 Hemp seed in this form is considered to be non-
viable, or incapable of germination.42  Because it cannot germinate, 
one might argue that it fits into the exemption of the definition of 
marijuana above. However, the DEA maintains that the definition 
in the CSA includes all categories of Cannabis sativa, which they 
35  Drug Scheduling, Drug Enf’t Admin., https://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml. (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
36  21 U.S.C. §812(c)(10) (2012). 
37  21 U.S.C. §812(b).
38  Johnson, supra note 8, at 12
39  Id. at 17.
40  21 U.S.C. § 802(16).
41  See Hemp Seed Hearts, Organic, NOW Health, https://www.nowfoods.com/natural-foods/hemp-seed-hearts-organic (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
42  Hulled Hemp Seeds, Hempseed.Ca, http://www.hempseed.ca/hulled-hemp-seed/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
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argue gives them jurisdiction to regulate industrial hemp.43  
IV.  State of the Law – Present Day 
As mentioned above, the DEA has been acting under the 
presumption that industrial hemp and marijuana are essentially 
the same, and that they have authority to regulate both. The 
reason that the scope of DEA’s authority is now coming under 
increased scrutiny is because of a provision in the 2014 Farm 
Bill. Under §7606, Congress specifically granted authority to 
universities and state departments of agriculture to grow or 
cultivate industrial hemp if it is done for the purposes of research 
under an agricultural pilot program.44 These pilot programs can 
be developed to study the growth, cultivation, or marketing of 
industrial hemp.45 The details for how the pilot programs are run is 
left up to the individual states, as the law gives states the authority 
to enact regulations in this area.46 The statute does specify that 
such programs may only be created in states that allow industrial 
hemp to be grown.47 
What is particularly significant about this provision in 
the farm bill is the definition of industrial hemp that is provided. 
Under this statute industrial hemp, for the purposes of these state 
pilot programs, is defined as any part of the Cannabis sativa L. 
plant, whether the plant is growing or not, as long as the THC 
concentration is 0.3% or below.48 
In and of itself, this provides a clear distinction between 
what is to be considered marijuana – THC concentration above 
0.3%, and industrial hemp – THC concentration of 0.3% or 
43  Notice, Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, 81 Fed. Reg. 156, 
53,395, 53,395-53,396 (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2016/08/12/2016-19146/statement-of-principles-on-industrial-hemp [hereinafter Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp].
44  State Industrial Hemp Statutes, Nat’ Conference of State Legislatures (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/agriculture-and-rural-development/state-industrial-hemp-statutes.aspx. 
45  H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted). 
46  Id.
47  See id.
48  Id.
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below.49 However, this law does not exist on its own, but rather 
co-exists with, and has the same legal weight as, the CSA.50 And 
so it creates the appearance of a misalignment or conflict between 
these two laws. 
What Congress failed to do when enacting this law was 
to specifically amend the definition of marijuana under the CSA 
to exclude industrial hemp. Instead of creating a straightforward 
path for those who want to produce or process industrial hemp, in 
reality, it has created confusion and uncertainty. While states have 
autonomy, to a certain extent, to create their own industrial hemp 
programs,51 the DEA continues to define industrial hemp in such 
a way as to be within their jurisdiction. 
This creates some unusual results. First, it means that 
not all producers are able to participate in this market. It only 
provides opportunities for producers who live in states that have 
since created industrial hemp pilot programs.52 For those who 
do live in states with pilot programs, they are still subject to 
restrictions within those programs.53 For example, most programs 
require some type of licensure for producers and manufacturers, 
and producers may be required to supply certain data to the state 
programs.54 
There are additional limitations to growing industrial hemp 
that do not exist with other crops. If one wants to grow industrial 
hemp under a state pilot project, one is still required to register 
with DEA, because it is considered to be a Schedule I drug.55 This 
creates the odd reality for farmers of having to register with the 
49  Johnson, supra note 8, at 1-2.
50  H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted).
51  Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, supra note 43, at 53,395.
52  State Industrial Hemp Statutes, supra note 44. As of the time of this writing, at 
least 34 states had passed legislation related to industrial hemp. Id. 
53  See id. Specific requirements vary by state; details of individual state programs are beyond the scope of this essay. Id.
54  See id.
55  See State Industrial Hemp Statutes, supra note 44. Under some state programs, 
the state department of agriculture will be the entity that registers with the DEA. Id. 
For example, this is the case under the state industrial hemp pilot program in North 
Carolina. See e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-568.53(1).
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DEA to grow a crop that is seemingly legal. There are few other 
crops that require producers to jump through as many regulatory 
hoops in order to obtain seed and be permitted to grow them. 
It has also created complications for farmers who want to 
purchase seed to plant industrial hemp. Under the CSA, industrial 
hemp plants and seeds cannot be transported across state lines; 
this applies to driving the seed or plants across state lines, as 
well as mailing or shipping seed.56 So, for example, if a producer 
lives in a state with a pilot program such as North Carolina and 
wants to purchase seed from Colorado (also a state with a pilot 
program), and is stopped in a state in between, the producer could 
potentially be charged with possession of a controlled substance 
under criminal law.57 
The result is potential fines and/or a prison sentence under 
both state and federal law.58 This seems like a harsh result for a 
producer who is trying to obtain seed to plant a crop.59 
In August of 2016 the DEA, USDA and Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) issued the Statement of Principles on 
Industrial Hemp in an attempt to clarify the positions of the three 
federal regulatory agencies that are most involved in regulating 
industrial hemp.60 The purpose was to inform the public so that 
people could participate in state pilot programs and still be in 
compliance with federal law.61 
Notably, the guidance document specifically states that 
“Section 7606 did not remove industrial hemp from the controlled 
substances list. Therefore, Federal law continues to restrict hemp-
56  21 U.S.C. § 822
57  See id.
58  See Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., Drug Offenses: Maximum Fines and 
Terms of Imprisonment for Violation of the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act and Related Laws i, 8, n. 25 (2015)
59  See e.g., Hemp seeds bound for Colorado seized at U.S.-Canada border, CBS News 
(June 19, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hemp-seeds-bound-for-colorado-
seized-at-u-s-canada-border/ (demonstrating instances when the DEA has tried to 
block the sale of industrial hemp seed). In response, Congress passed an appropriation 
law that restricted federal agencies, including the DEA, from interfering in activities 
that are permitted under the 2014 Farm Bill. Johnson, supra note 8, at 1. 
60  Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, supra note 43, at 53,395.
61  Id.
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related activities, to the extent that those activities have not been 
legalized under section 7606.”62 In addition, it also explains that 
the provision in the farm bill “did not eliminate the requirement 
under the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act that 
the importation of viable cannabis seeds must be carried out by 
person registered with the DEA to do so.”63
Perhaps most telling was the statement that section 
7606 of the farm bill “left open many questions regarding the 
continuing application of Federal drug control statutes to the 
growth, cultivation, manufacture, and distribution of industrial 
hemp products, as well as the extent to which growth by private 
parties and sale of industrial hemp products are permissible.”64
Indeed, the farm bill did seem to open many questions, as 
discussed above. Unfortunately, the Statement of Principles did 
not do much to resolve them. We are still left in a reality in which 
a crop is seemingly legal, yet is hampered by the restrictions 
placed upon it by criminal drug laws. 
The DEA has taken actions that seem to be at odds 
with the language and intent of section 7606. For example, in 
December of 2016, the DEA published a final rule stating that a 
new drug code would be used for extracts of marihuana.65 The 
term “marihuana extract” is defined as “an extract containing one 
or more cannabinoids that has been derived from any plant of the 
genus Cannabis…”66 The agency stated that these extracts would 
remain listed as Schedule I drugs, and that anyone who handled 
them would be required to register with the DEA accordingly.67 
This is notable because it would impact a significant portion of 
the industrial hemp industry that is focused on producing and/
or retailing cannabidiol (“CBD”).68 CBD is a non-psychoactive 
62  Id.
63  Johnson, supra note 8, at 35.
64  Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, supra note 43, at 53,395. 
65  Establishment of a New Drug Code for Marihuana Extract, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,194, 
90,194 (Dec. 14, 2016) (to be codified 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308). 
66  Id.
67  Id. at 90,195-90,196.
68  Id. at 90,195.
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compound that can be derived from industrial hemp, and can be 
used as a dietary supplement.69 The DEA’s rule stating that these 
extracts would fall under their jurisdiction and be classified as 
Schedule I drugs seemed to contradict the farm bill provision. 
Although the agency did provide further clarification in March 
of 2017,70 this situation is evidence of the need for greater 
clarification across the board about the DEA’s role in regulating 
industrial hemp and hemp products.71 
V.  Next Steps 
The current legal status of industrial hemp leaves the 
industry in limbo. Congress has the authority to remedy this. 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach is to provide a fix in 
the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill. First, Congress can expressly state 
that the industrial hemp pilot programs are permanent. Section 
7606 on its face does not seem to sunset;72 however, there is also 
no express language stating that it is a permanent program. In 
fact, the language specifically refers to the state programs as being 
“pilot programs”, seemingly indicating a non-permanent nature.73 
 In addition, Congress can specifically clarify and amend 
the definition of marijuana under the CSA to exclude industrial 
hemp. This would have the effect of clearing up any current 
discrepancies between the language of the current farm bill and 
DEA’s interpretation of the language of the CSA. In so doing, 
Congress could take the additional step of clarifying the scope of 
69  Renee Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., Potential Use of Industrial Hemp 
in Cannabidiol Products 1 (2016), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/assets/crs/IF10391.pdf.  
70  Clarification of the New Drug Code (7350) for Marijuana Extract, Diversion 
Control Div. Of The U.S. Dep’t Of Justice (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.deadiversion.
usdoj.gov/schedules/marijuana/index.html. 
71  See Larry K. Houck & Riëtte van Laack, Hemp Industries Association Seeks 
Contempt Against DEA; Alleges Violation of 2004 Hemp Order, Hyman, Phelps & 
McNamara, P.C.: FDA L. Blog (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2017/02/
hemp-industries-association-seeks-contempt-against-dea-alleges-violation-of-2004-
hemp-order/; see Colleen Keahey, Hemp Industries Association Sues DEA Over 
Illegal Attempt to Regulate Hemp Foods as Schedule I Drugs, Hemp Industries 
Association (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.thehia.org/HIAhemppressreleases/4594319. 
72  See H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted).
73  Johnson, supra note 8, at 13-14.
22 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol. 14
DEA’s authority by drawing a bright line between marijuana and 
industrial hemp. 
To go one step further, after removing the regulation 
of industrial hemp from the DEA’s authority, Congress could 
expressly preempt this area of law. This would eliminate the state 
programs altogether and level the playing field by permitting all 
producers and processors the opportunity to enter this market if 
they choose, regardless of what state they reside in. 
Congress could also choose to pass separate, freestanding 
legislation that would essentially serve the same function as 
above. Such legislation has been introduced, but so far has not 
been passed into law. For example, the Industrial Hemp Farming 
Act was introduced in the House of Representatives in July of 
2017.74 The purpose of the bill was to amend the CSA to exclude 
industrial hemp from the term marihuana.75 
VI.  Conclusion 
Congress provided the opportunity for states to create 
industrial hemp pilot programs in the last farm bill. This 
demonstrates a clear intent to have industrial hemp be a legitimate, 
legal crop. And societal norms seem to have shifted in favor 
of allowing this crop to be grown for food and other uses, as is 
evidenced by the steadily increasing market in industrial hemp. 
However, the current state of the law creates confusion about 
the legality of industrial hemp and leaves a potentially profitable 
industry in limbo. It is understandably difficult for potential 
producers and manufacturers to engage in this industry under the 
current state of the law. Congress took a step in the right direction 
by allowing for the industrial hemp pilot programs and providing 
a means (although still limiting) for states to move forward. Now 
Congress must take the next step and remove the remaining legal 
and regulatory obstacles so that producers, manufactures and 
retailers can move forward confidently with their businesses. The 
74  Industrial Hemp Farming Act of 2017, H.R. 3530, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.
congress.gov/115/bills/hr3530/BILLS-115hr3530ih.pdf. 
75  Id. 
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next step is not necessarily complicated, but it is one that Congress 
needs to take action on. It is time to remove any ambiguity and 
move forward. 
Building Indian Country’s Future through Food, Agriculture, 
Infrastructure, and Economic Development in the 2018 Farm 
Bill
By Janie Simms Hipp,* Colby D. Duren,** and Erin Parker*** 
Introduction
Agriculture is, and has always been, important to 
Indian Country. According to the data collected by the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (“NASS”) for the most recent 
Census of Agriculture, there are over 71,9471 American Indian 
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and Alaska Native (“AIAN”) Farmers and Ranchers,2 working 
on more than 57 million acres of land, with a market value of 
products producing reaching over $3.3 billion—including $1.4 
billion in crops and $1.8 billion in livestock and poultry.3 Indian 
Country operations are twice the size of non-Native operations, 
but with half the income and involvement in federal farm security 
programs.4 These numbers tell us not only what contributions 
Indian Country already makes to American agriculture, but also 
speak to the potential for future opportunities if current operations 
were expanded, and contemporary federal policy adjusted in a 
way that facilitates Tribes and individual AIAN operators to more 
fully take advantage of U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) 
programming. Food and agriculture production could be a huge 
economic driver for Tribes, the entirety of Indian Country, and 
the rural communities in which their communities are found. 
Production could equal the revenue generated by gaming and 
create opportunities for Tribes that will never benefit from gaming 
because of their isolated location. 
In order to realize this potential, we must re-calibrate 
USDA programs to capitalize on current successes in Indian 
Country agriculture and agribusiness and expand those 
opportunities throughout Indian Country, including feeding the 
people living in our most rural and remote places. Agriculture and 
agribusiness can create jobs and stabilize economies for Native 
in Agricultural & Food Law from the University of Arkansas.
1 U.S. Dept. of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture: United States Summary 
and State Data Volume 1, Geographic Area Series, Part 51 65 (2014), https://
www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/
usv1.pdf.
2  Experts in this area suggest the total number of AIAN operators is undercounted 
by as much as half; focused attention and outreach in Tribal communities results in 
more accurate reporting. See William Iwig et al., Multi-Cultural Outreach to Ethnic 
Farmers for the 2007 Census of Agriculture, U.S. Dept. of Agric., https://unstats.
un.org/unsd/statcom/statcom_09/seminars/innovation/Innovation%20Seminar/USA-
AgriCensus-Abstract.pdf.  
3  U.S. Dept. of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Highlights: American 
Indian Farmers 1 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_
Resources/Highlights/American_Indian_Farmers/Highlights_American_Indian_
Farmers.pdf. 
4  See id. 
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people who have deep connections to the land on which they live, 
to farming and ranching, and to the foods they produce every day. 
In addition, Tribal governments and Tribal communities have 
always been and are continuing to be the providers of essential 
governmental services in countless rural, remote, and isolated 
communities throughout the United States. 
This essay focuses on several key provisions and themes 
that could have the greatest impact to support and grow agriculture 
and agribusiness in Indian Country if implemented in the 2018 
Farm Bill reauthorization. 
 
Acknowledgement and Parity for Tribal 
Governments Throughout the Farm Bill
One of the most substantial steps forward that can be 
taken in the 2018 Farm Bill is for Congress to permanently 
acknowledge the status and role of Tribal governments and Tribal 
Departments of Agriculture in setting and shaping agricultural 
policy. Similar to their State counterparts, Tribal Departments 
of Agriculture are created by their Tribal governments and are 
charged with administration of agriculture and food systems, 
yet Tribal Departments of Agriculture have not been recognized 
in the law with the clear authority to interface with all agencies 
within USDA and the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs at 
USDA. Recognizing Tribal governments, Tribal Departments 
of Agriculture, and Tribal law in the same manner as similar 
authorities defer to States, State Departments of Agriculture, and 
State law is a critical step towards improving USDA program 
delivery throughout Indian Country. This simple action would 
fully realize the existing trust responsibility and treaty obligations 
the federal government has to Tribal Nations, and would support 
the self-governance and self-determination that stabilize Tribal 
communities and accelerate the ability of Tribes to meet their 
economic, food, infrastructure, and health needs. 
Most USDA programs have not begun to be seriously 
utilized by Tribes because, for the most part, the acknowledgement 
of Tribal governmental authority has not been clearly embraced 
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by USDA.  Including “Tribal governments” in the existing 
intergovernmental approaches, through which many of the USDA 
programs are delivered, will acknowledge Tribal governments’ 
inherent sovereignty and importance to rural America and will 
expand the reach of programs, create jobs, and build more food 
businesses in Indian Country. 
 
Tribal Government Management of All Nutrition and 
Food Assistance Programs
In this Farm Bill, Congress must allow Tribal governments 
to directly manage all federal nutrition and food assistance 
programs, especially the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (“SNAP”), and improve the ability for Tribes to 
manage and include traditional and Native grown foods in the 
Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (“FDPIR”) 
food packages. Tribal governments are best positioned to serve 
food insecure citizens within their own communities making 
direct communication, outreach, nutrition education, and feeding 
program delivery more streamlined. Not only can this lead to 
greater program efficiency and customer service, it can also 
present Tribes with the opportunity to tailor these programs to 
suit their communities and build more robust food systems. 
Tribal citizens have high usage rates of all federal feeding 
and nutrition programs. In some rural and remote reservation 
communities, nearly 25 percent of all community citizens are taking 
part in the feeding programs,5 and in other communities those 
numbers can climb as high as 60 to 80 percent.6 These participation 
rates remain high because of the relative unemployment rates of 
individuals in the communities that are directly caused by the 
lack of employment options,7 poor transportation to jobs and food 
5  U.S. Dept. of Agric. Food and Nutrition Serv., Addressing Child Hunger 
and Obesity in Indian Country: Report to Congress Summary 1 (2012), https://
fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/IndianCountrySum.pdf. 
6  Native Farm Bill Coalition, December 18, 2017 Webinar, Seeds of Health (Dec. 18, 
2017), http://seedsofnativehealth.org/webinars/. 
7  Kenneth Finegold et al., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Background Report on the 
Use and Impact of Food Assistance Programs on Indian Reservations 1 (2005), 
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sources/retail facilities,8 the age and population characteristics 
of the individuals in the communities, and the prevalence of 
chronic health problems, among other issues.9 Because the rate of 
obesity, diabetes, chronic heart diseases, cancer, and rated health 
problems is so high in so many communities in Indian Country,10 
participation rates in the feeding programs, when coupled with the 
prevalence of persistent poverty, create a fragile system of food 
security and food access across Indian Country. Yet, most feeding 
program participants live on the lands that could feed them, but, 
instead, grow foods that are destined for far away markets.  
A consistent, comprehensive, and Tribal government-led 
approach tailored to the needs of Indian Country is paramount. 
Linking or “coupling” the feeding programs to the food production 
that occurs on Tribal lands will do two things simultaneously. 
First, it will ensure that, over time, the use of feeding programs 
in Indian Country could decline, and, in some regions, could 
disappear altogether because of the ability to link with local food 
production to meet the needs of tribal communities. Second, it will 
ensure that food produced on Indian lands are focused on three 
simultaneous goals: (1) retaining enough food products that Tribal 
citizens will be fed by food produced locally or regionally; (2) 
ensuring that fresher foods are available to Tribal citizens needing 
access to feeding programs; and (3) ensuring the stabilization of 
food businesses because the foods are being used to feed people 
who lack food access and, at the same time, offering a consistent, 
albeit federal, market or anchor contract that gives food producers 
the economic stability to continue access to additional markets off 
tribal lands.
However, key issues remain that are critical to the future 
of the feeding programs, and how those programs are delivered 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42906/411133-Background-
Report-on-the-Use-and-Impact-of-Food-Assistance-Programs-on-Indian-
Reservations.PDF. 
8  Id. at 10.
9  Id. at 9.
10  Id. at 14.
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to or serve Indian Country citizens and these must be addressed 
in the 2018 Farm Bill.  In a report authorized by the 2014 Farm 
Bill, USDA reviewed the feasibility of Tribal administration of 
federal food assistance programs. Nearly all Tribes participating 
and more than 90 percent of all respondents expressed interest in 
administering federal nutrition assistance programs as an exercise 
of sovereignty and to provide direct service to Tribal citizens in 
need of assistance.11 These respondents felt the ability to provide 
flexibility in the management of nutritional quality of the food 
provided and culturally appropriate programming and service 
delivery were also critical.12
While there are many additional infrastructure needs 
identified to achieve these interrelated goals of management of 
feeding programs, the report states that USDA, and its Food and 
Nutrition Service (“FNS”), does not have the requisite “638-
like authority” that explicitly provides Congressional support 
for executing contracts between federal agencies and Tribes to 
coordinate the management of specific federal programs.13 This 
can be achieved by introducing legislative language modeled 
after the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638,14 as amended, or by providing treatment 
as a state/parity for Tribes to manage these programs in the Farm 
Bill. 
Tribal governments must directly manage all the nutrition 
and feeding programs, because they are best able to ensure that 
food security needs in their reservation, rural, and very remote 
communities are met. They are also more capable of directly 
linking agribusiness food production to the long-term vision of 
removing people from feeding program participation and into 
11  Garasky, Steven et al., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., 
Feasibility of Tribal Administration of Federal Nutrition Assistance 
Programs – Final Report 68 (2016) https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/TribalAdministration.pdf. 
12  Id. at vii.
13  See id. at 52, n. 68.
14  See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
93-638 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2012)).
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the local job market, which can and should include a strong and 
viable agribusiness economic development approach. For Tribal 
governments, marrying the food security needs of the people with 
food job opportunities at the Tribal level promotes both enhanced 
food security and economic diversification in Indian Country.
 
Improve Credit Access in Indian Country and 
Support Authority for Farm Service Agency and the Farm 
Credit System
Due to the capital-intense nature of farming, ranching, 
and agribusiness in general, many titles have long been important 
parts of the Farm Bill, including: credit, commodity, conservation, 
and crop insurance. Farming, ranching, and agribusiness are high-
risk enterprises, and are linked to production systems that have 
unique regulatory requirements and challenges. Good times for 
agriculture can very quickly be followed by bad times. Having 
access to a lending entity willing to understand these financial 
realities is critical. During turbulent times, Indian Country is 
always hit as hard or harder than most other areas of the country, 
because of the remote and isolated nature of our farms, ranches, 
and agribusinesses and the reality that in most reservation 
communities a “credit desert” exists alongside food deserts.
 First, our important partners in lending in rural areas, like 
those in the Farm Credit System (“FCS”), must have no questions 
concerning their authority to lend in Indian Country. Due to the 
nature of landholding and land ownership in Indian Country, 
which is a matter controlled by federal law, some clarification of 
the authority to lend is to help provide additional certainty for the 
FCS in lending within Indian Country. Tribal governments, tribal 
producers, and groups of producers must often organize their 
business engagement in ways not required of non-Tribal entities 
and governments due to unique issues associated with federal 
Indian law; making sure that they are able to borrow under FCS 
laws and regulations is important.
Additionally, the improvements the Farm Service Agency 
(“FSA”) has made in the extension of credit to farmers and 
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ranchers in Indian Country in the post-Keepseagle era must 
continue, but separate programs that allow for unique training 
and technical assistance concerning financial issues and loan 
servicing for tribal producers must also be considered. Access to 
credit through FSA and Rural Development (“RD”) must not be 
hampered by outdated program rules that do not match our credit 
needs. Further, we must make sure that the program officers at 
RD and FSA have deep awareness of the way in which Tribal 
governments, Tribal agribusinesses, and Tribal producers do 
business, and ensure they are not constrained by an additional 
regulatory burden nor shut out of lending opportunities available 
to all producers.
Many smaller or beginning producers who are not yet 
ready for FSA or FCS lending relationships utilize the services 
of local, smaller retail banking entities, community development 
financial institutions (or “CDFI”s), credit unions, or use other 
means of acquiring needed capital. Native CDFIs must be 
included in all FSA and Rural Development lending authorities 
in order to leverage access to credit for Indian Country producers 
and Tribal governments. Ensuring that Native-owned banks can 
easily interface with FSA, RD, and FCS lending institutions on 
agribusiness and agriculture infrastructure business opportunities 
will further support credit access and economic growth in Indian 
Country.
 
Ensure the Commodity, Conservation, Forestry, and 
Crop Insurance Farm Bill Titles Support Indian Country 
and Native Producers
The Commodity, Conservation, and Crop Insurance 
Titles of the Farm Bill all work together to provide not only 
farm security for producers, they also support the health of our 
Tribal lands. These programs must be updated to consider the 
unique jurisdictional and agribusiness/product needs of Tribal 
governments and Tribal producers.
First and foremost, many Tribal governments and 
Tribal farming, ranching, and food businesses produce covered 
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commodity crops of wheat, corn, and soybeans, and are deeply 
engaged in livestock operations impacted by the Commodity 
Title. We must ensure equitable access to these programs for 
Tribal producers, including ensuring federal or Tribally chartered 
corporations, especially those created under Tribal law, Section 
17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,15 or Section 3 of the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936,16 are explicitly eligible for 
programs such as the commodity disaster assistance programs. 
Additionally, the definition of “livestock” must be amended to 
include commonly raised livestock like “reindeer,” “caribou,” 
“elk,” “horses,” or other animals raised or harvested in Tribal 
communities. All of these animals must be recognized as livestock 
and their owners must be eligible for full protection and program 
participation Department-wide. 
Since the Conservation Title programs are often the 
gateway to participate in other USDA programs, it is vital that 
Tribal governments and producers can access all program 
authorities and funding. Wherever there is a reference to “state”, 
“local”, or “regional” agricultural producers, the term “tribal” 
should be inserted into that section to ensure that any inadvertent 
failure to list Tribal governments, Tribal producers, or Tribal 
organizations does not preclude them from participating or relegate 
them to a lesser importance or priority within the relevant section. 
This also includes making sure any reference to “state law” in the 
Conservation Title says “state law or tribal law” to acknowledge 
the conservation laws and codes our Tribal governments pass and 
enforce each day with regard to the lands over which they have 
jurisdiction. This change also needs to be extended to the Forestry 
Title programs, especially by adding “Tribes” to title of the State 
and Private Forestry program, and including Tribes explicitly in 
the Good Neighbor Authority” cooperative agreement program. 
Further, the Farm Bill must allow for greater Tribal participation 
15   Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 988, Sec. 17 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5124 (2012)).
16  Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967, Sec. 3 (1936) (codified 
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5203 (2012)).
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in Tribal Forest Protection Act of 200417 (“TFPA”) projects by 
authorizing the application of “638” contracting authority to 
TFPA projects on Forest Service lands at USDA or Bureau of 
Land Management lands at the U.S. Department of the Interior.
Crop insurance is an important tool of risk management 
and the products in place now must be examined to ensure 
they are suitable for Tribal food production systems. The Risk 
Management Agency (“RMA”) must conduct a study to ascertain 
the efficacy and applicability of the current crop insurance 
products as they relate to Indian Country agriculture production. 
If that study reveals that either the specific crop insurance products 
or the general guidance documents of RMA do not adequately 
consider unique tribal production issues, a separate administrative 
guidance or notice should be issued to solve these concerns, and 
RMA should pursue unique crop insurance products and crop 
insurance administration systems. The goal must be to increase 
the utilization and remove any inadvertent barriers to access crop 
insurance products in Indian Country. Finally, USDA must engage 
Native-owned insurance companies and Native CDFIs and other 
entities to encourage the offering of crop insurance products in 
Indian Country. While many Tribes and Tribal producers maintain 
crop insurance, the current crop insurance research, product 
development, and policy sales areas are not developed for, and do 
not adequately reach, Tribal producers. 
 
Apply the Substantially Underserved Trust Area 
designation to all Rural Development and USDA Funding 
Authorities
The Substantially Underserved Trust Area (“SUTA”) 
designation authorized by the 2008 Farm Bill18 helps USDA’s 
Rural Utility Service (“RUS”) offer low interest rates; waive non-
duplication, matching, and credit support requirements; extend 
17  Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 Pub. L. No. 108-278 (2004) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 3115a (2012)).
18  See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 
1196. 
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loan repayment terms; and provide the highest funding priority 
for SUTA projects.19 Currently, SUTA is only applied to a small 
segment of utilities infrastructure programs,20 but more explicit 
instruction must be provided to allow the Secretary to exercise 
this discretion more broadly.
 This change will help ensure more equitable access to 
Rural Development (“RD”) programs and authorities in these 
substantially underserved areas, and can be used to provide much-
needed support to Tribal citizens operating businesses and living in 
rural communities. The change would, among other things, allow 
the waiver of matching requirements for projects funded through 
RD, which can be a significant barrier to applicant participation 
in RD business and infrastructure projects where remoteness 
and related lack of tax base is a problem. In the determination 
of eligibility and repayment ability, local school district social 
demographics should be utilized instead of county-wide data. 
A broader application of SUTA will recognize the unique and 
essential Tribal infrastructure needs and will help build rural 
America, as many tribal governments are the backbone of the 
rural infrastructure now and those trends appear to be unrelenting.
Establish a Permanent Rural Development Tribal 
Technical Service and Assistance Office
In additional to the SUTA provision above, establishing 
a permanent office providing technical service and assistance 
across all RD funding authorities, via a cooperative agreement 
with USDA, would help with two major issues of access to RD 
programs in Indian Country. First, the complexities of lending 
and infrastructure establishment in Indian Country--tied to 
the nature of the trust land base--call for the establishment of 
such an office that can prepare and monitor lessons learned, 
19  Substantially Underserved Trust Area (SUTA): Overview, U.S. Dept. of Agric., 
https://www.rd.usda.gov/about-rd/initiatives/substantially-underserved-trust-area-
suta (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
20  Native Farm Bill Coalition, Indian Country Priorities and Opportunities 
Title VI: Rural Development 2 (2017), http://seedsofnativehealth.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/Title-VI-Rural-Development.pdf. 
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establish user-friendly application systems, and assist staff at 
the tribal or business level in preparing applications. This is a 
function the federal government cannot readily undertake. Such 
assistance would also provide needed insight to federal staff in 
the ongoing execution of their roles by providing a single point-
of-contact for all concerned. Second, the trust responsibility of 
the federal government to tribes supports the need to establish 
such assistance interventions. This would model some current 
RD practices, particularly in the infrastructure arena, where field 
staff assist agency staff and the applicant in analyzing financial 
viability, key engineering specifications, and related technical 
requirements for more complex infrastructure projects. 
Equal Access to Research, Education, and Extension 
Funding for Tribal Colleges and Universities and the 
Federally Recognized Tribes Extension Program
All entities working within research, extension, and 
education in Indian Country, including Tribal Colleges and 
Universities (“TCU”s) and the Federally Recognized Tribes 
Extension Program (“FRTEP”) must have the same access to 
research, education, and extension funding as all other entities. 
Further, FRTEP must maintain its unique program authorities and 
be protected from over-subscription by those who have access 
to other program funding like the 1862, 1890, and 1994 land-
grant institutions and TCUs.  FRTEP was created by Congress to 
address the needs of those Tribes not served by Tribal colleges.21 
The funding for both extension for TCUs and FRTEP is very 
low.22 Entities serving Indian Country must be entitled to the 
same level of eligibility and access to National Institute of Food 
and Agriculture (“NIFA”) funding as all other entities. Educating 
the next generation of producers, scientists, technical specialists, 
21  See Federally-Recognized Tribes Extension Program, Nat’l Inst. of Food and 
Agric.,  https://nifa.usda.gov/program/federally-recognized-tribes-extension-grant-
program (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
22  See Native Farm Bill Coalition, Indian Country and Opportunities for the 
2018 Farm Bill, Title VII: Research 2 (2017), http://seedsofnativehealth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Title-VII-Research.pdf. 
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business managers, engineers, lawyers, and related professionals 
who advise and support the agriculture and food sectors is 
vital and making sure that Native youth aspire to those career 
paths is important to the survival of Tribal communities and to 
creating viable occupations that support food and agriculture 
sectors in Indian Country. We are in an intergenerational shift in 
agriculture.23 and Indian Country is no different. Our farmers are 
older and our young people are hungry for a meaningful career. 
With 12,000 Native students in FFA as of 2016,24 we know many 
AIAN young people want that career to be in agriculture. 
Agriculture research, education, and extension programs 
are critical to our food, health, and self-sufficiency. Agriculture 
research is important because it monitors and explores old and 
new knowledge regarding plant and animal health, explores 
the impact of science to solve food problems, tackles societal 
issues related to health, and ensures our food supplies are sound 
and resilient.  Accessing research, building our own research 
systems within TCUs, and supporting educational institutions 
and faculty within Tribal communities is essential to stabilizing 
agriculture production and communities. Focusing on the 
importance of traditional knowledge and exploring its use in 
modern communities is best done at Tribal-owned and managed 
institutions. Extending knowledge and research outcomes into 
communities and onto tribal farms, ranches, and food businesses 
is critical to their growth and stabilization.
We must address these issues in a thoughtful and 
comprehensive manner; however, FRTEP cannot be opened up 
in such a way that it becomes available to larger institutions with 
no relationship to Tribes and Tribal communities and that already 
have access to thirty thousand students or more and billion-
23  See Jennifer Mitchell, A Young Generation Sees Greener Pastures in Agriculture, 
NPR (Jan. 3, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/03/374629580/a-young-generation-
sees-greener-pastures-in-agriculture. 
24  Wayne Maloney, Native American FFA Members Discuss the Future of Agriculture 
with USDA Officials, U.S. Dept. of Agric. (July.23, 2013), https://www.usda.gov/
media/blog/2013/07/23/native-american-ffa-members-discuss-future-agriculture-
usda-officials. 
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dollar endowment funds. FRTEP funding must be returned to a 
process that preserves the programs in place while continuing to 
grow. TCUs have a very low and totally inadequate funding level 
for extension services and research. Even with low funding levels, 
TCUs do an incredibly important job within their communities 
and need to be respected and fully eligible for all of the funding 
authorities within the Research Title of the Farm Bill and research 
programs at USDA. Stabilizing both programs while growing 
both programs should be the goal; pitting programs against one 
another will not improve the situation. Opening the full portfolio 
at NIFA to equitable access for Tribal-serving institutions is 
necessary.  
Finally, we need data. A farmer, rancher, or food business 
has better productivity if they have good records and data access. 
We can use mobile technology in new ways with a new generation 
of farmers and ranchers, but we must make sure Tribes have 
greatly improved access to that technology as well. E-connectivity 
and rural broadband is incredibly important for all rural America 
and for Tribes—this access was among the first recommendations 
made to support prosperity for all rural America by the USDA 
Interagency Task Force of Agriculture and Rural Prosperity.25 
Their report to the President noted that e-connectivity is “a tool 
that enables increased productivity for farms, factories, forests, 
mining, and small businesses.”26 TCUs and FRTEP agents must 
be a part of the technological revolution in farming and ranching 
and agribusiness growth and be afforded access to improved 
research, education, extension funding.
 
Conclusion
The next Farm Bill presents an incredible opportunity 
to address the broad needs of a changing food and agriculture 
sector alongside the needs of our rural and remote communities 
25  U.S. Dept. of Agric., Report to the President of the United States from the 
Task Force on Agriculture and Rural Prosperity 18 (2017), https://www.usda.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/rural-prosperity-report.pdf. 
26  Id. at 17. 
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around the country. To take full advantage of the opportunities 
that Indian Country has in agriculture and agribusiness, as well 
as enhancing food sovereignty and securing the health of our 
people and communities, Tribal governments must be seen as 
equal governmental partners in delivering and accessing Farm 
Bill programs. 
By adjusting, developing, and improving the Farm Bill’s 
programs, we can build upon the great work already happening 
in Tribal communities surrounding food and agriculture. We 
can improve and expand our infrastructure. We can develop our 
Tribal food systems. We can provide the means for our agriculture 
businesses to thrive. We can continue to address and improve the 
health of our people. We can feed our communities in vibrant 
Native food systems with foods raised and grown by Tribal 
people. But equally important, the country can acknowledge 
the role Tribes have always played in our nation’s food security 
and we can now become better partners in food security, food 
production, and the agriculture sector. Improving the Farm Bill 
for Indian Country will help bolster the important work ahead for 
us all. 
A Farm Bill to Help Farmers Weather Climate Change
Peter H. Lehner* and Nathan A. Rosenberg**
Climate change affects farmers and ranchers more than 
almost any other sector. Agriculture depends on consistent 
weather patterns, and the more frequent droughts, floods, heat 
waves, pest attacks, and other impacts of climate change make an 
often uncertain activity even more so. A farm bill that focuses on 
the true long-terms interests of farmers would help producers slow 
climate change, while also helping them better prepare for the 
inevitable coming weather changes. Fortunately, many practices 
that help producers reduce their contribution to climate change 
also enhance their farms’ resilience to higher temperatures and 
more extreme weather. The farm bill should prioritize adoption 
of these climate-friendly practices. It’s time to decarbonize the 
farm bill. 
While this is a radical—or at least politically charged—
idea in the United States, other countries are beginning to treat 
agriculture as a major source of emissions1—and as a major 
pathway for reducing net emissions. Alongside the negotiations 
over the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2016, hundreds 
of countries, regional groups, and others joined in an initiative 
called “4/1000” to increase soil carbon stocks by 0.4 percent 
*  Senior Attorney and Director, Sustainable Food and Farming Program, Earthjustice.
** Adjunct professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. The authors thank 
Thomas Driscoll, Scott Faber, Greg Fogel, Sarah Saylor, and Seth Watkins for their 
helpful comments. The views expressed remain those of the authors alone. 
1  See, e.g., Eva Wollenberg et al., Reducing Emissions from Agriculture to Meet the 
2°C Target, 22 Global Change Biology 3859, 3860 (2016). Under the 2015 Paris 
Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, each 
country sets their own emission targets, while also planning and reporting their 
contribution. Id. So far at least 119 countries have pledged to reduce their agricultural 
greenhouse gas emissions in their statements of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (“INDC”s). Id.
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every year.2 This could be enough to offset about 30 percent of 
global anthropogenic emissions.3 
The measures necessary to increase soil carbon stocks 
would also reduce nonpoint source water pollution and soil erosion, 
while increasing agricultural productivity, soil water carrying 
capacity, and drought resilience.4 With the reauthorization of the 
farm bill every five years, and perhaps as soon as 2018, the U.S. 
has an opportunity to incentivize practices that benefit producers 
as well as society more broadly.  This essay offers suggestions on 
how the farm bill can be reformed to accomplish this. Although 
it’s unlikely the 2018 farm bill will address climate change, it’s 
not too early to lay the foundation for 2023 and beyond. 
Moving beyond the 1938 Farm Bill
The structure and priorities of the farm bill still owe much 
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.5 The 1938 Farm Bill 
compensated farmers for “soil conservation,” but, as observers at 
the time noted, the conservation component was largely a legal 
fiction, intended to ensure that the legislation, which primarily 
benefited large-scale commodity producers,6 passed constitutional 
2  Budiman Minasny, Soil Carbon per 4 Mille, 292 Geoderma 59, 82 (2017).
3  Id.; Contra A.J. VandenBygaart, Letter to the Editor, Comments on Soil Carbon 4 
per Mille, 309 Geoderma 113, 113-14 (2018) (arguing that Minasny et al. overstate soil 
carbon sequestration’s ability to mitigate climate change). 
4  Rattan Lal, Sequestering Carbon in Soils of Agro-Ecosystems, 36 Food Pol’y 
S33, S36 (2011); Rattan Lal, Sequestering Carbon and Increasing Productivity by 
Conservation Agriculture, 70 J. Soil & Water Conservation 55A, 55A, 58A-59A 
(2015). 
5  Wayne D. Rasmussen, New Deal Agricultural Policies after Fifty Years, 68 Minn. 
L. Rev. 353, 358-359 (1984); Douglas R. Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American 
Farmer in the Twentieth Century 151 (2002); Devan A. McGranahan et al., A 
Historical Primer on the US Farm Bill: Supply Management and Conservation Policy, 
68 J. Soil & Water Conservation 67A, 69A (2013).
6  See, e.g., Pete Daniel, Lost Revolutions: The South In the 1950s 41-42 
(Univ. of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press 2000); Charles Kenneth Roberts, 
The Farm Security Administration and Rural Rehabilitation in the South 
ix, 29 (Univ. of Tennessee Press 2015); Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: 
Southern Agriculture 1865-1980 143 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1984) (discussing 
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, which provided the model for the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938). The 1938 law also strengthened the influence 
of the conservative American Farm Bureau Federation. David Brody, On the Failure 
of U.S. Radical Politics: A Farmer-Labor Analysis, 22 Indus. Rel. 156 (1983).
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muster.7 Subsequent farm bills have followed this pattern, using 
conservation as a means to support large-scale, capital-intensive 
agriculture, but rarely treating it as end in itself. This has resulted 
in a farm safety net that places the interests of agribusiness over 
farmers and conservation programs that often do not do enough to 
strengthen the environment or rural communities. 
This history must help guide the decarbonization of the 
farm bill. Some agricultural practices may, in the short-term, help 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but in the long-run shore up 
an industrial model of agriculture that is ultimately less climate-
friendly.8 Moreover, a successful, climate-friendly farm bill would 
not only include programs designed to reduce emissions and 
increase soil health, but it would also work to change the political 
dynamics of farm communities. Without building a robust base of 
support in rural America by targeting benefits at a wide range of 
people—rather than a small group of very large, often corporate 
farms—any climate-friendly programs will soon face co-option 
or dissolution. 
Both the farm safety net and conservation programs must 
be designed with these long-term goals in mind. Some proposals 
to make conservation and research programs more “flexible” and 
financially secure by increasing the private sector’s involvement,9 
7  Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy 129 (3d ed. 1977); 
Paul W. Ward, The AAA Puts on False Whiskers, The Nation, Jan. 22, 1936, at 93 
(describing the rush to pass legislation basing farm benefits on the pretext of ‘soil 
conservation’ rather than ‘crop control’ in order to escape judicial veto). See United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (finding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
unconstitutional because regulated and controlled agricultural production, invading 
the reserved rights of the states).
8  See, e.g., Open Letter from Civil Society on the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart 
Agriculture, Climate Smart Agriculture Concerns (July 2014), http://www.
climatesmartagconcerns.info/english.html; Ben Lilliston, The Clever Ambiguity 
of Climate Smart Agriculture, Inst. for Agric. and Trade Policy (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.iatp.org/blog/201512/the-clever-ambiguity-of-climate-smart-agriculture.
9  See, e.g., Regional Conservation Partnership Program Improvement Act of 
2017, S. 1966, 115th Cong. (2017) (granting private entities more control over how 
conservation funds are spent); Callie Eideberg, How Congress Can Help Farmers 
Stay Profitable and Resilient, Envtl. Def. Fund (Feb. 27, 2017), http://blogs.edf.
org/growingreturns/2017/02/27/how-congress-can-help-farmers-stay-profitable-and-
resilient/ (proposing to strengthen farm bill conservation programs through private 
sector investment and collaboration). 
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for example, while advertised as a win-win for farmers and the 
environment,10 would in fact harm both.11 Many of the largest 
sources of private funding have very different interests than 
environmental stewardship or rural communities. Thus, ranking 
research funding applications higher if the applicants secure 
corporate matches would in the long-run advance the interests 
of agribusiness over those of independent farmers and the 
environment. 
Fortunately, it may be politically advantageous to 
decarbonize the farm bill with a long-term focus, prioritizing the 
public interest with the input of rural communities and a diverse 
range of farmers. Agribusiness is increasingly concentrated: Just 
four companies sold over 85 percent of the beef in the U.S.;12 five 
companies slaughter almost 70 percent of the swine;13 with recent 
mergers, just three companies control over 60 percent of agro-
chemical and seed sales internationally.14 This concentration, as 
well as the concentration of payments under federal farm programs, 
15 creates tensions in farm country,16 and thus a political opening. 
10  See, e.g., Callie Eideberg, The Next Farm Bill Can Jump Start Conservation. 
Here’s How., Envtl. Def. Fund (Oct. 24, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/
growingreturns/2017/10/24/farm-bill-rcpp-conservation-innovation/ (describing the 
Regional Conservation Partnership Program Improvement Act of 2017 as “a win-win 
for farmers and the environment.”). 
11  See generally Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me I’m a Pragmatist: A Partially 
Pragmatic Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 426 (2017) 
(discussing the pitfalls of relying on ‘win-win solutions’ as a means of environmental 
protection).
12  Kristina Johnson & Samuel Fromartz, NAFTA’s ‘Broken Promises’: These Farmers 
Say They Got the Raw End of the Trade Deal, NPR (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.
org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/07/541671747/nafta-s-broken-promises-these-farmers-
say-they-got-the-raw-end-of-trade-deal. 
13  The Agribusiness Accountability Initiative, Hogging the Market: How 
Powerful Meat Packers are Changing our Food System and what We Can Do 
About It 2, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/AAI_Issue_Brief_4.pdf. 
14  Merge-Santo: New Threat to Food Sovereignty, ETC Grp. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://
www.etcgroup.org/content/merge-santo-new-threat-food-sovereignty. 
15  The largest 7 percent of producers owns 60 percent of the harvested cropland, 
receives almost half of all government farm payments, and takes in almost 90 percent 
of all net farm income. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture 
94, 98, 100 tbl. 65 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_
Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf (Calculated by the authors using data 
from the Census of Agriculture). 
16  See, e.g., Ctr. for Rural Affairs, May/June 2013 Study among Rural/Small-
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Advancing carbon-sequestering policies could prove popular 
in many rural areas if those policies were designed to benefit a 
broader range of farmers than current programs, improve water 
quality and local landscapes, and help reverse land consolidation. 
Reforming farm bill programs
The farm bill is a massive omnibus bill. Its most recent 
iteration, the Agricultural Act of 2014, ran to 357 pages, amended 
16 previous farm bills, and authorized almost a trillion dollars 
of spending.17 Because the bill is typically so large, we do not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive guide to decarbonizing it.18 
Instead we focus on six critical steps that Congress should take 
to make future farm bills better for rural communities and the 
climate. 
Town Americans 12 (2013) http://files.cfra.org/pdf/Poll-of-Rural-Voters-Toplines-
by-Income.pdf. A 2013 survey of 804 registered voters in rural America found that 68 
percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “[t]oo much of federal farm 
subsidies go to the largest farms, hurting smaller family farms.” See id. Nationally, 
agribusiness companies are among the least popular corporations; Harris Poll’s annual 
poll of the 100 most visible corporations in the United States, for example, ranked 
Monsanto as having the fourth worst reputation. Harris Poll: Corporate Reputation 
Politically Polarized as Companies Wrestle with Taking a Stand for Their Values, 
Cision PR News Wire (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
harris-poll-corporate-reputation-politically-polarized-as-companies-wrestle-with-
taking-a-stand-for-their-values-300404867.html. A 2017 survey of 1,506 registered 
voters nationwide also found that 90 percent of voters had either “very serious 
concerns” or “somewhat serious concerns” about the potential merger of Monsanto 
and Bayer. Memorandum from Public Policy Polling to Interested Parties, 90 Percent 
of Voters Nationwide Concerned about Potential Merger of Monsanto and Bayer; 
Overwhelming Majority Say Merger Will Result in Harm to Consumers, Farmers 
(June 14, 2017), https://1bps6437gg8c169i0y1drtgz-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/legacy/National_Monsanto_Memo_6.9.17_002.pdf. 
17  Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to 
Frank D. Lucas, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture 
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/
costestimate/hr2642lucasltr00.pdf. 
18  See generally Peter Lehner & Nathan Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-
Neutral Agriculture, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. 10845 (2017) (comprehensive approach 
to decarbonizing farm programs). The Farm Bill Law Enterprise (“FBLE”) and 
the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition (“NSAC”) are also independently 
releasing comprehensive sets of recommendations designed to make the farm bill 
more sustainable and equitable. See generally Broad Leib et al., Farm Bill Law 
Enterprise, Diversified Agricultural Economies (2018), http://www.farmbilllaw.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/FBLE_Diversified-Agricultural-Economies_Final.
pdf; Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coalition, An Agenda for the 2018 Farm Bill 
(2017), http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/NSAC-2018-
Farm-Bill-Platform-FINAL.pdf. 
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1.  Expand research and extension service on climate-
friendly practices.
Over the last decade, public spending on agricultural 
research has dropped by almost one-third19 and less than two percent 
of the remaining funding is devoted to diversified systems,20 which 
offer the greatest climate and environmental benefits.21 Given the 
critical need both for greater study and demonstration of many 
climate-friendly practices, Congress should restore sufficient 
funding to U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) research 
programs and require that at least half of the department’s research 
expenditures support climate-friendly practices or systems.
Similarly, extension services have proven remarkably 
effective at disseminating and perpetuating new agricultural 
practices.22 Yet funding is way down and there is inadequate focus 
on climate-friendly practices such as the use of cover crops, prairie 
grass strips, perennial crops, and buffer zones along streams and 
lakes. Congress should both restore funding for extension to at 
least $900 million annually, and, perhaps building on the existing 
(for now) Climate Hubs, devote the additional funding to support 
practices that will both increase soil carbon stocks and improve 
farm resilience to extreme weather. 23 
19  Matthew Clancy et al., U.S. Agricultural R&D in an Era of Falling Public Funding, 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric, Econ. Res. Serv. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
amber-waves/2016/november/us-agricultural-rd-in-an-era-of-falling-public-funding/. 
20  Marcia DeLonge et al., Investing in the Transition to Sustainable Agriculture, 55 
Envtl. Sci. & Pol’y 266, 267 (2016).
21  See id.
22  See, e.g., Irwin Feller, Technology Transfer, Public Policy, and the Cooperative 
Extension Service—OMB Imbroglio, 6 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 307, 307 (1987) 
(“The Cooperative Extension Service has come to represent the best of both an 
articulated but decentralized political arrangement and of a technology transfer 
system.”); George McDowell, Engaged Universities: Lessons from the Land Grant 
Universities and Extension, 585 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 31, 35-36 (2003).
23  Congress should also provide permanent baseline funding for the USDA National 
Agroforestry Center, while increasing its budget to at least $10 million. It was 
originally appropriated $5 million by Congress in the 1990 Farm Bill; however it 
typically receives about $1 million, despite agroforestry’s demonstrated potential 
to rapidly increase carbon sequestration. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and 
Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–624, §1243, 104 Stat. 3546 (1990).
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2. Enforce conservation limitations—and place new ones 
on payment size
In order to remain eligible for a number of important 
federal farm programs, farmers are prohibited from producing 
agricultural products on highly erodible land without a conservation 
plan,24 or from doing so on unconverted wetlands under any 
circumstances.25 These requirements, known as “conservation 
compliance,” apply to the crop insurance program, each of the 
conservation programs, and many smaller programs. They offer 
potentially important climate benefits because conventional 
farming on highly erodible land and wetlands results in significant 
greenhouse gas emissions.26 
These requirements must be strengthened, however, to 
ensure that government funds protect—rather than undermine—
soil and water quality and that farmers implementing sound 
stewardship practices are not placed at a disadvantage. Congress 
should require operators and landowners to plan and implement 
conservation systems for all land planted with annual crops in 
order to be eligible for farm program benefits and crop insurance 
subsidies.27 These conservation systems must help protect carbon 
stocks by ensuring that soil erosion on annually planted cropland 
does not exceed the soil loss tolerance level—the maximum annual 
rate of soil erosion possible without causing a decline in long-term 
24  16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3812 (2014).
25  16 U.S.C. § 3821. Wetlands drained or filled before December 23, 1985 are not 
protected. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A).
26  Wetlands are estimated to emit between 405 and 1215 metric tons of CO2 eq. per acre 
when converted to agricultural land. Richard Plevin et al., Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Biofuels’ Indirect Land Use Change Are Uncertain But May Be Much Greater 
than Previously Estimated, 44 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 8015, 8018 (2010), https://pubs.
acs.org/doi/ipdf/10.1021/es101946t. 
27  See generally Food & Farm Act, H.R. 4425, 115th Cong. §§ 201-206 (2017) 
(proposing to extend conservation plan requirements to all cropland planted with row 
crops, not just highly erodible land as under the current law); Nat’l Sustainable 
Agric. Coalition, supra note18, at 32-33, 44-45, 84 (discussing the importance 
of comprehensive conservation plans for effective stewardship); Envtl. Working 
Grp., Less Farm Pollution, More Clean Water: An Agenda for Conservation 
in the 2018 Farm Bill 2 (2017), https://cdn3.ewg.org/sites/default/files/u352/
EWG_Report_Conservation_C06.pdf?_ga=2.167498046.187388472.1525043603-
1751440026.1525043603, (advocating for extending conservation plan requirements 
to all annually tilled land).
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productivity;28 address gully erosion, which is responsible for 
up to 40 percent of soil loss in the United States;29 and maintain 
waterway buffers to reduce runoff and nitrous oxide emissions.30 
These steps will greatly improve soil and water quality locally 
and throughout the country, resulting, among other benefits, in 
significantly reduced climate impacts.   
The USDA Inspector General has also found that the 
department has failed to consistently enforce current conservation 
requirements.31 Congress should adequately fund conservation 
compliance enforcement and increase USDA’s technical 
assistance capacity to ensure that providers know how to comply.32 
Finally, Congress should require USDA to report compliance and 
enforcement data to Congress, allowing policymakers and the 
public to evaluate USDA’s enforcement efforts.33 
Just as USDA programs should, at a minimum, preserve 
environmentally sensitive land, they should also protect small- and 
medium-scale farms, which provide a number of services to rural 
28  See generally H.R. 4425 (proposing to require conservation plans to maintain soil 
erosion levels at or below the soil loss tolerance level); Nat’l Sustainable Agric. 
Coalition, supra note 18, at 36 (urging Congress to require conservation plans for 
highly erodible land to achieve soil erosion levels at or below the soil tolerance level); 
Envtl. Working Grp., supra note 27 (recommending that Congress integrate the soil 
tolerance level into conservation plans).
29  See generally H.R. 4425 (proposing to require conservation plans to address 
ephemeral gully erosion); Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coalition, supra note 18, at 37 
(discussing USDA’s inadequate efforts to reduce gully erosion and proposing reforms); 
Envtl. Working Grp., supra note 27, at 3 (recommending that conservation plans 
prevent gully erosion).
30  See generally H.R. 4425 (requiring 50 feet of perennial vegetation between annually 
tilled land and intermittent or perennial waterways); Envtl. Working Grp., supra 
note 27 (proposing that the 2018 Farm Bill require conservation plans to include 50 
feet of perennial vegetation between annually tilled land and waterways).
31  The report also found that the agency’s auditing process had completely bypassed at 
least 10 states in 2015, apparently in error. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Monitoring 
of Highly Erodible Lands and Wetland Conservation Violations, Audit Rep. 
50601-0005-31 3 (2016), https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-0005-31.pdf; 
see also Laurie Ristino & Gabriela Steier, Losing Ground: A Clarion Call for Food 
System Reform to Ensure a Food Secure Future, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 59, 96-102 
(2016) (discussing flaws in conservation compliance enforcement).
32  See Farm Bill Law Enterprise, supra note 27 (detailing possible improvements in 
enforcement and compliance within the conservation compliance regime).
33  Both FBLE and NSAC also recommend mandated collection and reporting of 
conservation compliance data. See Farm Bill Law Enterprise, supra note 27; Nat’l 
Sustainable Agric. Coalition, supra note18, at 36.
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communities,34 reduce wealth inequality,35 and have been found 
to be disproportionately likely to adopt sustainable practices.36 
Currently, however, USDA programs disproportionately favor 
large-scale producers and help drive land consolidation. The 
top 7 percent of producers, for example, received almost half of 
all government farm payments in 2012.37 While some programs 
currently cap payments, many, including crop insurance, do not, 
and existing caps are too high. Congress should place a cap on 
payments across all farm safety net and conservation programs 
at $150,000 or lower, and use the resulting savings to increase 
support for sustainable small- and medium-sized farms.
3. Require crop insurance providers to base premiums on 
soil health
In an era when the public is growing increasingly 
skeptical of industrial agriculture and farm subsidies, crop 
insurance has become a politically palatable way for the federal 
government to subsidize large-scale operations. The program is 
portrayed as, and often perceived to be, a safety net for farmers 
in the event of catastrophic crop failure. While about 16 percent 
of federal crop insurance contracts are limited to this type of 
protection, the vast majority, 84 percent, also include revenue 
protections.38 These revenue-based policies guarantee enrolled 
farmers a certain level of income regardless of market prices or 
their crop productivity.39 Further, crop insurance premiums are 
themselves highly subsidized. A 2016 analysis of crop insurance 
34  See Peter Rosset, The Multiple Functions and Benefits of Small Farm Agriculture in 
the Context of Global Trade Negotiations, 43 Development 77, 81 (2000); see generally 
Linda Lobao & Curtis W. Stofferahn, The Community Effects of Industrialized 
Farming: Social Science Research and Challenges to Corporate Farming Laws, 25 
Agric. & Human Values 219 (2008) (focusing on the consequences of farmland 
consolidation and industrialized agriculture for rural communities).
35  See Rosset, supra note 34, at 78-79.
36  Id. at 80-81; Lobao & Stofferahn, supra note 34, at 226-28.
37  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 15, at 94, 100 tbl. 65.
38  Dennis Shields, Cong. Research Serv., Federal Crop Insurance: Background 2 
(2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40532.pdf. 
39  Id.
48 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol. 14
policies, for example, found that farmers realized an annual 
average return of 120 percent on their policies between 2000 
and 2014.40 These extraordinarily high crop insurance premium 
subsidies have increased agricultural emissions by incentivizing 
agricultural production on marginal land, while also increasing 
land consolidation.41 
Crop insurance should do the opposite. Rather than 
encouraging cultivation of marginal lands, which is financially 
risky, and discouraging climate-friendly practices such as cover 
crops, Congress should create financial incentives for practices 
that will make the system more secure. It should make soil 
health—of which soil carbon content is a key factor—a criterion 
in determining insurance premiums, rewarding those who act as 
good stewards of the land. This would discourage planting on poor 
quality land (which is often the most ecologically important) and 
create financial incentives for practices that both reduce climate 
change and improve resilience to droughts, floods, and the like, 
thus reducing the very risks that the program seeks to address. 
All this would, in turn, reduce federal expenditures.42 Congress 
should also ensure that USDA and researchers have access to 
soil health data, allowing them to quantify the impact of different 
sustainability practices on soil health.43
4.  Turn the Conservation Reserve Program into a true 
land retirement program
The Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”) pays farmers 
for taking environmentally sensitive land out of production for 10-
40  Bruce A. Babcock, Envtl. Working Grp., Crop Insurance: A Lottery That’s 
a Sure Bet 3 (2016), https://static.ewg.org/reports/2016/federal_crop_insurance_
lottery/EWG_CropInsuranceLottery.pdf?_ga=2.90653337.2042648376.1516647185-
417038531.1514752376. 
41  See, e.g., Daniel Sumner & Carl Zulauf, Council on Food, Agric. & Res. Econ., 
Economic & Environmental Effects of Agricultural Insurance Programs 
(2012), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/156622/2/Sumner-Zulauf_Final.pdf. 
42  See Joshua D. Woodard & Leslie J. Verteramo-Chiu, Efficiency Impacts of Utilizing 
Soil Data in the Pricing of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 99 Amer. J. Agric. 
Econ. 757, 758 (2017).
43  Id. at 769.
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15 years.44 Out of the three main conservation programs, Congress 
gave it the largest allocation in the 2014 bill, resulting in roughly 
$1.8 billion annually.45 USDA estimated that CRP sequestered 
over 43 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions in 
2014, mitigating about 7 percent of agriculture’s greenhouse gas 
emissions that year.46 This is misleading, however, since many 
producers bring their CRP acres back into production after their 
contracts expire, quickly releasing any carbon stored during the 
contract’s term. A 2016 study found that expired CRP land was 
10 times more likely to be converted into crop production than to 
be shifted into other set-aside conservation programs.47 Between 
2007 and 2014, for example, an estimated 15.8 million acres 
previously protected by CRP—at a cost of $7.3 billion—were 
returned to agricultural production.48 Researchers have also found 
that some farmers compensate for the loss of production on CRP 
lands by converting marginal land to crop production.49
44  Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Service Agency, 
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-programs/
conservation-reserve-program/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).
45  See Cong. Budget Office, CBO’s March 2015 Baseline for Farm Programs 26 
(2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51317-2015-03-usda.pdf 
[hereinafter CBO’s March 2015 Baseline for Farm Programs]; Cong. Budget 
Office, CBO’s March 2016 Baseline for Farm Programs 26 (2016), https://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51317-2016-03-usda.pdf [hereinafter CBO’s 
March 2016 Baseline for Farm Programs]; Cong. Budget Office, CBO’s June 
2017 Baseline for Farm Programs 28 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
recurringdata/51317-2017-06-usda.pdf [hereinafter CBO’s June 2017 Baseline for 
Farm Programs]. 
46  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Year 2016-
2018 Update 25, 28, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/
AboutFSA/fsa-strategic-plan-2016-2018.pdf. 
47  Philip E. Morefield et al., Grasslands, Wetlands, and Agriculture: The Fate of Land 
from the Conservation Reserve Program in the Midwestern United States, 11 Envtl. 
Res. Letters 1, 5 (2016).
48  Envtl. Working Grp., supra note at 27 at 7.
49  See JunJie Wu, Slippage Effects of the Conservation Reserve Program, 82 J. Agric. 
Economics 979, 990 (2000) (finding that for each 100 acres of land enrolled in CRP, 
another 20 acres were put into production); David A. Fleming, Slippage Effects of 
Land Based Policies: Evaluating the Conservation Reserve Program Using Satellite 
Imagery, 93 Papers Regional Sci. S167, S176 (2013) (observing varying rates of 
slippage according to land cover using satellite data); Nancy Leathers & Lisa M.B. 
Harrington, Effectiveness of Conservation Reserve Programs and Land “Slippage” in 
Southwestern Kansas, 52 Professional Geographer 83, 83-93 (2004) (finding that 
slippage greatly reduce CRP’s effectiveness in Kansas). Contra Michael J. Roberts 
& Shawn Bucholtz, Slippage in The Conservation Reserve Program or Spurious 
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In order to effectively reduce agricultural emissions, 
Congress should restructure CRP in two ways. First, satellite 
imagery and other modern technology should be used to identify 
the most sensitive lands (such as former wetlands or stream beds), 
which should then be prioritized. Second, the CRP should provide 
farmers with either permanent easements or 30-year easements 
that are linked to permanent set-asides, effectively expanding the 
current Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (“ACEP”).50 
Farmers who complete a 30-year easement contract, for example, 
could be given an incentive to sign a permanent contract to 
keep the land from being cultivated. This would change CRP 
to a program that both supplements the incomes of farmers and 
provides sustained water quality and climate benefits. 
 
  5.  End EQIP subsidies for industrial operations
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (“EQIP”) 
offers farmers funding and technical assistance for developing 
and implementing single conservation practices.51
In recent years, Congress has provided EQIP with 
approximately $1.4 billion annually.52 More than a quarter of 
EQIP payments went to support waste storage facilities in large-
scale animal production facilities (legally termed “concentrated 
animal feeding operations” or “CAFO”s) and irrigation systems. 
Doing so has the effect of subsidizing large-scale, environmentally 
degrading practices.53 
Correlation? A Comment, 87 Amer. J. Agric. Economics 244, 250 (2005) (finding no 
evidence of slippage using an alternative model).
50  USDA currently offers farmers long-term and permanent easements through ACEP, 
but funding for its component initiatives has been cut substantially in recent years and 
the program now receives between 8 to 15 percent of CRP’s funding annually. See 
Cong. Budget Office, supra note 45. 
51  Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural 
Resources Conservation Service, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/
main/national/programs/financial/eqip/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).
52  See, e.g., Cbo’s June 2017 Baseline For Farm Programs, supra note 45.
53  See, e.g., Andrew Martin, In The Farm Bill, A Creature from the Black Lagoon, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/business/13feed.
html (suggesting that the program’s name should be changed to the “Factory Farm 
Incentive Program”); Tom Laskaway, Stop The Environmental Subsidy for Factory 
Farms, Grist (Apr. 17, 2009), http://grist.org/article/stop-the-environmental-subsidy-
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When Congress created EQIP in 1996, it required that 
at least 50 percent of the program’s total funding go toward 
livestock operations.54 However, it excluded large confined 
livestock operations,55 and limited payments to a maximum of 
$50,000 in most cases,56 ensuring that EQIP funds would benefit 
smaller operations. In the 2002 Farm Bill, Congress eliminated the 
restriction against large confined livestock operations and raised 
the payment cap to $450,000,57 where it currently stands.58 As a 
result, waste storage facilities for CAFOs received a larger share 
of payments—over $100 million—than any other single practice 
supported by EQIP.59 Since CAFOs depend on the production 
of vast amounts of grain—the production of which causes 
significant air and water pollution—and concentrate manure 
in ways that create further air and water pollution, supporting 
CAFOs effectively subsidizes a greenhouse gas-intensive form 
of animal production that also undermines rural economies and 
animal welfare.60 
The largest share of EQIP payments—$181 million 
in 201661—however, goes to a bundle of practices designed 
to improve irrigation systems, such as the installation of new 
for-factory-farms/; CAFOs and Cover Crops: A Closer Look at 2015 EQIP Dollars, 
Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal. Blog (Nov. 20, 2015), http://sustainableagriculture.
net/blog/fy15-general-eqip-update/.
54  Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 
§1241(2), 110 Stat. 996-97 (1996).
55  Id.
56  Id.
57  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, §§ 
1240B-1240G, 116 Stat. 254-57 (2002).
58  The cap was lowered to $300,000 in the 2008 Farm Bill, but was ultimately raised 
back to $450,000 in the 2014. Farm Bill. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 2508, 122 Stat. 923, 1063 (2008); Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. 
L. 113-79, §2206, 128 Stat. 649, 730 (2014) (amending § 1240G).
59  Melissa Bailey & Kathleen Merrigan, Rating Sustainability: An Opinion Survey 
of National Conservation Practices Funded Through the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program, 65 J. Soil & Water Conservation 21A, 23A (2010). 
60  Carrie Hribar, Nat’l Assoc. of Local Boards of Health, Understanding 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Their Impact on Communities 
7-10 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf. 
61  Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., supra note 18, at 52.
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irrigation pipelines or reservoirs.62 Instead of using EQIP funding 
just to improve the efficiency of irrigation, however, farmers 
often use their savings to expand irrigated crop production, 
switch to more water-intensive crops, or both.63 This leads to land 
conversion, a major source of greenhouse gas emissions.64
Farmers deserve support for installing environmentally 
friendly infrastructure, but EQIP must be better tailored. Congress 
should prohibit funding for new and expanding CAFOs. It should 
also contractually bar operators receiving EQIP payments for 
water conservation from expanding irrigated crop production. 
The resulting savings should be redirected to practices used 
in sustainable systems, ensuring long-term benefits to the 
environment and climate. 
6.  Focus the Conservation Stewardship Program on 
environmental benefits
The Conservation Stewardship Program (“CSP”) is an 
incentive-based working lands program, designed to make active 
farms more environmentally friendly.65 Farmers participating 
62  See Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) practice suite payments in 
the United States, 1997-2015, Envtl. Working Grp., https://conservation.ewg.org/
eqip_practice_suite.php?fips=00000&regionname=theUnitedStates (last visited Apr. 
29, 2018) (between 1997 and 2015 over $1.6 billion went to fund irrigation systems 
through EQIP). 
63  See generally Frank Ward & Manuel Pulido-Velazquez, Water Conservation in 
Irrigation Can Increase Water Use, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. Am. 18215 
(2008); Lisa Pfeiffer & C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, Does Efficient Irrigation Technology Lead 
to Reduced Groundwater Extraction? Empirical Evidence, 67 J. Evnt’l Econ. Mgmt. 
189 (2014).
64  See Emily Cassidy, Envtl. Working Grp., Ethanol’s Broken Promise: Using 
Less Corn Ethanol Reduces Greenhouse Gas Emissions 4 (Nils Bruzelius ed. 
2014), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/105/47/18215.full.pdf. The Environmental 
Working Group, for instance, estimates that the conversion of wetlands to farmland 
between 2008 and 2012 resulted in greenhouse gas emissions totaling 25 to 74 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent annually. Id. Others have studied the 
conversion of native grasslands to farmland, in large part to supply corn to ethanol 
plants, and similarly found significant soil carbon losses. Tyler Lark et al., Cropland 
Expansion Outpaces Agricultural and Biofuel Policies in the United States, 10 Envtl. 
Res. Letters 1, 5 (2015).
65  EQIP, in contrast, is a cost-share working lands conservation program. CSP may 
be merged with EQIP in the upcoming farm bill, however, a similar performance-
based payment program will likely remain in some form. Conservation Stewardship 
Program (CSP), U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Service, 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/oh/programs/financial/csp/ (last 
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in CSP enroll their entire operation in a contract to plan and 
adopt comprehensive conservation measures. While CSP has the 
smallest budget of the three main conservation programs—it has 
received about $1.1 billion annually since the last farm bill66—
CSP is the largest USDA conservation program on an acreage 
basis.67 Unfortunately, recent changes to CSP have deemphasized 
environmental considerations in USDA’s application and payment 
determinations.
Congress should require that CSP payments encourage 
practices with the most environmental and climate benefits. Now, 
payments for many CSP practices that increase crop diversity 
and soil health, such as Resource Conserving Crop Rotations 
(“RCCR”s) and Soil Health Crop Rotations, are actually lower 
than payments for standard enhancements.68 Congress should 
strengthen the CSP sustainability standards for participation; 
increase the importance of environmental benefits in the 
application process; and raise payment rates for practices that 
provide the greatest climate benefits.
Transforming the farm bill
Agricultural land, which covers more than 60 percent of 
the continental United States, 69 is capable of producing a number 
of public goods in addition to agricultural commodities, including 
environmental goods, such as biodiversity, water quality, 
and climate stability, and social goods such as rural vitality, 
animal welfare, and food security.70 The farm bill should move 
beyond its traditional focus on the production of agricultural 
visited Apr. 28, 2018).
66  See Cbo’s June 2017 Baseline For Farm Programs, supra note 45.
67  Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), supra note 65.
68  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Service, Payment 
Schedule Handbook, Part C § 600.13(F) (2016), https://directives.sc.egov.usda.gov/
OpenNonWebContent.aspx?content=40186.wba. 
69  Cynthia Nickerson et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Major Uses 
of Land in the United States, 2007 4 (2011), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/44625/11159_eib89_2_.pdf?v=41055. 
70  Francesco Vanni, Agriculture and Public Goods: The Role of Collective Action 
119 (Springer 2014).
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commodities and treat agriculture’s other public goods with equal 
consideration.71 In addition to the specific changes recommended 
above, Congress should develop a robust program to pay farmers 
for these important stewardship services. 
The federal government currently incentivizes farms to 
grow crops that are used, in a highly inefficient manner, to produce 
corn ethanol, sweeteners, and highly processed food products.72 
Why not encourage farms to produce what the country needs 
more of? Congress should develop a program to pay farmers 
for permanent carbon sequestration, which measures would also 
protect water quality and quantity. The farm safety net should 
not just enrich the largest farms, but protect the environment, 
mitigate climate change, grow healthy food, and strengthen rural 
communities. Decarbonizing the farm bill would not only help 
stabilize our climate, but would also transform rural America into 
a healthier, more sustainable, and equitable place.
71  This would not necessarily result in a decline in production or an increase in land 
use, although funding for research in agroecological methods would need to be 
increased in order to maintain productivity.
72  While the production of these commodity crops may be efficient when measured 
by inputs (such as labor) or yield, their use is grossly inefficient when human needs, 
such as nutritious food, are considered. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 10853. 
A 2013 study found that 67 percent of calories and 80 percent of protein in crops 
produced in the United States are diverted to animal feed. Emily Cassidy et al., 
Redefining Agricultural Yields: From Tonnes to People Nourished Per Hectare, 8 
Envtl. Res. Letters 1, 4 (2013). An additional 6 percent of both calories and protein 
of U.S. crops were diverted to a biofuel production—a share that has likely increased 
significantly since the enactment of the Renewable Fuel Standard. Id. Finally, an 
estimated 75 percent of the average American’s diet comes from processed or ultra-
processed foods, which are low in nutritional quality. Jennifer Poti et al., Is the Degree 
of Food Processing and Convenience Linked With the Nutritional Quality of Foods 
Purchased by US Households, 101 Am. J. Clinical Nutrition 1251, 1251 (2015). 
Some researchers have started to refer to this diet as a “commodity-based diet” due 
to its reliance on commodity crop production. See David Ludwig, Commentary, 
Technology, Diet, and the Burden of Chronic Disease, 305 JAMA 1352, 1352 (2011).
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Insuring a Future for Small Farms
Mary Beth Miller* & D. Lee Miller**
Introduction 
All farmers face systemic risk from bad weather and 
the vagaries of the market.1 Farmers with small, diversified 
operations must also contend with treacheries as unique as the 
farms they threaten. As a beginning farmer and coordinator of a 
farm incubator in North Carolina, you see and hear these stories 
all the time. An independent slaughter facility serving 600 small 
poultry farmers shuts down three weeks before the national 
celebration of poultry that is Thanksgiving.2 An ice storm cancels 
a bustling weekend farmers market after produce has been picked, 
washed, and packed, and then collapses a high tunnel holding the 
next month’s harvest.3 Coyotes destroy one third of a heritage-
breed turkey flock in a single night.4 A soil-borne fungus prevents 
planting and renders a field barren for six years.
Whole-Farm Revenue Protection (“WFRP”), a pilot 
* Lomax Farm Coordinator at the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association, and Co-
owner of Blue Merle Farm in North Carolina
** Clinical Fellow at the Harvard Law School Food Law and Policy Clinic. The authors 
wish to thank the editors for their excellent work. Opinions do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association or the Harvard Law School Food 
Law and Policy Clinic.
1  See generally Mario J. Miranda & Joseph W. Glauber, Systemic Risk, Reinsurance, 
and the Failure of Crop Insurance Markets, 79 Am. J. of Agric. Econ. 206 
(1997), http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ642/Babcock/Miranda-Glauber_
SystemicRisk.pdf. 
2  See, e.g., North Carolina Poultry Processor Closing; Farmers in Bind, U.S. 
News (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/north-carolina/
articles/2017-11-03/north-carolina-poultry-processor-closing-farmers-in-bind. 
3  See, e.g., Debbie Roos, Farmers Don’t Get Snow Days! This Winter a Challenging 
One for Area Farmers, N.C. State Univ., https://growingsmallfarms.ces.ncsu.
edu/2014/02/farmers-dont-get-snow-days-this-winter-a-challenging-one-for-area-
farmers/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
4  See, e.g., Jeannette Beranger et al., How to Raise Heritage Turkeys on Pasture: 
Protecting Heritage Turkeys from Predators, The Livestock Conservancy 73, 73 
(2007), https://livestockconservancy.org/images/uploads/docs/ALBCturkey-8.pdf. 
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program created by the 2014 Farm Bill and administered by 
USDA’s Risk Management Agency (“RMA”), enables farmers to 
protect against financial ruin after events like these.57 With a few 
tweaks, WFRP could become an even stronger safety net against 
weather extremes and natural disasters, as well as the market 
and supply-chain disruptions that endanger small, diversified 
operations. As WFRP expands its reach, it would enable more 
small, diversified farms to access credit and find the security to 
invest in expansion. Congress has an opportunity to make needed 
reforms in WFRP in the upcoming farm bill, and they have a good 
reason to follow through: as small, diversified farms flourish, they 
bring economic, social, and environmental benefits that justify 
the public investment in their financial security. 
WFRP has only been available since 2015, and few 
scholarly papers have considered the role of whole-farm 
policies in catalyzing small farm viability.6  Section I of this 
essay highlights why small, diversified farms deserve public 
support and how whole-farm revenue policies can fill a need by 
providing insurance tailored to these farms. Section II provides 
an overview of the first three years of WFRP. Section III explores 
four concrete opportunities for Congress to improve upon WFRP 
through the next farm bill by increasing program awareness and 
education, aligning incentives for agents to write whole-farm 
policies, mitigating and reversing conflicts between coverage and 
5  Whole Farm Revenue Protection for Diversified Farms, Nat’l Sustainable Agric. 
Coal., http://sustainableagriculture.net/publications/grassrootsguide/credit-crop-
insurance/whole-farm-revenue-protection-for-diversified-farms/ (last visited Apr. 18, 
2018).
6  Several studies have examined the potential to replace existing commodity and crop 
insurance programs with a whole-farm revenue approach. However, these studies are 
limited to scenarios where producers have significant program base acreage, making 
whole-farm coverage less advantageous relative to status quo. Area-based whole-farm 
designs help reduce adverse selection and moral hazard while reducing recordkeeping 
burdens, but do little to benefit producers for whom product differentiation and crop 
diversity are key to their marketability. See Lekhnath Chalise et al., Developing Area-
Triggered Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance, 42 J. of Agric. and Resource Econ. 
27, 28 (2017), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/252753/files/JARE_Jan2017__3_
Chalise_27-44.pdf; see J. Marc Raulston et al., Agric. & Food Policy Center 
Texas A&M University Dep’t of Agric. Econ., The Farm Level Impacts of 
Replacing Current Farm Programs with a Whole Farm Revenue Program 1,2 
(2011), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/98785/files/SAEA2011%20Raulston.pdf. 
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conservation activities, and simplifying program access for small 
farms. The section ends by outlining how WFRP could be used 
as a basis for more ambitious public support for small, diversified 
farms.
I. Support for Small, Diversified Farms
Like most definitions in agriculture, what should qualify 
as a “small” farm necessarily varies among geographic areas and 
production systems. USDA’s definition of a farm with $350,000 or 
less in gross annual sales provides enough of a reference point for 
the purposes of this essay. By this count, the average small farm 
controls 231 acres.7 Within this universe of small farms, those 
that earn between $10-250k in gross sales account for slightly 
more than one third of all farms in the United States.8 
Like “small”, USDA has a definition of “diversified”,9 
although what we mean by diversified farms is better illustrated 
by examples from our home state of North Carolina. At Four 
Leaf Farm, Tim and Helga MacAller grow specialty fruits and 
vegetables, ornamental plants, and microgreens intensively on 
two acres, cultivating well over fifty varieties of plants in a single 
year. 10 Over seventeen years, they have built a thriving business 
that provides fresh, organically grown food to the community and 
employs aspiring young farmers throughout the year.11 Jillian and 
Ross Mickens of Open Door Farm got their start on a farm incubator 
7  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Highlights, Family Farms 
1 (2015) https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/
Highlights/NASS%20Family%20Farmer/Family_Farms_Highlights.pdf. 
8  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Economic Class of Farms by 
Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold and Government Payments: 
2012 and 2007,  https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/
Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_003_003.pdf. 
9  For the purposes of the WFRP program that is the subject of this essay, diversification 
is measured by counting the number of distinct commodities a farm producers. To be 
included, the commodity must account for a percent of total revenue equal to the 
operations total revenue, divided by the number of commodities grown, divided again 
by 3. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Whole Farm Revenue Protection 
2 (2017), https://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/rme/wfrpfactsheet.pdf. 
10  See Four Leaf Farm, http://www.fourleaffarm.org/, (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
11  Id.
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six years ago, with almost no prior agricultural experience. 12 
After three seasons at the incubator, they purchased land where 
they now grow vegetables, cut flowers, and microgreens.13 Daniel 
Dayton runs Old Milburnie Farm, specializing in mushrooms, 
seasonal vegetables, and pasture-raised pork and poultry on ten 
acres, where he regularly hosts community dinners.14
Embedded in these operations, and the many other small, 
diversified farms throughout the country, are a set of economic, 
social, and environmental benefits that farm policy, as enacted by 
the farm bill, should go out of its way to support. For example, 
small farm size is linked to a stronger middle class, reduced 
unemployment, greater socioeconomic stability, and higher rates 
of civic engagement.15 Small, diversified farms account for 46 
percent of all direct-to-consumer sales through farmers markets, 
roadside stands, or community-supported agriculture (“CSA”) 
programs.16 In other words, small farms have a disproportionate 
role in driving local food economies, which shorten the supply 
chain and put a greater share of each food dollar in the farmers’ 
pockets.17 This money is often reinvested in local business by way 
of seed, equipment, livestock, and feed purchases,18 creating a 
“multiplier” effect where each dollar spent generates more value 
12  See Our Story, Open Door Farm, https://www.opendoorfarmnc.com/about.html, 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
13  Id. 
14  See Old Milburnie Farm, http://www.oldmilburniefarm.com/, (last visited Apr. 18, 
2018).
15  See Union of Concerned Scientists, Growing Economies: Connecting 
Local Farmers and Large-Scale Food Buyers to Create Jobs and Revitalize 
America’s Heartland 1, 1-2 (2016),  https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/
attach/2016/01/ucs-growing-economies-2016.pdf; see Thomas A. Lyson et al., Scale 
of Agricultural Production, Civic Engagement, and Community Welfare, 80 Soc. 
Forces  311, 311 (2001).
16  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Highlights, Small Farms 
2 (2016), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/Fact_
Sheets/Farm_Numbers/small_farm.pdf. 
17  Jeffrey K. O’Hara, Market Forces: Creating Jobs Through Public Investment 
in Local and Regional Food Systems, Union of Concerned Scientists 17 
(2011), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food_and_
agriculture/market-forces-report.pdf. 
18  Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 18, at 2.
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as it moves through the local economy.19 The upshot is tremendous 
opportunity for rural economic development through the vehicle 
of small, diversified farms. And as the average American farmer 
approaches retirement age,20 a new generation of growers is 
taking root on small farms. 97 percent of all beginning farmers21 
run “small” farms.22 
Small and diversified go hand in hand. Compared to 
larger operations, small farms are more likely to implement 
environmentally sustainable agronomic systems23 and maintain 
diversified production that promotes biodiversity.24 At the Elma 
C. Lomax Incubator Farm in Concord, NC, we train small 
farmers how to rotate multiple plant varieties and choose disease-
resistant cultivars; incorporate cover crops in field management 
and minimize synthetic inputs; use season extension techniques 
and high tunnels; and diversify revenue streams with niche 
specialty crops, among many other things. These practices add 
to biodiversity, soil health, ecosystem stability, and a farmer’s 
capacity to adapt to unexpected weather and changes in consumer 
19  See generally David Swenson, Leopold Ctr for Sustainable Agric., Selected 
measures of the economic values of increased fruit and vegetable production 
and consumption in the upper Midwest 16 (2010), https://www.leopold.iastate.
edu/files/pubs-and-papers/2010-03-selected-measures-economic-values-increased-
fruit-and-vegetable-production-and-consumption-upper-mid.pdf. 
20  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 
Profiles, United States Farms with Women Principal Operators Compared 
with All Farms 1, 2, 4 (2015),  https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/
Online_Resources/Race,_Ethnicity_and_Gender_Profiles/cpd99000.pdf. 
21  See Beginning Farmer and Rancher Loans, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.
fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/farm-loan-programs/beginning-farmers-
and-ranchers-loans/index (last visited Apr. 18, 2018) (defining “beginning 
farmer” as those who have operated a farm or ranch for fewer than 10 years); The 
Federal Crop Insurance Act reserves Beginning Farmers benefits to those with five or 
fewer crop years. 7 U.S.C. § 1502(b)(3).
22  Beginning Farmers and Age Distribution of Farmers, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. 
Research Serv. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/
beginning-disadvantaged-farmers/beginning-farmers-and-age-distribution-of-
farmers/. 
23  Gerard D’Souza & John Ikerd, Small Farms and Sustainable Development: Is Small 
More Sustainable?, 28 J. of Agric. & Applied Econ. 73, 76-77 (1996).
24  Kristina Belfrage et al., Effects of Farm Size and On-Farm Landscape 
Heterogeneity on Biodiversity—Case Study of Twelve Farms in a Swedish Landscape, 
39 Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 170, 177-179, 183 (2015).
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demand, which in turn, improve resilience and mitigate risk.25 
Diversified farms are more resilient farms, economically and 
ecologically.26 
The Role of Insurance
For all their benefits, the characteristics of small, diversified 
farms that make them reliable producers of public goods also 
make them difficult to insure through traditional yield or revenue 
policies. Commodity-specific policies do not effectively serve the 
needs of operations growing many different crops.27 A diversified 
farmer would need to insure each crop separately—a headache 
on its own—and would not capture the benefit of mitigating 
risk through diversification.28 Many small, diversified farms, 
like those profiled above, sell into multiple markets at different 
price points.29 For them, traditional insurance cannot effectively 
manage either yield or price risk. 
Yet small, diversified farms need insurance. Because 
small farms operate on even tighter margins than the industry as a 
whole, moderate to severe losses can cause a farmer to default on 
her operating loans or mortgage, fail to cover personal expenses, 
or ultimately file for bankruptcy.30 This creates a double bind 
for small farms. Many banks require proof of insurance before 
approving a loan,31 but crop insurance has been difficult or 
25 Gail Feenstra et al., What is Sustainable Agriculture?, U.C. Davis, Agric. 
Sustainability Inst., Sustainable Agric. Res. and Educ. Program, http://asi.
ucdavis.edu/programs/sarep/about/what-is-sustainable-agriculture (last visited Apr. 
18, 2018). 
26  Id.
27  Id.
28  See Erik. J. Donoghue et al., Econ. Res. Serv., Does risk matter for farm 
businesses? The Effect Of Crop Insurance On Production And Diversification 
7 (2005), https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19397/1/sp05od02.pdf. 
29  See Becky Krystal, Farmers market prices tend to be higher in the city: Why?, The 
Washington Post (June 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/
farmers-market-prices-tend-to-be-higher-in-the-city-why/2016/06/16/27233ea6-2f4b-
11e6-9de3-6e6e7a14000c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3a811522beb6. -
30  Robert Hoppe, Profit Margin Increases with Farm Size, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Econ. Res. Serv. (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/
januaryfebruary/profit-margin-increases-with-farm-size/. 
31  See Anna Johnson & Glen Ready, Center for Rural Affairs, New Option for 
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impossible to access without scale. Perhaps the greatest promise of 
an insurance product for small, diversified farms is that it expands 
access to credit, thereby increasing solvency and opening credit 
lines for further investment. Enter WFRP.
II. Whole Farm Revenue Protection
WFRP is a pilot program developed by RMA to meet 
the 2014 Farm Bill’s inclusion of a revenue protection policy 
for diversified farms.32 Congress specified that the whole farm 
program include both a diversification incentive33 and market-
readiness provision.34 When policies were first made available for 
2015, Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack touted that WFRP “gives 
farmers more flexibility, promotes crop diversity, and helps 
support the production of healthy fruits and vegetables.”35
To achieve this broader access, WFRP provides coverage 
for many types of farm operations that other federal insurance 
programs ignore. In so doing, it provides a template that future 
farm bills can build upon. The current iteration of WFRP already 
improves upon previous whole farm revenue programs, Adjusted 
Gross Revenue (“AGR”) and AGR-Lite, which had been around 
since the late 1990s.36 Researchers credit the underutilization 
of AGR and AGR-Lite to its limited geographical availability, 
program complexity and, above all, insufficient coverage rates 
that protected a maximum of 80 percent of expected revenues. 37 
Farm Risk Management: Whole Farm Revenue Protection Usage in Nebraska 
2 (2017), https://www.cfra.org/sites/www.cfra.org/files/publications/WFRP%20
Report.pdf. 
32  See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1522(c)(19)).
33  Id. at § 1522(c)(19)(C).
34  Id.
35  New Pilot Program Offers Coverage for Fruits and Vegetables, Organic and 
Diversified Farms, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (May 21, 2014), http://www.usda.gov/wps/
portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2014/05/0100.xml. 
36  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Adjusted Gross Revenue 1 
(2014), https://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/rme/agr2014.pdf ; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk 
Mgmt. Agency, Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite 1 (2014), https://www.rma.usda.
gov/pubs/rme/agr-lite.pdf. 
37  Dennis A. Shields, Cong. Research Serv., R43494, Crop Insurance Provisions 
in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79) 8 (2014), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-
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WFRP begins to address the shortcomings of AGR 
and AGR-Lite by increasing coverage levels up to 85 percent 
and removing payment rate limits, meaning that producers are 
indemnified for 100 percent of covered losses.38 The market-
readiness provision covers some of the labor-intensive post-
production expenses—e.g., packing, packaging, washing, and 
labeling—necessary to bring crops out of the field.39 Finally, 
WFRP increases the premium subsidy up to 80 percent.40
Whole-farm policies, 2014-201741
 *Indemnity and loss ratio data will fluctuate until the 
claim filing window closes.
When WFRP was first offered in 2015, it covered 1200 
content/uploads/assets/crs/R43494.pdf. 
38  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 12, at 2.
39  See id. at 3.
40  Frequently Asked Questions: Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) Plan, U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.rma.usda.gov/
help/faq/wfrp2018.html. 
41 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
Commodity Year Statistics for 2014 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/
sob/current_week/insplan2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Federal Crop Insurance]; U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
Commodity Year Statistics for 2015 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/
sob/current_week/insplan2015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Federal Crop Insurance]; U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
Commodity Year Statistics for 2016 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/
current_week/insplan2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 Federal Crop Insurance]; U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation Commodity 
Year Statistics for 2017 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/current_week/
insplan2017.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Federal Crop Insurance].
Crop Year Policy Policies Sold Total Liabilities(millions) Total Premium (millions) Federal Subsidy(millions) Indemnities(millions) Loss Ratio
2014 AGR + 
ARG-L
840 $525 $20 $11 $55 2.87 (AGR);
2.71 (AGR-L)2015 WFRP 1,126 $1,146 $53 $38 $69 1.302016 WFRP 2,228 $2,332 $119 $84 $165 1.392017 WFRP 2,845 $2,866 $145 $103 $33* .23*
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farms, insuring over a billion dollars in production value, more 
than twice the coverage of the AGR programs it replaced.42 
Program participation more than doubled over the following two 
years and in 2017, insured revenue reached almost $3 billion.43 
Over its first two years, the loss ratio fell by half compared to 
AGR policies, meaning that WFRP comes much closer to RMA’s 
mandate to provide insurance at rates that are actuarially sound.44
Early Administrative Refinements 
As WFRP entered its second crop year in 2016, RMA 
updated the policy in an effort to improve access and coverage.45 
First, RMA made WFRP universally available.46 AGR and AGR-
Lite used a checkerboard approach that excluded large swathes 
of the Midwest, South, and Plains, and in its first year WFRP 
excluded five states and some counties in states where policies 
were available.47 WFRP is now available in every state and every 
county.48 
Second, RMA took a first step toward increasing access 
for beginning farmers by modestly adjusting production history 
requirements that excluded farmers who could not produce such 
histories because they began farming recently.49 The program 
also enrolls new farmers who take over 90 percent of an existing 
operation, 50 which recognizes the importance of supporting 
producers during the growing wave of intergenerational farm 
42  See 2015 Federal Crop Insurance, supra note 44.
43  See 2017 Federal Crop Insurance, supra note 46
44  See 2015 Federal Crop Insurance, supra note 44; see 2016 Federal Crop Insurance, 
supra note 45. 
45  Historic Changes to Whole Farm Revenue Protection, Rural Advancement 
Foundation International (Aug. 27, 2015), http://rafiusa.org/blog/rma-announces-
historic-changes-to-whole-farm-revenue-protection/.
46  See id.
47   See Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., Farming for the Future: 
A Sustainable Agriculture Agenda for the 2012 Food & 
Farm Bill 28 (2012), http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/
uploads/2008/08/2012_3_21NSACFarmBillPlatform.pdf. 
48  U.S. Dep’t of Agric, supra note 12, at 1.
49  See id. at 2. 
50  Historic Changes to Whole Farm Revenue Protection, supra note 52.
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transitions. Finally, beginning farmers and ranchers receive an 
automatic 10 percent increase in premium subsidy levels.51 
III. Farm Bill Opportunities
Despite impressive growth to date WFRP remains broadly 
underutilized.52 The remainder of this essay proposes farm bill 
reforms that would improve WFRP to meet the needs of small, 
diversified operations. Targeting this tranche of farms, WFRP 
could easily surpass the benchmarks set in its first years. In turn, 
expanding WFRP participation would strengthen the risk pool, 
help achieve and maintain actuarial soundness, and manifest trust 
among farmers and insurance providers that the program is here 
to stay. Growth in program participation, we believe, is the best 
long-term solution to overcome institutional barriers. Once agents 
and underwriters see WFRP as a permanent program, a virtuous 
cycle of investment in agent training and specialized software 
will attract still broader participation.53
First, however, Congress should demonstrate its support 
through reforms to WFRP that increase program awareness, 
encourage agents to write whole-farm policies, mitigate and 
reverse conflicts between coverage and conservation activities, 
and simplify program access for small farms. 
Immediate Opportunity: Expand and improve WFRP 
education and outreach. 
Farmers and their advisers lack awareness and information 
on WFRP, contributing to its broad underutilization.54 Risk 
management education is nothing new, and Congress has 
established and funded efforts to provide education on risk 
51  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Fed. Crop Insurance Corp., Whole-Farm Revenue 
Protection Pilot Handbook: 2016 and Succeeding Crop Years 39 (2016), http://
www.rma.usda.gov/handbooks/18000/2016/16_18160-1h.pdf.
52  See Johnson & Ready, supra note 35, at 5.
53  Id. at 10.
54  See Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., An Agenda for the 2018 Farm Bill 43 
(2017),http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/NSAC-2018-
Farm-Bill-Platform-FINAL.pdf. 
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management strategies generally, and crop insurance specifically, 
through the National Institute of Food and Agriculture’s Risk 
Management Education (“RME”) program55 and RMA’s 
Risk Management Education Partnerships (“RME”) and 
Risk Management Education in Targeted States (“RMETS”) 
programs.56 
Each program makes grants to both public and private 
entities that provide education and outreach on risk management, 
including several recent projects that specifically target WFRP.57 
However, in 2016 their combined budgets totaled only $13.7 
million. The next farm bill provides an opportunity for Congress 
to increas its investment in risk management education through 
these existing programs, and to direct that NIFA and RMA should 
prioritize projects that focus on whole farm risk management 
strategies. Beyond increased funding, Congress should ensure 
that there is adequate reporting and evaluation built into each 
funded project so that the most successful educational materials 
and outreach strategies can be identified and replicated in future 
years.
Immediate Opportunity: Create a simplified policy for 
small farms. 
Farmer advocates identify the complexity and number 
of WFRP documentation requirements as a significant barrier 
preventing broader participation.58 Documentation includes: 
extensive revenue history forms to write the policy, three interim 
reports submitted during the growing season, and a variety of 
worksheets.59 For small farms, this additional recordkeeping 
can consume more time than the benefit of carrying insurance.60 
55  7 U.S.C. § 1524 (2012).
56  7 U.S.C. § 1522.
57  See, e.g., , Risk Management Education Partnership Program, U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency https://www.rma.usda.gov/aboutrma/agreements/
awards/2017/2017partnerships.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
58  See, e.g., Johnson & Ready, supra note 35, at 10. 
59  See Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., supra note 61, at 78.
60  See RAFI Producer Survey on Whole Farm Revenue Protection, Rural 
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Congress can address this barrier by creating a simplified WFRP 
policy for small farms.
There is recent precedent for such a move in the Microloan 
program. Introduced in 2013, and expanded in the 2014 Farm 
Bill,61 the Microloan Program streamlines the application process 
required for larger loan programs.62 For example, farmers may 
demonstrate farming experience and production history using 
more flexible means.63 The next farm bill should include a similar 
mandate that RMA develop a WFRP policy for small farms. 
Congressman Rick Nolan (D-MN) recently introduced a marker 
bill that would create a streamlined WFRP policy for farms 
insuring under $1 million in annual revenue.64
Immediate Opportunity: Remove barriers and incentivize 
adoption of resource-conserving practices. 
A farmer’s coverage should not be threatened by the use of 
resource-conserving agronomic practices, which inherently lower 
on-farm risks especially over time. In order to meet the terms 
of their insurance contract, farmers must follow “good farming 
practices.” Because these practices include, inter alia, strict 
planting and harvest deadlines, they can retard or even prevent 
adoption of conservation practices like cover cropping.65 The 
Advancement Found. Int’l. (July 1, 2015), http://rafiusa.org/blog/rafi-producer-
survey-on-whole-farm-revenue-protection/. 
61  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 5106(a), 128 Stat. 649, 837-38 (2014) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1943(c)).
62  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Expands Microloans to Help Farmers 
Purchase Farmland and Improve Property (Jan. 19, 2016),  https://www.usda.gov/
media/press-releases/2016/01/19/usda-expands-microloans-help-farmers-purchase-
farmland-and-improve.
63  Sarah Tulman et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., USDA 
Microloans for Farmers: Participation Patterns and Effects of Outreach 
1 (2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/81871/err222_summary.
pdf?v=42761. 
64  See Crop Insurance Modernization Act of 2018, H.R. 4865, 115th Cong. § 2(e) 
(2018). 
65  Gabrielle Roesch-McNally et al., The trouble with cover crops: Farmers’ 
experiences with overcoming barriers to adoption, Renewable Agric. and Food 
Systems 1, 9 (2017), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/
content/view/732DAC57E92E1C9EFC5A451F7EAF454A/S1742170517000096a.pdf/
trouble_with_cover_crops_farmers_experiences_with_overcoming_barriers_to_
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farm bill should specify that all NRCS-approved conservation 
activities are considered “good farming practices” and prohibit 
the insurance industry’s practice of using contract “terms and 
conditions” to undermine this safe harbor,66 ensuring that practices 
like cover cropping never threaten coverage.67
Although such a safe harbor for conservation activities 
mitigates some existing challenges, Congress should take 
additional action requiring RMA to make WFRP’s diversification 
incentives more robust. One such proposal by the Farm Bill Law 
Enterprise would reserve the highest subsidy rates for farmers 
who adopt advanced conservation practice bundles or resource-
conserving crop rotations, as determined by NRCS.68 Another 
approach, proposed by NRDC, would create a pilot program 
tying subsidy rates to practices shown to improve soil health and 
mitigate climate risks.69 
Immediate Opportunity: Create WFRP evangelists by 
improving insurance agent compensation. 
All federal crop insurance policies, whole-farm or 
otherwise, are sold by independent crop insurance agents and 
assigned to RMA-approved private insurance companies.70 The 
adoption.pdf. 
66  See Peter Lehner & Nathan A. Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-Neutral 
Agriculture, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10845, 10876 n.223 (2017).
67  The Crop Insurance Modernization Act, supra note 73. The Act would implement 
this change by amending Section 508 of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, codified at 7 
U.S.C. § 1508. See Nathaniel Levy, Improving Soil Health Through Crop Insurance, 
Farm Bill Law Enterprise (Apr. 13, 2018), http://www.farmbilllaw.org/2018/04/13/
improving-soil-health-crop-insurance/. 
68  See Emily Broad Leib et al., Farm Bill Law Enterprise, Diversified 
Agricultural Economies 17 (2018), http://www.farmbilllaw.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/FBLE_Diversified-Agricultural-Economies_Final.pdf.   
69  See Claire O’Connor, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Soil Matters: How the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program Should Be Reformed to Encourage Low 
Risk Farming Methods with High Reward Environmental Outcomes 3 (2013), 
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/soil-matters-IP.pdf. 
70  See Bruce Babcock, The Politics and Economics of the U.S. Crop Insurance 
Program, in Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Res., The Intended and Unintended Effects 
of U.S. Agricultural and Biotechnology Policies 83-112, at 107-09  (Joshua 
S. Graff Zivin & Jeffrey M. Perloff eds., University of Chicago Press 2012), http://
www.nber.org/chapters/c12109.pdf. There is strong evidence that this dynamic makes 
independent crop insurance agents, rather than crop insurance company owners, the 
2018] Insuring a future for small farms 69
insurance companies bid for agents’ books of business, and each 
insurance company receives revenue from underwriting gains 
and administrative and operating (“A&O”) subsidies in relation 
to the value of the policies assigned.71 Thus, agent compensation 
ultimately depends on the value of the policies they write.
Due to their complexity, it takes more time to write WFRP 
policies than other crop insurance policies, creating opportunity 
costs for agents who could be writing simpler policies with 
higher values.72 As a result, agents are less likely to seek out or 
create opportunities to sell them.73 Congress should correct this 
prejudice against WFRP by requiring RMA to develop alternative 
compensation schemes for agents who write whole-farm policies, 
for example by setting a flat commission per policy or by paying 
agents based on the time spent writing the policy.
A Vision for WFRP 
As we consider immediate reforms, it is worth sparing a 
moment to consider what a farm bill could do with a program 
like WFRP if it were truly dedicated to the long-term success of 
small, diversified farms. We envision a program that is altogether 
removed from RMA and the private crop insurance companies it 
uses to deliver its products. The characteristics that make small, 
diversified farms unique, resilient, and valuable public assets—
commitment to environmental stewardship and biodiversity, 
reliance on local economies and food systems, a young and 
diverse workforce—are the same traits that cause these farms to 
be unintelligible or simply ignored by traditional credit agencies 
and crop insurance companies. The government pays an enormous 
price to outsource crop insurance program delivery, while the 
insurance industry captures about one third of total federal crop 
residual beneficiaries in the crop insurance industry.  
71  Id. at 86.
72  See Memorandum from the Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal. to Leiann Nelson, 
Senior Underwriter, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency (April 25, 2015), 
http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/NSAC-WFRP-
Recommendations-Final.docx.
73  See id.
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insurance outlays.74 Yet this expense has failed to buy adequate 
delivery for small farms. As we note above, private actors lack 
robust incentives to service small farms with complex operations. 
A “public option,” administered and delivered through FSA, 
addresses all the issues we have identified and many others.
FSA is a logical choice for a revenue guarantee program 
for small farms. FSA already serves small farms through points of 
contact that include microloans, the Non-Insured Crop Disaster 
Assistance (“NAP”), and outreach through efforts like the 
“Bridges to Opportunity” program.75 There are over 2,100 FSA 
offices nationwide including in nearly every rural county,76 and 
farmers are connected to FSA from the time they first acquire 
a farm number at their local FSA office. A whole-farm program 
administered by FSA disentangles farmers’ needs from insurance 
agent incentives, strengthens working relationships between 
farmers and FSA, and it puts FSA into a position of insuring the 
livelihoods of those who are willing to sustain rural communities 
while investing in local soil and water quality through conservation 
practices. For small farmers, FSA could be more than the “Lender 
of Last Resort,” but the “Insurer of First Opportunity.” 
Conclusion 
Our farmers are aging and we need a new generation that 
not only takes their place, but that is ready to meet the public’s 
demand for nutritious and local foods grown in healthy soil. 
We need a farm bill that updates the social contract between 
farmer and eater, and that embraces the opportunities that small, 
diversified farms offer to farmers and their communities. When 
we invest in small, diversified farms, we invest in the promise 
74  Joseph W. Glauber, Taxpayers for Common Sense, Crop Insurance and 
Private Sector Delivery: Reassessing the Public-Private Partnership 1 (2016), 
http://www.taxpayer.net/images/uploads/downloads/Crop_Insurance_and_Private_
Sector_Delivery_1.pdf.
75  USDA’s Farm Service Agency Expands Bridges to Opportunity Nationwide, U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-
room/news-releases/2017/nr_20170111_rel_0006. 
76  Id.
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of jobs that cannot be exported, stewardship of local natural 
resources, revitalization of rural communities and shortening the 
distance food travels. The next farm bill, and the ones that follow 
in the years to come, have an opportunity to improve and build on 
the Whole Farm Revenue Protection program so that it becomes 
a pillar of small farms throughout the country.
Proactive Policies: Building the Farm Bill of the Future 
Through New Collaborations and Perspectives
Jennifer Zwagerman
Consumers and agricultural producers have been linked 
in the Farm Bill for over 70 years, in various and evolving 
ways.  While the Farm Bill has evolved and grown over the years, 
with numerous new programs added through subsequent farm bills 
and additional legislation, there is no denying that with its broad 
scope of programs impacting agriculture and nutrition, producers 
and consumers remain absolutely connected in today’s Farm Bill 
as well.1 However, this comprehensive, broad-based piece of 
legislation that impacts not just every American, but has a much 
more global impact, is contentious and involves much debate and 
political fighting each time it comes up for renewal.2  I believe 
more can be done to bridge the many divides that occur when it 
comes to the Farm Bill, starting with a change in process and in 
mindset that will build more broad-based coalitions of support 
beyond the traditional agricultural block, while also helping 
remove some of the contentious debate that occurs every renewal 
cycle. A more broad-based view of the purpose and scope of the 
Farm Bill will also more accurately reflect the changing scope of 
agriculture, where agriculture means much more than just food 
production, and help agriculture and its many partners focus on 
long-term, sustainable solutions to issues that are intricately tied 
to agriculture, food, the environment, rural development, and 
more.
1  See Tom Vilsack, The 2018 farm bill is so much more than farming — here’s how it 
impacts all Americans, Business Insider (Jan. 21, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.
com/heres-how-the-2018-farm-bill-impacts-all-americans-2018-1. 
2  See Jeremy Bernfeld, Out of Public Eye, A Bitter Farm Bill Fights, Harvest Public 
Media (July 11, 2014), http://harvestpublicmedia.org/post/out-public-eye-bitter-farm-
bill-fights. 
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Consumers and Producers, and the Rural/Urban 
Divide 
The origins of what we call the “Farm Bill” date back to 
the 1930s and the Great Depression, part of FDR’s New Deal, 
with a goal of helping farmers by boosting crop prices.3  Despite 
a generally strong economy, the 1920s were not good to farmers 
and the farm economy, and the Great Depression made a bad 
situation even worse for agricultural producers.4
One way the 1933 legislation supported prices was by 
paying farmers to limit production.5  This bill, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, provided the payments for non-production, 
allowed the government to purchase excess grain from producers, 
and provided for financing options, among other things.6 This 
was an emergency declaration, stated to “cease to be in effect 
whenever the President finds and proclaims that the national 
economic emergency in relation to agriculture has ended.”7
For the purpose of this essay, the importance of this law 
lies in some of its goals: parity and avoiding a disparate impact 
on consumers. In the 1933 Farm Bill, parity was defined as “an 
equality of exchange relationship between agriculture and industry 
or between persons living on farms and persons not farms.”8 The 
1993 Act also stated an “intent to protect the consumers’ interest 
by readjusting farm production to a level that would not increase 
3  Michael X. Heiligenstein, A Brief History of the Farm Bill, Saturday Evening Post 
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2014/04/17/culture/politics/a-
brief-history-of-the-farm-bill.html. 
4  Id.
5  See e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31, 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/farmbills/1933.pdf; 
Heiligenstein, supra note 3.
6  See e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., History of Agricultural Price-
Support and Adjustment Programs, 1939-84 3 (1984), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/41988/50849_aib485.pdf?v=42079; Agricultural Adjustment 
Act; Sara Menker, Grains in Mali: More than Meets the Media, Linked In (July 26, 
2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/grains-mali-more-than-meets-media-sara-
menker. 
7  Agricultural Adjustment Act §13. 
8  U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., History of Agricultural Price-Support 
and Adjustment Programs, 1939-84 3 (1984), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/41988/50849_aib485.pdf?v=42079.
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the percentage of consumers’ retail expenditures” above the 
amount used as the financial baseline goal.9 In short, the goal was 
to provide support to farmers, as the country saw value in a strong 
agricultural industry, while also ensuring that an improving farm 
economy and crop prices would not have an overly negative 
impact on consumers.10 
The Farm Bill today continues, in many ways, to 
reflect those same goals, albeit on a much broader and larger 
scale.  Programs have expanded to include not just those 
directed towards commodity support, but conservation, trade, 
nutrition, rural development, energy, and more.11 The Farm Bill 
is legislation that has tremendous impact, is vital to supporting 
strong agricultural and rural communities, and ensures millions of 
Americans have access to food.12 This legislation has unrealized 
potential to do great things, but it has to start with expanding the 
public’s perception of agricultural production and its role in our 
society.  
In order for the Farm Bill to grow, to modernize, and 
to reflect the current state of our country and needs, it is more 
important than ever that new coalitions of support be created to 
develop and support the Farm Bill. These coalitions need to more 
strongly reflect all voices, move beyond the “us vs them/urban vs 
rural” mentality, and reflect the changing environment and needs 
of the current economy and population.  In doing so, I believe we 
will see not only stronger legislation addressing environmental, 
rural, nutritional, agricultural, and scientific needs, but find a path 
that will provide for a more collaborative and less contentious 
path moving forward.
9  Id. at 4.
10 What is the Farm Bill? Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., http://
sustainableagriculture.net/our-work/campaigns/fbcampaign/what-is-the-farm-bill/ 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
11  See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649, https://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr2642enr/pdf/BILLS-113hr2642enr.pdf. 
12  See Vilsack, supra note 1.
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Changing Rural Economies and US Population Divides
At the time of the first Farm Bill, in the 1930s, rural 
Americans and those involved in agriculture made up a higher 
percent of the population that what we see today.13 When the U.S. 
began collecting farm census data in 1920, the population was 
approximately 105.7 million, and the farm population was just 
over 30.2% of the total population.14  As of 2016, less than 2% 
of the population was directly involved in agriculture,15 and only 
14% of the population resides in rural parts of the country (with 
continued downward population trends).16 However, agriculture 
is 6% of the overall economy and 10% of US employment 
overall.17 I do not expect that the number of farms will grow in 
the near future (the last USDA Census of Agriculture reported 
approximately 2.1 million farms in 2012, down from 2.2 million 
in 2007);18 I do expect that agricultural-related employment 
will increase.  Examples of growth areas include wind and solar 
energy, which are tightly connected to agriculture and continue 
to expand, even as we see industries like biofuel slow.19  There 
13  See U.S. Census Bureau, Urban and Rural Population 1900-1990 (1995), 
https://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urpop0090.txt (identifying 
downward trends in rural population as a percentage of total population over time).  
14  Farm Population Lowest Since 1850’s, N.Y. Times (July 20, 1988), http://www.
nytimes.com/1988/07/20/us/farm-population-lowest-since-1850-s.html. 
15  Employment Projections: Employment by major industry sector, U.S. Dept. of 
Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stat., https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_201.htm (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2018).
16  U.S. Dept. of Agric, Rural America at a Glance, 2017 Edition 1 (2017) https://
www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/85740/eib-182.pdf?v=43054. 
17  Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy, U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. 
Serv.,  https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-
essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy.aspx (last updated Oct.18, 2017).
18  U.S. Dept. of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture, Highlights: Farms & 
Farmland 1 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_
Resources/Highlights/Farms_and_Farmland/Highlights_Farms_and_Farmland.pdf. 
19  See Daniel Cusick, Wind and Solar Growth Outpace Gas, Scientific American 
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wind-and-solar-
growth-outpace-gas/; Renewable Energy and Agriculture: A Natural Fit, Union 
of Concerned Scientists, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-
solutions/increase-renewables/renewable-energy-and.html#.WtAe6YjwbIU (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2018) (providing four fact sheets on renewable energy and the natural 
synergy with agricultural and rural America); Daniel Cusick, Farmers Find a New 
Cash Crop: Renewable Energy , Scientific American (Nov. 26, 2014), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/farmers-find-new-cash-crop-renewable-
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is also growth, with the potential for much more, in the sciences 
and agricultural-related technology, as we seek means to 
address concerns such as climate change, water quality, and soil 
health.20 Agriculture as a whole is an industry that matters for so 
many reasons and to different people for different reasons, yet 
Americans are increasingly removed from rural American and 
agricultural production,21 leading to many misunderstandings and 
misconceptions about the impact of agriculture on our everyday 
lives. One of the most direct effects is the fact that Americans pay 
a lower percentage of household income on food than the rest of 
the developed world, in some cases much, much less.22 That is 
due, at least in part, to our agricultural policies such as those in 
the Farm Bill.
However, the importance of agriculture to those not 
directly connected has waned over the years.  Only 14% of the 
U.S. population resides in rural areas, despite almost 75% of 
energy/; Michael Essery, Global Biofuels to Rise to 67 Billion Gallons in 2022 as 
Next-Generation Technologies Take Over, LuxResearch (Feb. 14 2017), http://www.
luxresearchinc.com/news-and-events/press-releases/read/global-biofuels-rise-67-
billion-gallons-2022-next-generation. 
20  See Organisation for Economic Development, Agriculture and Climate 
Change 1 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/tad/sustainable-agriculture/agriculture-
climate-change-september-2015.pdf (discussing use of technical solutions to help 
mitigate role of agriculture in climate change); David Austin & Molly K. Macauley, 
Cutting Through Environmental Issues: Technology as a Double-Edged Sword, 
Brookings Institute (Dec. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/cutting-
through-environmental-issues-technology-as-a-double-edged-sword/ (highlighting 
technology as a tool, but also a concern, when it comes to addressing environmental 
challenges related to climate and water quality, among others); Katharine Garvin, 
Wilton Park, Conference Report: Global Food Security: The Roles of 
Science and Technology 1 (Oct. 2012), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/Global%20food%20security%20the%20role%20of%20science%20
and%20technology.pdf (identifying need to develop new and adopt emerging 
technologies that address many of the concerns related to food security worldwide). 
21  See Mike Maciag, America’s Rural-Urban Divide is Growing, Governing (Apr. 28, 
2013), http://www.governing.com/gov-americas-rural-urban-divide-is-growing.html. 
22  See U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Percent of consumer expenditures 
spent on food, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco that were consumed at home, 
by selected countries (2016); https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/50606/
table97_2016.xlsx?v=43019 (providing map highlighting expenditures by country); 
Alex Gray, Which Countries Spend the Most on Food? This Map Will Show You, 
World Economic Forum (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/
this-map-shows-how-much-each-country-spends-on-food/. 
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the U.S. land base considered rural.23 The urban/rural divide is 
also seen in the composition of the elected officials who draft 
and debate the Farm Bill, with over 80% of our elected officials 
not representing rural parts of the country.24  When some of the 
more modern battles over the Farm Bill began, nutrition support 
programs (formerly called food stamps) were combined with the 
more traditional agricultural support programs, making the bill 
more appealing to a broader audience.25  Over time, though, that 
coalition of support has been waning, leading to prolonged battles 
each renewal cycle,26 and I believe a process that has kept the 
Farm Bill from evolving in a way that more directly reflects and 
meets both our current and future needs in the agricultural sector. 
That is not to say that there are not changes to the Farm 
Bill with each cycle.  Some years those changes have been more 
profound than others.27  I believe that, overall, the Farm Bill has 
maintained its status quo over the years in terms of the core types 
of programs and support, despite the addition of new or pilot 
programs or making changes to existing programs or payment 
types. It also demonstrates the strength of the coalitions that seek 
to help define two of the key aspects of the Farm Bill: commodity 
support (including direct support and crop insurance) and nutrition 
23  U.S. Dept. of Agric., supra note 16.
24  Christopher Doering, As More Move to the City, Does Rural America Still Matter?, 
USA Today (Jan 13, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/12/
rural-decline-congress/1827407/. 
25  See Philip Brasher, Lesson #4: Linking Farm, Food Programs is Crucial to Farm 
Bill Passage, AgriPulse (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8996-
lesson-4-linking-farm-food-programs-is-crucial-to-farm-bill-success; see 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Short History of SNAP, U.S. 
Dept. of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-
history-snap (last updated Nov. 28, 2017).
26  See e.g., Sara Wyant, Lesson #1, Every Farm Bill is Unique, The Last One Was a 
Doozy, AgriPulse (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8894-lesson-
1-every-farm-bill-is-unique-the-last-one-was-a-doozy.
27  See e.g., Ralph M. Chite, Congressional Res. Serv., The 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 
113-79): Summary and Side-by-Side i (2014), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/R43076.pdf (highlighting significant changes to traditional 
commodity support payment programs); see generally Neil D. Hamilton, The 2014 
Farm Bill: Lessons in Patience, Politics and Persuasion, 19 Drake J. Agric. L 1, 1-37 
(2014) (identifying key elements and changes in the 2014 Farm Bill).
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programs.28
It is in many ways necessary to keep the status quo though 
to maintain a core coalition of legislative support.29  Despite 
changes on the surface of the law, certain new initiatives, 
and various attempts to modernize it, I believe the Farm Bill 
remains more reactive than proactive. It reacts to current market 
conditions and needs, and it primarily reacts to the current state of 
the industry and world.30 While the Farm Bill is an important part 
of agricultural policy that provides support to many individual 
and organizations, it could do so much more by helping shape 
the future of the industry instead of focusing on the current state 
of the industry. A shift in focus, in long-term goals, and in the 
coalitions of legislators and organizations that help shape the 
Farm Bill, would provide an opportunity to draft a Farm Bill 
that would proactively lead and shape our food and agricultural 
industries for the future. 
We must start from the premise that there is value in 
building and supporting a strong agricultural economy within 
the United States.  However, we need to make sure that the 
programs and policies in effect to do so also support the rest of 
our food, environmental, and energy needs.  Agriculture is not 
an insular industry.  We need to ensure that farmers producing 
our food supply have forms of support to ensure our industry 
thrives.  However, we also need to ensure that the agricultural 
28  See Agricultural Act of 2014: Highlights and Implications, U.S. Dept. of Agric., 
Econ. Res. Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/agricultural-act-of-2014-highlights-and-
implications/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2018) (noting that crop commodity payments and 
nutrition make up the main expenditures of the current Farm Bill); Stephanie Mercier, 
The Making of a Farm Bill, 31 Choices 1, 4 (2016), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/244572/2/cmsarticle_527.pdf (discussing in part the formation of coalitions 
to support key elements of the Farm Bill).  
29  See id. at 2, 4.
30  See generally Sara Wyant, Lesson #1, Every Farm Bill is Unique, The Last One 
Was a Doozy, AgriPulse (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8894-
lesson-1-every-farm-bill-is-unique-the-last-one-was-a-doozy   (noting that during 
the contentious debate surrounding the 2014 Farm Bill, net farm income peaked and 
legislators looked to the current environment and farm economy where prices, and 
spending, were high, stating that “From a political lens, some lawmakers said farmers 
were making too much money and didn’t need any more help from the government. 
And many commercial farmers and ranchers weren’t terribly interested in what the 
government, or more specifically, the farm bill, could do for them”).
2018] Proactive Policies: Building Farm Bill of Future 79
support is done in a way that complements and supports other 
U.S. policy priorities and interests, including public health and 
environmental concerns.31  If we do not separate agriculture from 
other interests, but instead think of them as a complementary 
and dependent pieces of a larger puzzle, can we start to ease 
some of the contention and divides when it comes to the Farm 
Bill?  Perhaps we can then realize that the agricultural industry 
of the future is more than just commodity production, and that 
for agriculture to succeed, it needs to be deeply intertwined with 
environmental, energy, research, and rural interests. This can 
be done, with goals such as fighting climate change,32 building 
stronger rural communities,33 improving nutrition and access to 
healthy foods,34 and in particular, harnessing the focus on STEM 
initiatives to support public research providing tools and solutions 
that will allow agriculture to thrive in the future both domestically 
and abroad.35
By developing a more holistic Farm Bill, and by building 
new coalitions with equal voices and input from numerous areas, 
31 See generally Network for Public Heath, Issue Brief: How the Farm Bill 
Affects Public Health 1 (2011), https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/76kz89/
Farm-Bill-and-Public-Health-FINAL.pdf (noting four key areas “in which the Farm 
Bill affects health: nutrition, environmental health, emergency preparedness and 
community health” and identifying areas of opportunity for improvement).
32  See Todd Edwards & Matt Russell, Earth Friendly Agriculture for Soil, Water, 
and Climate: A Multijurisdictional Cooperative Approach; 21 Drake J. Agric. L. 
325, 339-40 (2016) (discussing how the Farm Bill could be used to create a market 
for environmental services, similar to that being done to create a market for farm 
products in the energy sector).
33  See U.S. Dept. of Agric., Report to the President of the United States from 
the Task Force on Agriculture and Rural Prosperity 2-3 (2018), https://www.
usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/rural-prosperity-report.pdf (identifying over 
100 recommendations for the federal government to consider in order to help improve 
life in rural America, centered around e-connectivity, economic development, 
innovation and technology, workforce, and quality of life).
34  See Center for Science in the Public Interest, Nutrition Policies for 2018 
Farm Bill 1 (2017), https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment/2018-farm-
nutrition-bill.pdf (PDF download available on webpage) (stating “recommendations 
to address hunger while improving nutrition and health, and to increase access to 
affordable, nutritious food, particularly for vulnerable populations” from numerous 
organizations).
35  See Joyce E. Parker & David J. Wagner, From the USDA: Educating the Next 
Generation: Funding Opportunities in Food, Agricultural, Natural Resources, and 
Social Sciences Education, 15 CBE – Life Sciences Education 1, 1 (2016), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5008903/pdf/fe5.pdf. 
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there is also the potential to lessen, if not remove, the legislative 
strife that occurs every Farm Bill cycle.36 The more that private 
and public industries and individuals can work together to get 
behind proactive and innovative policies, the more likely our 
politicians are to listen and provide support. 
Shifting power of the consumer
As we talk about building new coalitions and a broad base 
of support (and understanding) for future Farm Bills, we cannot 
overlook the role and power of the consumer in this process.
Consumers are increasingly exhibiting power over the 
agricultural sector.37  You can often hear examples in the news, 
from increased demand to know how food is produced and 
where it originates,38 to recently causing several of the world’s 
leading food manufacturers to make major changes in agricultural 
inputs and ingredients.39 Food manufacturers are showing an 
increasing inclination to respond to consumers when it comes to 
certain demands and concerns, and this has a direct impact on 
agricultural producers.  If more and more major food companies 
decide to source sugar from non-GE sources, the market for 
36  See Hamilton, supra note 27, at 2-5 (discussing the hotly debated, and delayed, 
process that went into crafting and passing the 2014 Farm Bill).
37  See Label Insight, 2016 Label Insight Food Revolution Study, How 
Consumer Demand for Transparency is Shaping the Food Industry 2 
(2016), https://www.labelinsight.com/hubfs/Label_Insight-Food-Revolution-Study.
pdf?hsCtaTracking=fc71fa82-7e0b-4b05-b2b4-de1ade992d33%7C95a8befc-d0cc-
4b8b-8102-529d937eb427.  
38  Id.; see e.g., Center for Food Integrity, Press Release, Most Consumers 
Say They Lack Access to Information about Food: How Can the Food 
Industry Satisfy Their Appetites? 1, 1-2 (2016), http://www.foodintegrity.org.
s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Consumers-Say-They-Lack-Access-
to-Information-About-Food-CFI.pdf; see e.g., Isaac Fletcher, Food Producers: 
Consumers Demand Transparency, FoodOnline (June 6, 2014), https://www.
foodonline.com/doc/food-producers-consumers-demand-transparency-0001. 
39  Dannon Announces Breakthrough Sweeping Commitment for Sustainable 
Agriculture, More Natural Ingredients and Greater Transparency, Dannon (Apr. 
27, 2016), http://www.dannon.com/the-dannon-pledge-on-sustainable-agriculture-
naturality-and-transparency/;  Tom Meersman, Hershey Dumps Sugar Beets Because 
of GM Concerns, Star Tribune (Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/
hershey-dumps-sugar-beets-because-of-gm-concerns/363498311/; Jane Lindholm, 
Some Food Companies are Quietly Dumping GMO Ingredients, Nat’l Pub. Radio 
(July 22, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/07/22/333725880/some-
food-producers-are-quietly-dumping-gmo-ingredients.   
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genetically-engineered sugar beets will be severely impacted. 
Farmers may seek alternative seed sources, but could find that 
there are not sufficient supplies of non-GE seeds available, or that 
those available may not respond as well to our current climate and 
volatile weather patterns. Consumers, with a demand for non-GE, 
non-organic products initiated this action which trickles down not 
only to the producer, but to the many industries and entities that 
are depending on that crop throughout the growing cycle: input 
suppliers, processing companies, the rural communities and towns 
where these entities are located, and the many employees that 
live and work in these communities. We cannot have a discussion 
about food and agricultural industry power dynamics and policy 
initiatives without including the consumer as a voice.  
Conclusion
As a colleague of mine told me, “Agriculture solves 
human problems.”  Agriculture has the potential to solve many of 
our human problems, only one of which is how we feed a growing 
population. The more we think of the Farm Bill as a proactive 
tool for solving developing problems and designing the food and 
agricultural system of the future, and not just one supporting our 
current systems and policies, the better chance we have to expand 
and develop effective and efficient farm policies.  If we continue 
with the status quo, with the same coalitions, the same fights, and 
ultimately, a newer version of essentially the same bill, that will 
not happen.
Change is not easy, nor does it come fast. Revamping 
our Farm Bill in a way to make it a proactive tool that can do 
everything we ask of it to do in its many Titles will take time, 
concerted effort, and the dedication and support of a broad group 
of coalitions and organizations.  In our current political climate, 
I remain skeptical of any real success in this area.  However, I 
remain hopeful that coalition-building in the private sector may 
start to occur and that rural and urban interests, environmental 
and agricultural interests, and those seeking to ensure there is a 
sufficient and nutritious food supply available to all, can start to 
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build relationships.40  We need to move beyond our traditional 
camps and the entrenched interests and instead build relationships 
that can help build bridges, reduce misunderstandings and 
misconceptions, encourage education and cooperation, and better 
realize the potential of what food and agricultural policy, and the 
Farm Bill in particular, can be. 
If we want to develop a strong agricultural industry, one 
built around strong rural communities and with policies in place 
that support environmental, energy, and public health goals, then 
it is time to come together. Agriculture is not an insular industry, 
and in order for it to succeed, it needs to be a partner in all ways 
with consumers and even opposing interest, to craft the Farm Bill 
of the future. Starting small and having these conversations on 
a local level, hoping to build upon them from there, is a good 
first step.  These are big hopes and big goals, but there is real 
potential if we all come together in a constructive fashion to build 
a sustainable agricultural system that truly meets the needs of the 
country and the world, beyond all that it does now.
40 We are seeing many new voices emerge in the Farm Bill discussion and seek to have 
influence, but a key step is encouraging collaboration and not competition among the 
various groups, while ensuring groups with historically less impact on the process 
are heard as well. See D. Lee Miller, A Seat at the Table: New Voices Urge Farm 
Bill Reform, 127 Yale L.J. F. 395, 409 (2017) (discussing role of coalition of food 
law and policy professionals in advocating for Farm Bill reform); see Our Mission, 
Plate of the Union, http://www.plateoftheunion.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 12, 
2018) (announcing a new collaborative campaign for Farm Bill advocacy between a 
series of partners). See also, Susan Schneider, Food Farming and Sustainability: 
Readings in Agricultural Law 18 (2d ed. 2016) (stating that “development of 
agricultural laws and overall farm policy have traditionally been left to those involved 
in the industry…In recent years, however, a variety of voices outside of the agricultural 
industry have increasingly sought a place at the table in agricultural policy debates 
… [and are] often critical of not only agricultural policies but food policies as well.”).
The SNAP Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Debate: Restricting 
Purchases to Improve Health Outcomes of Low-Income 
Americans
Nicole E. Negowetti*
Introduction 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)1 
is a highly effective government program that reduces poverty 
and improves food security for millions of our country’s most 
vulnerable families.  SNAP is the nation’s most important and 
largest anti-hunger and anti-poverty food and nutrition benefits 
program.2 It is the nation’s “first line of defense” against hunger 
and serves as the foundation of America’s nutrition safety net.3 
It aims to address food insecurity and improve food access by 
increasing the food purchasing power of low-income households.4 
SNAP assists low-income households to meet their food needs by 
providing cash benefits via a debit card that can only be spent on 
food.  Households may not use SNAP benefits to purchase alcohol, 
tobacco, household supplies, pet food, vitamins, medicines, food 
to be eaten in the store, or prepared foods.5 Approximately 42 
million Americans—or 13 percent of the population—depend on 
these benefits to purchase food.6  Nearly 40 percent of all SNAP 
* Clinical Instructor, Harvard Law School Food Law and Policy Clinic
1  7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2012).
2  Id. (Subtitle A of the 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized appropriations for SNAP through 
fiscal year 2018).
3  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Building a Healthy America: A Profile of the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 1 (2012), https://fns-prod.
azureedge.net/sites/default/files/BuildingHealthyAmerica.pdf. 
4  Id.
5  Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): What Can SNAP Buy?, U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligible-food-
items (last updated Nov. 17, 2017).
6  Maria Godoy & Allison Aubrey, Trump Wants Families On Food Stamps To Get 
Jobs. The Majority Already Work, NPR: The Salt (May 24, 2017), https://www.npr.
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recipients live in households with earnings and half of SNAP 
recipients are children.7  
SNAP is reauthorized pursuant to the farm bill and 
is jointly administered by the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) and states.8 Congress changed the 
program’s name from “Food Stamps Program” to “SNAP” in 
2008, declaring that SNAP’s purpose is to “permit low-income 
households to obtain a more nutritious diet,” to raise their “levels 
of nutrition,” and alleviate “hunger and malnutrition.”9 The goal 
of providing eligible households with an “opportunity to obtain a 
more nutritious diet” was also emphasized in the text of the law 
establishing the program.10 Despite these declarations, there are 
no nutrition standards accompanying the redemption of SNAP 
benefits.11 This has fueled a debate about whether the program 
should actually provide nutrition assistance, or whether it should 
simply provide supplemental income for food purchases.12 
When SNAP was first implemented in 1939, the program 
was designed to address calorie insufficiency and was also intended 
to reduce agricultural surpluses.13 Eight decades later, nutrition-
related health challenges have changed significantly. In the U.S. 
approximately one third of adults are obese.14 The prevalence of 
org/sections/thesalt/2017/05/24/529831472/trump-wants-families-on-food-stamps-
to-get-jobs-the-majority-already-work; Policy Basics: The Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, https://www.cbpp.
org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
program-snap (last updated Feb. 13, 2018).
7  Brian Barth, How Would Trump’s Food Stamp Cuts Hurt Americans? Let Us Count 
the Ways, Modern Farmer (July 13, 2017), https://modernfarmer.com/2017/07/
trump-snap-benefit-cuts/. 
8  7 U.S.C. § 2011 (Subtitle A of the 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized appropriations for 
SNAP through fiscal year 2018).
9  Id.
10  7 U.S.C. § 2013(a).
11  Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Jamie F. Chriqui, The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program: Analysis of Program Administration and Food Law Definitions, 49 Am. J. 
Prev. Med. 428, 428 (2015).
12  Id. 
13  Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Short History of SNAP, U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-
snap (last updated Nov. 28, 2017).
14  Adult Obesity Facts, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.
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diabetes continues to climb, with 30.3 million Americans suffering 
from the disease, and approximately 84.1 million adults have 
prediabetes.15 There is an undeniable link between rising rates 
of obesity and rising medical spending. Medical costs associated 
with obesity (which largely fall on Medicare and Medicaid) are 
estimated to be at least $147 billion per year.16 
A.  Poverty and Health: the Paradox of Food Insecurity 
and Obesity 
The U.S. now faces a food insecurity-obesity 
paradox, where many individuals suffer from both conditions 
simultaneously.17 The problem is now a lack of access to affordable, 
healthy food, rather than calorie deficits. In the United States, 15.6 
million households—comprising about 12.3 percent of the U.S. 
population18—experience food insecurity, defined as “difficulty 
at some time during the year providing enough food for all their 
members due to a lack of resources.”19  Low-income individuals 
are likely able to obtain enough calories but these calories may 
come from cheap foods that are calorically dense and nutritionally 
poor.20 A USDA study using data from the National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) showed that SNAP 
participants were more likely than income-eligible and higher 
cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2018).
15  Statistics About Diabetes: Overall Numbers, Diabetes and Prediabetes, American 
Diabetes Ass’n, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-basics/statistics/?referrer=https://
www.google.com/ (last updated Mar. 22, 2018).
16  See Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: 
Payer and Service-Specific Estimates, 28 Health Affairs w822, w822 (2009).
17  See Food Research & Action Center, Understanding the Connections: Food 
Security and Obesity 1 (2015), http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/frac_brief_
understanding_the_connections.pdf. 
18  Key Statistics & Graphics: Food Security Status of U.S. Households in 2016, U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-
nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/key-statistics-graphics.aspx 
(last updated Oct. 4, 2017).
19  Alisha Coleman-Jensen et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., 
Household Food Security in the United States in 2015 i (2016), https://www.
ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/79761/err-215.pdf?v=42636. 
20  Alice S. Ammerman et al., Behavioral Economics and the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program: Making the Healthy Choice the Easy Choice, 52 Am. J. Prev. 
Med. S145, S145 (2017).
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income nonparticipants to be obese (40 percent versus 32 percent 
and 30 percent, respectively).21 Although there is mixed evidence 
about a causal relationship between obesity and food insecurity,22 
there is agreement that food insecurity and diet-related diseases 
co-occur in communities, families, and individuals.23 Because 
both food insecurity and obesity are consequences of economic 
and social disadvantage, it not surprising that these conditions 
coexist.24 
Several theories have been offered to explain the paradox 
of food insecurity and obesity. Some argue that food insecurity 
and obesity are independent consequences of poverty and the 
resulting lack of access to enough nutritious food or stresses of 
poverty and that obesity among food insecure and low-income 
people occurs in part because they are subject to the same 
challenging cultural changes as other Americans (e.g., more 
sedentary lifestyles,25 increased portion sizes), and also because 
they face unique challenges in adopting and maintaining healthful 
behaviors.26 Low-income families may spend their limited food 
budget on high-calorie, low-quality products. 27 They may also 
experience variation in food availability, causing them to  over-
21  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., Diet Quality Of Americans By 
Snap Participation Status: Data From The National Health And Nutrition 
Examination Survey, 2007-2010 – Summary 1 (2015), https://fns-prod.azureedge.
net/sites/default/files/ops/NHANES-SNAP07-10-Summary.pdf. 
22  See Marlene B. Schwartz, Moving Beyond the Debate, 52 Am. J. Prev. Med. S199, 
S201 (2017) (noting that because it is a difficult empirical question, there is considerable 
debate in the scientific literature about the strength of evidence demonstrating whether 
SNAP participants are at higher risk of poor diet than the general population). 
23  Id. at S199.
24  Food Research & Action Center, supra note 17, at 1.
25  Id. at 4. (“There is emerging evidence that food insecurity is associated with less 
physical activity (a risk factor for obesity) and greater perceived barriers to physical 
activity (e.g., too tired to be physically active). In addition, many studies find that 
low-income populations engage in less physical activity and are less physically fit 
than their higher income peers. This is not surprising, given that many environmental 
barriers, such as lack of attractive and safe places to be physically active, to physical 
activity exist in low-income communities.”).
26  Id. at 3.
27  David S. Ludwig et al, Opportunities to Reduce Childhood Hunger and Obesity 
Restructuring the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (the Food Stamp 
Program), 308 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2567, 2567 (2012).
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consume food  at the beginning of the month after receiving 
SNAP benefits and then to go without adequate food at the end of 
the month when benefits have run out. 28 
In addition to higher rates of obesity, low-income people 
face heightened risk of diet-related chronic diseases that directly 
relate to poor dietary choices—approximately 70 percent higher 
prevalence of diabetes and 19 percent higher prevalence of 
hypertension, compared with the highest-income population.29 
These health disparities have precipitated a national conversation 
about how the government can harmonize its efforts to improve 
nutrition with those to reduce food insecurity. 30 This essay 
examines the debate surrounding a longstanding and controversial 
proposal to improve the health of SNAP recipients—restricting 
the purchase of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) with SNAP 
benefits. This article first  provides a brief history of proposals to 
restrict SNAP purchases to improve nutrition.  
I.  A brief history of proposals to restrict SSB
Although proposals to restrict SNAP purchases have 
received considerable attention over the past several years,31 the 
idea of restricting SNAP is not new. Policymakers at the federal 
and state governments have proposed restrictions multiple 
times since the program began.  Changes to SNAP would need 
to be authorized or mandated by the federal government and 
implemented by states or localities.32 Congress can require 
the USDA to either pilot a program,33 or engage in notice and 
comment rulemaking to amend SNAP guidelines, perhaps to 
reflect nutrition science and public health concerns.34
28  Id.
29  Susan M. Levin et al., A Proposal for Improvements in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, Am. J. Prev. Med. S186, S186 (2017).
30  Schwartz, supra note 22, at S199.
31  See id.
32  See Pomeranz & Chriqui, supra note 11, at 432. 
33  See id. 
34  Id. Congress required the USDA to open rulemaking to revise the Women, Infants 
and Children (WIC) Program food package. See Women, Infants and Children (WIC) 
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State agencies administering SNAP have requested waivers 
of the USDA to implement pilot programs restricting the purchase 
of certain unhealthy foods. In 2004, Minnesota’s Department of 
Human Services petitioned the USDA for permission to exclude 
soft drinks and candy from the foods eligible for purchase with 
SNAP.35  In 2007, the USDA explained its rationale for rejecting 
the waiver in a position paper, Implications of Restricting the 
Use of Food Stamp Benefits, asserting that “there are serious 
problems with the rationale, feasibility and potential effectiveness 
of” prohibitions on types of foods that could be purchased with 
SNAP.36  In 2010, New York State submitted a proposal to the 
USDA to administer a demonstration project in New York City 
that would restrict SSBs from SNAP to test whether a restriction 
would lead to changes in consumption of sweetened beverages 
and other food groups among SNAP recipients, as well as whether 
a restriction could be implemented.37 The USDA has consistently 
denied all requests for waivers.38 Most recently, the USDA denied 
Maine’s second request for a restriction on the purchase of candy 
and SSBs with SNAP.39
Background: Revisions to the WIC Food Package, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & 
Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/background-revisions-wic-food-
package (last updated Feb. 14, 2018).
35  Letter from Ollice Holden, Regional Administrator, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
to Maria Gomez, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human 
Services (May 4, 2004), https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/
publications/15364.pdf. 
36  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., Implications Of Restricting 
The Use Of Food Stamp Benefits – Summary 1 (2007), https://fns-prod.azureedge.
net/sites/default/files/FSPFoodRestrictions.pdf.
37  N.Y. State Office of Temp. & Disability Assistance, A Proposal to Create a 
Demonstration Project in New York City to Modify Allowable Purchases 
Under the Federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 2 (2010), 
https://www.empirecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/snap-proposal.pdf. 
38  Marion Nestle, USDA Asks Maine for More Information—lot more—about its 
SNAP Waiver Request, Food Politics (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.foodpolitics.
com/2017/04/usda-asks-maine-for-more-information-about-its-snap-waiver-request-
lots-more/. 
39  Eric Russell, Feds Tell Maine: You Can’t Ban Food Stamp Recipients From Buying 
Sugary Drinks, Candy, Portland Press Herald (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/01/19/feds-again-reject-lepage-request-to-ban-
food-stamp-recipients-from-buying-sugary-drinks-candy/. 
2018] SNAP Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Debate 89
State legislators in states including California,40 Illinois,41 
Maine,42 and West Virginia43 have also proposed a range of bills 
that would permit their states to seek a waiver from the USDA, 
conduct a pilot program, or pass a resolution urging Congress to 
remove certain foods from SNAP eligibility.44 
Federal and local leaders have also called on Congress and 
the USDA to allow pilot programs to restrict purchases with SNAP, 
to no avail.  In 2013, Senators Harkin and Coburn attempted to 
amend the Farm Bill to allow SNAP demonstration projects in two 
states to promote the purchase of healthier food.45 Mayors of 18 
major cities across the United States, including Boston, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, and New York  similarly called on Congress to allow 
the opportunity to “test and evaluate” restrictions on SSBs while 
also incentivizing the purchase of healthier foods.46 When Harkin 
and Coburn’s amendment failed to pass, the Senators urged the 
USDA to engage in two demonstration projects on its own to limit 
the use of SNAP benefits on foods that are over-consumed and 
may increase risk of chronic disease.47 The USDA rejected this 
request.48  
40  S.B. 134, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (banning the purchase of calorically sweetened 
beverages).
41  H.B. 0177, 98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (proposal to ban the purchase of carbonated 
soft drinks, snack cakes, candies, chewing gum, flavored ice bars, fried, high-fat 
chips with SNAP).
42  S. Res. 505, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013) (prohibiting the purchase of 
foods not “consumed for human nourishment,” including soft drinks, iced tea, sodas, 
fountain beverages, candy, confections, and prepared food).
43  S.B. 262, 2014 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (banning the purchase of soft drinks, 
carbonated beverages, candy, cookies, crackers, ice cream with SNAP).
44  Pomeranz & Chriqui, supra note 11, at 430.
45  77 Cong. Rec. S3911 (2013).
46  Letter from Mayors of Baltimore et al. to Speaker Boehner and Minority Leader 
Pelosi (June 18, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2013/snap_letter_to_
house_6_18_13.pdf.  
47  Letter from Center from Science in the Public Interest to Thomas Vilsack, Secretary 
of Agriculture (Aug. 1, 2013), https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment/
organizations-letter-to-vilsack-8-1-13.pdf. 
48  Pomeranz & Chriqui, supra note 11, at 439.
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II.   Targeting SSBs to Improve Nutrition and Health  
Unlike proposals from states and advocates calling for a 
ban on a variety of “junk foods” (e.g., candy, chips, snack cakes, 
etc.) with SNAP, a restriction of just SSBs is based on clear 
evidence of the harms of added sugar and the potential impact to 
improve public health. The USDA’s Dietary Guidelines note that 
beverages, including soft drinks, fruit drinks, and energy drinks, 
are the major source of added sugars in typical U.S. diets—almost 
half of added sugars consumed by the U.S. population come from 
sweetened beverages.49 Scientific evidence suggests that the 
consumption of SSBs, can have profound and serious negative 
effects on health, especially among children.50 As the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, (CDC) has recognized, 
frequently drinking SSBs is associated with weight gain/obesity, 
type 2 diabetes, heart disease, kidney diseases, non-alcoholic 
liver disease, tooth decay and cavities, and gout.51 Reducing 
the consumption of SSBs also follows the guidelines of leading 
health agencies such as the World Health Organization, the 
National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, the Institute of Medicine, and the Surgeon General of 
the United States.52 The USDA itself urges Americans to “drink 
water instead of sugary drinks.”53 As the bipartisan National 
49  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2015-2020 54-55 (8th 
ed. 2015) https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_Dietary_
Guidelines.pdf. 
50  See, e.g., Lenny R. Vartanian et al., Effects of Soft Drink Consumption On Nutrition 
And Health: A Systematic Review And Metaanalysis, 97 Am. J. Public Health 
667, 667 (2007); Vasanti S. Malik & Frank B. Hu, Fructose And Cardiometabolic 
Health: What The Evidence From Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Tells Us, 66 J. Am. 
Coll. Cardiol. 1615, 1616 (2015); Vasanti S. Malik & Frank B. Hu, Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverages And Health: Where Does The Evidence Stand? 94 Am. J. Clin. Nutr. 1161, 
1162 (2011).
51  Get the Facts: Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Consumption, Centers for Disease 
Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/nutrition/data-statistics/sugar-
sweetened-beverages-intake.html (last updated April 7, 2017).
52  Nat’l Comm’n on Hunger, Freedom from Hunger: An Achievable Goal for 
the United States of America: Recommendations of the National Commission 
on Hunger to Congress and the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture 
44 (2015).
53  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Find Your Healthy Eating Style & Maintain It for a 
Lifetime (2016).  
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Commission on Hunger54 reasoned in supporting a restriction on 
the purchase of SSB, SNAP benefits should help families meet 
their nutritional needs, not contribute to negative health outcomes 
through poor nutrition choices.55  “With its right hand, the federal 
government funds nutrition education and wellness programs 
to encourage healthy eating; but with its left hand, the federal 
government funds SNAP participants’ purchase and consumption 
of sweetened beverages.”56
SNAP is the only federal nutrition assistance program that 
fails to regulate the quality of foods that can be purchased and is 
the only one to subsidize the purchase of SSBs.57 This lack of focus 
on nutrition in SNAP may simultaneously exacerbate hunger and 
promote obesity.58 Sweetened beverages do not alleviate hunger 
because they do not satiate 59 and they have minimal nutritional 
value.60  To illustrate, if a child consumes 20 ounces of a sugary 
drink, she will become hungrier more quickly than if she ate a 
large apple and a large tablespoon of peanut butter, even though 
both contain same number of calories.61 The addition of SSBs 
merely adds excess calories and sugar, which contribute to 
obesity, diabetes, and other chronic diseases.62 By putting SSBs 
on the same economic basis as more-healthful choices, SNAP may 
54  The bipartisan National Commission on Hunger, established to identify solutions to 
hunger. Mariana Chilton & Robert Doar, Nat’l Comm’n on Hunger, Hearing 
Series: Past, Present, and Future of SNAP 2 (2015). The 10-member Commission, 
appointed by the House and Senate leadership, represented government, industry, 
academia, and nonprofit organizations. See id.
55  Id. at 6.
56  Anne Barnhill, Impact and Ethics of Excluding Sweetened Beverages From The 
SNAP Program, 101 Am. J. Pub. Health 2037, 2038 (2011).
57  Kelly Blondin, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Reform: A 21st Century 
Policy Debate, J. Sci. Pol’y Governance (2014), http://www.sciencepolicyjournal.
org/uploads/5/4/3/4/5434385/__blodin_snap.pdf. 
58  Ludwig et al., supra note 27, at 2567.
59  D. P. DiMeglio & R. D. Mattes, Liquid Versus Solid Carbohydrate: Effects on Food 
Intake and Body Weight, 24 Int. J. Obesity Related Metabolic Disorders 7941 794 
(2000).
60  School Meals: Foods of Minimal Nutritional Value, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food 
& Nutrition Serv., http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/menu/fmnv.htm (last updated Sept. 
13, 2013).
61  Ludwig et al., supra note 27, at 2567.
62  Id. at 2567-68.
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actually aggravate diet-related diseases.63 A nutrition assistance 
program that permits the purchase of SSBs is blatantly ignoring 
decades of research documenting the harm associated with these 
products.64 
While recent polls reveal that an overwhelming majority 
of American voters of both parties favor restricting SNAP 
benefits from being used to buy soda and candy,65 the issue has 
polarized typical allies—anti-hunger and public health nutrition 
groups.66 Arguments against a purchasing restriction in SNAP 
can be divided into two main themes: whether a restriction can 
successfully be implemented (i.e., whether it is feasible and likely 
to be effective) and whether it should be enacted (i.e., whether it 
is ethical to impose such a restriction). In the following sections, 
key arguments under each theme are explained and responded to 
in turn.
III.  Could it be done? The Feasibility and Effectiveness 
of a Restriction on SNAP 
The USDA and groups who oppose a SSB restriction 
in SNAP argue that such a policy would impose significant 
administrative burdens on the USDA, states administering the 
program, and retailers accepting SNAP benefits. In addition 
to these concerns about the feasibility of implementing a SSB 
63  Levin et al., supra note 29, at S191.
64  Vartanian et al., supra note 50, at 667, 671; Malik & Hu, supra note 50, at 1615-16. 
65  Steven Kull, Program for Public Consulation, Americans on SNAP Benefits 
6-7 (2017), http://vop.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/SNAP_Report.pdf. The study 
found that of the 7,000 voters polled, 73 percent were in favor for banning SNAP 
recipients from using their benefits to buy soda. Id. Eighty-two percent of Republican 
respondents and 67 percent of Democrats agreed with soda restrictions. Id. 
66  Schwartz, supra note 22, at S200. For example, when New York City requested a 
waiver from the USDA to conduct a pilot study to test the effect of restricting sugary 
drinks from purchase using SNAP benefits, the Food Research & Action Center 
published a report in opposition to changing SNAP. See Heather Hartline-Grafton 
et al., Food Research & Action Center, A Review Of Strategies To Bolster 
SNAP’s Role In Improving Nutrition As Well As Food Security 14 (2013), 
http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/SNAPstrategies_full-report.pdf. In contrast, the 
Center for Science in the Public Interest organized a letter signed by more than 50 
organizations and health experts to USDA Secretary Vilsack to allow pilot tests of 
restricting SSBs from SNAP. Letter from Center from Science in the Public Interest 
to Thomas Vilsack, supra note 47.
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restriction, some opponents of the policy have questioned 
whether it would have any impact on consumption of SSBs or 
health outcomes. Each argument is addressed below. 
A.  The Feasibility of Implementing a Ban on SSBs
One general argument against restricting certain foods 
from SNAP is that it would require the USDA to rate or rank 
foods on some type of nutrition scale, and second, it would need 
to define the uncertain boundaries of “healthy” and “unhealthy” 
foods.67 The USDA and others claim that doing so would be 
problematic because such a ranking system does not exist68—
the Dietary Guidelines recommend overall eating patterns, not 
specific foods.69 Another related concern is that this process will 
open up the floodgates of food industry lobbying to ensure that 
their products are not restricted, or alternatively, are incentivized.70 
While these issues may be relevant to a proposal for banning all 
“junk” food (over which debates could be had over the nutritional 
value of some granola bars, pretzels, chips, etc.), the evidence is 
quite established regarding the lack of nutritional value of SSBs.71
Another concern regarding feasibility of implementation 
is that imposing restrictions in the SNAP program would burden 
retailers. As a result, some retailers might stop accepting SNAP 
which could limit access for households.72 SNAP represents a large 
share of the national food budget and it seems unlikely that retailers 
would be deterred from participating because of an additional 
67  See Hartline-Grafton et al., supra note 66, at 14. 
68  Id. 
69  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 49.
70  See Margaret Sessa-Hawkins, Congress Could Cut Soda and Candy from SNAP, 
but Big Sugar is Pushing Back, Civil Eats (Aug. 28, 2017), https://civileats.
com/2017/08/28/congress-could-cut-soda-and-candy-from-snap-but-big-sugar-is-
pushing-back/  (discussing the push-back from the sugar industry to restrictions on 
candy and soda in SNAP). 
71  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 3-5.
72  See Jacob A. Klerman et al., Improving Nutrition by Limiting Choice in the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 52 Am. J. Prev. Med. S171, S175-76 
(2017).
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restriction.73 EBT systems are already capable of implementing 
restrictions. When the NY waiver was proposed, retailers were 
consulted about the ease or difficulty of implementing such a 
SSB restriction.74 Those with EBT systems indicated that it could 
be done fairly easily because restrictions are already in place for 
other purchases, such as alcohol or nonfood items.75  In addition, 
retailers who accept SNAP must already adhere to certain 
stocking requirements.76 The 2014 Farm Bill amended the Food 
and Nutrition Act of 2008 to increase the requirement that certain 
SNAP authorized retail food stores have available on a continual 
basis at least three varieties of items in each of four staple food 
categories, to a mandatory minimum of seven varieties—meat, 
poultry or fish; bread or cereals; vegetables or fruits; and dairy 
products.77
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, 
Infants, and Children (WIC) serves as another example of the 
feasibility of implementing nutrition standards in a public nutrition 
assistance program.78 WIC provides federal grants to states for 
supplemental foods, health care referrals, and nutrition education 
73  Id. at 176.
74  Angela Rachidi, American Enterprise Institute, The Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Time to Test a Sweetened Beverage 
Restriction, Statement before the House Committee on Agriculture On the 
Pros and Cons of Restricting SNAP Purchases 8 (2017), https://agriculture.
house.gov/uploadedfiles/rachidi_testimony.pdf
75  Id. 
76  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Regulatory Flexibility Analysis – Final
Rule: Enhancing Retailer Standards in SNAP: Changes to Depth of Stock 
and Stocking Requirements Using New Farm Bill Definition 1, 10 (2016), 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/RFA-Enhancing-Retailer-
Standards.pdf. 
77  Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), 81 Fed. Reg. 90,675, 90,675 (Dec. 15, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 
271 & 278).
78  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Finalizes Changes to the WIC Program, 
Expanding Access to Healthy Fruits and Vegetables, Whole Grains, and Low-
Fat Dairy for Women, Infants, and Children (Feb. 28, 2014), www.fns.usda.gov/
pressrelease/2014/003114. In addition, the USDA has improved the National School 
Lunch and Breakfast Programs and the Child and Adult Care Food Program. School 
Meals: Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition 
Serv., www.fns.usda.gov/school-meals/healthy-hunger-free-kids-act (last updated 
Oct. 5, 2017).
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for low-income pregnant, breastfeeding, and non-breastfeeding 
postpartum women, and to infants and children up to age five 
who are found to be at nutritional risk.79 WIC participants receive 
checks, vouchers, or an electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card to 
purchase specific nutritious foods each month to supplement their 
diets.80 Eligible foods include infant cereal, eggs, milk, cheese, 
peanut butter, dried and canned beans/peas, canned fish, soy-based 
beverages, tofu, fruits and vegetables, baby foods, whole-wheat 
bread.81 Unlike for SNAP, Congress directs the USDA to amend 
the WIC food package “to reflect nutrition science, public health 
concerns, and cultural eating patterns” at least every 10 years 
“to reflect the most recent scientific knowledge.”82 In 2005, the 
Institute of Medicine issued a report suggesting the USDA revise 
the WIC food package to encourage a healthier diet and match 
dietary guidance for infants and children.83 Based almost entirely 
on these recommendations, the USDA issued proposed rules and 
interim requirements that were finalized in 2014,84 strengthening 
WIC nutritional requirements to increase the allotment of whole 
grains, fruit, and vegetables; reduce juice; exclude white potatoes; 
and replace whole milk with low-fat or nonfat milk.85 The 
successful adoption of nutrition standards for WIC demonstrates 
the feasibility of supporting a pilot to test whether the restriction 
79  Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition 
Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/women-infants-and-children-wic (last updated 
Feb. 14, 2018).
80  Women, Infants and Children (WIC): Frequently Asked Questions about WIC,  U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/frequently-
asked-questions-about-wic#5 (last updated Apr. 20, 2018).
81  Id. 
82  42 U.S.C. § 1786 (2012) (section titled Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants, and Children).
83   Inst. of Med., WIC Food Packages: Time for a Change, National Academies 
Press 71 (2005). It is noteworthy that neither the USDA nor the anti-hunger 
organization Food Research & Action Center (FRAC) objected to revising the WIC 
food package. Food Research & Action Center, New WIC Food Packages 
Proposed: Preliminary Summary 2 (2006), www.dchunger.org/pdf/WIC%20
7Aug06.pdf.
84  Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC): 
Revisions in the WIC Food Packages, 71 Fed Reg. 44,784, 44,784 (Aug. 7, 2006) (to 
be codified at 7 C.F.R. 246).
85  7 C.F.R. § 246 (2018). 
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of SSB could support SNAP’s goal of improving nutrition of low-
income Americans.
There is also precedent from previous farm bills to 
fund projects that could improve health and nutrition of SNAP 
recipients. The 2008 Farm Bill authorized $20 million for pilot 
projects to evaluate health and nutrition promotion in SNAP to 
determine if incentives provided to SNAP recipients at the point-
of-sale increase the purchase of fruits, vegetables or other healthful 
foods.86 The Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP), which operated from 
2010 – 2013 demonstrated that providing incentives for fruits and 
vegetables increases consumption among SNAP participants.87 
A logical next step is for the 2018 Farm Bill to authorize a 
randomized controlled trial paralleling the Healthy Incentives 
Pilot trial, testing a ban on SSBs.88
HIC can serve as a model to test the SSB restriction.89 Just 
as the HIP reprogrammed retailers’ EBT data systems to identify 
and calculate incentives, the same could be done with a SSB 
restriction.90  Pilot participants assigned to the restriction group 
would receive special EBT cards and retailer EBT systems would 
be programmed to not allow SSB purchases among those SNAP 
households. Few retailers who participated in HIP identified 
problems with their EBT systems or store operations.91  Similarly, 
piloting a restriction on SNAP would not be overly burdensome on 
retailers. A pilot similar to HIP is thus both feasible and likely to 
provide a strong control study to demonstrate whether restrictions 
on the purchase of SSBs with SNAP reduce consumption and 
86  Healthy Incentives Program (HIP)—Basic Facts, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & 
Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/hip/healthy-incentives-pilot-hip-
basic-facts (last updated Apr. 20, 2014).
87  Susan Bartlett et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., 
Evaluation of the Healthy Incentive Pilot (HIP): Final Report 202 (2014), 
https://mafoodsystem.org/media/resources/pdfs/PilotFinalReport.pdf. 
88  Sanjay Basu et al., Ending SNAP Subsidies For Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Could 
Reduce Obesity and Type 2 Diabetes, 33 Health Affairs 1032, 1038 (2014).
89  Rachidi, supra note 74, at 8. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
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B.  Likelihood of Effectiveness
Some argue that restricting SSBs from SNAP will have 
little to no effect on consumption of SSBs because the majority 
of SNAP recipients can substitute their own funds to buy the 
excluded product.93 If total household expenditure on unhealthful 
foods was less than total household cash expenditure on food, 
the household can purchase healthful foods with SNAP and 
unhealthful foods with cash—with no change in total purchase 
or intake of unhealthful foods.94 While SNAP benefits make up 
a substantial share of the food budget in most SNAP households, 
they are modest—approximately $4.50 per person per day.95 
SNAP benefits do not necessarily provide the entire food budget, 
nor are they expected to do so.96 Nearly all families supplement 
their SNAP purchases with groceries purchased from their cash 
income. 97 As reflected in its name, SNAP is intended to be a 
supplemental program and consistent with the program’s intention, 
the SNAP benefit formula is calculated with the assumption that 
households spend 30 percentage of income on food.98  If SNAP 
recipients continue to purchase SSBs, then it is unlikely that a 
SSB restriction would actually change the nutrition profile of 
food purchases or induce any behavioral changes.99
A related concern is that the exclusion of sweetened 
beverages will cause SNAP participants to switch to other 
92  Id.
93  Jessica E. Todd & Michele Ver Ploeg, Restricting Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 
From SNAP Purchases Not Likely To Lower Consumption, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Econ. Research Serv. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/
march/restricting-sugar-sweetened-beverages-from-snap-purchases-not-likely-to-
lower-consumption/. 
94  Klerman et al., supra note 72, at S173.
95  Policy Basics: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), supra note 
6.
96  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 5. 
97  Id. 
98  Klerman et al., supra note 72, at S172.
99  Id. 
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beverages, such as diet soda, that have no nutritional value––a 
seemingly inefficient use of nutritional assistance funds.100 SNAP 
recipients could use their benefits to purchase other unhealthy 
foods, such as candy, chips, and cakes.  It is also argued that a 
SSB restriction without increased access to healthy foods could 
be ineffective because low-income households purchase energy-
dense foods because they are cheap and readily available source 
of calories.101
Other opponents of a restriction note the lack of evidence 
base demonstrating that a SSB restriction could improve diets 
or reduce obesity. 102 In addition, food choices are affected by a 
number of factors, including cost, taste, convenience, personal 
preference, and availability.103 Restricting food choice would not 
substantially change most of these factors.104
In response to these arguments, recent studies do show 
promising results about the potential for a SSB restriction to 
lead to reduced consumption of SSBs.  A recent study examined 
the effects of financial incentives for the purchase of fruits and 
vegetables, restriction of the purchase of SSBs, candy, and 
sweet baked goods, or both, on food purchases among lower 
income adults.105 Restricting the use of food program benefits for 
purchasing SSBs, sweet baked goods, and candy appeared to be 
effective in reducing the purchase of SSBs and sweet baked goods. 
The results suggest that interventions that limit SSB purchases 
may be effective in decreasing spending for these foods, and 
thus may contribute to improvements in dietary quality.106 Even 
though some out of pocket funds were used in place of food 
100  Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2039.
101  Hartline-Grafton et al., supra note 66, at 8. 
102  Id. at 15.
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Simone A. French et al., Financial Incentives And Purchase Restrictions In A Food 
Benefit Program Affect The Types Of Foods And Beverages Purchased: Results From 
A Randomized Trial, 14 Int. J. Behavioral Nutrition & Physical Activity 1, 2 
(2017).
106  Id. at 6. 
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benefit funds to purchase restricted foods, results suggest that out 
of pocket funds did not fully replace what otherwise may have 
been spent on these types of foods.107 Certainly, further research is 
warranted to explore the potential effects of a restriction on both 
food purchases and dietary intake of all household members.108 
That is precisely the reason to allow pilot programs.
Another study which used a combination of economic 
and epidemiological modeling techniques, concluded that a 
SSB restriction in SNAP is likely to significantly reduce obesity 
prevalence and type 2 diabetes incidence.109  The study combined 
data from a nationally representative dietary survey and a 
price database of nearly 20,000 children and adults in SNAP 
to simulate proposed SSB restriction.110  These data reveal that 
SNAP participants consume almost twice as many calories from 
SSBs as they do from vegetables and fruit, but they are sensitive 
to changes in SNAP benefits and food prices.111 The result of this 
study suggest that the impact of a SSB restriction could be very 
significant—obesity prevalence could decline by over 281,000 
adults and 141,000 children under a SSB restriction policy.112 
The researchers concluded that a policy to ban SSBs purchases 
made with SNAP dollars is more likely to significantly reduce 
obesity prevalence and type 2 diabetes incidence than a policy 
to subsidize vegetable and fruit purchases using SNAP dollars.113 
In addition, a USDA study of the Summer Electronic 
Benefit Transfer for Children Program published in 2016 supports 
these conclusions about the likely impact of a restriction on SSBs. 
The USDA study found that only a WIC– based model of food 
107  Id. at 8. 
108  Id.
109  Basu et al., supra note 88, at 1033, 1038. The largest effects in the model were 
observed among adults ages 18–65 and among nonblack, non-Mexican ethnic 
minorities such as other Latinos and Asians, although the effects remained significant 
for children and white populations as well. Id. at 1036.
110  Id. at 1037.
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. It is interesting to note that a vegetable and fruit subsidy had a nonsignificant 
effect on obesity and type 2 diabetes. Id. 
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assistance, which restricted what could be purchased with benefits 
(including SSBs), led to a reduction in SSB consumption among 
families who participated.114 The SNAP-based model, which had 
no restrictions, did not reduce SSB consumption.115
The effectiveness of a restriction on SSB purchases and 
consumption is an empirical question that requires a pilot test 
of the policy to answer. As the USDA itself has stated, “There 
is no way to know – other than through carefully designed and 
evaluated pilot tests – to what extent the proposed restriction 
would have the desired effect of reducing purchases of foods with 
limited nutritional value.”116
IV. Should it be Done? The Ethics of Restricting SNAP 
Purchases
Those who oppose a restriction on SNAP purchases 
assert several arguments related to the ethics of governmental 
interference with a free market and personal purchasing decisions. 
The sections below explain and respond to the two primary 
assertions—that a SSB restriction unfairly and inequitably 
limits the choices of SNAP recipients and that the restriction is 
demeaning and stigmatizing. 
A. Restricting Free Choice and Limiting Access 
The SSB exclusion is considered inequitable because it 
restricts the beverage options of SNAP recipients so that they have 
less access to beverages of their choice than non-participants.117 
The restriction is thus considered a strategy “aimed uniquely at 
keeping poor people from the normal streams of decision-making 
and commerce.”118 Put another way, a restriction on SSB is 
114  Ann M. Collins et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Summer Electronic Benefit 
Transfer for Children (SEBTC) Demonstration: Summary Report 55 (2016), 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/ops/sebtcfinalreport.pdf. 
115  Id.
116  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 5.
117  Anne Barnhill & Katherine F. King, Evaluating Equity Critiques in Food Policy: 
The Case of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 41 J. L. Med. & Ethics 301, 302 (2013).
118  Hartline-Grafton et al., supra note 66, at 13.
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considered by some to be a patronizing attempt to “micromanage” 
the lives of the poor.119 The message conveyed through the 
restriction on SSB purchases with SNAP is that that poor people 
make bad choices, therefore requiring government intervention 
to manage their food choices whereas higher income persons do 
not.120
Relatedly, critics of the SSB restriction assert that SNAP 
participants and non-participants have similar intakes and 
purchases of unhealthy foods.121 There is limited evidence that 
SNAP participation increases SSB consumption beyond the risk 
associated with poverty.122 Therefore, if SNAP benefits are not to 
blame for additional purchases of SSBs, restricting only SNAP 
purchases in this way is not justified.123 
There is an ethical concern that the SSB ban unfairly targets 
SNAP participants, without imposing a similar restriction across 
other government programs, thereby singling out poor persons 
for a problem experienced by the majority of Americans.124 Thus, 
some critics have argued that the restriction on SSBs can pass 
ethical muster only if it can be applied to all types of government 
funds used to purchase beverages, including cafeterias in all 
government buildings and all beverages purchased with federal 
grant funds.125
To address the concerns about undermining the free choice 
and autonomy of SNAP recipients with a SSB restriction, it is 
necessary to note how our eating behavior and choices are more 
constrained that we may imagine.126 Research studies demonstrate 
119  Patrick McGeehan, U.S. Rejects Mayor’s Plan to Ban Use of Food Stamps to Buy 
Soda, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2011),  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/nyregion/ban-
on-using-food-stamps-to-buy-soda-rejected-by-usda.html. 
120  Nancy Kass et al., Ethics and Obesity Prevention: Ethical Considerations In 3 
Approaches To Reducing Consumption Of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 104 Am. J. 
Pub. Health 787, 791 (2014); Barnhill & King, supra note 117, at 302.
121  Hartline-Grafton et al., supra note 66, at 13.
122  Id. 
123  Schwartz, supra note 22, at S201.
124  Kass et al., supra note 120, at 791.
125  Id. 
126  Barnhill & King, supra note 110, at 304.
102 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol. 14
how various features of the external food environment, such 
as large portion sizes, availability and location of snack foods 
and caloric beverages, function as psychological “cues” that 
encourage “mindless” overconsumption.127 Furthermore, there 
is evidence that salty and sugary foods disrupt our appetite 
regulation, subverting the psychological and physiological 
systems that regulate food intake.128 There is also evidence that 
low-income youth and adults are exposed to disproportionately 
more marketing and advertising for obesity-promoting products 
that encourage the consumption of unhealthful foods such as fast 
food and SSBs.129
 It is thus difficult to claim that obesity prevention 
policies, such as a restriction on the purchase of SSBs with SNAP, 
would impose for the first time, a constraint on choice of what 
to consume.130 This reality helps us to understand that a SSB 
restriction is not based on an assumption that low-income people 
are uniquely bad at making food choices, or that low-income 
people are more easily manipulated by their environments.131 
The influence of environmental cues on all people, regardless 
of income levels, should force policymakers and advocates to 
question whether “maximizing consumer food choice” is the 
pinnacle of good policy.132 This is admittedly a complex ethical 
issue; however, freedom of choice must be balanced with public 
health goals.133 Of course, decisions about what or how much we 
eat  deserve protection, but it must be acknowledged that when 
obesity prevention policies such as a SSB restriction in SNAP are 
implemented, they would replace one set of influential external 
stimuli with a different set, rather than exert influence on consumer 
127  Id.
128  Id.
129  Food Research & Action Center, supra note 17, at 4.
130  Kass et al., supra note 120, at 792.
131  Barnhill & King, supra note 117, at 304-05.
132  Id.
133  Id. at 305.
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choices where none had previously existed.134 
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the disparity 
in consumer choice is not ethically decisive. The goal of SNAP is 
to address a specific problem: the diet and nutrition of low-income 
people.135 The disparity of overriding importance, when evaluating 
the proposal to restrict SSBs, is the disparity in diet, nutrition, 
and health between low-income and higher-income Americans.136 
Thus, because low-income Americans have a disproportionately 
higher prevalence of diet-related disease than other Americans, 
SNAP policy changes may disproportionately benefit these 
populations most affected by the health consequences of poor 
nutrition.137 National data show that people with lower incomes 
consume fewer fruits and vegetables and more SSBs compared 
with higher income people.138 They also experience higher rates 
of obesity and type 2 diabetes than higher-income groups.139  
Such disparities were revealed in a recent review of 25 
studies that examined the diets of SNAP participants, eligible 
non-participants, and higher income individuals.140 Although 
overall caloric intake and consumption of macronutrients and 
micronutrients were similar between SNAP and income-eligible 
non-participants, adult SNAP participants consumed a less healthy 
diet than either comparison group. 141 Children whose families 
participated in SNAP had similar nutrition quality to income-
eligible non-participants, but lower quality than higher-income 
134  Kass et al., supra note 120, at 792.
135  Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2040.
136  Id.
137  Basu et al., supra note 88, at 1032. It can also be said that the issue of whether 
SNAP participants have worse nutrition or health than non-participants is irrelevant; 
what is relevant is whether SNAP participants’ nutrition and health could be improved 
with a SSB restriction. Barnhill & King, supra note 117, at 305.
138  French et al., supra note 105, at 1.
139  Basu et al., supra note 88, at 1032.
140  Tatiana Andreyeva et al., Dietary Quality of Americans by Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program Participation Status A Systematic Review, 49 Am. J. Prev. Med. 
594, 594 (2015).
141  Schwartz, supra note 22, at S201.
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children.142 While the findings comparing SSB consumption of 
SNAP participants with eligible nonparticipants were mixed, 
overall, the data suggest that SNAP participants consume more 
SSBs than higher-income individuals, but similar amounts as 
eligible non-participants.143 Results showed that SSBs accounted 
for approximately 12 percent of total daily caloric intake of SNAP 
participants, higher than that of SNAP-eligible nonparticipants (9 
percent total daily intake) and SNAP-ineligible nonparticipants 
(6 percent total daily intake).144
Another reason to restrict SNAP purchases is economic. 
As a federally funded program, taxpayers pay for SSBs twice: 
once at the point of sale through the SNAP program and later 
as health care expenditures for treatment of diet-related diseases 
through Medicaid and Medicare, and indirect economic costs 
from future lost work productivity attributable to obesity, type 
2 diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.145 SNAP pays for an 
estimated $4 billion in soft drinks per year, or about 20 million 
servings each day.146 The costs of medical spending attributable 
to obesity is estimated at $147 billion per year.147 Of this amount, 
$61.8 billion is financed by Medicare and Medicaid.148 Put this 
way, SSBs have enormous costs to public health and spending. 
In summary, where the goal of unfettered consumer choice 
is at odds with the goal of promoting health and good nutrition, 
it is ethically justifiable to modestly limit the consumer choice to 
improve the nutrition and health of SNAP participants, just as it is 
ethically justifiable to limit choice of unhealthy products in other 
settings such as schools, day care centers, hospitals, and places 
142  Id.
143  Id.
144  Binh T. Nguyen & Lisa M. Powell, Supplemental nutrition assistance program 
participation and sugar-sweetened beverage consumption, overall and by source, 82 
Prev. Med. 81, 84 (2015).
145  Basu et al., supra note 88, at 1032-33; Ludwig et al., supra note 27, at 2567-68.
146  Ludwig et al, supra note 27, at 2567.
147  Finkelstein et al., supra note 17, at  w822.
148  Id.
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of employment.149 Such limitations are already incorporated into 
SNAP—an assistance program to buy food, not to generally 
maximize consumer choice. 150
B. Stigmatization of SNAP Recipients 
The USDA151 and opponents to a restriction on SNAP 
purchases have expressed concerns that such a policy would 
stigmatize low-income families.152 There is a related concern 
about the message such a policy conveys to society about the 
poor.153 As stated by Joel Berg, former Executive Director of 
New York City Coalition against Hunger, such proposals to 
restrict SNAP purchases are “based on the false assumption that 
poor people were somehow ignorant or culturally deficient.”154 
There is concern that rejection of purchases at checkout could 
cause embarrassment and stigmatization of SNAP recipients by 
signaling them out as receiving assistance.155 Increased stigma 
could become a threat to participation, and a decline in SNAP 
participation could in turn increase food insecurity.156 
To counter the concerns above, the issue of whether SNAP 
participants would feel stigmatized and deterred from using their 
benefits  are empirical issues that can only be assessed through a 
pilot study.157 Several surveys of SNAP recipients may actually 
demonstrate that concerns about potential negative impacts 
of a restriction are unwarranted. In recent surveys of SNAP 
recipients, the majority of respondents agreed that it would be 
149  Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2040.
150  Id.
151  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 1, 4. 
152  Food Purchase Restrictions: A Bad Idea for SNAP, The Center for Law and 
Social Policy (CLASP) (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.clasp.org/blog/food-purchase-
restrictions-bad-idea-snap. 
153  Kass et al., supra note 120, at 793.
154  McGeehan, supra note 119.
155  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 1, 4-5. 
156  Schwartz, supra note 22, at S202.
157  Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2039.  
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appropriate to restrict SSBs from SNAP.158  When New York City 
SNAP participants were surveyed on their consumption patterns 
and attitudes around restrictions in 2011, “almost 70 percent of 
surveyed SNAP participants supported restricting sweetened 
beverages from SNAP (49 percent)” or did not express an opinion 
on the issue (16 percent).159 An extensive campaign to notify all 
SNAP recipients should accompany any change in the types of 
items that can be purchased.  Embarrassment and stigma, if any, 
would have to be weighed against the potential benefits of SSB 
restriction, such as lower rates of obesity, diabetes, and other 
chronic disease, conditions that are themselves stigmatizing.160 
Rather than causing the stigmatization of SNAP recipients, 
there could actually be a reduction of stigma associated with a 
restriction of SSBs. Excluding SSBs from SNAP could bolster the 
public perception of SNAP, portraying the program as a carefully 
designed nutrition assistance program that helps families eat 
healthier, as opposed to an inefficient welfare program.161  Rather 
than sending negative messages about SNAP participants, a 
restriction on SNAP sends messages about nutrition—that SSBs 
are unhealthy, people drink fewer SSBs, and that SSBs do not 
contribute to good nutrition.162 These messages should be aimed 
not only at SNAP recipients, but at all Americans.163 Put another 
way, a restriction on purchases of SSBs is a policy focused on 
singling out the drinks, not singling out SNAP participants.  It is a 
policy solidly backed by nutrition science and public health goals 
articulated by the government and advocacy organizations.164 
158  Michael Long et al., Public Support For Policies To Improve The Nutritional 
Impact of The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 17 Pub. Health 
Nutrition 219, 219 (2014); Cindy Leung et al., Improving the nutritional impact of 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: perspectives from the participants, 
52 Am. J. Prev. Med. 193, 196 (2016).
159  Rachidi, supra note 74, at 7.
160  Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2038-39.
161  Id. at 2039.
162  Barnhill & King, supra note 117, at 306.
163  Id.
164  See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, The CDC Guide to Strategies 
for Reducing the Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 4 (2010), 
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There are other examples of anti–SSB policies that only reach 
a subset of the population, such as restricting these products 
in schools, hospitals, and government buildings. Like the SSB 
SNAP restriction, “these policies are not aimed uniquely” at poor 
people; they are aimed uniquely at sugary drinks.165
In summary, a pilot program to test the efficacy of a 
restriction on SSB purchases with SNAP can and should be 
included in the 2018 Farm Bill. The administrative obstacles 
for the USDA, states, and retailers are not insurmountable, as 
evidenced by other such as WIC nutrition assistance programs and 
HIC pilot program. There are several recent studies suggesting 
that a SSB restriction would reduce consumption of SSBs, which 
could lead to improved health outcomes. The ethical objections to 
a SSB restriction as patronizing and demeaning, though valid, are 
not decisive. At stake is the public health of 42 million Americans 
who depend on the SNAP program to purchase food. Given the 
“general consensus that SSBs contain no beneficial nutrients”166 
and compelling evidence linking SSBs to obesity, diabetes, and 
other chronic diseases for which low-income Americans are 
particularly at risk, it is the government’s moral imperative to 
implement policies that address health disparities.167 
V.  Recommendation for a SSB Restriction Pilot Project 
The 2018 Farm Bill presents an opportunity for Congress 
to authorize the funding of a pilot that restricts the purchase 
of SSBs168 with the use of SNAP. Such a restriction brings the 
http://dhhs.ne.gov/publichealth/Documents/Guidance_Doc_Sugar_Sweetened_Bev.
pdf; AMA Adopts Policy to Reduce Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 
American Med. Ass’n, (June 14, 2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-adopts-
policy-reduce-consumption-sugar-sweetened-beverages. 
165  Schwartz, supra note 22, at S201.
166  Blondin, supra note 57, at 5.
167  See Cynthia M. Jones, The Moral Problem of Health Disparities, 100 Am. J. Pub. 
Health S47, S47 (2010).  
168 Although pilot proposals can suggest definitions of SSBs, one suggestion is from 
the CDC: caloric, sweetened beverages including: soft drinks (soda or pop), fruit 
drinks, sports drinks, tea and coffee drinks, energy drinks, sweetened milk or milk 
alternatives, and any other beverages to which sugar, typically high fructose corn 
syrup or sucrose, has been added. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 
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program in alignment with its longstanding goal—to “safeguard 
the health and wellbeing of the Nation’s population and to raise 
levels of nutrition among low-income households.”169  
An evidence base is needed to evaluate the most effective 
ways to curb the obesity epidemic, particularly among the nation’s 
most vulnerable populations who are at higher risk of diet-related 
diseases.  As the USDA has recognized, “carefully designed 
and evaluated pilot tests” are the only way to evaluate the effect 
of a SSB restriction on reducing consumption.170 To date, no 
randomized trial has been conducted to examine the effects of 
restrictions on the purchase of certain food and beverage items.171 
The objections regarding feasibility and efficacy discussed in the 
preceding sections rely on empirical issues that could be resolved 
with a pilot project.  In addition, many of the ethical debates and 
assumptions about stigma to SNAP recipients could similarly be 
resolved with more data, and more importantly, more inclusion 
of SNAP recipients in the conversation about how to improve 
nutrition of low-income populations. Thus, Congress should 
direct the USDA to invite applications from states to pilot a well-
designed, thoroughly evaluated, and carefully messaged SSB 
restriction. 
A well-designed pilot will include a rigorous evaluation 
plan to compare similar locations that would experience the 
restriction while others would not, and to assess whether retailers 
could appropriately implement the restriction and whether 
participants could follow the changes.172 Like the NYC proposal, 
a pilot authorized in the farm bill should use survey data and 
retailer data to assess changes in consumption patterns over time, 
as well as qualitative assessments of the experiences of retailers 
supra note 164, at 4. 
169  The Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-525, §2, 78 Stat. 703 (1964) (demonstrating 
the goal of the original food stamp program).
170  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 5.
171  French et al., supra note 105, at 2.
172  Rachidi, supra note 74, at 8.
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and participants during the pilot.173  Messaging and education 
will also be critical to address concerns regarding stigma and 
administrative burdens for retailers. A public information campaign 
should inform all SNAP recipients of changes, and retailers 
should be notified well in advance of implementation to allow 
time to upgrade systems and procedures. The public information 
campaign should explain the public health justifications for the 
restriction to make clear that the policy is aimed at SSBs, not 
SNAP recipients.
A restriction on the purchase of SSB should not be read to 
support a reduction of SNAP benefits. It is beyond dispute, from 
this author’s perspective, that SNAP benefits should be increased 
to alleviate food insecurity, increase food expenditures, and 
improve diet quality among low-income Americans, while also 
injecting money into local economies.174 Nor should this proposal 
be interpreted as a rejection of other measures to improve the 
health and nutrition of SNAP recipients, such as educational 
campaigns about the harms of SSBs175 and incentives to purchase 
fruits and vegetables.176  Rather, a restriction on the purchase of 
SSBs means that the federal government will cease subsidizing 
the purchase of products that are demonstrably and indisputably 
harmful to public health. 
There should be no winners or losers in the debate about 
restricting SNAP among anti-hunger and public health advocates. 
Anti-hunger, social justice, and public health groups should 
173  Id. at 7.
174  See Michael Leachman et. al, President Trump’s Budget Would Shift SNAP Costs 
to States, Increasing Risk of Hunger and Weakening Response to Recessions, Ctr. 
on Budget & Pol’y Priorities (July 19, 2017),  https://www.cbpp.org/research/
state-budget-and-tax/president-trumps-budget-would-shift-snap-costs-to-states-
increasing.  
175  See Jess Lynch, HIA on SNAP and Sugar Sweetened Beverages, Ill. Public Health 
Institute (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/09/25/3lynch.
pdf?la=en (recommending education about the health effects of drinking SSBs).
176  See, e.g., Bartlett Et Al., supra note 87, at 11; Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive 
(FINI) Grant Program, Nat. Inst. of Food & Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., http://
nifa.usda.gov/program/food-insecurity-nutrition-incentive-fini-grant-program (last 
visited May 14, 2018); Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program (SFMNP), U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., http://www.fns.usda.gov/sfmnp/senior-
farmers-market-nutrition-program-sfmnp (last updated Apr. 15, 2015). 
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coalesce around the issue of improving the health and nutrition of 
our country’s most vulnerable populations. Rather than framing 
the issue as a restriction of choice, with low-income individuals 
aS targets, the issue is about targeting SSBs as void of nutrition, 
detrimental to public health, and undeserving of subsidization 
by the government. Allowing the purchase of SSBs with SNAP 
makes the government complicit in lining the soda industry’s 
pockets at the expense of the public health. 
Conclusion
SNAP is essential for hunger prevention in the United 
States, but its exclusive focus on food quantity contributes 
to malnutrition and obesity and is misaligned with the goal of 
helping beneficiaries lead healthier lives.177 SNAP is not merely 
a transfer of wealth, but a program intended to alleviate hunger 
and improve nutrition and health of low-income Americans. 
Authorizing a pilot program in the 2018 Farm Bill to test the 
efficacy of a SSB restriction could be a significant opportunity 
to reduce the burden of diet-related disease among low-income 
children and families.
177  Ludwig et al., supra note 27, at 2568.
Strengthening the National Organic Program with State 
Organic Programs  
Kelly Damewood* 
Introduction 
Now, more than ever before, organic stakeholders 
must consider all options to strengthen the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) National Organic Program (NOP). Over 
the last 15 years, USDA-certified organic production significantly 
grew both domestically and abroad.1 This growth is largely 
attributed to consumer trust in the integrity of the USDA-certified 
organic seal—NOP sets and enforces federal organic standards 
for all products sold or labeled as organic in the United States.2 
*  kjdamewood@gmail.com
1  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Agric. Stat. Serv. Highlights, 2015 
Certified Organic Survey: Farms, Land, and Sales Up 1 (2016), https://www.
nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2015_Certified_Organics/2015_
Certified_Organic_Survey_Highlights.pdf; Documentation, U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., Econ. Research Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/organic-
production/documentation/ (last updated Sept. 22, 2016) (“Together, certified organic 
cropland and pasture accounted for about .6 percent of the U.S. total farmland in 
2011”); Organic Trade, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Researsch Serv., https://www.
ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic-
trade/ (last updated Jan. 19, 2018) (“Growth in organic agricultural production is 
occurring in both developed and developing countries worldwide, and the competition 
for major consumer markets in developed countries, particularly the United States and 
Europe, is increasing.”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, 
Nat’l Organic Pro., Strategic Plan 2015-2018 2 (2015), https://www.ams.usda.
gov/sites/default/files/media/NOP-2015StrategicPlan.pdf (“With an appropriated 
budget of approximately $9 million in FY 2014 and 2015, the NOP oversees more than 
80 certifying agents and 27,800 organic operations around the world. In the U.S., there 
are 19,474 certified organic operations; a new record of $39.1 billion in U.S. organic 
sales was reached in 2014.”) [hereinafter AMS Strategic Plan 2015-2018].
2  Robust organic sector stays on upward climb, posts new records in U.S. sales, 
Organic Trade Association (May 24, 2017), https:www.ota.com/resources/market-
analysis (“The robust American organic sector stayed on its upward trajectory in 2016, 
gaining new market share and shattering records, as consumers across the United 
States ate and used more organic products than ever before. . . . Organic sales in the 
U.S. totaled around $47 billion in 2016, reflecting new sales of almost $3.7 billion 
from the previous year. The $43 billion in organic food sales marked the first time 
the American organic food market has broken though the $40-billion mark. Organic 
food now accounts for more than five percent -- 5.3 percent to be exact -- of total 
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But the continued success of organic depends on whether NOP 
can maintain strong oversight in a rapidly evolving marketplace 
with its current enforcement budget and authority.3 Therefore, 
organic stakeholders must work to strengthen NOP enforcement 
resources because it will protect consumer trust in the integrity of 
the USDA-certified organic seal. 
At the federal level, efforts are well underway to 
strengthen NOP enforcement resources through the next farm bill. 
food sales in this country, another significant first for organic.”); The Cost of Organic 
Food, Consumer Reports (Mar. 19, 2015, 12:00 PM), www.consumerreports.org/
cro/news/2015/03/cost-of-organic-food/index.htm (finding that “[o]n average, organic 
foods were 47 percent more expensive” and describing reasons consumers are willing 
to pay more for organic).
3  See Organic Trade Association Priorities for the Farm Bill, Organic Trade 
Association https://ota.com/advocacy/organic-trade-association-2018-farm-bill-
priorities (last visited May 2, 2018) (describing need for “support and adequate funding 
for the [NOP] to keep pace with industry growth, set uniform standards, and carry out 
compliance and enforcement actions in the U.S. and abroad.”); Documentation, supra 
note 1 (“Together, certified organic cropland and pasture accounted for about .6 percent 
of the U.S. total farmland in 2011.”); Organic Trade, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. 
Research Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/
organic-agriculture/organic-trade/ (last updated Jan. 19, 2018) (“Growth in organic 
agricultural production is occurring in both developed and developing countries 
worldwide, and the competition for major consumer markets in developed countries, 
particularly the United States and Europe, is increasing.”); Miles McEvoy, former 
Deputy Administrator of National Organic Program, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Presentation at Spring 2017 National Organic Standards Board Meeting (Apr. 19, 2017) 
(noting the amount of resources spent on tasks other than enforcement such as 2 full 
time FOIA staff and several contractors); Peter Whoriskey, The labels said ‘organic.’ 
But these massive imports of corn and soybeans weren’t, The Wash. Post (May 12, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-labels-said-organic-
but-these-massive-imports-of-corn-and-soybeans-werent/2017/05/12/6d165984-2b76-
11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.ae4e87fdbe65  (describing a case of 
organic fraud in organic grains). AMS Strategic Plan 2015-2018, supra note 1, at 2 
(“With an appropriated budget of approximately $9 million in FY 2014 and 2015, the 
NOP oversees more than 80 certifying agents and 27,800 organic operations around 
the world. In the U.S., there are 19,474 certified organic operations; a new record of 
$39.1 billion in U.S. organic sales was reached in 2014.”); Peter Whoriskey, “Why the 
hell am I paying more for this?” Major egg operation houses “USDA Organic” hens at 
three per square foot, The Wash. Post (July 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/13/more-than-a-million-hens-filling-barns-at-three-
per-square-foot-and-yes-theyre-usda-organic/?utm_term=.88178cb01d51; Peter 
Whoriskey, Millions of pounds of apparently fake ‘organic’ grains convince the food 
industry there may be a problem, The Wash. Post (June 12, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/12/millions-of-pounds-of-apparently-
fake-organic-grains-convince-the-food-industry-there-may-be-a-problem/?utm_
term=.f3ceee314e97; Peter Whoriskey, Why your ‘organic’ milk may not be organic, 
The Wash. Post (May 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
why-your-organic-milk-may-not-be-organic/2017/05/01/708ce5bc-ed76-11e6-9662-
6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.59baf3a57a28; The Cost of Organic Food, 
supra note 2.
2018] Strengthening the National Organic Program 113
Congress first authorized NOP when it passed the Organic Foods 
Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) as part of the 1990 Farm Bill, and 
Congress must reauthorize funding for NOP in the next farm bill 
as well as include any other changes to the program.4 So now is 
the time to make any changes to the program—such as shoring 
up NOP enforcement authority—and to advocate for increased 
authorized funding.5 Thus, organic stakeholders are prioritizing 
and advocating for increased NOP enforcement resources in the 
next farm bill.6 
But in addition to their farm bill advocacy, organic 
stakeholders should also consider how state-level action can 
support their federal efforts. Precedent and other pressing federal 
issues indicate that Congress could likely delay the next farm 
bill, which should be reauthorized in September 2018 when the 
2014 Farm Bill expires.7 Moreover, the Trump administration 
has already taken action to undermine new organic enforcement 
standards.8 And organic critics have also called for changes to 
NOP that could undermine its efficacy.9 So, given the current 
political climate, it is worth supplementing farm bill advocacy 
4  Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6524 (2012); Faso 
Introduces Bill to Crack-Down on Fake Organics, Support Organic Farmers, 
U.S. Congressman John J. Faso (Sept. 28, 2017), https://faso.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=582.
5  See Organic Trade Association Priorities for Farm Bill, supra note 3 (describing 
need for “support and adequate funding for the [NOP] to keep pace with industry 
growth, set uniform standards, and carry out compliance and enforcement actions 
in the U.S. and abroad.”); Faso Introduces Bill to Crack-Down on Fake Organics, 
Support Organic Farmers, supra note 4.
6  See Organic Trade Association Priorities for Farm Bill, supra note 3.
7  Ed O’Keefe, Farm bill passes after three years of talks, The Wash Post, Post Politics 
(Feb. 4, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/02/04/
farm-bill-passes-after-three-years-of-talks/?utm_term=.bb0bc8a146f9. See 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress.gov Resources, https://www.
congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Year+2017 
(showing trend of continued resolutions and partisan voting rather than passing timely 
legislation). 
8  Lynne Curry, Years in the Making, Organic Animal Welfare Rules Killed by Trump’s 
USDA, Civil Eats (Dec. 18, 2017), https://civileats.com/2017/12/18/years-in-the-
making-trumps-usda-kills-organic-animal-welfare-rules/. 
9  Peter B. Matz, Organic Reform, Olsson Frank Weeda (Jan. 17, 2017), www.
ofwlaw.com/2017/01/17/organic-reform/; Tom Philpott, “Dark Forces” Are Coming 
for your Organic Food, Mother Jones (Feb. 9, 2017, 6:30 PM), www.motherjones.
com/politics/2017/02/dark-forces-organic/.
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with state-level action. 
Specifically, organic stakeholders should consider 
advocating for state organic programs at the state-level because 
they are unique, often overlooked enforcement tools. It may seem 
counterintuitive to consider state-level action to protect a federal 
program, but OFPA has a unique provision whereby NOP can 
authorize state departments of agriculture to enforce federal organic 
standards, e.g. states can create ‘state organic programs’.10  So far, 
California is the only state to establish a state organic program, 
the California State Organic Program (SOP).11 NOP audits and 
oversees the program, but its program functions, funding, and 
structure are set forth in California state law.12 While the SOP 
has some drawbacks for California’s organic producers, overall 
California has the most robust, efficient organic enforcement 
in the United States.13 Therefore, organic stakeholders should 
consider how advocating for additional state organic programs 
can strengthen organic enforcement, and in turn support their 
farm bill priorities. 
Thus, this article examines how organic stakeholders can 
strengthen NOP with state organic programs. Section I reviews 
the authority, functions, and responsibilities of state organic 
programs. Section II weighs the costs and benefits of the SOP. 
Section III then applies the cost-benefit analysis of the SOP to 
describe key attributes of states with potential to establish state 
organic programs. Section IV recommends guiding principles for 
new state organic programs. Finally, this article concludes that 
some states should consider establishing carefully constructed 
10  7 C.F.R. §§205.620-205.622 (2017).
11  State Organic Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing 
Service, https//www.ams.usda.gov/services/enforcement/organic/state-compliance 
(last visited May 2, 2018). 
12  See generally Kelly Damewood & Jane Sooby, California Certified Organic 
Farmers, Review of the California State Organic Program (2015), https://
www.ccof.org/sites/default/files/Review%20of%20the%20California%20State%20
Organic%20Program%20-%20CCOF%202015%20web.pdf
(describing  SOP authority); State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
13  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 29-30 (discussing challenges SOP creates 
for California producers). 
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state organic programs because additional state organic programs 
can support national efforts to strengthen NOP enforcement 
resources in the next farm bill.
I.  Overview of State Organic Programs
State organic program are a commonly overlooked tool 
for organic enforcement. Although the NOP primarily works with 
organic certifiers to regulate the organic marketplace, OFPA also 
authorizes NOP to work with state organic programs to ensure 
local oversight and control over organic production in the state.14 
California is the only state operating a state organic program.15 
As a result, California has a different regulatory framework for 
organic production and certification than other states.16 
A.  The NOP works with Organic Certifiers to regulate the 
Organic Marketplace
Organic certification is the primary means of ensuring 
agricultural products sold as organic in the U.S. are produced 
and handled in compliance with federal organic standards.17 NOP 
accredits private and governmental entities, both domestically 
and abroad, to verify that products with organic claims have been 
produced and labeled in compliance with the organic standards.18 
Operations who produce or handle agricultural products intended 
to be sold as organic with gross annual organic sales of more 
than $5,000 must be certified by an accredited certifier.19 Thus, 
the NOP works with organic certifiers around the world to ensure 
products sold as organic are meeting the requirements of NOP’s 
standards.20 
Organic certifiers have an important role in oversight and 
14  7 C.F.R. §§205.620-205.622. 
15  State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
16  Id. 
17  See 7 C.F.R. §§205.500-205.510 (2017).
18  Id. §§ 205.500-205.501(a). 
19  Id. § 205.100.
20  Id. § 205.400.
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enforcement because they work directly with producers to ensure 
compliance with NOP standards. Certifiers review producers’ 
organic system plans, annually inspect facilities, verify producers’ 
record-keeping, and analyze residue samples of at least 5% of 
their certified clients annually.21 Producers must immediately 
notify their certifiers of any application, including drift, of a 
prohibited material or a change in production systems that may 
impact compliance with the organic standards.22 If a producer is 
not in compliance with NOP standards, then the certifier must 
alert NOP, issue a noncompliance, and evaluate actions taken 
to correct the noncompliance.23 Therefore, the rigorous organic 
certification process ensures products labeled as organic are in 
compliance with NOP standards. 
While organic certifiers play an important role, NOP is 
ultimately responsible for enforcement. NOP has authority to 
enforce the standards through legal action, including stopping the 
sale of a product and issuing civil penalties.24 Any individual or 
operation who makes a false statement to NOP or to an organic 
certifier is subject to fines and even imprisonment of up to five 
years.25 Additionally, NOP must audit organic certifiers and 
oversee compliance with accreditation requirements.26 So NOP 
oversees all final enforcement actions and decisions. 
In sum, NOP works with organic certifiers to monitor the 
organic marketplace. Through the organic certification process, 
accredited certifiers verify that agricultural products sold and 
labeled as organic are in compliance with the organic standards.27 
And NOP has authority to enforce the standards and oversee 
certifiers.28 
21  Id.; Id. §205.670. 
22  7 C.F.R. § 205.400(f) (2017). 
23  Id. § 205.405.
24  Id. § 205.100(c)(1). 
25  Id. § 205.100(c)(2); Id. §3.91.
26  Id. § 205.501.
27  7 C.F.R. §205.400 (2017).
28  Id. § 205.661; Id. § 205.668.
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B.  In California, NOP works with certifiers and the 
California State Organic Program. 
In California, the NOP not only works with certifiers, but 
it also works with the California State Organic Program (SOP) 
to oversee organic production and certification. The NOP can 
authorize state departments of agriculture to establish what are 
referred to as ‘state organic programs.’29 State organic programs 
are enforcement programs that provide local oversight of 
certification, production, and handling in the state; they do not 
operate independently from the NOP.30 So far, California is the 
only state operating a state organic program.31 So California is the 
only state enforcing NOP standards.32 
The SOP is a unique enforcement arm of the NOP. The 
SOP assumes activities conducted by NOP in other states such 
as working with certifiers to resolve non-compliances, stopping 
sale of noncompliant products, issuing civil penalties, or handling 
legal actions when a producer appeals the decision of a certifier.33 
The SOP even takes on some enforcement activities that NOP 
cannot provide for all states such as proactively monitoring the 
organic marketplace with unannounced inspections and residue 
testing beyond what certifiers are already required to perform.34 
Thus, the SOP handles all organic enforcement activities in 
California with approval and oversight from NOP.35
If NOP suspects a noncompliance of a certified organic 
operation, then it will work with the operation’s certifier to 
investigate the complaint.36 But in California NOP will direct 
29  Id. § 205.622.
30  Id. § 205.620; See also id. §205.100 (requiring that all agricultural products sold 
as organic be in compliance with OFPA and federal organic standards, i.e., OFPA 
preempts any state organic law or standard). 
31  State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
32  Id.
33  7 C.F.R. §§ 204.101(c)(2), 205.620(d), 205.668, 205.670 (2017). 
34  Id. § 205.670.
35  State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
36  7 C.F.R. §205.661(a); Id. §205.668. 
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the SOP to work with the certifier.37 California is the only state 
where a state department of agriculture is regularly working with 
certifiers to resolve non-compliances. 
Another important area of enforcement handled by 
the SOP is investigations of potential fraud. Any member of 
the public may submit a complaint to NOP.38 If the complaint 
regards a noncertified operation selling product as organic, then 
NOP must investigate the operation itself because certifiers 
only have jurisdiction over their clients.39 But if the complaint 
concerns a noncertified operation in California, then NOP will 
direct the SOP to investigate the complaint.40 The public may also 
submit complaints of fraud directly to the SOP.41 In other words, 
California is the only state with a state department of agriculture 
regularly receiving and investigating complaints of fraud in the 
organic marketplace. 
In sum, the SOP is a unique enforcement arm of the NOP 
because it is the state-administered organic enforcement program 
in the U.S. As an enforcement arm, it enforces federal organic 
standards such as resolving non-compliances and investigating 
complaints of fraud within the state.42
37  Id. §205.661(b); Id. 205.668.
38  How to File a Complaint on Organic Regulations, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Agricultural Marketing Service, https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/
enforcement/organic/file-complaint (last visited May 2, 2018). 
39  7 C.F.R. §205.661(a) (2017).
40  Id. §205.661(b). 
41  CDFA Organic Complaints, Cal. Dept. of Food & Agric., https://organic.cdfa.
ca.gov/complaints/ (last visited May 2, 2018).  
42  Id.
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C.  State Organic Programs are different than State 
Organic Certifiers
 An important yet often misunderstood distinction exists 
between state organic programs and state organic certifiers.43 
California is the only state operating a state organic program 
while some states have state departments of agriculture that are 
accredited certifiers such as the Washington State Department 
of Agriculture (WSDA).44 An accredited state department of 
agriculture has the same requirements and functions as an 
accredited private company—they maintain records with their 
certified clients, notify clients of regulatory changes or compliance 
issues, and annually inspect their clients’ farm or facilities.45 In 
contrast, a state organic program takes on functions similar to 
the NOP—it works with certifiers to resolve non-compliances, 
investigates noncertified operations, and handles appeals or other 
legal actions.46 Thus, state organic programs have different roles 
than state organic certifiers. 
The difference between a state organic program and a 
state organic certifier is further highlighted by the impact of each 
on producers operating in the state. Producers may choose to 
certify with any certifier operating in the state.47 So a producer 
in Washington could certify with the WSDA Organic Program, 
or it could choose to certify with another accredited certifier 
like Quality Insurance International (QAI), which is a private 
organization.48 In contrast, producers must comply with a state 
43  Kelly Damewood, California Certified Organic Farmers, Compilation of Interviews 
& Key Takeaways for SOP Report 2015-2016 (2016) (on file with author) (noting that 
many interviewees do not understand the differences between state certifiers and state 
organic programs) [hereinafter Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report]. 
44   Damewood & Scooby, supra note 12, at 8.
45  Id. at 27-37. 
46  Id. at 38-49. 
47  See 7 C.F.R. § 205.100 (mandating certification of applicable operations with 
any accredited certifying agent), see also id. § 205.401 (setting forth requirements 
for certification applications and not requiring producers certify with any specific 
certifier). 
48  Id. 
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organic program.49 For example, in California producers choose a 
certifier but they must comply with SOP requirements in addition 
to certifying with their chosen certifier.50 So the SOP impacts 
producers differently than a state organic certifier because it has 
authority over all organic producers in the state while certifiers 
only have authority over their clients. 
D.  State Organic Programs may create Additional 
Requirements.
Another unique feature of state organic programs is their 
ability to impose additional requirements for certification. The 
NOP may allow a state organic program to set more restrictive 
requirements than what is required under OFPA and the organic 
standards.51 The additional requirements should address the 
environmental conditions or the necessity of specific production 
or handling practices particular to the State or region.52 So 
producers selling agricultural product as organic in the U.S. must 
meet the requirements of OFPA, but they may also be required 
to meet state requirements if they operate in a state with a state 
organic program. 
In California, the SOP has four additional requirements:
1. Organic producers and handlers must register with the 
SOP through the California Department of Food and 
Agriculture.53   
2. Organic processors must register with the SOP through 
the California Department of Public Health (CDPH).54 
3. Organic producers, processors, and handlers must 
49  See id. §§ 204.101 (c)(2), 205.620 (d), 205.668. 205.670 (requiring producers make 
records and facilities available to state organic programs). 
50  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 9.
51  7 C.F.R. § 206.620 (c) (2017). 
52  Id.
53  Policy Memorandum from Miles McEvoy to Stake Holders and Interested 
Parties on California State Organic Program, Additional Requirements Granted, 
(Jan. 21, 2011), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/NOP-PM-11-8-
CaliforniaRequiremetns.pdf.
54  Id. 
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provide verification of SOP registration to their 
accredited certifying agent prior to granting or 
continuing organic certification;55 and
4. Accredited certifying agents must register with CDFA 
and pay registration fees.56 
As a result of these additional requirements, California 
producers must annually register and pay fees to the SOP in 
addition to annually renewing and paying fees to their certifier.  
II.  The Benefits of the SOP outweigh the Costs.
The costs and benefits of the SOP must be carefully 
evaluated before establishing more state organic programs 
because it is the only established state organic program from 
which to judge the merits of such a program on. Under its current 
structure, the benefits of the SOP outweigh the costs—the SOP 
had significant issues in the past, but these have largely been 
addressed or are being addressed through ongoing refinements 
to the program.  But the SOP would not be easily replicated or 
suitable for all states; rather, state organic programs modeled 
after the SOP would only be appropriate in states where there is 
sufficient benefit to the state’s organic producers, high stakeholder 
engagement, and no conflict of interest issues with a state certifier. 
A.  The Benefits of the SOP.
The SOP benefits California producers by providing them 
with the most efficient, robust enforcement of national organic 
standards in the U.S. The primary benefits include: reliable 
funding, local staff, local legal authority, marketplace surveillance, 
and close oversight over noncertified operations. The SOP also 
has several ancillary benefits to enforcement such as reliable 
data, administration of cost share, and authority to further support 
organic production in the state. Additionally, the SOP benefits the 
entire organic sector, not just California. 
55  Id.
56  Id.
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i.  The SOP has consistent funding independent of farm 
bill negotiations and federal appropriations and is entirely focused 
on enforcement. 
 One significant benefit of the SOP is that it allows 
California to have a consistent, independent source of funding 
dedicated entirely to enforcement activities. NOP’s budget 
must fund a range of activities including enforcement actions, 
developing and implementing organic standards, auditing 
certifiers, responding to Freedom of Information Acts, and 
other administrative functions.57 In contrast, the SOP’s budget is 
almost entirely dedicated to enforcement activities—it has some 
administrative costs, but it does not write rules, conduct audits, 
or handle FOIA requests like NOP.58 Thus, the SOP funding is 
focused solely on enforcement. 
Additionally, the SOP budget is not subject to farm bill 
negotiations and federal appropriations. Upon reviewing its entire 
farm bill budget, Congress authorizes an annual budget for NOP—
that is, Congress determines the maximum amount Congress 
may appropriate to NOP annually.59 But Congress is not under 
an obligation to appropriate the full amount.60 To date, Congress, 
has not appropriated NOP at its full authorized amount—the 
2014 authorizes $15 million a year for NOP but Congress has 
always appropriated $9 million a year.61 But the SOP budget is 
57 AMS Strategic Plan 2015-2018, supra note 1, at 2 (“With an appropriated budget 
of approximately $9 million in FY 2014 and 2015, the NOP oversees more than 80 
certifying agents and 27,800 organic operations around the world. In the U.S., there 
are 19,474 certified organic operations; a new record of $39.1 billion in U.S. organic 
sales was reached in 2014.”); 7 U.S.C. §§ 6519, 6505, 6514, 6581 (2012). See also Key 
Activities, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., National Organic Program, https://www.ams.
usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/national-organic-program  (last visited 
May 2, 2018) (listing the range of NOP responsibilities and activities).
58  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46000 (2017). 
59  What are Appropriations?, Nat’l Sustainability Agric. Coal., http://
sustainableagriculture.net/our-work/campaigns/annual-appropriations/what-are-
appropriations/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
60  Id. 
61  Nat’l Sustainability Agric. Coal., House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees, Agricultural Appropriations Chart Fiscal Year 
2018,http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/
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completely independent of the NOP because it is funded almost 
entirely funded by registration fees paid by organic producers in 
the state.62 Therefore, SOP funding is consistent and independent 
of the political pressures faced by NOP. 
Stable funding is increasingly important in today’s 
political climate. Some organic critics have called on Congress to 
slash funding to the NOP.63 While Congress so far seems unwilling 
to slash NOP funding altogether, there is ongoing uncertainty as 
Congress struggles to pass annual appropriations due to ongoing 
partisan disagreements.64 If NOP were to lose its funding for 
enforcement, then the organic seal would lose the confidence 
of consumers.65 Therefore, the consistent, independent funding 
stream is increasingly reassuring for organic producers during a 
time of heightened uncertainty. 
Moreover, if Congress were to defund the NOP, either by 
cutting it from the 2018 farm bill or by not appropriating funds, 
then the SOP would become an important backstop for the organic 
marketplace. Before NOP implemented federal standards, the 
SOP had its own standards, which were the de facto standards 
for organic production nationwide because producers selling into 
California had to comply with the SOP.66 Today, California state 
NSACFY2018AgAppropriationsChart-SComfull.pdf.  
62  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46013.1 (e)(1). 
California Department of Food & Agriculture, Organic Program Budget FY 2015-
2016 (January 2016) (receiving no funding from the NOP but receiving proportionally 
small amounts of funding from other sources than registration fees). See also 
Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 16.
63  Tom Philpott, “Dark Forces” Are Coming for your Organic Food, Mother Jones 
(Feb. 9, 2017, 6:30 PM), www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/02/dark-forces-organic/. 
64  See Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress.gov Resources, https://www.
congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Year+2017 (last 
updated May 4, 2017). (showing continued resolutions and partisan voting but no cuts 
to NOP funding). 
65  See Organic Trade Association Priorities for the Farm Bill, supra note 3.
66  Mark Lipson et. al., Remarks at 2016 EocFarm Conference Panel: Campaign to End 
State Organic Program Fees (2016), https://eco-farm.org/sites/default/files/session_
audio/EFC16_Campaign_to_End_State_Organic_Program_Fees.mp3 (“In the 1990’s 
California organic foods act of 1990 was the de facto national standard. It was the 
foundation on which consumer trust on a national level was built. I strongly believe 
that”). 
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law mandates the SOP enforce federal organic standards.67 So 
if Congress defunds the NOP, then the SOP would once again 
become the de facto assurance of organic enforcement because it 
would still have funding and enforcement authority.68 Thus, under 
the worst case scenario of a defunded NOP, the SOP would serve 
as a back stop for enforcement. 
ii.  The SOP has local enforcement Staff.
A second benefit of the SOP is its local enforcement 
staff.69 NOP investigative staff are primarily based in Washington, 
D.C.70  To investigate complaints of fraud, the NOP must fund 
travel to the reported operation, handle the complaint from afar, 
or perhaps work with the local state department of agriculture, 
which may or may not have the expertise to track down the 
necessary information.71 In contrast, the SOP has trained organic 
investigators who immediately travel and respond to complaints 
in California.72 The SOP also contracts with county agricultural 
commissioners—county-based personnel who provide regulatory 
services for a variety of CDFA and USDA programs—to handle 
SOP enforcement activities in their region.73 Therefore, the SOP 
provides boots on the ground enforcement to quickly investigate 
and resolve compliance issues or complaints of fraud. 
67  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code §§ 46000 (2017).
68  CCOF Priorities for the 2018 Farm Bill, California Certified Organic Farmers 
(2018), https://www.ccof.org/sites/default/files/2018%20CCOF%20Farm%20Bill%20
priorities.pdf. 
69  See Cal. Dep. Of Food & Agric., State Organic Program, Compliance & 
Enforcement/Appeals Summary: FY 2015/2016 & FY2016/2017 (2017), https://
www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/i_&_c/pdfs/SOP_EnforcementActivitiesSummary.pdf (citing 66 
complaints investigated by SOP staff) [hereinafter Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., 
Compliance Summary].
70  See Miles McEvoy, supra note 2 (citing eight compliance and enforcement staff in 
addition to NOP Compliance and Enforcement Director).
71  Interview with Miles McEvoy, former Deputy Administrator, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, National Organic Program in Washington, D.C. September 30, 2015 
(noting that NOP successfully contracted with state departments of agriculture to 
investigate fraud but NOP staff are primarily based in D.C.).
72  See Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note 
69. See also, Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 12 (describing one 
supervising special investigator and three special investigators on SOP staff).
73  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code §§ 46000 (b) (2017). 
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Local staff are especially important for investigating 
noncertified operations.74 For complaints or issues with certified 
organic operations, NOP can often rely on the certifier to inspect 
the operation, take residue tests, or otherwise investigate the 
operation.75 But if an operation is not certified, then the certifier 
has no authority to investigate the operation.76 So NOP cannot rely 
on certifiers for investigating noncertified operations, which then 
requires NOP to travel to the region, contract with the state staff, 
or otherwise handle the investigation.77 But as an enforcement arm 
of NOP, the SOP has authority over anyone selling agricultural 
product as organic in California so it can send staff to investigate 
noncertified operations.78 Thus, the SOP’s local enforcement staff 
ensure efficient resolution of issues with noncertified operations 
in California. 
iii.  The SOP has Local Legal Authority. 
A third benefit is the SOP resolves issues that rise to legal 
action more efficiently than the NOP because it handles local 
appeals and mediations. NOP may suspend or revoke certification 
of an operation.79 The operation may go through mediation 
with the NOP, appeal the suspension or revocation to the AMS 
Administrator, or, if the AMS Administrator denies the appeal, 
the operation may request a hearing with a USDA Administrative 
Law Judge.80 NOP may settle an appeal, and mediation is 
common.81 But in California alone, organic operations go through 
74  See 7 C.F.R. § 205.101 (2017) (stating that operations exempt from certification 
“must comply with the applicable organic production and handling requirements”).
75  Id.
76  See id. § 205.661(a) (granting authority to certifying agents to investigate production 
and handling operations “certified as organic by the certifying agent.”). 
77  See id. § 205.101 (stating that operations exempt from certification “must comply 
with the applicable organic production and handling requirements”). 
78  See Ca Agric. Code §46002 (adopting by reference the NOP standards); 7.C.F.R. 
§205.661 (b) (stating authority of SOP over all organic operations in California).
79  7 C.F.R. § 205.660 (2017).
80  Id. § 205.680(a)-(c).
81  Id. § 205.663. 
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a local legal system to appeal decisions.82 So California-based 
operations are not dependent on a backlogged federal system and 
do not have to work with a court from across the country.83 So 
the SOP responds to and resolves noncompliance issues more 
efficiently than NOP. 
iv.  The SOP provides Marketplace Surveillance.  
A fourth benefit is that the SOP proactively monitors the 
organic marketplace. The NOP has limited staff and financial 
resources, so its enforcement budget is almost entirely aimed at 
responding to noncompliances and investigating complaints.84 
The SOP, however, not only responds to noncompliances 
and investigates complaints, but it also monitors the organic 
marketplace through spot inspections and random pesticide 
residue sampling.85 So unlike NOP, the SOP helps certifiers 
monitor the organic marketplace. 
Spot inspections may help find bad actors who would not 
otherwise be identified by a complaint. For example, the SOP 
contracts with the county agricultural commissioners who go 
to farmers markets to make sure producers have the appropriate 
signage and adequately separate organic produce from their 
conventional produce.86 So county agricultural commissioners 
82  Id. § 205.681; see generally U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing 
Service, National Organic Program, Office of the Administrator Adverse 
Action Appeal Process for the National Organic Program (2014), https://www.
ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/4011.pdf. 
83  See Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note 69; 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, National Organic 
Program, Compliance & Enforcement/Appeals Summary: FY 2016 (2017), www.
ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/NOPQtrlyEnforcementRptQ4FY16Summary.
pdf. (closing one out of three appeals in process in FY2015/216 versus NOP closing 14 
out of 32 appeals in FY 2016. 6 of the closed appeals were carried over from previous 
fiscal years). 
84  Interview with Miles McEvoy, former Deputy Administrator, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, National Organic Program in Washington, D.C. September 30, 2015 
(noting that NOP would like to do more random residue testing and marketplace 
surveillance, but it has limited capacity). 
85  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46003.2 
(2017).
86  Id. § 46003.2 (6); Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., California’s State 
Organic Program Fact Sheet 1, 2 (2017), https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/
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are out in the field proactively looking for any issues.87 
Like spot inspections, pesticide residue sampling can 
be helpful in identifying any issues in the organic supply chain. 
SOP staff or county agriculture commissioners can go to farmers 
markets or retail establishments—from local grocers to large 
supermarkets—and sample produce for pesticide residues.88 If 
a residue test is over the allowed amount in organic production 
or shows a residue of a prohibited material, then the SOP will 
initiate an investigation where it will trace the produce back to the 
handler and producer.89 
However, the value of marketplace monitoring should 
not be overly exaggerated. Some would argue that the SOP spot 
inspections and residue testing not only duplicate certification 
requirements but also duplicate other California regulations.90 
For example, the Certified Farmers Market program also inspects 
for organic compliance at farmers markets and the Department 
of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) also conducts periodic residue 
sampling.91 A recent stakeholder taskforce reviewed the SOP and 
concluded that spot inspections and residue testing benefit the 
organic sector when the SOP prioritizes enforcement actions and 
does not duplicate other areas of enforcement.92 So marketplace 
surveillance is a benefit when surveillance activities are properly 
conducted. 
v.  The SOP monitors Noncertified Operations. 
A fifth benefit is the SOP monitors exempt operations. All 
producers selling agricultural products as organic must comply 
i_&_c/pdfs/CalOrganicPrgrmFactSheet.pdf. 
87  See Cal. Dep. Of Food & Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note 69.
88  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 24-25.
89  See Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note 69 
(detecting 4 instances of residues in violation of tolerance levels in FY2015/106 as a 
result of sampling and conducting).
90  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 30.
91  Id. 
92  Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., California State Organic Program: 
Recommendations from the Organic Stakeholder Work Group 11, 13-14 (2017), 
www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/i_&_c/pdfs/OSWG_RecommendationsReport.pdf. 
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with the federal organic standards.93 However, organic producers 
with gross annual organic sales of $5,000 or less are exempt from 
certification requirements.94 There are two risks of fraud for these 
exempt producers: first, they may be surpassing the $5,000 mark 
but they are avoiding the hassle of certification;95 second, they 
may not be in compliance with the standards because they do not 
have a certifier annually inspecting and surveying their production 
practices.96 Many certified producers who sell at farmers market 
or directly to consumers suspect this may be an area of significant 
fraud.97 
The SOP is better equipped to enforce organic standards 
for exempt operations than the NOP.  While the NOP has authority 
to investigate any exempt operation when it receives a complaint 
or suspects fraud, the NOP does not have information on hand 
about noncertified entities because they have no obligation to 
report to NOP, and they are not undergoing the annual inspection 
or paperwork of certified operations.98 In contrast, producers 
exempt from certification who operate in California must register 
with and provide production information to the SOP.99 The SOP 
uses this information to conduct investigations as well as spot 
inspections or residue testing.100 Thus, the SOP ensures robust 
oversight over exempt producers, which helps level the playing 
field at farmers markets and direct to consumer sales channels. 
vi.The SOP has Authority to Create Additional 
Requirements.
A sixth benefit is the SOP has the unique authority to 
add requirements to organic certification. Its current additional 
93  7 C.F.R  § 205.102 (2017).  
94  Id. § 205.101(a). 
95  Id.
96  Id. § 205.102; id. §205.101(a). 
97   Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43. 
98  7 C.F.R. § 205.101(c) (2017). 
99  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46013.1 
(2017). 
100  Id. 
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requirements—registration and annual fees—provide for 
reliable funding, marketplace surveillance, and oversight over 
noncertified operations.101 However, the SOP could also leverage 
this unique authority to address enforcement issues when the 
federal rulemaking process is stalled or not making sufficient 
changes.  
For example, the SOP could potentially strengthen 
the prohibition of the use of GMOs. Organic producers may 
not use inputs derived from GMOs and they must proactively 
prevent inadvertent contamination of their crops.102 Despite 
this requirement, testing shows that GMO contamination is 
occurring in organic grains.103 Many suspect that contamination 
most likely occurs when producers use conventional seeds.104 So 
one way to strengthen enforcement of the prohibition of GMOs 
is to add a requirement that producers growing crops at risk of 
GMO contamination keep records demonstrating the seed they 
plant has been tested to show no presence of GMOs.105 Certifiers 
could then verify that producers have taken all precautions to 
prevent inadvertent contamination.106 Thus, the SOP could add 
requirements to further strengthen enforcement. 
But the authority of the SOP to strengthen enforcement 
through additional requirements—such as requiring increased 
101  See supra text accompanying section II A (i)-(v).
102  See 7 C.F.R. § 205.2; id. § 205.105(3) (prohibiting the use of excluded methods 
and defining excluded methods as “[a] variety of methods used to genetically modify 
organisms”). 
103  Letter from Danny Lee, Supervising Special Investigator, California State 
Organic Program, to Industry Stakeholders (May 3, 2017). https://www.cdfa.
ca.gov/is/i_&_c/pdfs/Organic-Letter_IndustryStakeholders.pdf. 
104  National Organic Standards Board, Crops Subcommittee Proposal: 
Strengthening the Organic Seed Guidance 1 (2017) (“Since the mid-2000s, 
genetically engineered seeds have led to contamination of the seed supply, and organic 
seed companies are struggling to stay viable when the adoption of organic seed is not 
growing at the same rate as the organic products market.”).
105  California Certified Organic Farmers, Public comment on Crops 
Subcommittee’s Proposal: Strengthening the Organic Seed Guidance 2 (2017), 
https://www.ccof.org/sites/default/files/CCOF%20Comments%20on%20Crops%20
Proposal%20-%20Strengthening%20the%20Organic%20Seed%20Guidance.pdf 
(“Operations should demonstrate that seeds of at-risk crop have been produced 
without excluded methods.”).
106  Id. 
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record keeping for at risk seed—is only theoretical at this time. 
The SOP’s current additional requirements relate to fees and 
registration;107 they do not substantively alter enforcement of 
the federal organic standards.108 To date, an effort to strengthen 
standards at the state level have not been made in California; 
rather, organic stakeholders generally work to strengthen organic 
standards through the federal rulemaking or guidance process in 
which he National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) reviews 
public input and makes recommendations to the NOP for 
clarification, guidance, or new standards.109 Thus, the full potential 
to leverage the authority to impose additional requirements 
remains untested.  
Further, establishing more requirements for certification 
through the SOP could be quite challenging because CDFA or 
stakeholders would have to sponsor legislation to change the 
requirements and then the NOP would have to approve the 
requirements.110 On one hand, some producers may not support 
more additional requirements because it would put them at a 
competitive disadvantage to other producers who certify with 
fewer requirements.111 On the other hand, some producers may 
welcome stronger enforcement and recognize the potential for 
California to pave the way for stronger standards as it leads by 
example. So it is not clear whether an effort to add requirements 
through the SOP would be successful.  
 Nonetheless, it is still important to consider the benefits 
of additional requirements because it could help strengthen 
enforcement when the federal NOSB and NOP process is stalled. 
For example, it took the NOSB at least three years before it 
finalized a recommendation to update the definition of GMOs in 
107  Policy Memorandum from Miles McEvoy, supra note 53.
108  Id.
109  7 U.S.S. § 6518. 
110  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. § 46000; 7 C.F.R. § 
206.620(c) (2017). 
111  COFFA FAQs: Policy & Advocacy, California Certified Organic Famers, 
https://www.ccof.org/policy-advocacy/california-organic-food-and-farming-act/
coffa-faqs (last visited May 2, 2018).
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the organic standards.112 And the NOSB recommendation is not 
enforceable; rather the NOP must go through formal public notice 
and comment.113 It can take years before NOP pursues rulemaking 
on an NOSB recommendation.114 And even if the NOP acts on the 
recommendation, the rule can be stalled by political pressures or 
Congressional interference.115 Therefore, the SOP’s authority to 
establish additional requirements is an untested but potentially 
potent benefit to California’s organic producers. 
vii.  The SOP also has Benefits ancillary to Enforcement.
While the primary purpose of the SOP is enforcement, the 
program also provides ancillary benefits to the organic sector in 
California. The SOP provides unique data on organic production, 
it administers the National Organic Cost Share Program on behalf 
of California producers, and it has authority to support organic 
producers through education, outreach, and other programmatic 
activities.  
112  See Letter from Tracy Favre, Chair of National Organic Standards Board to Secretary 
of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Report to the USDA Secretary on 
Progress to Prevent GMO Incursion into Organic Agriculture (Nov. 18, 2016), https://
www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/MSFall2016ReporttoSecy.pdf (“To 
address public concerns, 5 years ago the NOSB established an ad hoc Committee on 
GMOs”); Letter from Tracy Favre, Chair of  National Organic Standards Board to 
National Organic Program, Formal Recommendation regarding Excluded Methods 
Terminology (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
MSExcludedMethods.pdf (recommending updates to definitions of GMOs). 
113  Letter from Jeff Moyer, Chair of National Organic Standards Board to National 
Organic Program, Formal Recommendation regarding Animal Welfare (Nov. 5, 
2009), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/NOP%20Final%20
Sunset%20Rec%20Animal%20Welfare.pdf (passing livestock recommendation in 
2009); National Organic Program (NOP); Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices—
Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,988, 59,988 (Dec. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. 
pt. 205) (noting that NOP issued first publication of final rule for comment on Jan. 
19, 2017). 
114  See Rulemaking, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-
regulations/rulemaking (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
115  OTA submits comments on animal welfare rule, AgNews Feed (June 9, 2017), http://
agnewsfeed.com/2017/09/11/ota-submits-comments-animal-welfare-rule/ (describing 
stalls in the implementation of the proposed Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices 
rule despite overwhelming support from the organic sector and a thorough NOSB 
process because a few egg companies do not like the rule’s provisions). 
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1.  The SOP has unique data on California production. 
The information collected by the SOP at registration 
has several uses not related to enforcement. For example, 
production data may be useful for producers who may evaluate 
crop trends to make decisions about perennial crop plantings.116 
Additionally, county agriculture commissioners report they use 
SOP registration data to ensure organic farms are not sprayed with 
prohibited materials when there is a federal or state-mandated pest 
treatment.117 Finally, organic advocates use data about organic 
production to make the case for increased public investment in 
organic research and other programmatic support.118 Thus, the 
SOP registration data has uses beyond enforcement. 
In fact, the unique data collection in California through 
the SOP is the most reliable data on organic production in the 
state. Organic data is notoriously difficult to track because 
traditional agricultural data reporting has not called out organic in 
the past.119 And most organic data is collected through voluntary 
reporting while SOP registration reporting is mandatory.120 Thus, 
historically California has had the most reliable farm production 
data on the organic farming sector because all organic producers 
are required to report to the SOP every year. 
Moreover, California is  the only state with reliable data 
on the organic processing industry.121 Organic farms and ranches 
voluntary report production information to federal statistics and 
research agencies, but organic processers do not have analogous 
survey opportunities through federal agencies. In California, 
however, processors report production information, including 
gross organic sales, to the SOP.122 And the SOP annually reports 
116  Kelly Damewood, Notes from COPAC Technical Subcommittee on Registration 
(Jan.-May 2017) (on file with author). 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Interview with Jane Sooby, Senior Policy Specialist, California Certified Organic 
Farmers, in Santa Cruz, CA (Aug. 1, 2017).
120  Id.; California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code §§ 46013.1.
121  See California State Organic Program Fact Sheet, supra note 89.
122  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 22. 
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this data back to the industry.123 Reports show that organic food 
processing has grown to almost $10 billion in 2016.124 This 
impressive sales number helps organic advocates demonstrate the 
value of organic to the California economy and make the case for 
investment in organic.125 
Despite the benefits of SOP data, it is also important to note 
that this data is not being used to its fullest potential. Under state 
law, the SOP must report data on the processing sector annually, 
but it is not required to report data on farm production.126 The 
SOP makes data available upon specific request, but it does not 
systematically report the data.127 So while the SOP registration 
data may have many uses, it is currently underutilized because the 
general public does not have regular access to it.128 
2.  The SOP administers Cost Share 
Another ancillary benefit of the SOP is it administers the 
National Organic Cost Share Program (cost share) on behalf of 
organic farmers in the state.129 First authorized in the 2002 Farm 
Bill, cost share is a federal program that reimburses organic 
producers 75% of their certification costs, up to $750 per scope.130 
The USDA works with state departments of agriculture, and the 
Farm Service Agency (FSA) to administer cost share.131 Some 
state departments choose not to administer it, but the SOP has 
always been committed to administering it and strives to enroll 
as many producers as possible in the program.132  Due to recent 
123  Id. 
124  CDPH Report on Organic Processing FY 2015-16 (on file with author). 
125  Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
126  See CA Health & Safety Code §§110811-12 (requiring annual reporting); Ca 
Agric. Code § 46000, et seq. (not requiring annual reporting). 
127  Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
128  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 27-28.
129  Id. at 27.
130  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C. 6523(d).
131  Organic Certification Cost Share Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural 
Marketing Service, https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/occsp, (last visited 
May 2, 2018). 
132  Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119; see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Report 
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changes, California producers may also apply through their local 
FSA office; however, it is helpful for organic producers to apply 
through the SOP because they already register with the SOP 
annually.133 Therefore, the SOP benefits the organic sector by 
administering cost share. 
3.  The SOP can support Education, Outreach, and other 
Programmatic Activities.  
An important but unrealized ancillary benefit of the 
SOP is its authority to support education, outreach, and other 
programmatic activities for organic producers. In 2016, California 
updated and streamlined the SOP through the passage of the 
California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA).134 These 
updates broadened the authority of CDFA and the SOP from 
solely enforcing federal organic standards to also incorporating 
education, outreach, and other programmatic activities for organic 
producers.135 While CDFA has not yet acted on this new authority, 
it is expected that COPAC will consider advising the Secretary 
of CDFA on new opportunities for the SOP in the future.136 Thus, 
the SOP could implement programs to support and grow organic 
production in the state.  
to Congress Fiscal Year 2015, National and Agricultural Management 
Assistance Organic Certification Cost Share Programs 4 (2015) (listing 
California has distributing 88% of cost share funds to 2384 participants), https://www.
ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/FY2015OCCSReporttoCongress.pdf.  
133  USDA Provides New Cost Share Opportunities for Organic Producers and 
Handlers, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Dec. 21 2016), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-
releases/2016/12/21/usda-provides-new-cost-share-opportunities-organic-producers-
and.  
134  Kelly Damewood, COFFA Signed into Law with your Help, From Field to Forum 
(Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.ccof.org/blog/coffa-signed-law-your-help. [hereinafter 
Damewood, COFFA Signed into Law with Your Help].
135  Id.
136  Kelly Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, 
Organic Report (Aug. 17, 2017), http://theorganicreport.com/new-era-
organic-leadership-california [hereinafter Damewood, A New Era of Organic 
Leadership in California].
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viii. The SOP benefits the entire Organic Sector.
The full range of SOP benefits cannot be discussed 
without considering the impact on national enforcement and the 
organic marketplace as a whole. As the state with the highest 
volume of organic production, strong enforcement in California 
supports consumer confidence in the integrity of organic 
production and compliance.137 Moreover, the SOP essentially 
subsidizes enforcement throughout the U.S.—by funding its own 
enforcement through fees, California’s SOP allows the NOP to 
direct its limited resources toward enforcement in other states.138 
As discussed below, many California producers resent subsidizing 
national enforcement.139 Nonetheless, additional resources and 
support for the NOP benefits the entire organic sector because 
the success of the organic marketplace depends upon strong 
enforcement.140 Therefore, the SOP benefits the entire organic 
sector by providing strong, self-funded enforcement.
B.  The Costs of the SOP
While the SOP provides the strongest, most robust 
enforcement in the U.S., the SOP also has several disadvantages. 
California organic producers have the highest costs of certification 
because they pay more fees, comply with more paperwork, 
operate in a more confusing regulatory landscape, have more 
communications challenges, and have more need for engagement 
and advocacy.  However, COFFA addresses many of these costs 
and stakeholders continue to work with CDFA to refine the 
program. 
i.  California’s Organic Producers pay more Fees for 
Organic Certification. 
One SOP cost is the requirement that California producers 
pay an annual SOP registration fee in addition to their certification 
137  Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43. 
138  Id. 
139  See infra text accompanying notes 130-40. 
140  See supra text accompanying notes 1-4. 
136 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol. 14
fee.141 The NOP allows the SOP to collect an annual SOP registration 
fee as an additional requirement to organic certification.142 Many 
California producers resent paying an additional fee because 
they feel it puts them at an unfair advantage to organic producers 
outside the state who only pay a certification fee.143
Many California producers also resent subsidizing 
national enforcement. The NOP does not spend enforcement 
dollars in California because the SOP is self-funded through its 
registration fees.144 This allows the NOP to spend its enforcement 
dollars outside the state.145 So, at the very least, California 
producers argue that they should receive their fair share of federal 
enforcement dollars from the NOP.146 
SOP fees also create an additional barrier to certification 
for small to mid-scale farmers. The fees are relatively low—
they range from $25 to $3,000 depending on gross annual 
sales, with the majority paying in the range of $250. However, 
farmers operate with thin margins.147 And California farmers are 
arguably the most regulated farmers in the world with multiple 
layers of fees.148 Small to mid-scale producers report that the fees 
are a barrier to the success of their business.149 Therefore, even 
seemingly small SOP fees challenge producers, especially small 
to mid-scale farmers. 
Organic stakeholders are also concerned that the SOP has 
an excess reserve fund of about three million dollars.150 The SOP 
141  California Organic Program, Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., https://www.cdfa.
ca.gov/is/i_&_c/organic.html (last visited May 2, 2018).
142  Policy Memorandum from Miles McEvoy, supra note 53.
143  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 9. 
144  Interview with Miles McEvoy, supra note 84. 
145  Id.  
146  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 9.
147  Phil LaRocca, La Rocca Vineyards & Chair of California Certified Organic 
Farmers, Testimony before California State Board of Food and Agriculture (Feb. 
2016).
148  American Farmland Trust, Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., California 
Agricultural Vision: Strategies for Sustainability 11 (2010), https://www.cdfa.
ca.gov/agvision/docs/Ag_Vision_Final_Report_Dec_2010.pdf.  
149  Id. at 23.
150  Damewood & Sooby, supra note, 12 at 9. 
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first accumulated a large reserve of excess funds in 2009 when 
every state agency was ordered to freeze spending.151 During 
that time, the SOP collected fees without expending them on 
enforcement.152 Now the SOP reports that it operates at budget, 
yet the reserve fund continues to grow.153 So some stakeholders 
are concerned about the legitimacy of the SOP growing a large 
reserve fund while small and mid-scale farmers struggle to pay 
their fees.
Fortunately, the burden of SOP fees has eased over the last 
year. In 2016, a new state organic law—the California Organic 
Food and Farming Act (COFFA)—streamlined SOP registration 
and updated the fee schedule.154 It capped the current fee schedule 
so producers will not see higher fees, and it lowered fees for 
producers in the lowest category of gross organic sales.155 CDFA 
could also lower SOP fees further, especially given the cost 
savings of a more streamlined registration process.156 Therefore, 
COFFA helped ease some concerns regarding fees. 
Additionally, SOP fees are now eligible for cost share 
reimbursement as an additional scope of certification. California 
producers may receive up to $750 in reimbursement for their 
SOP fees, which would cover the entire SOP fee for most small 
to mid-scale producers.157 The downside is that producers must 
still pay their SOP fee and then apply for reimbursement.158 And 
an even more important concern is that cost share is at high 
risk for defunding in the 2018 Farm Bill because Congress will 
151  Interview with Rick Jensen, former Director of Inspection Services, California 
Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, CA November 24, 2014. 
152  Id. 
153  Id.  
154  See California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code  § 46000 
(2017). 
155  See Historic Updates to California State Organic Program Becomes 
Law, Reducing Duplicative Paperwork and Fees, California Certified 
Organic Farmers (Sept. 21, 2016),  https://www.ccof.org/press/historic-
update-california-state-organic-program-becomes-law-reducing-
duplicative-paperwork. 
156  See id. 
157  USDA provides new Cost Share Opportunities, supra note 133.  
158  Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
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be looking to cut programs that make direct payments such as 
cost share.159   So, as long as cost share funds are available and 
producers make use of the program, the burden of SOP fees is 
greatly diminished.160  
Concerns regarding the excess reserve fund are also 
being addressed. COPAC may advise CDFA on the expenditure 
of the reserve fund; however, it must work through bureaucratic 
budgeting steps to access the funds.161 COPAC began the process 
to access the funds in May of 2017.162 Now it will consider how to 
best spend the funds, such as updating communications to organic 
stakeholders about the role and enforcement actions of the SOP.163
ii.  California organic producers have more paperwork.
Historically, the most significant SOP cost has been 
cumbersome paperwork and reporting requirements.164 As part of 
their annual SOP registration, producers must report information 
about their crop production.165 Before COFFA, producers were 
reporting highly detailed information including gross sales per 
crop per location166. These reporting requirements were especially 
cumbersome for highly diversified operations who may grow over 
50 crops.167 And, just as California farmers pay multiple layers 
of fees, they also complete multiple layers of state paperwork 
requirements—they were reporting information to the SOP that 
they already reported to other state and federal agencies as well as 
159  Organic Certification Cost-Share at Risk, National Organic Coalition (Dec. 
15, 2017), http://www.nationalorganiccoalition.org/news-items/organic-certification-
cost-share-at-risk. California Organic Products Advisory Committee, Minutes, 
Public Comment by Laura Batcha of the Organic Trade Association (Jan. 25, 2018), 
available at https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/uploader/postings/hearings/#hide-fam2009. 
160  Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
161  See Inspection Service Minutes, California Organic Products Advisory 
Committee, https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/uploader/postings/hearings/#hide-fam2009 
(last visited May 4, 2018) (describing multi-step process to access reserve funds).
162  See id. 
163  See id. 
164  Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43.
165  Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 9. 
166  Id. at 29.
167  Id.
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their certifiers.168 The additional and duplicative paperwork was 
extremely burdensome for producers.169 
However, the cost of excess paperwork has largely been 
addressed or is being addressed by ongoing refinements to the 
SOP. COFFA significantly reduced the information required 
at SOP registration.170 And the SOP is working with CCOF, 
which certifies the majority of farms in the state, to develop a 
data sharing system whereby certifiers can report information on 
behalf of their clients.171 So the cost of additional paperwork has 
diminished.  
iii.  California producers operate in a more challenging 
regulatory landscape. 
An unavoidable cost of the SOP is that it creates a more 
challenging regulatory landscape for California producers. Even 
with greatly improved fee and paperwork requirements, the SOP 
adds another layer of compliance on California producers who 
have seen significant rises in compliance costs over the last few 
years. For example, California producers must comply with a wide 
range of regulations not commonly required in other agricultural 
states such nutrient management reporting, comprehensive 
pesticide use reporting, and overtime and minimum wage 
requirements for farmworkers.172 Keeping up with regulations 
and state agencies is especially challenging for small and mid-
scale producers who cannot afford staff to oversee compliance.173 
Therefore, even a streamlined SOP costs California producers 
168  Id. at 9.
169  Id. at 29.
170  Kelly Damewood, Comment Period Open on State Organic Program Registration 
Requirements, From Field to Forum (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.ccof.org/blog/
comment-period-open-state-organic-program-registration-requirements [hereinafter 
Damewood, Comment Period Open on State Organic Program Registration 
Requirements].
171  Id. 
172  American Farmland Trust to the California State Board of Food and 
Agriculture, California Agricultural Vision, (December 2010). https://www.
cdfa.ca.gov/agvision/docs/Ag_Vision_Final_Report_Dec_2010.pdf.  
173  Id.
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who are under significant regulatory pressures. 
iv.  SOP creates communication challenges around organic 
certification and compliance. 
Another SOP costs is the communication challenges 
it creates for organic stakeholders. For many years, organic 
producers thought that they were paying fees and registering 
with the SOP for absolutely no reason—they were not aware of 
the extent of SOP enforcement activities.174 Although CCOF’s 
work to pass COFFA helped raise awareness about the program, 
many producers still struggle to understand the role of the 
SOP.175 Certifiers must explain to their clients that they cannot 
finalize certification until their client registers with the SOP.176 In 
other words, navigating the certification process is challenging 
enough for producers but in California they must also grasp the 
relationship between the SOP, the NOP, and certifiers. 
COPAC and CDFA are slowly addressing the 
communication challenges. Historically, the SOP put out little 
to no communications about the program.177 It did not attend 
industry events such as organic conferences or NOSB meetings.178 
As a result, organic stakeholders had no understanding of the 
program. Now, COPAC is working to recommend an updated 
website, newsletter, and other basic communication functions.179 
Additionally, SOP staff have begun engaging in industry events 
such as hosting a booth at an organic trade show. So some 
communication challenges are being addressed. 
v.  Additional need for advocacy and engagement 
An important SOP cost is that it will require ongoing 
advocacy and engagement from organic stakeholders. Like 
174  Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43. 
175  Kelly Damewood, notes on input after COFFA (on file with author).
176  Id. 
177  Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., supra note 92, at 9.
178  Id. at 16.
179  Id. at 16-17.
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any industry, the organic stakeholders must ensure statewide 
officeholders and representatives are meeting the unique needs 
of organic producers and supporting the growth of organic 
production. But organic is especially challenged in arguing 
for their fair share of public funds and programs because they 
compete with powerful conventional lobby groups and critics 
of organic certification.180 Moreover, organic advocates spend 
significant advocacy efforts on improving and protecting organic 
standards.181 Thus, the need to engage with an additional state 
program strains organic stakeholders who already struggle to 
represent the diverse needs of the organic sector.  
The importance of stakeholder advocacy and engagement 
should not be underestimated. The most significant SOP costs were 
made worse when organic stakeholders failed to engage CDFA 
and COPAC. Stakeholders did not ask the state to update the fee 
schedule and other program requirements for over ten years while 
producers expressed grave concerns about and resentment towards 
the program.182 COPAC could have long ago recommended 
streamlined reporting requirements, better communications, 
and other improvements; however, the committee struggled to 
maintain active membership.183 And stakeholders failed to go to 
committee members for help.184 Now, with renewed engagement 
from CCOF, the largest organic advocacy group in California, 
advocacy and engagement have improved.185 For example, 
COPAC has nearly a full roster and is working to further refine 
the program.186 Nonetheless, organic stakeholders will have to 
continue to engage with the SOP to ensure it is an effective, not 
180  See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. 
181  See id.
182  See Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12; Minutes of January 2016 COPAC 
meeting (discussing long standing concerns not brought to COPAC’s attention and not 
addressed by SOP).  
183  Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 136. 
184  See Minutes of January 2016 COPAC meeting (discussing long standing concerns 
not brought to COPAC’s attention and not addressed by SOP). 
185  Damewood, COFFA Signed into Law with Your Help, supra note 134.
186  Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 136.
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overly burdensome program. 
C.  The Benefits outweigh the Costs. 
Overall, the benefits of the SOP outweigh the costs. The 
SOP has numerous benefits for California’s organic producers, 
which in turn benefits the organic sector as a whole.187 Although 
the SOP had significant costs in the past, they have largely been 
addressed with the passage of COFFA or are being addressed 
through further refinements to the program.188 Meanwhile, funding 
for the NOP and its ability to strengthen standards is increasingly 
uncertain under the current political climate.189 Therefore, 
the SOP is a valuable program and a model for strengthening 
enforcement through state organic programs because the costs to 
organic producers in California are diminishing while the benefits 
are increasingly important.
III.  Key Attributes of States with Potential for State 
Organic Programs. 
The benefits of a new state organic program may not 
outweigh the costs for all states. The costs and benefits of the 
SOP are directly related to the unique regulatory landscape and 
the overall production value of organic in the state.190 Therefore, 
the costs and benefits of establishing a new state organic program 
should be considered in the context of that state’s own organic 
production and agricultural regulations.   
Applying the SOP as a model, state organic programs 
are most likely viable in states with the following attributes: 
additional enforcement adds value to the state’s organic sector, 
organic stakeholders are highly engaged with the state department 
of agriculture and other agencies, and the state department of 
agriculture does not have a conflict of interest.  
 
187  See supra text accompanying section II (A).
188  See supra text accompanying section II (B).
189  See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. 
190  See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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A.  Additional Enforcement adds Value to the State’s 
Organic Sector. 
To justify the costs, state organic programs should add 
value the state’s organic sector. For example, the SOP adds 
value because California produces the highest volume of organic 
products, which increases the risks of noncompliance and fraud.191 
By contrast, additional enforcement would not add much value to 
a state like Mississippi where there is a small amount of organic 
production and, therefore, relatively low risks of fraud.192 
But the potential value of additional enforcement should 
not be judged on volume of organic production in the state alone. 
The SOP helps with oversight of farmers markets and direct to 
consumer sales because it has registration data and local staff.193 
Other states like Hawaii and Northeastern states have a strong 
direct to consumer market.194  Therefore, they would likely benefit 
from more oversight of the use of the term organic at farmers 
markets and other direct to consumer sales channels.195  
Another factor impacting the value of additional 
enforcement would be risks associated with the types of crops 
grown in the state. The SOP’s random testing and inspections help 
identify issues such as GMO contamination.196 So state organic 
programs may be helpful in a state like Montana where grain is 
staple crop for organic producers.197  
Thus, states should consider the volume of organic 
production, the types of sales channels, risks associated with the 
state’s main organic crops, and other factors when weighing the 
value of a state organic program. 
191  See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.  
192  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 1, at 1.
193  See supra text accompanying section II (A) (ii), (v). 
194  Id.  
195  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 1, at 2.
196  Letter from Danny Lee, supra note 103.
197  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 1, at 1-2.
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B.  Organic Stakeholders are Highly Engaged with the 
State Department of Agriculture and other Regulatory Agencies. 
It is also important to consider the level of engagement and 
advocacy a state may expect from organic stakeholders. One of the 
long standing problems with the SOP was a lack of understanding 
about the program and engagement from the community to 
improve its outdated requirements.198 If a state does not have 
existing organic organizations or trade associations, then it will 
be difficult for producers to understand state organic program 
developments or to advocate for changes to the program. But, 
for example, a state like Montana has an active organic farming 
association, which would presumably engage with a state organic 
program to represent the interests of its growers.199 Therefore, the 
level of engagement a state may expect from organic stakeholders 
will determine whether a state organic program will have long 
lasting benefits without overly burdening the state’s organic 
producers.200  
C.  The State Department of Agriculture does not have a 
Conflicts of Interest. 
Finally, state organic programs may not be appropriate 
for states where the state department of agriculture operates an 
organic certification agency. State organic programs can overrule a 
certifier’s decision and must work with all certifiers in the state.201 
So a state department of agriculture may have a real or perceived 
conflict of interest if it operates both a state organic program 
and a state certifier.202  California has never operated an organic 
certification agency, and it is the only state that has applied for 
state organic program status.203 Therefore, the potential conflict 
198  See supra accompanying text for notes 164–169. 
199  Montana Organic Association, http://montanaorganicassociation.org/ (last 
visited May 2, 2018).  
200  See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
201  See supra accompanying text for notes 40-59. 
202  Id. 
203  Interview with Miles McEvoy, supra note 84.
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of interest issue has yet to be tested. 
If a conflict of interest exists, then some state certifiers 
should consider becoming state organic programs. For example, 
Oregon has a long-established, well-respected private certifier—
Oregon Tilth—as well as many other certifiers operating in the 
region while its state certifier is relatively new.204 Given the high 
amount of organic production in the state, a state organic program 
would make sense for Oregon’s department of agriculture.205 In 
contrast, WSDA has long certified producers in the state.206 So 
if a conflict of interest exits, then it may be more worthwhile to 
replace some state certifiers with state organic programs but it 
will depend upon the history and reputation of the certifier. 
IV.  Recommendations for Structuring State Organic 
Programs 
Using the costs and benefits of the SOP as a model, a new 
state organic program should be structured under the following 
principles: high accountability, streamlined requirements, and 
fair funding sources. 
A.  State Organic Programs should have High 
Accountability to the State’s Organic Stakeholders.  
New state organic programs can avoid the downfalls of 
the SOP by putting in place a program structure that ensures high 
accountability to the state’s organic sector. Prior to COFFA, one 
core issue with the SOP was lack of accountability—it had poor 
communications, outdated requirements, and low engagement 
with the organic community.207 Therefore, new state organic 
programs should be structured to ensure high accountability. 
204  Oregon Tilth, https://tilth.org/about/history/ (last visited May 3, 2018).  
205  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 1, at 1.
206  Heidi Peroni, Organic Roots: Washington’s Extensive History of 
Organic Agriculture and Certification, Ag Briefs, (Sep. 14, 2016) https://
wastatedeptag.blogspot.com/2016/09/organic-roots-washingtons-extensive.
html. 
207  See supra text accompanying notes 179-83.
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To ensure high accountability, a state organic program 
should incorporate the following programmatic features: a 
concise advisory committee, staff attendance at industry trainings 
and events, state of the art communications, and a sunset date.  
i.  Establish a concise, meaningful advisory committee. 
State organic programs should have advisory committees 
made up of a small, but representative number of committee 
members. COPAC advises the Secretary of CDFA on the SOP, 
but low participation in COPAC resulted in ongoing issues 
with the SOP.208 Some would argue that COPAC has too many 
seats to fill, including alternate seats, which requires ongoing 
outreach and support from NGOs and other stakeholders.209 A 
more effective committee would have a limited number of seats 
with no alternates—this would make selection more competitive 
and incentivize higher participation by sitting members. Another 
problem with COPAC is that it did not include a certifier seat, 
which made it difficult for the committee to address coordination 
with certifiers or complicated certification issues.210 Therefore, 
new state organic programs should have concise advisory 
committees. 
Additionally, the committee members must have authority 
to advise the program on meaningful recommendations. One 
reason for low COPAC participation was its limited authority to 
advise the Secretary CDFA on enforcement activities.211 COFFA 
broadened COPAC’s authority, so it may now advise the Secretary 
of CDFA on a range of activities related to organic production.212 
This broader authority is attracting more interest and participation 
from stakeholders.213 Thus, state organic programs should have 
208  Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 136. 
209  Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43. 
210  Peter Nell, CCOF Representation on COPAC Increases with Key Appointments, 
From Field to Forum (May 1, 2017), https://www.ccof.org/blog/ccof-representation-
copac-increases-key-appointments. 
211  Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43. 
212  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric.§ 46003(b) (2017). 
213  Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 
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concise advisory committees who also advise on a range of topics 
related to organic production. 
ii.  Require staff attendance at Industry Trainings and 
Events
State organic programs should require staff to attend 
industry trainings and events. NOP hosts annual trainings 
for certifiers to ensure they are up to date on standards and 
enforcement activities as well as promote a consistent certification 
process among the certifiers.214 However, SOP did not regularly 
attend these trainings until 2010 when NOP audited the SOP and 
directed the SOP to require attendance at NOP-hosted trainings.215 
SOP staff also did not frequent industry events such as organic 
conferences or NOSB meetings until work began to reform the 
SOP through the passage of COFFA.216 Now, staff attend industry 
events such as organic conferences or NOSB meetings, which is 
improving communication with the industry.217 Therefore, state 
organic program staff should attend industry trainings and events.
  
iii.  Use State of the Art Communications 
State organic programs should use state of the art 
communications. Perhaps one of the greatest downfalls of the SOP 
was its poor communications to the organic sector—the majority 
of organic producers in the state assume the SOP only collects 
fees;218 they do not understand the SOP’s important enforcement 
functions.219 By contrast, California’s new program to regulate 
cannabis production, CalCannabis, has a reader-friendly, regularly 
136. 
214  See Organic Training, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing 
Service, https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/organic-certification/
training (last visited May 3, 2018) (listing ongoing trainings for certifiers). 
215  Letter to David Carlson, Senior Special Investigator for CDFA’s SOP from 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, National 
Organic Program (on file with author) (regarding 2009 audit May 11, 2010).
216  Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119. 
217  Id. 
218  Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43.
219  Id.
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updated webpage, social media accounts, accessible flyers, and 
other useful communication tools.220 Producers regulated under 
CalCnnabis already have much more public information available 
to them than producers regulated under the SOP.221 Thus, new 
state organic programs should use state of the art communications 
from the outset. 
iv.  Establish a Sunset Date
State organic programs should have sunset dates. A sunset 
date is a date in the authorizing legislation when the program will 
expire unless renewed by legislation.222 Although a sunset date 
is severe, it ensures accountability because organic stakeholders 
will have to weigh in with their state representatives when the 
state legislature votes on whether to renew the program. Organic 
stakeholders advocated for the original law establishing the SOP; 
however, when the NOP implemented the national standards, 
many stakeholders no longer supported the SOP.223 Rather, they 
wanted to be on the same regulatory playing field as producers 
in other states who were all subject to national standards and 
certification.224 But the SOP did not consult with stakeholders 
when it applied for state organic program status with the NOP.225 
Thus, state organic programs should have sunset dates to ensure 
buy in from the state’s organic stakeholders. 
B.  Streamline Paperwork 
The second principle for new state organic programs is 
220  See CalCannabis: What We Do, Cal. Dept. Food & Agric., http://calcannabis.
cdfa.ca.gov/ (last visited May 3, 2018) (hosting a reader-friendly, modern webpage 
with resources, an events & activities paged, and photos).   
221  See California Organic Program, Cal. Dept. of Food & Agric. (last visited August 
1, 2017) (listing details about the program but showing no branding or reader-friendly 
interface; hosting one fact sheet created in 2016; not hosting any details about COPAC 
meetings). 
222  Brian Baugus & Feler Bose, Mercatus Ctr. At George Mason Univ., Sunset 
Legislature in the States: Balancing the Legislature and the Executive 3 
(2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Baugus-Sunset-Legislation.pdf. 
223  LaRocca, supra note 147.
224  Id.
225  Cal. Dep’t of FOod & Agric., supra note 92, at 17-18.
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streamlined paperwork. State organic programs should collect 
data from certifiers rather than from producers. And they should 
share their data with state and federal agencies to avoid duplication 
of other reporting requirements. 
i.  State organic programs should collect data form 
certifiers rather than producers. 
State organic programs should have as streamlined 
paperwork requirements as possible to ensure the program does 
not overly burden producers. COFFA helped ease the most 
significant cost of compliance for the SOP, excess paperwork, 
by greatly reducing the information producers must report at 
registration.226 And paperwork may be eliminated altogether 
when CDFA establishes a data sharing system with certifiers.227 
While some certifiers may need to collect more information at 
certification to ensure they have all the information the SOP 
needs, it will be more efficient for the SOP to collect data from 
the 20 (give or take) certifiers operating in the state rather than the 
3,000 plus individual farmers and ranchers.228 Thus, state organic 
programs can streamline paperwork at the outset by collecting 
registration information from certifiers rather than directly from 
individual producers. 
ii.  State organic programs should share data with other 
state and federal agencies. 
State organic programs should share their data and 
registration information with other state and federal agencies 
because it could help ease the burden of duplicate reporting 
requirements. Organic producers report the same information 
in many different formats to many different agencies. For 
example, they complete annual production surveys for agencies 
like the Economic Research Service or the National Agriculture 
226  See supra text accompanying notes 161-62. 
227  Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., supra note 92, at 11.
228  Id. 
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Statistics Service.229 They also report production information 
for programs under the Farm Services Agency, the National 
Resource Conservation Service, and crop insurance programs.230 
And they may have to report to state agencies like departments 
of pesticide regulation or water quality control boards.231 If state 
organic programs can share their information in such a way that 
it eliminates the need for producers to complete separate forms 
or reporting requirements, then the SOP would greatly benefit 
producers by streamlining paperwork across a variety of agencies 
and programs. 
C.  Establish a Fair Funding Source 
The final principal for state organic programs is a fair 
funding source. A long-time concern of California producers is 
that they subsidize national enforcement by paying an unfair, 
additional fee in California. There are two complimentary 
solutions to establishing a fair funding source for a state organic 
program: NOP could allocate some funds to the program, and the 
state organic program can collect fees from certifiers rather than 
directly from individual producers. 
i.  NOP could allocate Funds to State Organic Programs. 
The NOP could direct enforcement funds to state organic 
programs to ensure producers in those states receive their fair 
share of NOP resources. Arguably, the NOP should help fund 
investigations in California because it funds investigations in all 
other states.232 But the SOP also takes on enforcement activities 
that the NOP cannot afford in other states, like spot inspections and 
residue testing.233 NOP could give SOP funds for investigations 
while the SOP continues to fund its additional enforcement 
activities through fees. Thus, NOP could ensure producers receive 
229  Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
230  Id.
231  Id.
232  See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
233  See supra text accompanying sections II (A)(i), (iv). 
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their fair share of enforcement resources by allocating funds to 
state organic programs for investigations. 
ii.  State organic programs should collect fees from 
certifiers rather than individual producers. 
State organic programs should ensure they maintain a 
reliable funding source. NOP allocations should not be the sole 
income stream for state organic programs because the NOP has 
limited resources, and its funding is subject to Congressional 
discretion.234 By contrast, one of the benefits of the SOP is a 
consistent, abundant funding stream through registration fees.235 
Therefore, state organic programs will need a locally generated 
funding source. 
The most reliable way to ensure a funding source is fees 
not funds from the state general fund. Organic stakeholders would 
have to successfully pass legislation directing general funds to the 
program. This would be a challenging political lift for many states. 
Additionally, general funds are not as reliable as fees because they 
are subject to the discretion of the state legislature. So the most 
reliable funding source would be a fee-based program. 
To be most cost effective and limit the burden on producers, 
state organic programs should collect fees from certifiers rather 
than individual producers. COFFA now allows certifiers to 
renew their clients’ registration on their behalf.236 However, the 
only certifier pursuing this option, CCOF, cannot renew their 
members registration at this time because collecting and passing 
on the mandatory registration fee is too challenging.237 A more 
straightforward option would be to levy a fee on certifiers rather 
than directly on individual producers. The certifier would pass 
234  See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
235  See supra text accompanying section II (A)(i). 
236  California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46014.1(c) (2017). 
237  See Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 136 
(stating that CCOF would pursue the option to renew their members certification); 
Damewood, Comment Period Open on State Organic Program Registration 
Requirements, supra note 170 (stating CCOF would pursue data sharing with CDFA 
but no longer stating it would pursue option to renew registration). 
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that cost onto its clients; however, producers would have the 
benefit of only one billing for their certification a year. Moreover, 
collecting from certifiers may reduce the fee because there will be 
cost savings when the program collects fees from 25-30 certifiers 
rather than over 3,500 individual organic operations every 
year. Thus, collecting fees from certifiers would provide stable, 
consistent funding for state organic programs.  
Conclusion 
Organic stakeholders should consider how to better 
leverage state organic programs as they work to advance their 
farm bill priorities. While there are a number of options to shore up 
enforcement through the farm bill process, state organic programs 
offer a viable, often- overlooked solution to strengthening organic 
enforcement without further changes to OFPA. As demonstrated 
in California, state organic programs create a robust enforcement 
scheme at the state-level and add valuable support to NOP. 
Therefore, organic stakeholders should consider establishing state 
organic programs to support organic enforcement throughout the 
United States. 
But new state organic programs should not simply 
replicate the SOP; rather, they should learn from the successes 
and failures of the SOP to ensure effective programs in the future. 
Specifically, state organic programs should be established in 
states where additional enforcement adds value to the organic 
sector, where organic stakeholders are highly engaged with the 
state department of agriculture and other regulatory agencies, and 
where no conflict of interest exists for the state department of 
agriculture. And new programs should be structured to include 
the following principles: accountability, streamlined paperwork, 
and fair funding sources. By using the SOP as a model, organic 
stakeholders are well poised to create effective state organic 
programs in new states.  
Thus, organic stakeholders in some states should consider 
establishing state organic programs with the recommended 
guiding principles outlined in this article because additional state 
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organic programs would support national efforts to strengthen 
NOP enforcement resources in the next farm bill. 
The End of the Ramen Diet:
Higher Education Students and SNAP Benefits
Erika M. Dunyak*
Introduction
Americans joke that college students have so little money 
that they subsist on ten-cent packs of ramen. Unfortunately, 
the current reality of nutrition on campus is no joking matter. 
Statistically, college students face much higher rates of food 
insecurity than the general population and the situation is 
particularly dire for students of color.1 This article will look to a 
solution for this hungry, and often neglected, population.
In a statement to Congress encouraging “Great Society” 
legislation, President Lyndon Johnson said, “Higher education is 
no longer a luxury, but a necessity.”2 The average graduate with 
a Bachelor’s degree will earn double what the average individual 
without a degree will make in his or her lifetime.3 By federally 
supporting students during this period, they will likely have 
greater financial self-sufficiency later in life.
Hunger advocates have focused especially on children, 
through the National School Lunch Program (NSLP);4 the 
* Erika Dunyak is a graduate of Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law and the Agricultural and Food Law LL.M. at the University of Arkansas. 
The author would like to express her gratitude to Jessica Friedman for her 
tireless support and encouragement. 
1  See Sara Goldrick-Rab et al., Wisconsin Hope Lab, Still Hungry 
and Homeless in College 17 (2018), http://wihopelab.com/publications/
Wisconsin-HOPE-Lab-Still-Hungry-and-Homeless.pdf. 
2  Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress: “Toward Full Educational 
Opportunity,” The American Presidency Project (Jan. 12, 1965), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27448. 
3  Brad Hershbein & Melissa Kearney, The Hamilton Project, Major 
Decisions: What Graduates Earn Over their Lifetimes 5 (2014), https://
www.financialbuildingblocks.com/assets/What%20Graduates%20Earn%20
Over%20Their%20Lifetimes.pdf. 
4  National School Lunch Program, Food Research & Action Center (Feb. 
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working poor, though the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP);5 and the elderly, though Meals on Wheels and 
SNAP.6 However, all of these programs exclude actively enrolled 
college students.7 Those students have outgrown NSLP and 
are excluded from SNAP.8 A two-prong solution would require 
striking the exclusion of college students from SNAP and, further, 
actively enrolling college students who are financially supported 
by federal income-based university programs. 
In 2010, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFKA) 
reauthorized the NSLP.9 HHFKA contained several innovations 
in the NSLP; one that is particularly relevant is expansion of the 
“identified students” provision.10 Under this scheme, students 
whose families already receive SNAP benefits also qualify for free 
or reduced-price school meals without a separate application.11 
With the next iteration of the Farm Bill, SNAP should be adjusted 
to similarly accommodate low-income college students without 
an additional application. Under this new program, students who 
qualify for Perkins Loans, Pell Grants, Federal Supplemental 
Educational Opportunity Grants, and similar federal programs 
would also receive SNAP benefits without an additional 
application. 
The benefits to such a program would be tremendous. 
College students are often specifically excluded from receiving 
benefits such as SNAP and Medicaid. This policy change would 
move students away from food insecurity, reduce the burden of 
18, 2018, 9:55 AM), http://frac.org/programs/national-school-lunch-program. 
5  Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Food Research & Action 
Center (Feb. 18, 2018, 9:55 AM), http://frac.org/programs/supplemental-
nutrition-assistance-program-snap.  
6  Id., Meals on Wheels Facts & Resources, Meals on Wheels America (Feb. 
18, 2018, 9:55 AM), https://www.mealsonwheelsamerica.org/theissue/facts-
resources. 
7  See National School Lunch Program, supra note 5; see also Meals on Wheels 
Facts & Resources, supra note 7. 
8  See National School Lunch Program, supra note 5.
9  Randy Alison Aussenberg, Cong. Research Serv., Tracking the Next 
Child Nutrition Reauthorization: An Overview 3 (2017).
10  7 C.F.R. § 245.9(f)(1)(ii) (2016). 
11  Id. 
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schools providing high quality dining experiences that are a major 
contributor to the cost of higher education, reduce student debt, 
and bring the political capital of university students to SNAP. 
This article will first define the problem of hunger on 
campuses and provide an overview of the potential economic 
impacts of food insecurity on college campuses. The second 
section will describe the proposed Farm Bill-based solution to 
hunger and food insecurity on campuses. Finally, the third section 
will explore the possible benefits and difficulties of implementing 
the program.
This article is limited in its scope and only applies to 
undergraduate students. Further research must be completed to 
both understand the degree and effects of hunger for graduate 
students and research assistants and explore federal policy shifts 
to address those problems. 
I.  Background
Like any social policy, hunger policy exists within a 
complex landscape of moving parts. This section will break down 
that landscape. First, this section will define the terms “hunger” 
and “food insecurity” as they are used in this article. The next 
subsection will examine some of the latest data on hunger and 
food insecurity on college campuses. Third, this section will 
describe the economic burden of the college experience, generally, 
and the cost of providing food to students, specifically. The third 
subsection will also address the cost of food from the angles of the 
students, parents, and the schools. Finally, this section will briefly 
describe the existing legal frameworks that have the greatest effect 
on hunger in the United States, namely the Supplement Nutrition 
Assistance Program and the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act.
A.  What are Hunger and Food Insecurity?
In 2006, the Committee on National Statics (CNSTAT), at 
the behest of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), authored 
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a report that defined both “hunger” and “food insecurity.”12 The 
Food Insecurity and Hunger in the United States report defines 
“food insecurity” as “whenever the availability of nutritionally 
adequate and safe foods or the ability to acquire acceptable foods 
in socially acceptable ways is limited or uncertain.”13 
The USDA expands its definition to create a range of food 
security. The USDA contrasts “high food security,” defined as 
“no reported indications of food-access problems or limitations,” 
with “marginal food security,” defined as “one or two reported 
indications—typically of anxiety over food sufficiency or shortage 
of food in the house [with] little to no indication of changes in 
diets or food intake.”14 These two categories comprise the USDA 
definition for “food security.”15
Similarly, “low food security” and “very low food security” 
make up “food insecurity.”16 “Low food security” occurs when a 
household “reports […] reduced quality, variety, or desirability of 
diet [with] little to no indication of reduced food intake[;]” low 
food security is sometimes referred to as food insecurity without 
hunger.17 “Very low food security” refers to “reports of multiple 
indications of disrupted eating patterns and reduced food intake” 
and is sometimes described as food insecurity with hunger.18
The CNSTAT report defines hunger as “a potential 
consequence of food insecurity that, because of prolonged, 
involuntary lack of food, results in discomfort, illness, weakness, 
or pain that goes beyond the usual uneasy sensation.”19 
Importantly, the report clarifies that hunger and food insecurity 
12  Comm. on Nat’l Statistics, Div. of Behavior and Soc. Sci. and Educ., 
Food Insecurity & Hunger in the United States: An Assessment of the 
Measure 17 (Gooloo S. Wunderlich & Janet L. Norwood eds., 2006). 
13  Id. at 43.
14  Definitions of Food Security, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv. 
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/
food-security-in-the-us/definitions-of-food-security/. 
15  Id.
16  Id.
17  Id.
18  Id.
19  Comm. on Nat’l Statistics, supra note 13, at 48.
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are distinct.20 Specifically, hunger is an indicator and a potential 
outcome of food insecurity and is a condition that researchers and 
agencies must study on an individual level and separate from food 
insecurity.21
This article will use both the terms “food insecurity” and 
“hunger.” While “food insecurity” will typically describe the 
conditions described above as “low food security” and “very 
low food security,” some referenced research may use other 
definitions of food insecurity and those will be distinguished 
as appropriate. This article will also use the term “hunger” as 
described above, as the prolonged, involuntary lack of food. As 
described by CNSTAT,22 food insecurity usually, but not always, 
causes hunger. As such, this article will often use both terms. 
However, the program proposed in this article can only target 
food insecurity and the hunger resulting thereof. 
B.  Food Insecurity and Hunger on Campus
There is a significant lack of data regarding the overall 
problem of hunger and food insecurity on college campuses. 
Many schools’ researchers have collected data on the hunger and 
food insecurity for a specific campus.23 This research is important 
for effective policy advocacy. One study, and subsequent report, 
aggregated the data of thirty-four campuses — both community 
colleges and four-year universities — and found 48% of students 
at those institutions are food insecure.24 While that survey states 
its data may skew toward over-representing food insecure 
20  Id.
21  Id. 
22  Id.
23  See e.g., Kate K Diamond & Michael J. Stebleton, “Do you Understand 
What It Means to be Hungry?” Food Insecurity on Campus and the Role 
of Higher Education Professionals, The Mentor: An Acad. Advising J. 
(Apr. 11, 2007), https://dus.psu.edu/mentor/2017/04/do-you-understand-what-
it-means-to-be-hungry-food-insecurity-on-campus-and-the-role-of-higher-
education-professionals/. 
24  James Dubick et al., Nat’l Student Campaign Against Hunger & 
Homelessness, Hunger on Campus: The Challenge of Food Insecurity 
for College Students 7 (2016), http://studentsagainsthunger.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/Hunger_On_Campus.pdf.  
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students,25 that data is not grossly inconsistent with the findings of 
other, narrow- scope studies. Recently, the Wisconsin Hope Lab 
published a broad study on campus hunger.26 That study found that 
36% of four-year university students experience food insecurity.27 
Other studies estimate a range of food insecurity on campus from 
14% to 59%, with most studies finding food insecurity in the mid-
thirties percent range.28 
In addition to the limited number and scope of studies, 
the data on food insecurity and hunger on college campuses is 
lacking in other ways. The data to date suffers from four major 
inadequacies and inconsistencies, which make aggregating 
studies from various institutions difficult. First, current studies 
inquire about food insecurity over inconsistent durations — from 
one month to one year.29 Secondly, the studies that do aggregate 
25  Id at 15. 
26  See Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 17.
27  Id. at 10. 
28  See, e.g., Alisha Gaines et al., Examining the Role of Financial Factors, 
Resources and Skills in Predicting Food Security Status among College 
Students, 38 Int’l J. of Consumer Studies 374, 379 (2014) (finding 14% 
food insecurity at the University of Alabama); Meg Bruening et al., Factors 
Related to the High Rates of Food Insecurity among Diverse, Urban College 
Freshmen, 116 J. of the Acad. of Nutrition & Dietetics 1450, 1452 (2016) 
(finding 32% food insecurity over one month and 37% food insecurity 
over three months at Arizona State University); Loran Mary Morris et al., 
The Prevalence of Food Security and Insecurity Among Illinois University 
Students, 48 J. of Nutrition Educ. & Behavior 376, 379 (2016) (finding 
35% food insecurity across four public Illinois universities); A. Hillmer et al., 
Prevalence of Food Insecurity Among College Students at a Small Midwestern 
University, Suppl. 1—Abstracts 117 J. of the Acad. of Nutrition & Dietetics 
A-92 (2017) (finding 37.5% food insecurity at a small Midwestern University); 
Linda L. Knol et al., Food Insecurity, Self-rated Health, and Obesity among 
College Students, 48 Am. J. of Health Educ. 248, 251 (2017) (finding 37.6% 
food insecurity at the University of Alabama); R. Holland et al., Prevalence 
of Food Insecurity among College Students at a Southeastern University, 
Suppl. 1—Abstracts 117 J. of the Acad. of Nutrition & Dietetics A-93 
(2017) (finding 48% food insecurity at a Southeastern University); Megan M. 
Patton-Lopez et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Food Insecurity Among 
Students Attending a Midsize Rural University in Oregon, 46 J. of Nutrition 
Educ. & Behavior 209, 210 (Nov. 2014) (finding 59% food insecurity at a 
midsize, rural university in Oregon — this study includes students enrolled in 
academic programs other than 4-year undergraduate).
29  See, e.g., Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 10 (one month); Gaines et 
al., supra note 29, at 378 (twelve months); Bruening et al., supra note 29, at 
1452 (one month and three months); Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378 (nine 
months); A. Hillmer et al., supra note 29; Knol et al., supra note 29, at 250 
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information may include four-year universities, two-year 
programs, and graduate students. This is particularly relevant 
here, because only students enrolled in four-year undergraduate 
programs are excluded explicitly from participation in SNAP,30 
see below for more information. The recent Wisconsin Hope 
study did aggregate several schools and separated data of four-
year and two-year institutions.31 However, even that study only 
included 35 four-year institutions of the over three thousand four-
year institutions in the country.32 Additionally, much of the data 
skews toward female students or other demographics.33 Finally, 
the inconsistency in recruitment and small sample sizes yield 
inconsistent results.34 
The studies mentioned in this article do consistently 
use a USDA-defined methodology of determining rates of food 
insecurity. This allows additional researchers and commentators 
to compare roughly the data from a variety of studies and reports. 
However, campus food security studies would be stronger if a 
single entity collected the data and further standardized it. The 
Department of Education should collect this data for every student 
in the United States. The Department of Education already collects 
(twelve months); R. Holland et al., supra note 29 (twelve months); Patton-
Lopez et al., supra note 29, at 210 (did not disclose duration).
30  7 U.S.C. § 2015(e) (2015).
31  Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 7. 
32  Id.; Thomas D. Snyder et al., Digest of Education Statistics 2015 62 
tbl. 105.50 (51st ed. 2016) (table titled “Number of educational institutions, by 
level and control of institution: Selected years, 1980-81 through 2013-14”), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016014.pdf. 
33  See, e.g., Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 8 (over-represents female 
students); Gaines et al., supra note 29, at 379 (over-represents female students 
and seniors); Bruening et al., supra note 29, at 1452 (likely over-represents 
female students); Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378 (likely over-represents 
female students, over-represents white students); Knol et al., supra note 29, 
at 251 (likely over-represents female students); Holland et al., supra note 29; 
Patton-Lopez et al., supra note 29, at 210 (over-represents female students).
34  See, e.g., Gaines et al., supra note 29, at 379 (finding 14% food insecurity at 
the University of Alabama); Knol et al., supra note 29, at 251 (finding 37.6% 
food insecurity at the University of Alabama). These studies were only three 
years apart and at the same institution. Yet, they show vastly different statistics 
about the number of food insecure students at the University of Alabama. It 
is not likely that campus food security would change that dramatically over 
that time. 
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over thirty datasets; including student migration, demographics, 
and parental financial status.35
Finally, and importantly, participation in a university-
sponsored meal plan does little to curb food insecurity.36 Meal 
plans, participation in which is often required for first- and second-
year students at four-year universities, typically include an option 
to receive only seven to ten meals per week. These smaller meal 
plans cost less over the semester, though more per meal, and are, 
therefore, a frequent choice of low-income students who are more 
likely to be food insecure. These students may be getting by on 
little more than one good meal per day. Additionally, the dining 
hall system relies on students receiving meals at designated food 
service locations, rather than cooking for themselves in kitchens. 
In addition to the costs associated with dining hall meals, students 
are losing valuable skills necessary for life after college.
Researchers have long focused on the impact of food 
insecurity as it relates to academic and social performance in 
children.37 Some recent studies have similarly examined the 
association of food insecurity and academic performance on 
college campuses.38 These studies have found a strong correlation 
between food security and grade point average.39
35  DataLab, Inst. of Educ. Sciences: Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., https://
nces.ed.gov/datalab/ (last visited May 17, 2018). 
36  Dubick et al., supra note 25, at 8.
37  See e.g., Diana F. Jyoti et al., Food Insecurity Affects School Children’s 
Academic Performance, Weight Gain, and Social Skills, 135 J. of Nutrition 
2831 (2005) (finding that food insecurity in kindergarten predicts imparted 
academic performance).  
38  Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378; Patton-Lopez et al., supra note 29, at 
210.
39  Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378; Patton-Lopez et al., supra note 29, at 212.
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Figure 1. Grade Point Average Distribution by Food 
Security.40
In addition to the clear academic disadvantage for individual 
students who are affected by food insecurity and hunger, the 
difference in academic performance could have broader societal 
implications. Students who experience food insecurity are more 
likely to be low-income.41 A positive correlation between students 
with reduced food security and lower grade point averages likely 
means low-income correlates with lower grade point average. 
Grade point averages can be loosely associated with salary, where 
higher grades result in higher salaries and lower grades in lower 
salaries.42 Additionally, these students may have lower educational 
attainment, as grade point averages are critical in admission to 
professional degree programs. Due to difficulties in securing 
higher paying entry-level positions or obtaining graduate degrees, 
40  Morris et al., supra note 29 (table created from data found in article).
41  See generally Dubick et al., supra note 25.
42  See Philip L. Roth & Richard L. Clarke, Meta-Analyzing the Relation 
between Grades and Salary, 53 J. of Vocational Behavior 386, 396 (1998). 
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low-income and food insecure students may also have reduced 
earning potential. This could widen the income gap and further 
reinforce a cycle of poverty among low-income individuals, even 
those with college degrees. 
Despite the inadequacies in data regarding food insecurity 
and hunger on campuses, the existing data is conclusive on the 
severity of the problem. The exact statistics of food insecurity and 
hunger may vary, but any public health issue that affects between 
14% and 59% of students demands attention. This is particularly 
concerning due to this public health issue’s effect on academic 
performance and earning potential. 
C.  Economic Burden of Providing Food on Campus
Media outlets and politicians have recently taken up the 
charge of the student debt crisis.43 According to the Department of 
Education, in the fourth quarter of 2017, there were 42.6 million 
recipients with $1.37 trillion in outstanding federal student loan 
debt.44 This averages to more than $32,000 of student loan debt per 
recipient, just in federal loans.45 In 2007, the average outstanding 
debt was a mere $18,233 per recipient. The increase to an average 
debt over $32,000 for every individual with federal student loan 
debt represents an increase of 76% in just ten years.46 
The dramatic and sudden increase in federal student loan 
debt mirrors similarly dramatic and sudden increases in tuition. 
Based upon the average advertised cost of four-year universities, 
43  See e.g., Elizabeth Bernstein, The Price of Admission, Wall St J. (Apr. 2, 2004), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SB108085665347972031.
htm; Lee Siegel, Why I Defaulted on My Student Loans, N.Y. Times (June 6, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/sunday/why-i-defaulted-
on-my-student-loans.html;  It’s Time to Make College Tuition Free and Debt 
Free, Bernie Sanders, https://berniesanders.com/issues/its-time-to-make-
college-tuition-free-and-debt-free/ (last visited May 16, 2018); Jack Herrera, 
How Republicans and Democrats Plan to Attack Student Debt, USA Today 
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://college.usatoday.com/2016/08/03/how-republicans-and-
democrats-plan-to-attack-student-debt/. 
44  See Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal 
Student Aid, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio 
(last visited May 16, 2018). 
45  Id.
46  Id.
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in the last ten years, tuition and fees have increased about 37% 
and 26% at public and private universities, respectively, even 
after being controlled for inflation.47 School tuition increased 
most strikingly for the 2009-10 academic year, at the peak of the 
economic recession, when low- and mid-income students could 
least afford the increase. In that year alone, private universities 
increased tuition and fees by 5.9% and advertised tuition at public 
universities increased a staggering 9.5%.48
Beyond tuition, many students pay room and board 
to attend a four-year university. The cost of room and board 
comprises a significant amount of the total cost of attendance at a 
university. In terms of percentage, room and board are 52% and 
26% at public and private universities, respectively, of the total 
bill for a year of university attendance.49 Following the trend of 
tuition, room and board has also dramatically outpaced the rate 
of inflation. Between the 2007-08 and 2017-18 academic years, 
room and board costs increased 25% and 21% at public and 
private universities, respectfully.50 In the academic year 2014-
2015, the average four-year student paid $4,412 and $5,021 at 
public and private universities, respectively, for board (meals); 
making it about half of the cost of room and board.51 Over a nine-
month academic year, board costs about $115 and $131 per week 
at public and private universities, respectfully.52 
Each month, the USDA issues a report that details the 
cost of food when cooking at home, called the Official USDA 
Food Plans. The reports include four budget levels: the “Liberal 
47  Tuition and Fees and Room and Board over Time, College Board, Trends 
in Higher Education (2017), https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/
figures-tables/tuition-fees-room-and-board-over-time. 
48  Id.
49  See id. 
50  See id.
51  Thomas D. Snyder et al., Inst. of Educ. Sciences, Nat’l Ctr. For Educ. 
Stat., Digest of Education Statistics 2016 605 tbl. 330.20 (52d ed. 2016) 
(table titled “Average Undergraduate Tuition and Fees and Room and Board 
Rates Changed for Full-Time Students in Degree-Granting Postsecondary 
Institutions, by Control and Level of Institution or Jurisdiction: 2013-14 and 
2014-15”). 
52  Id.
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Plan,” the “Moderate-Cost Plan,” the “Low-Cost Plan,” and the 
“Thrifty Plan.”53  The cost of a campus meal plan is dramatically 
higher than the USDA Food Plans — even “Liberal Plan,” has 
an estimated weekly cost of $85 for a male between the ages of 
nineteen and fifty.54 While the meal plans that offer fewer meals 
per week cost less per week, the cost per meal increases.55 As 
a result, in addition to the high cost per meal to every student, 
students with the fewest financial resources pay the most for 
their campus dining. The current system poses a dramatic cost 
to students and exaggerates the student debt burden, but has not 
been effective in alleviating student food insecurity. 
The economic burden of providing food to college students 
affects not only students, but may also affect their parents. Parents 
are more likely to provide financial support to their adult children 
when their children are in need.56 This often includes financial 
and food insecurity. There is also evidence that parental support 
of their adult children has increased over the past generation.57 
53  See USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Ctr. 
For Nutrition Pol’y & Promotion, https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/
USDAFoodPlansCostofFood (last visited May 16, 2018). 
54  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Official USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food at 
Home at Four Levels, U.S. Average, December 2017 (2018), https://www.
cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/CostofFoodDec2017.pdf. 
55  See, e.g., Meal Plans: 2017-2018 Meal Plans, Williams College, https://
dining.williams.edu/meal-plans/ (last visited May 16, 2018) (Smallest meal 
plan costing about $11.07 per meal over a 9-month academic year; largest meal 
plan costing about $8.69 per meal over a 9-month academic year); Columbus 
Campus Dining Plans, Ohio State Univ., https://dining.osu.edu/dining-
plans/columbus-campus-dining-plans/ (last visited May 17, 2018) (Smallest 
meal plan costing about $8.38 per meal over a 9-month academic year; largest 
meal plan costing about $7.75 per meal over a 9-month academic year); 
Undergraduate Dining, Rice Univ., http://dining.rice.edu/undergraduate-
dining/ (last visited May 17, 2018) (Smallest meal plan costing about $8 per 
meal; largest meal plan costing about $7.59 per meal); Traditional Meal Plans, 
Arizona State Univ., https://sundevildining.asu.edu/meal-plans/traditional-
meal-plans (last visited May 17, 2018) (Smallest meal plan costing about $8.24 
per meal over a 9-month academic year; largest meal plan costing about $7.75 
per meal over a 9-month academic year).
56  See Karen Fingerman et al., Giving to the Good and the Needy: Parental 
Support of Grown Children, 71 J. of Marriage & Family 1220, 1220 (2009). 
57  Patrick Wightman et al., Univ. of Michigan: Inst. for Social 
Research, Population Studies Center, Historical Trends in Financial 
Support of Young Adults 20 (2013), https://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/
pdf/rr13-801.pdf.   
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While proving such a hypothesis is beyond the scope of this article, 
it is possible that this increased parental financial support might 
correlate to increased university expenses and decreased financial 
and food security. This means that even families whose students 
do not take out student loans may face significant financial burden 
due to the increasing cost of attending university.
Additionally, increased university-associated costs, such 
as food and other expenses, means that parents who support, at a 
higher rate than previous generations, their college-aged children 
are diverting money from other expenses and savings, such as 
retirement, to support their adult children financially.58 This 
could cause an important economic ripple effect. If parents are 
not saving for retirement until later in their careers, they must 
retire later.59 This pattern might prevent movement and transition 
at the highest-level positions in companies. Thus, if executives 
are not retiring, mid- and entry-level associates cannot advance 
and there is little space for new hires.60 This hypothetical chain of 
events would further compound both the student debt crisis and 
parental financial dependence by making entry-level employment 
unattainable resulting in reduced income and greater likelihood of 
defaulting on student loans. 
Universities face similar burdens from the growing 
expense of campus dining, a system that leaves some students 
without consistent food access. In the competition to attract 
academically successful seventeen-year-olds, major universities 
are in an arms race for the best food and most interesting dining 
experiences.61 The National Center for Education Statistics at 
the Department of Education keeps data on university expenses, 
but the Center combines campus-dining expenditures with other 
58  Dan Kadlec, How to Avoid Paying for Your Kids Forever, Time (Sept. 10, 
2014), http://time.com/money/page/parents-adult-children-financial-support/. 
59  Id.
60  Stephen Miller, When Workers Won’t Retire, Workforce Challenges Arise, 
Soc’y for Human. Res. Mgmt (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.shrm.org/
resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages//workers-not-retiring.aspx. 
61  Cara Newlon, The College Amenities Arms Race, Forbes (Jul. 31, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caranewlon/2014/07/31/the-college-amenities-
arms-race/#380ced9c4883. 
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expenses, such as residence halls, into “auxiliary expenses.”62 
However, these expenses, which fund programs that should be 
self-sustaining, cost public and private four-year universities 
$3,090 and $4,819, respectively, per full-time student in the 2013-
2014 academic year.63 With every university expenditure, there is 
an associated opportunity cost; the same is true for campus dining 
expenditures. When schools spend more money on dining, they 
have less money to spend on instruction, research, or financial 
support. 
Quality education from a four-year university is an 
expensive investment. The costs associated with higher education 
affect students, parents, and the universities, themselves. However, 
on many campuses, the high cost of postsecondary education does 
not include reliable access to food. Students must feed themselves 
on meager, but expensive, meal plans. Parents step in to offer 
financial support when meal plans fail. Yet, universities spend 
large amounts on a dining system that will always be outshined 
by the lavishness of another institution and leaves many students 
hungry. 
D.  Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Approach 
to Hunger
The federal government has many programs that work to 
alleviate hunger and food insecurity across the country, with some 
programs specifically adapted to regional and community needs. 
The two with perhaps the largest reach are SNAP, authorized 
through the Farm Bill,64 and the National School Lunch Program, 
last authorized through the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act.65 
This section and the next will briefly explain these two important 
62  Snyder et al., supra note 33, at 748 tbl. 334.30 (2015) (table titled “Total 
expenditures of private nonprofit degree-granting postsecondary institutions, 
by purpose and level of institution: 1999-2000 through 2013-14”).
63  Id. at 745 tbl. 334.10.
64  7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2036c; Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 
Stat. 649. 
65  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1751-1769j; Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183. 
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programs. 
The Farm Bill is a large omnibus piece of legislation 
that includes agricultural trade, agricultural commodity support, 
agricultural conservation, nutrition, and other areas. The 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is one of the largest 
programs in the Farm Bill and makes up the majority of the 
Nutrition Title (Title IV).66 Nutrition spending comprises $756 
billion over ten years or 79% of the total Farm Bill spending.67 
Congress can amend SNAP with each new iteration of the Farm 
Bill though the Nutrition Title of the Bill.
SNAP is a monthly benefit program. Each month authorized 
state agencies provide eligible recipients with an allotment of 
benefits loaded onto an EBT (Electronic Benefit Transfer) card.68 
In order to be eligible for the program, a recipient’s net income 
must be at or below 130% of the poverty line,69 which, in 2018, 
is $12,140 for an individual.70 The allotment of the benefits is 
determined by calculating the cost of the USDA’s Thrifty Food 
Plan,71 less 30% of an individual’s income minus deductions.72 
For example, for a 20 year-old, the Thrifty Food Plan is $184, 
if that individual’s income is $200 per month after taking into 
account any deductions, the recipient would receive $124 per 
month in SNAP benefits or $184 minus $60, which is 30% of 
$200. The maximum monthly benefit for an individual in 2018 is 
$192 and the estimated average benefit for an individual in fiscal 
66  Id. 
67  Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, in One Graph, Wash. Post (Jan. 
28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/28/the-
950-billion-farm-bill-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.0a1dcbc9e994. 
68  7 U.S.C. § 2016 (2012); see also id. § 2017. 
69  Id. § 2014(c); A Quick Guide to SNAP Eligibility and Benefits, Ctr. on 
Budget & Policy Priorities (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/
a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-benefits. 
70  Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines Notice, 83 Fed. Reg. 2642, 
2642-44 (Jan. 18, 2018). 130% of the poverty line would be $15,782 for an 
individual.
71  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 55 (for a male individual between 19 and 
50 years old, the thrifty plan costs $184.60 per month). 
72  7 U.S.C. § 2017(a) (2012). 
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year 2018 is $145.73 Once the state agency loads these benefits 
onto the recipient’s EBT card, the recipient may then use that 
card, similar to a debit card, to make approved purchases at any 
approved food retail store, which includes most food in grocery 
stores or convenience stores.74 
SNAP has two limitations that are particularly relevant 
to college students First, SNAP’s authorizing language explicitly 
excludes students “enrolled at least half-time in an institution of 
higher education.” 75 Some students are exempt from the blanket 
exclusion of college or university students from SNAP if the 
student works more than twenty hours per week, is not between 
the ages of eighteen and fifty, or meets other exemption criteria.76 
Second, SNAP is only available to able-bodied adults without 
dependents for three months in a three-year period.77 Both of 
these present challenges to using SNAP to prevent food insecurity 
and hunger on college campuses. 
There are certain exceptions to this general disqualification. 
Importantly, students who work more than 20 hours per week or 
participate in work-study may participate in SNAP.78 Additionally, 
students who are parents or enrolled in some career or technical 
education programs may also qualify for SNAP.79 However, only 
27% of full-time students are employed and work more than 20 
hours a week,80 and therefore, most college students are prevented 
73  Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Food and Nutrition Service, to All 
Regional Directions of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (July 28, 
2017), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP_Fiscal_
Year_2018_Cost_of_Living_Adjustments.pdf; see Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) – National Data: National View Summary, U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/
supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap (last updated May 4, 
2018).
74  7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (2012).
75  Id. § 2015(e).
76  Id.
77  Id. § 2015(o)(2).
78  Id. § 2015(e)(4).
79  7 U.S.C. § 2015(e)(3),(5) (2012). 
80  College Student Employment, The Condition of Education, https://nces.
ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_ssa.asp (last updated May 2017).
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from accessing SNAP benefits. Moreover, only 56% of food 
insecure students are employed and only 38% of those employed 
work over 20 hours per week.81 This means that 79% of food 
insecure students are either not employed or work fewer than 20 
hours per week. This exception to the general disqualification 
of traditional college students does not reach most of the food 
insecure and hungry students on campuses. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 imposed limitations on SNAP. The 
act limits any able-bodied recipient with no dependents to only 
three months of benefits within any three-year period.82 There are 
certain exceptions to this restriction, including if a recipient works 
more than an average of twenty hours per week.83 The three-month 
limitation of SNAP benefits for non-working able-bodied adults 
without dependents is called the “work requirement.”84 Under the 
authorizing statute, state agencies are given the authority to waive 
the work requirement in areas in which the unemployment rate 
is over 10% or there is an insufficient number of jobs to provide 
employment to all individuals.85
SNAP is a powerful food insecurity and hunger alleviation 
tool managed by the federal government. Through the monthly 
EBT structure, SNAP preserves individuals’ dignity and teaches 
valuable skills in finance management. However, under SNAP’s 
current design, it is unable to reach the food insecure and hungry 
students at four-year traditional universities. The few exceptions 
for students who work at least twenty hours per week are 
inadequate to sustain food security. 
81  Dubick et al., supra note 25, at 6.
82  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. 104-193, § 824, 110 Stat. 2105, 2323-24.  
83  7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2)(A) (2014). 
84  Id.
85  See id. § 2015(o)(4) (2014). 
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E.  Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act Approach to Hunger
Championed by First Lady Michelle Obama, the Healthy, 
Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFKA) included several innovations 
on the National School Lunch Program (NSLP).86 The NSLP 
provides free and reduced-price meals to children while they 
are at primary and secondary school. Chief among the HHFKA 
innovations is expansion of automatic enrollment in the NSLP if 
a child’s family participates in SNAP, Medicaid, Head Start, or 
other federal programs.87 These students, who receive free lunch 
without an additional application, are “identified students.”88 In 
order to identify these students, HHFKA relies on interagency 
communication and coordination.89 Further building on the 
strength of the “identified students” system, schools could elect to 
participate in the “community eligibility provision” (CEP). CEP 
created a model in which schools with at least 40% identified 
students could provide free lunch to all students in the school.90 
HHFKA is an example of successful interagency 
coordination. By eliminating administrative burdens for parents, 
more students are able to participate in the NSLP. As will be 
explained, SNAP could build on the success of this program by 
similarly creating an automatic enrollment program based on 
participation in other federal programs.
F.  Federal Need-Based Postsecondary Education Support 
Programs
Under Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society agenda, the 
federal government implemented and continues to maintain 
several programs designed to help students pay for college.91 
At the signing of the Higher Education Act of 1965, President 
Lyndon Johnson said that Congress had opened a new door for 
86  See National School Lunch Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769j (2012).
87  7 C.F.R. § 245.9(f)(1)(ii) (2016). 
88  See id.
89  See id.
90  See id.
91  Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219.
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young people and “it is the most important door that will ever 
open — the door to education. And this legislation is the key 
which unlocks it.”92 
Many of these federal postsecondary education support 
programs are available to all students regardless of financial need, 
while others are reserved for students with demonstrated financial 
need. Federal financial assistance is divided into three categories 
— grants, loans, and work-study.93 The federal government 
determines need through a formula by calculating the cost of 
attendance minus expected family contribution minus financial 
assistance from other sources.94 Typically, the government 
obtains this information when students file their online “Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid” or “FAFSA.”95 There are 
five federal, need-based programs. Two of these programs are 
grant-based and do not require repayment — Pell Grants96 and 
Federal Supplemental Education Opportunity Grants.97 Two 
other federal aid programs are low interest or no interest loans — 
Perkins Loans98 and Federal Direct Stafford Loans (“Subsidized 
Loans”).99 The fifth program helps students pay for college 
when they work in addition to taking classes — Work-Study.100 
Eligibility for these programs is not tied to the federal poverty 
line, in the way that SNAP or the NSLP are, but is instead more 
dynamic, reflecting both the cost of the education and financial 
resources of the student.101 
92  Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks on Signing the Higher Education Act 
of 1965, Texas State University (Nov. 8, 1965), http://www.txstate.edu/
commonexperience/pastsitearchives/2008-2009/lbjresources/higheredact.
html. 
93  See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1070h (2012).
94  See id. § 1087-2. 
95  See id. § 1090(a)(1).
96  See id. § 1070a(a). 
97  See id. § 1070b-1(a).
98  See 20 U.S.C § 1087 (2012).
99  See id. §§ 1078(a)(2); see id. 1087e(a)(2)(A). 
100  See id. § 1087-52(c)(2) (2008).
101  See 20 U.S.C. § 1087.
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II. Expanding SNAP to Meet the Needs of College 
Students
As described above, the current system of feeding 
America’s postsecondary students is expensive and does not 
alleviate food insecurity or hunger. Many students, who are the 
future leaders and current innovators of the country, face declining 
academic performance related to food insecurity and hunger. This 
section will propose a program that would allow more college 
students to access food using SNAP benefits. 
The partial solution outlined in this article to the problems 
of hunger and food insecurity on college campuses is two-pronged. 
The first prong removes the barrier for college students wishing 
to participate in SNAP. This proposal eliminates the current 
exclusion of traditional, four-year college students from SNAP 
benefits by simply repealing § 2015(e) and creating an exception 
to the work requirement.102 The second component of the program 
actively facilitates enrollment in SNAP. Standing on the shoulders 
of the widely supported HHFKA, states should automatically 
enroll college students in SNAP according to data reported to the 
federal government in applying for student financial assistance. 
This section will describe each of these portions of this proposed 
federal program to stymie hunger on campuses. 
A.  Remove College Student SNAP Participation 
Disqualification
First, Congress must remove the exclusion of four-year 
college students from receiving SNAP benefits.103 Currently, 
SNAP is only available to traditional four-year university students 
without dependents if those students are enrolled in work-study 
or work more than twenty hours per week.104 As described above, 
these exceptions are quite small in comparison to the total student 
population experiencing food insecurity or hunger. By simply 
102  7 U.S.C. § 2015(o). 
103  Id. § 2015(e). 
104  Id. 
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striking the language of § 2015(e), Congress would permit the 
participation of 80% of food insecure and hungry students who 
do not work more than twenty hours per week. 
Congress must also exempt students from the “work 
requirement” for able-bodied adults without dependents. 
Currently, the issue of only receiving benefits for three months in a 
three year window does not occur when making SNAP eligibility 
determinations for college students. This is because the college 
students who may currently enroll in SNAP are those who are 
working at least twenty hours per week and, thereby, satisfy the 
work requirement. However, if Congress made SNAP available 
to all college students that demonstrate financial need, it must 
also remove the work requirement for those students. 
Congress should use one of three drafting strategies to 
make sure that the three-month limit does not apply to university 
students. First, Congress may accomplish this by adding “full-
time student” to the list of exceptions to the work requirement.105 
Second, Congress could redefine “work twenty hours” to 
recognize the over twenty hours of work per week that students 
invest in a full-time course load. This alteration, however, would 
require a formulation to adapt enrolled credit hours into working 
hours and could quickly become complicated; for example, 
two semester credit hours would convert to one working hour. 
Alternatively, Congress could completely remove the 1996 “work 
requirement.” The latter option is likely the least politically 
feasible. As Congress debates its steps forward in balancing the 
budget amid government shutdowns, a proposal to significantly 
expand SNAP to all recipients would likely not be met graciously.
There is one existing loophole to the “work requirement.” 
States may waive the “work requirement” in high poverty areas.106 
As mentioned above, only about half of university students are 
employed. This would meet the definition waiver requirement 
105  Id. § 2015(o)(3).
106  Id. § 2015(o)(4). 
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of unemployment greater than 10% in a particular area, 107 
specifically within the university’s campus and student housing 
areas. Seemingly, the size of the allowable area for a state waiver 
is not defined and has not been tested in the courts. This would 
be a promising option if Congress only removes the exclusion of 
traditional college students from receiving SNAP, but does not 
remove the work requirement. The drawbacks with this approach 
are that it would rely on states to identify the problem of food 
insecurity and hunger on campuses, and to act on that information. 
This strategy would ultimately result in an unequal distribution of 
SNAP benefits, with students in some states receiving benefits 
and others not.
The best option is for Congress, in addition to repealing 
§ 2015(e), to create an explicit exception to the “work 
requirement.” This would provide the greatest access to SNAP 
for college students in a way that simplifies the law, rather than 
further complicates it. This strategy also has the greatest political 
feasibility, to the extent that any SNAP expansion is currently 
politically feasible.
B.  Enroll Federally Supported Students in SNAP
The second prong of the federal program to enroll 
traditional college students in SNAP revolves around the 
direct enrollment of students. Because states execute the 
eligibility determinations for SNAP,108 this plan requires that 
state governments are responsible for the enrollment of college 
students in SNAP. Similar to HHFKA, the program would 
enroll students based on data obtained through other programs. 
However, distinctions between HFFKA and automatic enrollment 
of students in SNAP are necessary. Primarily, SNAP and NSLP 
eligibility are both contingent on a particular income relative to 
the federally determined poverty line. However, the need-based 
programs through the Department of Education include the cost 
107  7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(4)(A)(i). 
108  Id. § 2014. 
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of attendance in their need determinations and, as mentioned 
above, this metric is dynamic, not static. Therefore, it would not 
be practical for state agencies to directly enroll recipients in the “if 
SNAP, then NSLP” manner of HHFKA. Instead, the Department 
of Education compiles student financial data through FAFSA, and 
state agencies could then use this data to enroll students.  
In order for state agencies to enroll students in SNAP, 
the Department of Education, which maintains student financial 
records, must release the aid information to the necessary state 
agencies. This plan would be similar to the successful interagency 
coordination mandated in HHFKA. Drafters could use the 
language directly from HHFKA, which requires appropriate 
access to information and includes penalties for misuse of 
information. The details of the FAFSA sharing scheme must be 
defined by federal regulation. It would also be necessary for the 
statute and regulations to define the exact criteria for automatic 
enrollment; this would make the program more predictable for 
students.
In implementing this two-pronged program, the federal 
government could make strides in curbing food insecurity and 
hunger on campuses. More needy college students would be 
eligible for SNAP by removing the disqualification of college 
students and altering the “work requirement.” Through effective 
information sharing, state agencies could directly enroll low-
income college students in SNAP. 
III.  Benefits and Challenges of SNAP Expansion
The two-pronged approach of addressing SNAP benefits 
for college students has many benefits beyond reducing food 
insecurity and hunger on campuses. The next section will describe 
what some of those benefits might include. The following section 
is intended to describe some of the potential benefits and outline 
where more research must be conducted to further understand 
whether these benefits are achieved by SNAP access to college 
students. The subsequent section will describe the administrative 
hurdles of implementing the program outlined in this article. 
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A.  Benefits of SNAP Program for Undergraduates
The primary benefit of the program to students is the 
alleviation of food insecurity and hunger during their college 
years. However, the benefits may extend beyond simply providing 
food. Students may attain greater financial independence, which 
has the potential to instill a sense of dignity and build financial 
management skills. Students may then matriculate from their 
undergraduate programs with less debt. This reduced burden 
might allow recent graduates to pursue public interest work 
or other lower-salary positions. Allowing students to eat at a 
lower cost may prevent the continued cycle of poverty related 
to academic performance, as described previously. Additionally, 
if students gain further financial security due to SNAP benefits, 
those students may be less dependent on financial assistance from 
their parents. 
Beyond the financial benefits, participation in SNAP could 
help students develop necessary cooking skills. If schools would 
provide students with resident hall kitchens, those students could 
develop and maintain cooking skills that are essential to healthy 
and cost-efficient eating. These skills help contribute to life-long 
food security.
Universities could also benefit from the expansion of 
SNAP to low-income college students. Schools, who are concerned 
about access to food on their campuses, will not have to contribute 
funds to meal plans in order to increase their accessibility to low-
income students. The program also generally reduces the cost of 
providing food on campus, by allowing students to participate in 
smaller programs, supplemented by SNAP. Finally, this program 
encourages schools to provide greater access to residence hall 
kitchens and off-campus housing options. This may slow or end 
the dining hall “arms race”, in which facilities that are more lavish 
are necessary to attract academically competitive high school 
graduates.
Some benefits may be less measurable; namely the 
benefits to the program itself. University students are a segment 
of the general population with substantial political capital. Once 
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these students graduate to become societal and political leaders, 
their experiences with SNAP could inform commonsense policy 
improvements in the future. These students would also come 
to understand, by either first- or second-hand, the benefits and 
drawbacks of federal entitlement programs. The program outlined 
in this article could provide SNAP greater visibility nationwide 
and decrease stigma among other recipients.  
B.  Challenges in Administering Undergraduate SNAP 
Changes
Any policy proposal of this magnitude faces significant 
challenges in its effective administration. Many of these 
challenges can be resolved through continued research. One 
possible difficulty with administering this program is that out-of-
state students may have to establish residency in a state in order to 
qualify for that state’s social services. This process prevents fraud 
by ensuring that non-resident individuals do not receive services 
in more than one state. A possible solution to this problem may 
be to restrict the program to only in-state students. However, this 
alteration would shrink the program significantly and not serve 
students who are food insecure or hungry. Another possible 
solution is to grant eligible students temporary residency for 
students during their four-year tenure. 
College students often take longer to receive their degrees 
than the expected four years. Politicians might be uncomfortable 
with allowing students to receive benefits for an indefinite amount 
of time. In drafting legislative language that expands options for 
college and university students, Congress could limit students to 
only receiving SNAP benefits for five years as an undergraduate 
student or even require a particular grade point average to ensure 
that the changes to SNAP do not incentivize poor academic 
performance.
An additional hurdle facing the program is reliable access 
to kitchens. Because current campus-dining programs require 
students to eat meals prepared in dining halls, many students, 
particularly underclassmen, do not have access to cooking 
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facilities. Furthermore, SNAP forbids the use of benefits on hot 
foods. Therefore, SNAP must be used to purchase raw ingredients 
or packaged foods requiring kitchen preparation. This program 
would require that universities provide kitchen-access to students 
or permit off-campus housing. Residence hall kitchens could be 
communal — for example, only one large kitchen per residence 
hall — but all students should have access. Federal law could 
begin to require cooking facilities in newly constructed student 
housing facilities.
Lastly, many students file FAFSA and taxes as dependents, 
even if they, in actuality, receive little financial support from 
their parents. This may prevent students from accessing SNAP 
benefits. Further research should determine how many students 
this discrepancy effects. If a significant number of students are 
affected, schools and states should consider simplifying processes 
for undergraduate students to establish independence. One solution 
could be that undergraduate students default to independent 
status, similar to graduate students, unless the student and his or 
her parents claim otherwise.
The above challenges to expanding SNAP to college 
students are not insurmountable. Further research may help 
illuminate the best path forward. Governments and institutions 
must find innovative solutions to the problem of food insecurity 
and hunger on America’s college campuses. 
Conclusion
The status of food insecurity and hunger on college 
campuses is alarming. The federal government is well situated to 
make changes to the administration of SNAP. The recommendations 
proposed in this article are to eliminate the disqualification of 
college student participation and initiate an automatic enrollment 
of eligible college student recipients in SNAP. This new program 
has the potential to dramatically affect food insecurity and hunger 
on college campuses nationwide. This article did not address the 
federal economic impact of significantly expanding SNAP and 
further research is necessary to complete a full economic analysis 
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of the program described above.
Beginning with HHFKA and then moving to SNAP, this 
program could be part of an eventual movement to consolidate 
all federal benefits into a single FAFSA-style application. The 
government could eventually even move to automatically enroll 
eligible participants in federal programs when an individual files 
his or her taxes. 
The SNAP expansion outlined in this article is only 
one proposed piece in the greater fight to end food insecurity 
and hunger on college campuses. In addition to the points of 
further research mentioned throughout this article, researchers, 
potentially through the Department of Education, must work to 
more fully understand the determinants of food insecurity on 
college campuses.
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“It seeks for agriculture a normal income measured, not in 
money but in exchange value—in real human satisfactions.  
Because it has recognized this principle, the [Farm Bill] may be 
justly termed a Magna Carta for the American Farmer.”1
Introduction
The 2014 Farm Bill felt somehow different from the sixteen 
previous Farm Bills.2  In the few years leading up to its passage, 
local-foods advocates across the United States seemed suddenly 
called to action.  The Seattle City Council convened community 
leaders and quickly adopted Resolution 31296, official guidance 
called the “Seattle Farm Bill Principles” that instructed the city’s 
federal lobbyists to advocate for enumerated policy goals designed 
to turn the upcoming Farm Bill into a tool of localized reform.3 
Soon after, Seattle took its new Farm Bill platform to the National 
League of Cities, who adopted it as NLC Resolution #2012-
16.4  Across the country, cities rushed to adopt their own local 
platforms: Santa Monica, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Duluth, Salt 
Lake City, and New York City.5  Months later, the United States 
Department of Agriculture unveiled its own local-foods platform, 
the Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food Compass.6  With the 
1  George N. Peek, Recovery from the Grass Roots, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 
Agric. Adjustment Admin. 7 (Feb. 1934) (referring to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933, the first iteration of the Farm Bill).
2  For a list of the seventeen iterations of the Farm Bill, see United States Farm 
Bills, Nat’l Agric. Law Ctr., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills (last 
visited May 15, 2018).
3  See Seattle, Wash., Resolution 31,296 (May 16, 2011).
4  National League of Cities, National Municipal Policy and 
Resolutions 66–67 (2011), http://www.onehealthinitiative.com/publications/
nlc-national-municipal-policy-book-2012.pdf; Seattle Farm Bill Principles 
Adopted by Council, to Go Before National League of Cities, Council 
Connection (June 14, 2011), http://council.seattle.gov/2011/06/14/seattle-
farm-bill-principles-adopted-by-council-to-go-before-national-league-of-
cities. 
5  Dan Imhoff, Food Fight: The Citizen’s Guide to the Next Food and 
Farm Bill 192 (2d ed. 2012); Letter from Dean Kubani, Director of the Office 
of Sustainability and the Environment, to Mayor of Santa Monica & City 
Council of Santa Monica (May 8, 2012), https://www.smgov.net/departments/
council/agendas/2012/20120508/s2012050803-D.htm. 
6  Tim Vilsack & Kathleen Merrigan, Introducing . . . . . The Know Your 
Farmer, Know Your Food Compass, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Blog (Feb. 29, 
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goal of supporting local and regional food systems, the Compass 
helped all sorts of food-system stakeholders navigate agency 
programs and resources, learn about changes going on in their 
own communities, and read stories of the individuals transforming 
their own local food systems.7
For the first time, it looked like communities of all types 
had come together, empowered, to use federal legislation and 
federal agency actions to transform their local food systems. 
How long it would last, nobody could say.  No doubt, though, 
the surge had not been sudden at all.  By the time Michael Pollan 
began researching for his food-policy best-seller, The Omnivore’s 
Dilemma,8 he thought he may have been too late. “Something 
about the public’s attitude toward food and farming was already 
shifting underfoot,” he wrote in the Washington Post, “and I 
became convinced my book was going to be dated on arrival.”9 
Thankfully for Pollan, he was wrong.  Now, it is impossible to 
imagine a discussion about food policy without acknowledging 
the tremendous influence of The Omnivore’s Dilemma.10  But, 
2012), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2012/02/29/introducing-know-your-
farmer-know-your-food-compass. 
7  Id.
8  Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of 
Four Meals (2006).
9  Michael Pollan, A Decade After “The Omnivore’s Dilemma,” Michael Pollan 
Sees Signs of Hope, Wash. Post (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/lifestyle/food/a-decade-after-the-omnivores-dilemma-michael-pollan-
sees-signs-of-hope/2016/06/06/85cdadfe-2c0a-11e6-9b37-42985f6a265c_
story.html. 
10  Blake Hurst, Michael Pollan and His Faddish Foodie Followers, Ten Years 
After The Omnivore’s Dilemma, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.
nationalreview.com/article/438548/michael-pollans-omnivores-dilemma-
tenth-anniversary-edition-marks-decade-anti-science (“Ten years on, it is 
hard to think of a book that has influenced the public conversation on food 
more . . . .”); Susan A. Schneider, Reconnecting Consumers and Producers: 
On the Path Toward a Sustainable Food and Agriculture Policy, 14 Drake J. 
Agric. L. 75, 79 (2009). The book’s impact on the legal literature in food law 
and policy is also noteworthy.  See, e.g., Rebecca L. Goldberg, Administering 
Real Food: How the Eat-Food Movement Should—and Should Not—Approach 
Government Regulation, 38 Eco. L.Q. 773, 775 (2012) (“This Article represents 
an attempt to take one step toward bridging the gap between the large and 
complex regulatory structure that governs food production and sale of food in 
the United States, on the one hand, and the fast growing and highly influential 
food movement [made by popular by, most notably, Michael Pollan] . . . on the 
other.”); Michael T. Roberts, The Beginnings of the Journal of Food Law & 
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what Pollan was reflecting on in 2016, two years after the latest 
iteration of the Farm Bill became law, were “some remarkable 
changes [that] have taken place in the food and farming landscape 
since the book was published in 2006.”11  Namely, the American 
food system has begun an unprecedented process of self-
determination.
Today, the Seattle Farm Bill Principles are a civic relic, 
the platform’s website no longer accessible, and the Know Your 
Farmer, Know Your Food Compass seems to have vanished under 
Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue.12  Nevertheless, as we 
attempt to show in this article, the seeds of food democracy have 
already been sown and are beginning to sprout, and, as we show, 
it is through the Farm Bill that these seeds are broadcasted.  These 
seeds, however, are scattered across a vast landscape.  Although 
Congress has shown its interest in promoting diverse representation 
in American food systems, the methods to demonstrate that 
interest are piecemeal, lopsided, and often temporary.  Local-
foods advocates and others concerned with transforming their 
community food systems may look ahead brightly to future Farm 
Bills, but more must be done to systematize the innovations and 
advances made in localizing the Farm Bill.  In this article, we 
propose various methods Congress can use to focus its efforts in 
localizing food systems by promoting diverse representation in 
various Farm Bill programs and initiatives.
Policy, 11 J. Food L. & Pol’y 1, 1 (2015) (“The nascent, social food movement, 
popularized in literature, media, and progressive circles, was just starting.  For 
example, Michael Pollan’s best-seller, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural 
History of Four Meals, which galvanized tremendous interest food policy 
and food studies, was published in 2006, one year following the Journal’s 
inaugural edition.  In short, the Journal was a novel, specialty law journal 
attempting to lead the way of a food law and policy movement that was just 
inching off the starting block.”).
11  Pollan, supra note 12. 
12  The website that formerly hosted this program—https://www.usda.gov/
kyfcompass—no longer exists.  Additionally, the USDA Center for Nutrition 
and Policy used to provide access to this program at https://www.cnpp.usda.
gov/KnowYourFarmer.  That website, too, no longer exists.  The USDA 
archives the program, though, which is apparently only accessible through a 
search engine.  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Know Your Farmer Know Your 
Food, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/KYFCompass.pdf.
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Our intent in this Article is not to delineate foods that are 
local or not local, nor is it to lionize one agricultural production 
method over another.  Rather, we hope to build on the literature that 
for many decades has documented how local communities have 
emerged as influential actors on the American food system through 
establishing control over local supply chains often alongside 
national and global supply chains.  Such a community food system 
are those “a collaborative network that integrates sustainable 
food production, processing, distribution, consumption and waste 
management in order to enhance the environmental, economic, 
and social health of a particular place.”13  In this network, farmers, 
consumers, and other community members “partner to create a 
more locally based, self-reliant food economy.”14 Thus, when we 
discuss food localization—that is, the so-called localization of the 
food system, local food systems, and local foods generally—we 
are discussing all at once community food systems.
We begin with Part I, which explores how some food-
system scholars have conceptualized how these democratic 
changes are occurring. We look to Thomas Lyson’s concept of 
civic agriculture, which attempts to move corporation-oriented 
communities away from the model of industrial agriculture and 
toward a model in which individuals are locally empowered in 
the land and marketplace. We also review Neil D. Hamilton’s 
concept of food democracy, which, like civic agriculture, acts 
as a set of alternative choices to the industrial food system and 
allows for more localized control of the food supply chain. 
Afterward, we attempt to connect two seemingly unrelated case 
studies to demonstrate what a food system influenced by Lyson 
and Hamilton could look like and how it could empower local 
communities.
Next, in Part II, we turn to federal local-food policy. 
13  Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education Program, Defining 
Sustainable Community Food Systems, U.C. Davis Agric. Sustainability 
Inst.,http://asi.ucdavis.edu/programs/sarep/research-initiatives/fs/sfs/
defining-sustainable-community-food-systems.
14  Id.
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We discuss why laws promoting local food systems are proxies 
for laws democratizing our food system, and we then review a 
selection of federal legislation, often originating in the Farm Bill, 
that promote localization of the food system.
In Part III, we explore deliberative democracy, a 
political framework that encourages the sort of participation 
and representation conceptualized in food democracy and civic 
agriculture.  We then summarize the work of contemporary 
schools who have identified how deliberative democracy has 
been crafted by food-system participants.  We highlight examples 
from the American political process to demonstrate their current 
existence in the food system.  Afterward, we observe more deeply 
how deliberative democracy has grounded federal agriculture 
policy.
Finally, in Part IV, influenced by past Farm Bills and 
historical agricultural policy, we propose various mechanisms 
Congress can implement in future Farm Bills to further legitimize 
its actions to promote localized food systems, as well as to provide 
structure to the democratization efforts it continues to support. 
Specifically, we propose various ways Congress can increase 
diverse representation in the food system and federal agricultural 
programs, which, through expanded access to decision-making 
and the strengthening of self-determination among an array of 
individuals, provide for further and enhanced food localization.
I.  Democratizing the Food System
The food movement comprises countless individual actors 
and independent groups, as well as coalitions and federations, 
advocating for myriad issues, ranging from increased food safety 
to greater concern for environmental effects of agriculture to 
demands for more sustainably sourced crops.15  The collective 
consequences of this advocacy has resulted in a remarkable 
transformation of the food system, noteworthy for its substitution 
of the dominant industrial food system.  Scholars Thomas 
15  Joshua Ulan Galperin, Value Hypocrisy and Policy Sincerity: A Food Law 
Case Study, 42 Vt. L. Rev. 345, 355–56 (2017).
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Lyson and Neil D. Hamilton have conceptualized models of 
these changes, both as attempts to understand the changes and 
as visions of how these changes may further innovate the food 
system.  At the heart of their models—civic agriculture and 
food democracy, respectively—is the self-determined, diverse 
community exercising sovereignty over decision-making in the 
food system.
A.  Conceptualizing Localized Food Systems: Civic 
Agriculture and Food Democracy
Two years before Pollan published The Omnivore’s 
Dilemma, professors Thomas A. Lyson and Neil D. Hamilton 
separately published their own descriptions of the shifts in attitude 
toward American food and agriculture.  Lyson termed these changes 
“civic agriculture,” which referred to “the emergence and growth 
of community-based agriculture and food production activities 
that not only meet consumer demands for fresh, safe, and locally 
produced foods but create jobs, encourage entrepreneurship, and 
strengthen community identity.”16  Meanwhile, Hamilton termed 
his own observations “food democracy,” a social movement that 
encompasses (1) citizen participation in all aspects of the food 
system; (2) the availability of information about the food system 
with citizens making choices based on such information; (3) a 
proliferation of choices for consumers, growers, manufacturers, 
processors, and others in the food system; and (4) strong local 
community engagement alongside robust federal food policy.17
i. Civic Agriculture
Professor Thomas A. Lyson presents civic agriculture 
as an alternative model to the industrial model that largely 
dominates the American food system (and, thus, the global 
supply chain) today.  For Lyson, this industrial model, which he 
16  Thomas A. Lyson, Civic Agriculture: Reconnecting Farm, Food, and 
Community 2 (2004).
17  Neil D. Hamilton, Essay—Food Democracy and the Future of American 
Values, 9 Drake J. Agric. L. 9, 21–24 (2004).
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estimates began to replace small-scale family farming with the 
passage of the Morrill Act of 186218 and the growing influence 
of “scientific agriculture,”19 has resulted in an artificial emphasis 
on agricultural inputs and outputs, favoring “commodities that 
can be ‘mass-produced’ in accordance with the precepts put forth 
by the neoclassical production function and that articulate with 
standardized mass markets” and leaving behind “[n]onstandard 
varieties or commodities that have not achieved ‘economies of 
scale’ because they are too embedded in household or community 
relations to get an ‘economically unencumbered’ reading . . . .”20 
In other words, the industrial model of the food system “is framed 
in terms of well-defined markets and constructed categories of 
land, labor, capital, and management, which are organized to fit 
the production function.”21
Condensing the food system into this industrial model, 
Lyson believes, fails to account for the “community and household 
relations that can and do structure everyday economic activities.”22 
This community-centered economy is what Lyson calls the “civic 
economy” of urban and rural populations, “a richly textured set 
of intertwined household, community, and economic relations” 
that are evidenced especially by countless community gardens, 
farmers’ markets, community supported agriculture operations, 
community kitchens, and U-Pick operations.23
Industrial agriculture and civic agriculture may be in 
philosophical opposition with each other, but for Lyson their 
co-existence is essential.  Industrial agriculture comprises 
“large-scale, well-managed, capital-intensive, technologically 
sophisticated, industrial-like operations” that produce “large 
quantities of highly standardized bulk commodities” by a “network 
of national and global food producers” who will generate the 
18  Pub. L. 37-130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 3001).
19  Lyson, supra note 19, at 15-16.
20  Id. at 22–23.
21  Id. at 23.
22  Id.
23  Id. at 26–28.
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majority of gross agricultural sales.24  Civic agriculture, however, 
includes “smaller-scale, locally oriented, flexibly organized farms 
and food producers” who “will fill the geographic and economic 
spaces that have been passed over or ignored by large-scale, 
industrial producers” and “articulate with consumers demand for 
locally produced and processed foods.”25
Civic agriculture, therefore, is an embedded local food 
system—local agriculture and local food processing—that not 
only provides income to the civic agriculture enterprises, but 
improves the “health and vitality of communities in a variety of 
social, economic, political, and cultural” forms that industrial 
agriculture is fundamentally ill-equipped to account for.26 
Accordingly, because of its community-centered focus, the 
food system viewed under civic agriculture embodies the “civic 
concept.”27  Such manifestations may include direct marketing, 
integration into local networks of food processing, local producer 
and marketing cooperatives, regional trade associations, and 
community-based farm and food organizations.28  The supply 
chain here is not concerned with global influence, unlike its 
industrial counterpart; instead, the supply chain is controlled by 
and for the benefit of the local community.
ii.  Food Democracy
Law professor Neil D. Hamilton synthesizes his own 
observations of the changing food system through political 
participation.29  For Hamilton, “[t]he medium is food, but 
the theme is democracy.”30  Food democracy, as Hamilton 
24  Id. at 61.
25  Id.
26  Id. at 62.
27  Id. at 63.
28  Id.
29  Hamilton began writing about food-system alternatives and the move 
toward local decision-making in the food system as early as 1996.  See Neil 
D. Hamilton, Tending the Seeds: The Emergence of a New Agriculture in the 
United States, 1 Drake J. Agric. L. 7 (1996).
30  Hamilton, supra note 20, at 15.
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searchingly calls his food-system model, refers to the collective 
effort of communities to promote democratic ideals through food 
and agriculture.31  In other words, it “is a framework for making 
food more responsive to citizens’ needs (health, access, quality) 
and decentralizing control of production.”32 Such attempts at 
embodying these democratic values are seen in the growth of 
farmers’ markets and CSA memberships, the rise of chefs as much 
famous for their dishes of food as for their dishes of social justice, 
the proliferation of process-oriented food labels, the emergence of 
buy-local campaigns, and the increase in farmers and consumers 
engaging in direct commerce and community building.33
Food democracy comprises four essential traits.  First, 
because the success of democracy relies on citizens participating 
in the democratic process and on their representation in making 
decisions, food democracy requires that all stakeholders within 
the food system participate in decision-making and have 
their interests represented.  Such stakeholders would include 
consumers, food processors, farmers, food markets, workers, 
and regulators.  The interests of these stakeholders might consist 
31  Id. at 16.  As Baylen Linnekin points out, Hamilton “does not proffer a 
succinct definition of the term . . . .”  Baylen J, Linnekin, The “California 
Effect” & the Future of American Food: How California’s Growing 
Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the State & the Nation, 13 Chap. L. 
Rev. 357, 380 n.205 (2010).  Despite this, the term “food democracy” was also 
popularized by Tim Lang, who, believing that “food is both a symptom and a 
symbol of how we organize ourselves and our societies,” wrote that the term 
referred to “the demand for greater access and collective benefit from the food 
system.”  Tim Lang, Food Policy for the 21st Century: Can It Be Both Radical 
and Reasonable?, in For Hunger-Proof Cities: Sustainable Urban Food 
Systems 218 (Mustafa Koc et al., eds. 1999).  See also Neva Hassanein, 
Practicing Food Democracy: A Pragmatic Politics of Transformation, 19 J. 
Rural Studies 77, 79 (2003) (“At the core of [Lang’s] food democracy is 
the idea that people can and should be actively participating in shaping the 
food system, rather than remaining passive spectators on the sidelines.  In 
other words, food democracy is about citizens having the power to determine 
agro-food policies and practices locally, regionally, nationally, and globally.”). 
Because of the strong similarity between Hamilton’s and Lang’s food 
democracies—notably, both rely explicitly on alternatives and democratic 
participation—we interchangeably cite literature referring to either author or 
term.
32  Laurie Ristino, Back to the New: Millennials and the Sustainable Food 
Movement, 15 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1, 19 (2013).
33  Hamilton, supra note 20, at 16.
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of financial viability of small farmers, the workers’ wages, or 
consumer preferences.  “This means a food democracy seeks ways 
to broaden the involvement and representation of all segments of 
the food system in decisions.” 34
Second, since democratic participation demands the 
availability of information and the ability of citizens to make 
informed choices using that information, food democracy thrives 
when stakeholders, especially consumers, question their food-
system choices, uncover the reality of those choices, and adjust 
those choices according to what they learn.  Ideally, consumers 
“have dozens of votes to cast for the food [they] buy [from] dozens 
of polling places,” like grocery stores and farmers’ markets, 
ideally favoring candidates “providing information and education 
to the voters involved . . . .”35
Third, in order for a citizen to properly compare and 
contrast the various voting choices, a democracy necessitates that 
the voter have alternatives to choose from.  Similar to Lyson’s 
civic agriculture, Hamilton’s food democracy exists as an 
alternative to the predominant industrial model of production and 
consumption.36  But for Hamilton, the existence of alternatives is 
essential to the success of his model, and the greater the choice 
of alternatives, the more vibrant and democratic the food system. 
This means that a robust food democracy includes not only 
various choices of food, but of markets, farms, food processors, 
and consumer education, as well.37
Fourth, food democracy exists on various levels, from 
inside the home to national institutions.  This means that citizens of 
a food democracy—food democrats—make decisions regarding 
local farms and local markets, school cafeteria criteria, national 
food labels, the impact of their food choices on distant reaches 
of the globe, and so on.  Although food democracy is built on 
local food systems, it comprises myriad levels of democracy and 
34  Id. at 21.
35  Id. at 21–22. 
36  Id. at 9-10. 
37  Id. at 22.
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varying localized civic efforts.38
Just as industrial agriculture stands as antithesis to 
Lyson’s civic agriculture, so does Big Food stand as antithesis to 
Hamilton’s food democracy.  For Hamilton, Big Food constitutes 
the businesses and institutions that currently dominate the food 
system.39   Big Food’s behemoth industrial model, Hamilton 
argues, is “in many ways anti-democratic” and thus anti-food-
democracy.40  In an essay published a year after his first essay 
on Food Democracy, he tells the story of the American public’s 
reaction to mad cow disease in 2003 and 2004 as an example 
of this argument.41  According to Hamilton, the shock of 
realizing that bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), known 
colloquially and notoriously as mad cow disease, could originate 
in American beef surprised the American public in no fewer than 
six ways: (1) “downer” cows, regarded as carriers of BSE, were 
regularly processed at slaughterhouses for human consumption; 
(2) the number of downer cows actually tested for BSE by USDA 
was, at best, minuscule in comparison to the actual number 
processed; (3) luck, rather than reliable methods, led to the initial 
discovery of BSE; (4) animals suspected of containing BSE are 
nonetheless carried through processing because of inadequate 
storage facilities; (5) the meat Americans consumed often traveled 
halfway across the nation to reach their dinner plates; and (6) pet 
food was often made of the most detestable bits of “droppage” 
that no human would dare touch.42  Had mad cow not swept the 
American media, the public may not have been so surprised; after 
all, Big Food, specifically Big Meat and Big Food Regulator, 
preferred to keep these revelations concealed.43  Enlightened, 
38  Id. at 22–23
39  Id. at 19.
40  Id. at 25.
41  See Neil D. Hamilton, Food Democracy II: Revolution or Restoration?, 1 J. 
Food L. & Pol’y 13, 18–24 (2005).
42  Id. at 19–21.
43   Hamilton, supra note 20, at 25 (“Much of the economic and political agenda 
of Big Food is designed to limit the information and choices available to 
consumers, to restrict the availability of alternative products and markets, and 
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however, the American public would soon force the USDA and 
some large meat processors to shift their practices based on the 
new available information.44
Fundamentally, Big Food and food democracy are at odds 
with each other in three significant and irremediable ways.  The 
first is that Big Food opposes the consumer’s “right to know more 
about food,” as seen in the mad cow episode.45  The second is 
that Big Food’s products lack any sense of place or origin, which 
is at the heart of local foods and local markets.46  And the third 
concerns how food exists as an idea: Big Food regards food as 
a definition for a product, but food democracy regards it as a 
set of values or traits of the product.47  Unlike civic agriculture, 
which requires industrial agriculture for its co-existence, food 
democracy competes against Big Food for the preferred food-
system model; Big Food is “threatened” by values that perpetuate 
food democracy.48
Regardless of the actual potential for civic agriculture or 
food democracy to flourish, both Lyson and Hamilton present 
their models in conjunction with their observations of what has 
already transpired.  For Lyson and Hamilton, the localization of 
the food system was already underway, and the time had come, 
as Pollan also realized, to begin asking questions about how the 
food system was being transformed and how local efforts were 
steering its evolution.
B.  Democratic Food Systems in Action: Two Case Studies
Both Lyson and Hamilton developed their models for 
more democratic food systems in relation to a dominant paradigm 
that, in many ways, is antithetical to democracy.  Curiosity of 
and concern with the effects of the industrial model’s erosion of 
to assure consumers there is no reason for concern about our food.”).
44  Hamilton, supra note 44, 19, 22–24.
45  Id. at 34.
46  Id. at 34–35.
47  Id. at 35.
48  Hamilton, supra note 20, at 25.
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local decision-making and participation within the food system 
has motivated others to determine whether models like civic 
agriculture and food democracy ought to be given a chance 
in rural communities or how rural communities might begin 
shifting toward a more democratic food system.  In this section, 
we discuss how the unrelated studies of Walter Goldschmidt, an 
anthropologist who studied the agriculture and economies of two 
rural California towns in the 1940s, and Allyson Hayes-Conroy, 
a twenty-first-century sociologist who attempted to introduce 
civic agriculture to a small New Jersey town, illustrate the 
practical consequences of implementing these models in specific 
communities.
i. The Goldschmidt Study: Arvin and Dinuba
In the 1940s, Walter Goldschmidt was an anthropologist 
at the USDA Bureau of Economics when the Bureau took the 
lead in researching the economic problems and potential social 
consequences arising from a federal law designed to promote 
family farming in the West.49  Pertaining primarily to the Western 
United States, this law held that water, developed through projects 
of the U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, 
would be made available to those holding 160 or fewer acres; 
meanwhile, those with larger tracts had to take additional steps to 
claim some of that water.50
Goldschmidt premised his investigation on a single 
question: “Within the framework of American tradition, what 
effect does scale of farm operations have upon the character of 
the rural community?”51  To determine the answer to this, he 
and his team analyzed the social, civic, political, and economic 
conditions of two rural California towns, Arvin and Dinuba, that 
49  Walter Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and Political Power, in As You Sow: 
Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 455–56 
(1978).
50  Id. at 456.
51  Walter Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and the Rural Community, in As You 
Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 392 
(1978).
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shared similar qualities, including geography, size, population, 
proximity to major roads, variety of crops grown, total value of 
production, and more.52
Despite these similarities, certain differences existed, 
twelve of which Goldschmidt found noteworthy.  Namely, 
compared to residents in Dinuba, residents of Arvin tended to be 
dependent on wages; have generally lower standards of living; 
experience less population stability; dwell in houses and on streets 
of general poorer appearance and condition; have less access to 
community social services; possess poorer schools, parks, and 
facilities; engage less often in community organizations; choose 
from fewer religious institutions; express a lesser degree of 
community loyalty; make fewer decisions on community affairs; 
live in a greater degree of social segregation and greater social 
distance between various groups; and shop at fewer retail and 
other businesses in a marketplace.53
Goldschmidt began to address his question by scrutinizing 
various social aspects of community life between Arvin and 
Dinuba.  For example, he concluded that a town’s incorporation 
and quality of civic government “are important to this analysis 
not only because they affect the lives of citizens, but because they 
are indicative of the spirit and motivation of the community.”54 
While Dinuba had robust civic engagement, Arvin had never 
incorporated, which “undoubtedly finds its root cause in the lack 
of any real civic unity.”55  As another example, he looked at the 
recognized civic leaders of the two towns: In Dinuba, not only 
was the school superintendent recognized as a leader at social 
gatherings, but other teachers also served as leaders, such as by 
starting a civic organization, youth services, or other community 
improvements; yet, “lack of this type of leadership is constantly 
made evident in Arvin.  School and community functions suffer 
from an inadequate number of public-minded and trained citizens 
52  Id. at 287–91.
53  Id. at 394–95.
54  Id. at 344.
55  Id.
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to supervise such affairs.”56
After cataloguing these several social and economic 
differences between Arvin and Dinuba, Goldschmidt set out 
to discover their cause.  He looked especially at cultural and 
demographic factors.  In Arvin, eight out of ten families depended 
on wages; but, in Dinuba, only five out of ten were wage earners.57 
“These workers, especially those who are agricultural workers,” 
Goldschmidt observed, “have little economic or social investment 
in the community.  Furthermore, they do not supply the leadership 
for social activities, which almost without exception comes from 
farmers and white-collar workers.”58  This discrepancy in the pool 
of potential civic leaders is remarkable, because it influences the 
cultural, civic, and demographic development of the community.59 
At its core, though, this difference is “very largely a direct result 
of farm size—a simple arithmetic certainty.  For the number of 
farmers that can be supported by a given resource base is a direct 
function of the amount of resources each one controls.”60  In Arvin, 
the large-scale of agricultural operations that developed there 
“had one clear and direct effect upon the community: It skewed 
the occupation structure so that the majority of the population 
could only subsist by working as wage labor for others.”61  As a 
result, this occupation structure, “with a great majority of wage 
workers and very few persons independently employed and the 
latter generally persons of considerable means, has had a series 
of direct effects upon the social conditions in the community.”62 
These direct effects, according to Goldschmidt, are reluctance 
among residents to engage socially or economically with their 
town and little incentive to motivate them to do so.63  “The 
56  Id. at 351.
57  Id. at 401.
58  Id.
59  Id. at 401–02.
60  Id. at 402.
61  Id. at 415.
62  Id. at 415–16.
63  Id. at 416.
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laboring population does not take leadership in general civic 
action and rarely supports organizations that exist, out of a usually 
well substantiated feeling of ostracism that results from the large 
differences in economic status.”64  In other words, it is the very 
structure of agriculture in Arvin—large scale farming operations, 
absentee landowners, low-paid migrant workers, and clear class 
distinctions—that contributed to the town’s social, economic, and 
political nature.  Consequently, the town’s social institutions and 
retail trade are impoverished, and it is difficult for entrepreneurs 
to become independently employed.65
The answer to Goldschmidt’s question— What effect does 
scale of farm operations have upon the character of the rural 
community?—resulted in what is today known as the Goldschmidt 
Hypothesis.66  Based on his observations and conclusions, 
Goldschmidt hypothesized that large-scale farming bore the 
major responsibility for the social differences between Arvin and 
Dinuba for several reasons.  First, and most importantly, it created 
the social conditions giving rise to social, civic, and economic 
impoverishment.67  Additionally, large-scale agricultural 
operations that dominate towns tend to produce company 
towns, in which the communities depend almost entirely on that 
business, and the conditions at the operations can directly affect 
the conditions of the community.68  Finally, similar conclusions 
by previous researchers in other California towns and a cursory 
review of other California towns support these conclusions.69
Although Goldschmidt’s research was controversial as 
64  Id.
65  Id. at 416–17.
66  See Linda M. Lobao, Michael D. Schulman & Louis E. Swanson, Still Going: 
Recent Debates on the Goldschmidt Hypothesis, 58 Rural Sociology 277 
(1993).
67  Walter Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and the Rural Community, in As You 
Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 421 
(1978).
68  Id. at 421.  Goldschmidt points out that Arvin is not entirely dominated 
by large-scale agriculture, since it maintains “a small nucleus of working 
farmers” whose land would likely be held in large farms in their absence.  Id.
69  Id. at 421–23.
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soon his project became public, his basic premise has remained 
relevant.70  The differences between Arvin and Dinuba roughly 
correspond to the differences that Lyson and Hamilton have 
long observed.  While neither town fully embodies one model 
or its antithesis, Goldschmidt’s study has illustrated the practical 
consequences of how a community’s food system is controlled, 
designed, and incorporated civically and economically.
ii.  An Attempt to Introduce Civic Agriculture to a New 
Jersey Community
Inspired, in part, by the Goldschmidt Hypothesis and 
Lyson’s work, Allison Hayes-Conroy, a professor of critical food 
studies and geography, conducted a study in Burlington County, 
New Jersey, to determine the extent to which a rural community 
was willing to adopt a a stronger community food system.71  
Hayes-Conroy conducted her study in two phases.  The 
first was in a case study, wherein she gathered county educators 
and administrators and used civic agriculture as a “guideline for 
discussion” to determine individual perceptions of actualizing 
such an agricultural system.72  Her respondent group consisted 
of 30 individuals, comprising equal parts men and women, most 
of whom were in their 40s or 50s, and representing professors, 
nonformal educators, educational administrators, and county 
administrators.73  Through these dialogues, Hayes-Conroy 
hoped to ascertain what the respondents thought about such “a 
transformation, a movement in a different direction in regard to 
the overall way people think, society functions, and land figures 
on the horizon.”74 
70  For a summary of the backlash Goldschmidt faced and the attempt by 
various individuals and groups to prevent the study’s publication, see Walter 
Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and Political Power, in As You Sow: Three 
Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 482–87 (1978).
71  Allison Hayes-Conroy, Reconnecting Lives to the Land: An Agenda 
for Critical Dialogue 49 (2007) (discussing the Goldschmidt Hypothesis); 
id. at 125–50 (summarizing her case study and discussion study).
72  Id. at 126.
73  Id.
74  Id. at 125.
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She made six separate inquiries.  First, she asked about 
the degree to which community members might notice ecological 
activities, which she termed “place-based perceptual ecology.”75 
She asked respondents to judge the ability of individuals in 
South Burlington to “notice, comprehend, and identify with the 
complexities of surrounding human systems and ecosystems.”76 
The majority of respondents, although diverse in their individual 
responses, generally agreed that Burlington County was 
“deficient” in “attentiveness to human and natural systems, 
including agriculture,” and many wondered whether collective 
action could really make a difference to that deficiency.77
Second, she asked about the extent to which the attitudes 
and passions of community members were affected by the 
seasons.78  The responses to this inquiry suggested to Hayes-Conroy 
that “the seasons will be an effective way to locate attentiveness 
precisely because everyone must be aware of seasonal change on 
some level.  Furthermore in Burlington County many educators 
do tend to conflate seasonal change with phases in the agricultural 
calendar.”79
Third, she inquired into the possibility of adjusting the 
specific professions of her respondents by proposing whether 
agriculture could be taught widely across the curriculum; that is, 
whether “agricultural seasonal rounds can affect what is taught in 
classroom and in outreach programs.”80  Hayes-Conroy admitted 
that many of the respondents saw no connection between 
agriculture and their curriculum, but a majority were interested in 
discovering how their areas of expertise could fit with agriculture; 
moreover, Hayes-Conrroy found a few respondents were inspired 
to “think holistically” about incorporating agriculture into the 
75  Id. at 126.
76  Id. at 127.
77  Id. at 128.
78  Id. at 128–29 (referring to “seasonal rounds”).
79  Id. at 129.
80  Id. at 130.
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range of their work.81
Fourth, inspired by Wendell Berry, Hayes-Conroy sought 
to measure how aware Burlington County residents were of 
linkages between the natural world and the act of eating food.82 
Most respondents concluded that the community was “culturally 
inattentive” to these linkages, but several were personally inspired, 
after making the link themselves, to consider how much the term 
“agriculture” encompassed.83
Fifth, she asked educators about “localism through 
food”—what they thought about “the potential effect of the 
whole agricultural experience,” the combination of the changing 
landscapes throughout the year, the act of cultivation, and the 
purchasing of and eating of food.84  Hayes-Conroy found that 
this issue was “quite contested” such that those involved in local 
planning believed localism through food and farm already had 
momentum, but those with less direct experience in farming and 
no similar experience in local planning believed more cultural 
awareness of local food and farm issues had “the potential 
to affect sense of place or belonging, but that they have never 
given it much thought . . . .”85  Moreover, all respondents were 
skeptical that agriculture could be “culturally significant enough 
to substantially affect those outside the farming community.”86
Lastly, Hayes-Conroy asked the educators and 
administrators to consider “cultural reflection” of the ideas and 
its significance to the community and its issues of “land and 
landscape.”87  Overall, this inquiry exposed the most difficult 
obstacle to “transformational learning” in the community—
that is, shifting cultural attitudes about agriculture and the food 
81  Id. at 132.
82  Id. at 133.
83  Id. at 133–34.
84  Id. at 134.
85  Id. at 135.
86  Id. at 135–36.
87  Id. at 136.
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system.88  Several of the respondents appeared open to this wider 
view of agriculture in light of cultural reflection, while others 
voiced various obstacles “to furthered perceptual expansion in 
this direction.”89
This first case study involving the preceding six inquiries 
revealed three broad barriers to transforming a community into 
one that adopts civic agriculture.  These barriers are all rooted in 
attitudes of individuals:  (1) the attitude that social change is too 
difficult; (2) the attitude that it is not one’s duty (for example, as 
an educator or administrator) to work for transformation; and (3) 
the attitude that agriculture and any of its potential ecological or 
social effects is simply not important.90
Despite these attitudes, Hayes-Conroy found that 
respondents were enthusiastic about thinking through her 
agriculture-based questions, and many expressed an interest in 
thinking critically about and reflecting on the cultural issues 
implicated in them.91  Most of the educators, she found, believed 
that interest in local land, landscape, and ecology existed among 
residents, and that this interest could give the necessary support 
to advance a community-wide dialogue on civic agriculture or 
its values.92  For instance, pride in local food or locally grown 
produce, appreciation of or nostalgia for local agriculture, and 
the seasonal habits of purchasing and decorating could motivate 
residents to take up such discussions.93
The necessity to bring together a representative sample 
of the community, including antagonists and neutrals, to begin 
that discussion process encouraged Hayes-Conroy to conduct her 
second study.94  With support from a local community college, 
donations, and volunteers, she organized a community forum 
88  Id. at 136–37.
89  Id. at 139.
90  Id. at 139–40.
91  Id. at 140–41
92  Id. at 141.
93  Id.
94  Id. at 141–42.
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centered around the theme of adopting civic agriculture.95  Open 
to farmers, educators, landowners, business people, planners, 
naturalists, politicians, students, and others, the community forum 
included five break-out sessions, a keynote speaker to ground the 
various issues into a common theme of transformation, lunch 
with locally grown food, panel discussions, an open-floor Q&A, 
and an optional end-of-day field trip to a historical farming site.96 
The topics were similar to those presented to the educators and 
administrators from the first study—seasonal awareness, farming 
in the suburbs, agriculture across the curriculum, eating as an 
agricultural act, and food security.97
More than 100 individuals attended, from the “progressive 
Roman Catholic and conservative religious right, the struggling 
horse farmer and the concerned college student, the electrician 
and the professor, all side-by-side bringing up points that the rest 
may not have otherwise considered.”98  Noticeably, though, there 
were limitations in diversity and some “lifestyle” demographics 
were missing.99
Overall, Hayes-Conroy found the responses positive. 
Motivated attendees felt a “sense of inspiration” and they planned 
“further programs on issues of agriculture and reconnection to 
the land for the local area.”100  Additionally, the forum generally 
recognized the importance of “wholeness” in the community and 
in agriculture—“the need to include all voices was stressed quite 
firmly at the forum; if a dialogue is to be ‘whole,’ in any sense 
of the word, it must actively seek out ways to be inclusive.”101 
According to early responses, stressing inclusion and wholeness 
prompted a “sense of belonging in individuals from divergent 
groups” and left “them with a sense of responsibility for land and 
95  Id. at 143–46.
96  Id. at 144–147.
97  Id. at 144.
98  Id. at 147.
99  Id. at 149–50.
100  Id. at 148.
101  Id. at 148–49.
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place.”102  In other words, assuring individuals in a community 
that their opinions and decisions matter with respect to the local 
food system may negate the attitudes otherwise preventing a shift 
toward civic agriculture.
Goldschmidt’s study illustrates the potential economic 
and civic benefits of communities composed primarily of small 
farms owned and operated by community residents, especially 
in relation to towns dominated by large agricultural producers. 
Hayes-Conroy’s study identifies social barriers to transforming a 
community into one in which civic agriculture may prevail, but 
it also identifies how empowering individuals through inclusive 
and democratic discussion and decision-making may reduce 
those barriers.  Taken together, these two studies illuminate how 
communities can work together to localize their food system and 
why doing so benefits them as individuals and as a civic body. 
II. Legislating Local Food Systems: Federal Policies 
that Localize  Food
In Part I, we saw the theories that motivate communities 
to localize their food systems and empirical examples of those 
theories in practice.  In Part II, we turn to how the federal 
government has incentivized these community-centered food 
systems, particularly through the various iterations of the Farm 
Bill.
As much as they are prescriptive models toward which 
sectors of the food system may evolve, civic agriculture and 
food democracy are also normative explanations of how the food 
system has been changing toward conceptual food inversion.103 
Both Lyson and Hamilton explain that their models follow the 
natural tendencies they had been observing for years.  Since 
first presenting their models of localizing the food system, the 
102  Id. at 149.
103  At least one case study has been developed to analyze the practicability 
of implementing a model of food democracy.  See Neva Hassanein, Locating 
Food Democracy: Theoretical and Practical Ingredients, 3 J. Hunger & 
Envtl. Nutrition 286, 290–304 (2008). 
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tendencies they witnessed and were inspired by continue to 
unfold in dramatic fashion.104  While civic agriculture and food 
democracy might be dismissed or explained away by myriad 
arguments, the trends the two professors witnessed have remained 
remarkably resilient.105
The flourishing localization of the food system has been 
captured not only in the marketplace—seen around the United 
States in farmers’ markets, community supported agriculture 
and aquaculture, and public and private buy-local campaigns, to 
name a few—but in every link of the supply chain.  Much has 
been written about the localization innovations in production, 
104  Hamilton notes as much more than a half-decade after publishing his 
first essay on food democracy.  See Neil D. Hamilton, Moving Toward Food 
Democracy: Better Food, New Farmers, and the Myth of Feeding the World, 
16 Drake J. Agric. L. 117, 118–19 (2011) (“The goal of this essay is to consider 
some of the current developments in the U.S. food system with an emphasis 
on sustainability and its connection to food, farming and the land.  Much has 
happened on the American food and agriculture scene since I first about the 
idea of food democracy seven years ago.”).  See also Susan A. Schneider, 
Moving in Opposite Directions? Exploring Trends in Consumer Demand and 
Agricultural Production, 43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 400, 408 (2017) (“As 
the food movement has taken shape in recent years, Hamilton’s prediction of 
an ‘emerging food democracy’ has begun.”); Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting 
the Law: Personal Reflections on Thirty Years of Change in Agricultural 
Legislation, 46 Creighton L. Rev. 563, 573 (2013) (“In many ways, the ‘new 
farmers’ of tomorrow, the people I wrote about in the ‘New Agrarians,’ and 
the issues of food access and informed choice (e.g., ‘food democracy’), are the 
focus of today’s activists.”).
105  For theoretical and practical arguments against civic agriculture, see Carrie 
A. Scrufari, Tackling the Tenure Problem: Promoting Land Access for New 
Farmers as Part of a Climate Change Solution, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 497, 
501–03 (2017) (arguing that obstacles to land access among new and small 
farmers make civic agriculture a near-impossible model to realize); Laura 
B. DeLind & Jim Bingen, Place and Civic Culture: Re-Thinking the Context 
for Local Agriculture, 21 J. Agric. & Envtl. Ethics 127, 128-30 (2007) 
(presenting several arguments related to the conflation of “local” and “civic” 
among some proponents of civic agriculture); Morgan L. Holcomb, Our 
Agriculture Policy Dilemma: The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History 
of Four Meals, by Michael Pollan, 8 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 249, 274–75 
(2007) (arguing against the practicability of a large-scale implementation 
of civic agriculture and doubting whether small-scale farms are any more 
environmentally sound than their large-scale counterparts).  And for those 
against food democracy, see Stephen Carpenter, A New Higher Calling in 
Agricultural Law, 18 Drake J. Agric. L. 13, 34–35 (2013) (noting that the 
pursuit of food activists “to be more egalitarian than the mainstream food 
industry” may, on closer inspection, reveal uneven accomplishments rooted 
in elitism); Hassanein, supra note 34, at 80 (summarizing arguments that food 
democracy has no singular unifying focus).
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processing, distribution, marketing, as well as developments 
among minority and urban populations.  Such changes have come 
to embody the current food system.
As Lyson and others point out, however, for longer-
lasting structural changes to occur, the American public must 
reckon with its governmental policies that help perpetuate the 
status quo.  Cities and local municipalities have played increasing 
roles in developing and promulgating policies that promote the 
localization of the food system.106  The federal government, 
however, has the most potential to alter the national structure of 
the food system toward more localizing policies.  In recent years, 
the federal government, especially through the 2008 and 2014 
Farm Bills,107 has taken recent steps to encourage its citizens to 
take more local control of the food system.  Specifically, it has 
done this through creating programs that promote local food.
A. Local Food as a Framework for Measuring 
Representation in the Food System
Local food, as useful shorthand for a rich and thematic 
conceptual framework of community food systems, lacks any 
uniform legal definition.108  When advocates, consumers, scholars, 
legislators and rule-makers, and other food-system stakeholders 
use the term, they often refer to distance or geography, but the 
term encapsulates numerous other attributes, as well, including 
who produced the food, how the food was processed, and other 
meaningful characteristics related to the supply chain.109  Since 
we consider community food systems synonymous with local 
106  Martha H. Chumbler, et al., Urban Agriculture: Policy, Law, 
Strategy, and Implementation 232 (2015).
107  See, e.g., Renée Johnson & Tadlock Cowan, Cong. Research Serv., 
Local Food Systems: Selected Farm Bill and Other Federal Programs 
1 (2016),  https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43950.pdf. 
108  Susan A. Schneider, Food, Farming, and Sustainability 684 (2d 
ed. 2016); Local Foods: Overview, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research 
Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-prices/local-foods (last 
updated Oct. 10, 2017).
109  Schneider, supra note 111, at 684–85; Marne Coit, Jumping on the Next 
Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the Local Food 
Movement, 4 J. Food L. & Pol’y 45, 47 (2008).
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foods, local food systems, and the localization of the food system, 
we also consider policies promoting local foods as policies that 
promote community food systems.  Specifically, this localization 
of the food systems refers to local participation in the community 
food system and local decision-making in the food supply chain.
While localizing the food system constitutes an array 
of attributes related to agriculture, economics, democratic 
participation, personal identity, and community problem-solving, 
it is helpful to look at the developments in local-food policy to 
understand the trends Lyson, Hamilton, and others witnessed and 
wrote about.  Given the numerous ways to delineate local from non-
local foods, or even “local foods” from “locality foods,”110 clarity 
can be fleeting.  Nevertheless, the USDA Economic Research 
Service (ERS) has identified at least four broad iterations of local 
food: (1) distance traveled, (2) marketing outlet, (3) perceived 
attributes, and (4) potential to address food deserts.111
First, local food as distance traveled refers to how far the 
food had to be transported to arrive at the consumer’s plate.  This 
may, for example, refer to a specific number of miles, such as 
those in the 100-mile diet.112  It can, of course, be much more 
or much less than that.  The ERS found a range of instances in 
distance-qualifying local foods, from as little as twenty-five miles 
from the originating location to as far away as 350 miles from it.113 
Congress also relies on distance in the two instances it has defined 
local foods.114  In the first instance, the 2008 Farm Bill115 defined 
a “locally or regionally produced agricultural food product” for 
the purposes of a USDA loan program as food traveling fewer 
110  See Schneider, supra note 111, at 685.
111  See Renée Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., The Role of Local and 
Regional Food Systems in U.S. Farm Policy 2–11 (2016), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R44390.pdf. 
112  See generally Alisa Smith & J.B. MacKinnon, Plenty: Eating Locally 
on the 100-Mile Diet (2008); Alisa Smith & J.B. MacKinnon, The 100-
Mile Diet: A Year of Local Eating (2007)
113  Johnson, supra note 114, at 3.
114  See Michael T. Roberts, Food Law in the United States 387 (2016).
115  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 
Stat. 1651.
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than 400 miles.116  The second instance, the Food Safety and 
Modernization Act (FSMA)117 defined a “qualified end-user” as 
a restaurant or retail food establishment located in the same state 
in which the food was produced or “not more than 275 miles 
from such farm.”118  Although this is not an explicit reference to 
local food, FMSA exempts certain small-scale farms from the 
Preventative Controls Rule and the Produce Safety Rule based on 
amount of sales to qualified-end users, and these transactions are 
often entirely local in nature.119  More than a mere measurement 
of how far the crow might fly, distance can also refer to a specific 
region, such as within the boundaries of a state120 or some of other 
“geographical indicator,” which describes not only the place 
where the food comes from, but also the processes used to grow 
or manufacture that food; often, a geographical indicator informs 
the consumer of perceived quality, such as Washington apples, 
Florida oranges, or Napa Valley wines.121
Second, local food as marketing outlet refers to the sorts 
of marketing channels farmers use to distribute the food they 
produced or manufactured to consumers.122  These channels 
include (1) direct-to-consumer outlets, such as farmers’ markets, 
116  7 U.S.C. § 1932(g)(9) (2012) (defining a local food as food produced within 
a state’s border or “the total distance that the product is transported is less 
than 400 miles from the origin of the product”).
117  Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
118  21 U.S.C. §§ 350g(l)(4)(B), 350h(f)(4)(A).
119  21 U.S.C. §§ 350g(l)(1), 350g(l)(2) (exempting a “qualified facility” from the 
Preventative Controls Rule); 21 U.S.C. 350h(f) (exempting certain small-scale 
farms from the Produce Safety Rule); Gregory M. Schieber, Note, The Food 
Safety Modernization Act’s Tester Amendment: Useful Safe Harbor for Small 
Farmers and Food Facilities or Weak Attempt at Scale-Appropriate Farm and 
Food Regulations?, 18 Drake J. Agric. L. 239, 252–53 (2013) (discussing 
motivation for these exemptions as arising from congressional concerns about 
FSMA’s regulatory burden on local-food systems). 
120  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1931(g)(9)(A)(i)(II); CT Grown Program, Conn. 
Dep’t of Agric., http://www.ct.gov/doag/cwp/view.asp?a=3243&q=398984 
(last visited May 15, 2018) (stating that, with farmers and producers meeting 
certain conditions, “[f]arm products grown or produced in Connecticut may 
be advertised or sold in Connecticut as . . . “Local” or “Locally-Grown”). 
Nearly all states have their own “state-grown” programs. Johnson, supra 
note 114, at 4.
121  Id. at 4.
122  Id. at 5.
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roadside farm-stands, on-farm stores, and community-supported 
agriculture; and (2) intermediated outlets, such as grocery stores, 
restaurants, and regional distributors.123  As part of the agricultural 
census, the USDA collects sales information related to some 
of these local-food marketing channels, particularly direct-to-
consumer models.124  The so-called Locavore Index, which ranks 
states based on local-food sales and consumption, is based, almost 
in whole, on these direct and intermediate marketing outlets and, 
in part, on the USDA’s data collection related to them.125  For 
many consumers, the economic support of regional agriculture 
and the community is the primary motivation for using these 
channels.126
Third, local food as perceived attributes refers to various 
social or supply-chain characteristics in the food’s production 
that consumers deem desirable.127  Such perceptions are based on 
the type of farm, the methods of production, the simplification 
of the supply chain, the financial and social support of local 
communities, the fairness of the food system, and, as Lyson 
and Hamilton show, alternatives to the predominant industrial 
model of food production.  More concretely, these attributes 
might include whether the food originated at a small or urban 
123  Id. at 5–6.
124  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 U.S. Agricultural Census, 
Table 2: Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold Including 
Landlord’s Share and Direct Sales: 2012 and 2007 9 (2014), https://
www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_
Chapter_1_US/st99_1_002_002.pdf  (“Value of agricultural products sold 
directly to individuals for human consumption”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2007 
U.S. Agricultural Census, Table 2: Market Value of Agricultural 
Products Sold Including Landlord’s Share and Direct Sales: 2007 
and 2002 9 (2009), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_
Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_002_002.pdf  (same).  See also 
Direct Farm Sales of Food: Results from the 2015 Local Food Marketing 
Practices Survey, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Agric. Stat. Serv. (2016) 
(supplementing 2015 direct-marketing survey with Census of Agriculture 
data).
125  How Locavore Is Your State?: Strolling of the Heifers 2017 Locavore Index 
ranks states on local food commitment, Strolling of the Heifers (May 15, 
2017), https://www.strollingoftheheifers.com/locavorei. 
126  Johnson, supra note 114, at 7–8. 
127  Id. at 9.
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farm or with sustainable practices; others might mean support of 
the local economy, farmland preservation, minimal harm to the 
environment, use of alternative fertilizer and pest-control methods, 
and products that provide fairer wages to farm workers.128
Finally, local food as potential to address food deserts 
refers less to criteria delineating local from non-local food 
and more to the advocacy for an increase role of local foods in 
addressing concerns about access to healthy food in some low-
income or otherwise underserved community (so-called food 
deserts).129  While this may mean passing tax incentives to attract 
more food-retail outlets, improving already-existing food-retail 
outlets by encouraging stocking fresh foods, or diverting from 
the waste-stream to the supply chain, it may also mean promoting 
programs that encourage these communities to become active 
producers in urban agriculture or community gardening.130  Many 
local food policy councils prioritize local food production and 
consumption in addressing community hunger issues.131
Although “local food” lacks a formal definition, these 
four categories demonstrate, at the very least, that local food is 
rooted in a community’s identity of land, economics, political 
and social values, and unified problem-solving.132  Although these 
128  Id.
129  Id. at 10.
130  Id.; Philip Ackerman-Leist, Rebuilding the Foodshed: How to Create 
Local, Sustainable, and Secure Food Systems 111–13 (2013).
131  See, e.g., Detroit Food Pol’y Council, Creating a Food Secure Detroit: 
Policy Review and Update 8 (2017), http://detroitfoodpolicycouncil.net/
sites/default/files/images/DFPC%20Food%20Policy%20Document%20
021317%20%281%29.pdf; Marin Food Pol’y Council, Equitable Access 
to Healthy and Local Food in Marin County: Preliminary Report 
on Policy Priorities to the Board of Supervisors 2–3 (2015), http://
www.ucanr.edu/sites/MarinFoodPolicyCouncil/files/223505.pdf; Getting 
Food, Santa Fe Food Pol’y Council, https://www.santafefoodpolicy.org/
food-plan/getting-food (last visited May 15, 2018).  The Los Angeles Food 
Policy Council has developed an innovative strategy to encourage owners of 
corner liquor shops to stock their shelves with fresh produce.  See Healthy 
Neighborhood Market Network, L.A. Food Pol’y Council (2018), http://
goodfoodla.org/policymaking/healthy-neighborhood-market-network (last 
visited May 15, 2018).
132  See Roberts, supra note 117, at 386 (identifying ten related objectives of 
the local-food movement).
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communities are not easily defined, their cohesion often seems 
bound by the voluntary participation of producers, distributors, 
retailers, consumers, advocates, and other members of the public 
in coming together to transact and exchange information.  At its 
essence, then, local food is a proxy for the determination of a 
community to govern its food system, to set the goals that its food 
system should achieve, to design the infrastructure to support its 
food system, and to strive for self-reliance in its food system.
 
B.  Federal Policies Localizing the Food System
Since at least the 1930s, during President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s sweeping New Deal reforms, the USDA has 
experimented with encouraging more diverse participation in local 
and regional food systems, notably in the face of more established 
agricultural interests, primarily in attempts to alleviate rural 
poverty.133  Not until the last decades, however, has the conceptual 
structure of a local-food system emerged as a part of federal 
action to increase participation in agriculture policy.  Below is a 
brief summary of the various actions the federal government has 
taken to promote such a food system.
Federal policies and programs that support local foods 
often do not specifically limit themselves to or target local foods; 
instead, their breadth covers a wide range of food-system issues, 
including those associated with local foods.134  Increasingly, 
however, Congress and the USDA are carving out policies to 
particularly support the localization of food systems.  This section 
identifies examples of both sorts.  Because of the capacity of 
many federal laws to attract local foods into their purview, this is 
not an exhaustive list.
133  See Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy 88–95 
(1953) (discussing the work of the USDA Farm Security Agency in addressing 
rural poverty through programs designed to make impoverished families more 
self-sufficient, including promoting marketing and purchasing cooperatives, 
increased farm ownership, and overall community development, as well as 
focusing on bringing more Southern black farmers out of dire economic 
distress).
134  Johnson, supra note 114, at 28; Coit, supra note 112, at 63.
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i. Promotion of Localized Food-System Transactions
Federal statutes regulating the marketing of agricultural 
products, such as through commodity-specific price controls and 
marketing orders, have been in place since the early twentieth 
century, but this focus on transactions began to widen in the 
century’s latter half.135  In 1976, when Congress passed the 
Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act (Direct Marketing 
Act), federal agricultural-marketing legislation veered away 
from principally regulating commodities markets and expanded 
into the broader category of local foods.136  The purpose of this 
law was to “promote, through appropriate means and on an 
economically sustainable basis, the development and expansion 
of direct marketing of agricultural commodities from farmers 
to consumers.”137  Additionally, through this new law, Congress 
empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to create and maintain a 
program “designed to facilitate direct marketing from farmers to 
consumers for the mutual benefit of consumers and farmers.”138 
The Direct Marketing Act effectuated this program by directing 
the Secretary of Agriculture to coordinate with state departments 
of agriculture and local Extension Service offices for the 
development of direct-to-consumer activities most needed in the 
particular states.139  The activities could include, among other 
things, (1) sponsoring related conferences, (2) identifying state 
and local laws pertinent to direct-marketing and advocating for 
improved legislation, or (3) providing technical assistance to 
deepen understanding of direct marketing.140
The Direct Marketing Act is remarkable not only for its 
authorization of $3,000,000 for these collaborative and local 
programs, but it is an early example of Congress’ willingness 
135  See, e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 
31; Agricultural Marketing Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1282 (2006).
136  Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-463, 90 
Stat. 1982 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 3001).
137  Id. § 2.
138  Id.
139  Id. § 5.
140  Id.
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to encourage the activities of community food systems.141  In 
defining “direct marketing from farmers to consumers,” Congress 
noted several examples where such transactions occurred—
roadside stands, city markets, house-to-house marketing—which 
existed “to lower the cost and increase the quality of food to such 
consumers while providing increased financial returns to the 
farmers.”142  To the modern locavore, these examples resemble 
the current picture of local-food marketplaces, comprising 
farm-stands, farmers’ markets, and CSA subscriptions.  At a 
time when direct marketing among farmers and consumers was 
widely viewed as “a step backward into inefficiency,”143 the 
Direct Marketing Act’s empowerment of the USDA to assist 
local communities in localizing their food system, especially as 
an alternative to the increasingly industrial food supply, began 
to legitimize the importance of community-controlled local-food 
economics and policies.144
In the years that followed, the American farmers’ markets 
never succumbed to their alleged inefficiencies, and by 1992, as 
they continued to flourish, Congress passed the WIC Farmers’ 
Market Nutrition Act, which amended the Child Nutrition Act of 
1966,145 and created the WIC Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program 
(WIC Nutrition Program) to both expand the public’s awareness 
for farmers’ markets and “provide resources to women, infants, 
and children who are nutritionally at risk in the form of fresh 
nutritious unprepared foods (such as fruits and vegetables), from 
141  Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-463, § 
7(b), 90 Stat. 1982, 1984 (authorizing $1,500,000 “for each of the fiscal years 
ending” in 1977 and 1978).
142  Id. § 3.
143  Allison Brown, Counting Farmers Markets, 91 Geographical R. 655, 669 
(2001).
144  For an excellent analysis of the role of farmers’ markets across the United 
States during the period leading up to the passage of the Farmer-to-Consumer 
Direct Marketing Act and speculation about their demise in the face of the 
industrialized food-supply chain, see Jane Pyle, Farmers’ Markets in the 
United States: Functional Anachronisms, 61 Geographical R. 167 (1971).
145  WIC Farmers’ Market Nutrition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-314, 106 Stat. 
280.
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farmers’ markets . . . .”146  Specifically, Congress authorized 
funding for grants that states could use, in coordination with the 
USDA, to create programs in which qualified beneficiaries could 
exchange coupons for locally grown food.147  States could only 
use these grants, however, if they agreed to contribute their own 
dollars to fund the programs.148  In 1998, Congress reauthorized 
the WIC Nutrition Program, thus solidifying its role in supporting 
local-food systems.149  With the passage of the WIC Farmers’ 
Market Nutrition Act, Congress now found itself as a direct funder 
of local-foods system.
 Also, in 1998, the USDA National Commission on 
Small Farms recognized the significance of locally grown food 
on local communities, and it developed a thorough policy vision 
to promote local-food systems.  Specifically, it urged the USDA 
“to develop an interagency initiative to promote and foster local 
and regional food systems featuring farmers markets, community 
gardens, Community Supported Agriculture, and direct marketing 
to school lunch programs.”150  Among the principles guiding 
these policies were developing relationships between farmers and 
consumers, strengthening rural communities, fostering sustainable 
farming practices, creating diverse market outlets, and expanding 
opportunities to all Americans to engage in farming.151
Just four years later, Congress amended the Direct 
Marketing Act through the 2002 Farm Bill152 and created the 
Farmers Market Promotion Program (FMPP).  The FMPP was 
added to the Direct Marketing Act to “develop . . . new farmers’ 
markets, roadside stands, community-supported agriculture 
146  Id. § 2.
147  Id. § 3.
148  Id.
149  William F. Goodling Child Nutrition Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
105-336, § 203(o), 112 Stat. 3143, 3163-64.
150  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Nat’l Comm’n on Small Farms, A Time to Act: 
A Report of the USDA National Commission on Small Farms (1998), 
https://www.iatp.org/files/258_2_106175.pdf (the report is not paginated).
151  Id. (search for “Guiding Principles for Federal Farm Policy”).
152  Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, 116 
Stat. 134.
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programs, and other direct-to-consumer infrastructure.”153  The 
grants created to put the program into force could be awarded 
to a variety of entities, such as local governments, nonprofit 
organizations, an agricultural cooperative, or an economic 
development corporation.154  Moreover, it instructed the Secretary 
of Agriculture to work with states to train farmers’ market 
managers, assist local Extension Service office in developing 
marketing techniques, and to help local producers develop 
farmers’ markets.155  Congress gave the Secretary of Agriculture 
discretion to establish the guidelines and criteria of the FMPP.156 
Initially, Congress authorized that the FMPP be funded from 
2002 through 2006; however, the program did not receive funds 
until Congress provided $1 million in 2005.157  It continued to 
reauthorize funding for the FMPP in the 2008 and 2014 Farm 
Bills, as well.158
In addition to establishing and funding the FMPP, the 
2002 Farm Bill also created the Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition 
Program (Senior Nutrition Program). The Senior Nutrition 
Program, like the FMPP, amended the Direct Marketing Act.159 
The purposes of the Senior Nutrition Program were numerous; 
some reiterated the desire to expand local direct-to-consumer 
marketplaces, while another explicitly promoted local foods, 
specifically to “provide resources in the form of fresh, nutritious, 
unprepared, locally grown fruits, vegetables, and herbs” at these 
marketplaces.160  Congress authorized $5,000,000 in 2002 and 
$15,000,000 each year from 2003 to 2007 to support this nutrition 
153  7 U.S.C. § 3005(b)(1)(B) (2002).
154  Id. § 3005(c).
155  Id. § 3004(b).
156  Id. § 3005(d).
157  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Agric. Marketing Serv., Farmers Market 
Promotion Program: 2016 Report 2 (2017).
158  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 10003, 128 Stat. 649, 940-41; 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 10106, 122 
Stat. 1651, 2098-99.
159  See 7 U.S.C. § 3007 (2002).
160  Id. § 3007(b).
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program.161  As with the FMPP, it was up to the USDA to figure 
out how this program would work.162  In December 2006, the 
USDA Food and Nutrition Service finalized its rule, just in time 
to begin its operation at the start of 2007.163  The 2008 Farm Bill164 
not only reauthorized funding for this program with $20,600,000 
for each year through 2012,165 but it provided tax benefits, as 
well: purchases of qualifying food would not be subject to state 
or local sales taxes, and the economic benefits conferred on senior 
individuals would not be subject to local, state, or federal income 
tax.166  One small, but noteworthy amendment also included 
the addition of honey as a qualifying food.167  By adding honey, 
Congress once again recognized the actual activities occurring 
within local-food systems: in the face of honeybee colony 
collapse, many communities supported the sweet pay-offs of their 
local apiarists at their weekly farmers markets.168
The 2002 Farm Bill also looped in the WIC Nutrition 
Program by providing it mandatory funding.169  With an eye 
toward expanding the program and supporting local communities 
addressing hunger issues through local foods, Congress directed 
the USDA to examine the potential of food-stamps funded 
transactions at farmers’ markets, by way of the electronic benefits 
transfer (EBT) systems.170  This instruction came as the USDA 
161  Id. § 3007(a).
162  Id. § 3007(c).
163  See Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program Regulations: Final Rule, 71 
Fed. Reg. 74,618. 74,618 (Dec. 12, 2006) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 249).
164  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, 122 Stat. 
923.
165  7 U.S.C. § 3007(a) (2008).
166  Id. § 3001(c), (d).
167  Id. § 3001(b)(1).
168  See, e.g., MJ Paul Espinoza, The Honey Ladies: Saving Bay Area Bees One 
Swarm at a Time, Ctr. for Urban Educ. about Sustainable Agric. (June 
16, 2017), https://cuesa.org/article/honey-ladies-saving-bay-area-bees-one-
swarm-time; Emily Sunblade, Local Beekeeper Saving Bees, Serving Honey 
at Farmers Market, Patch Media (last updated Aug. 9, 2011), https://patch.
com/illinois/bolingbrook/thousands-of-ladies-one-beekeeper.
169  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 4307, 
116 Stat. 134, 332; 42 U.S.C. § 1786(m)(9)(A) (2002).
170  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 4111(b)
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was shifting away from paper coupons and toward the paperless 
EBT platform.171  Two years later, the Child Nutrition and WIC 
Reauthorization Act of 2004 extended this mandatory funding 
through fiscal year 2009, thus ensuring federal support of local-
food systems for several years to come.172  While the 2008 Farm 
Bill reauthorized the Senior Nutrition Program, it did not touch 
the WIC Nutrition Program; rather, the WIC Nutrition Program 
would not receive an extension until two years later through the 
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010.173  Under the 2010 law, 
Congress made funds available for the program through fiscal 
year 2015. 174
The 2014 Farm Bill extended funding for the Senior 
Nutrition Program, it did not do the same for the WIC Nutrition 
Program.175  At the same time, the 2014 Farm Bill amended the 
2008 Farm Bill to create the Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive 
(FINI).176  FINI is a grant program that “supports projects to 
increase the purchase of fruits and vegetables among low-
income consumers participating in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) by providing incentives at the point 
of purchase.”177  Grantees eligible for the millions of dollars in 
funding include farmers’ markets and community-supported 
(3)(A), 116 Stat. 134, 309.
171  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Food & Nutrition Serv., Nutrition Assistance in 
Farmers Markets: Understanding Current Operations: Final Report 2 
(2013), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/FarmersMarketsOps.
pdf. 
172  42 U.S.C. § 1786 (m)(9)(A) (2004).
173  Healthy, Hungry-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183.
174  Id. § 424; 42 U.S.C. § 1786(m)(9)(A) (2010).
175  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4203, 128 Stat. 649, 822-23 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 3007(a) (2014)).
176  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4208, 128 Stat. 649, 826 (codified 
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7517 (2014)).
177  Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) Grant Program, U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric. Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/food-
insecurity-nutrition-incentive-fini-grant-program (last visited May 16, 2018). 
Congress changed the name of food stamps to SNAP in the 2008 Farm Bill. 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 
Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap 
(last updated Nov. 28, 2017). 
218 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol. 14
agriculture programs.178  The USDA coordinates the dispensing of 
FINI funds through cooperation with state agencies responsible 
for administering SNAP.179  Since its inception, FINI has 
supported local efforts across the United States to promote and 
expand use of SNAP benefits at farmers’ markets; these programs 
target not only beneficiaries of the Senior Nutrition Program and 
WIC Nutrition Program, but of all SNAP beneficiaries.180 
Although with modest roots, the federal support of 
farmers’ markets and direct-to-consumer markets has greatly 
expanded through the most recent Farm Bills.  The Senior 
Nutrition Program and the WIC Nutrition merited particular 
attention.  So strong is federal support for these two programs that 
they are regarded as the “single most important federal or state 
program[s] relating to farmers markets”181  Not only is this federal 
support more than forty years old, but it is diverse, manifesting as 
stated purposes of support, direct funding of market transactions, 
and various grants designed to promote and expand direct-to-
consumer marketplaces.
ii. Promotion of Participation Among Traditionally 
Underrepresented Food-System Stakeholders
An essential characteristic of the localization of a food 
system is the ability of representatives of the entire community 
to participate in decision-making, market transactions, and goal-
setting.  Accordingly, policies and programs that encourage 
and incentivize groups traditionally under-represented in these 
processes to more equitably access them should be regarded as 
178  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric., Food Insecurity 
Incentive (FINI) Grant Program: 2018 Request for Applications (RFA) 
19 (2017), https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rfa/FY%202018%20FINI_
Final.pdf. 
179  Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) Grant Program, supra note 180.
180  See NIFA Programs Support Farmers Markets Nationally, U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://nifa.usda.gov/
announcement/nifa-programs-support-farmers-markets-nationally. 
181  Neil D. Hamilton, Farmers Market Policy: An Inventory of Federal, 
State, and Local Examples 7 (Oct. 26, 2005)
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efforts to localize food systems.182 This is especially exemplified 
among those laws targeting beginning and socially disadvantaged 
farmers and ranchers.
1.  Beginning Farmers
Through the Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development 
Program, the 2002 Farm Bill introduced the concept of “the 
beginning farmer” to federal legislation.  In creating the Beginning 
Farmer and Rancher Development Program, the bill defined a 
“beginning farmer or rancher” as a person who, on top of other 
conditions set by the USDA, has either (a) never operated a farm 
or ranch or (b) who has operated a farm or ranch for fewer than 
ten years.183  This program gave the USDA a means of providing 
training, education, outreach, and technical assistance for this 
group.184  Specifically, beginning farmers or ranchers could 
compete for federal grants in numerous subject areas of farm 
ownership and operation, such as mentoring and apprenticeships, 
farmland transfers, marketing strategies, conservation, and 
financial management.185  Only collaborative projects involving 
various entities would be eligible for these grants, some of which 
would be required to match the federal funds.186  In rolling out this 
program, the USDA was tasked with undertaking a democratic 
survey based on input from a wide array of food-system 
stakeholders.187  In his first publicized vision of the 2018 Farm 
182  It is important to note that in the history of American agriculture, and 
perhaps today in some circles, “localization,” “democracy,” and “grassroots” 
participation were effectively, and often intentionally, proxies for race-based 
exclusion. See generally Nathan A. Rosenberg, The Butz Stops Here: Why the 
Food Movement Needs to Rethink Agricultural Policy, 13 J. Food L. & Pol’y 
12 (2017).  It is our hope and expectation that with a clear focus on entire 
communities and specific efforts to overcome the lasting impacts of racial 
discrimination in particular, the concept of local and democratic participation 
in agriculture can overcome its past.
183  Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 7405, 
116 Stat. 134, 458–61.
184  Id.
185  Id.
186  Id.
187  Id. (describing the process for soliciting “Stakeholder Input”).
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Bill, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue noted his support of 
providing resources to beginning, veteran, and underrepresented 
farmers, particularly in the areas of access to land and capital, 
as well as strengthening the USDA management to better serve 
these groups.188  This program remains a central force for carrying 
out that vision.
To effectively bring new federal programs and conduct 
other outreach efforts among beginning farmers, the 2008 Farm 
Bill created the USDA Office of Advocacy and Outreach.189 
Congress created the Office to ensure that beginning farmers or 
ranchers, as well as socially disadvantaged farmers or ranchers, 
had access to and equitable participation in USDA program 
services.190  It did this through goal-setting, self-assessments, 
outreach, intra-agency coordination, analysis of program 
outcomes, and recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture to 
further the Office’s objectives.191  As part of the Office, Congress 
created the Small Farms and Beginning Farmers and Ranchers 
Group, which would work with the USDA National Institute of 
Food and Agriculture to administer the Beginning Farmer and 
Rancher Development Program, as well as perform other duties 
to promote the Office’s policies among beginning farmers.192 
Congress authorized the Office through 2012,193 and the 2014 
Farm Bill subsequently reauthorized it through 2018.194
Meanwhile, Congress expanded USDA loan funding to 
beginning farmers.  Although Congress had mandated reserving 
loan funds for beginning farmers and ranchers several years 
188  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2018 Farm Bill & Legislative Principles 2, 4 
(2018), https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2018-farm-bill-
and-legislative-principles.pdf. 
189  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 14013, 122 
Stat. 923, 1450. See also Office of Advocacy and Outreach (OAO), U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., https://www.outreach.usda.gov (last visited May 16, 2018).
190  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 14013, 122 
Stat. 923, 1450.
191  Id.
192  Id.
193  Id.
194  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12202, 128 Stat. 649, 984.
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before, the 1996 Farm Bill established an entire subsection of 
the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act dedicated 
to ensuring this group had access to federal funds.195  The new 
subsection increased reserved funding for beginning farmers from 
both the direct loan and guaranteed loan programs.196  The 2002 
Farm Bill maintained these same levels of reserved funding and 
reauthorized the program through 2007.197  The 2008 Farm Bill 
further increased the amount of reserved funding for beginning 
farmers and reauthorized the program through 2012.198  Finally, 
the 2014 Farm Bill maintained these same increased reservations 
and reauthorized the program through 2018.199  Congress 
authorized funds to be appropriated for carrying out this program 
through 2007.200  The 2008 Farm Bill subsequently reauthorized 
the program through 2012,201 and the 2014 Farm Bill, extending 
the funds to related farm-to-school programs, reauthorized the 
program through 2018.202
The 2002 Farm Bill also amended the Consolidated Farm 
and Rural Development Act to create the Beginning Farmer Land 
Contract Development Program.203  This program provided the 
USDA the means of launching a pilot program, in no fewer than 
five states, which encouraged private farmland or ranchland sales 
to beginning farmers or ranchers.  It did this by guaranteeing loans 
used by qualifying beginning farmers or ranchers to purchase 
195  Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
127, § 641, 110 Stat. 888, 1098–1102.
196  Compare 7 U.S.C. § 1994(b) (1996) with 7 U.S.C. § 1994(b) (1995).
197  Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5312, 
116 Stat. 134, 347.
198  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 5302, 122 
Stat. 923, 1151-52 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 1994(b)(2)).
199  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 5305, 128 Stat. 649, 840.
200  Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 7405, 
116 Stat. 134, 458–61.
201  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 7410, 122 
Stat. 923, 1254–55.
202  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 7409, 128 Stat. 649, 898–99.
203  Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5006, 
116 Stat. 134, 432.
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land from private sellers.204  The 2008 Farm Bill made permanent 
the structure of this pilot project and called the new program 
the Beginning Farmer or Rancher and Socially Disadvantaged 
Farmer or Rancher Contract Land Sales Program.205  The 2008 
update greatly expanded access to the USDA’s loan guarantee, 
but it set limits on receipt of it, including requiring the beginning 
farmer or rancher to invest at least a 5-percent down-payment into 
the acquired land.206  The 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for 
the program through 2018.207
In addition to the expansion of loan funding and loan 
guarantee program, Congress also expanded the Federal Crop 
Insurance program to better service beginning farmers.  Federal 
Crop Insurance emerged in 1938 as farmers were devastated by 
the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, and over the twentieth 
century, the program, increasingly vital to the agricultural 
economy, underwent substantial changes, especially with its 
expansion in the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980208 and the 
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994.209  At the turn of the 
next century, Congress passed the Agricultural Risk Protection 
Act, which increased the amount premium subsidies to eligible 
farmers.210  Not until 2008, however, did Congress begin targeting 
beginning farmers as potential beneficiaries for these insurance 
assistance programs.  Through an amendment to the Federal 
Crop Insurance Act of 1980, the 2008 Farm Bill created a risk-
management program, which instructed the USDA to focus energy 
on educating, reaching out to, and otherwise training beginning 
farmers and ranchers, as well as socially disadvantaged farmers 
204  Id.
205  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 5005, 122 
Stat. 923, 1145.
206  Id.
207  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 5305, 128 Stat. 649, 840.
208  Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-365, 94 Stat. 1312.
209  Erik O’Donoghue, The Importance of Federal Crop Insurance Premium 
Subsidies, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv. (Oct. 20, 2014), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2014/october/the-importance-of-
federal-crop-insurance-premium-subsidies. 
210  Id.
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and ranchers, about managing financial risks on their farms.211
But it was the 2014 Farm Bill, through another 
amendment to the Federal Crop Insurance Act, that brought 
actual savings to the new group.  The 2014 Farm Bill created 
provisions incentivizing beginning farmers to purchase crop 
insurance, specifically subsidized premiums for the federal crop-
insurance policies, a similar benefit many farmers had long been 
enjoying.212  An additional financial incentive included a waiver 
of administrative fees for “limited resource” beginning farmers 
and ranchers.213
The new law also roped beginning farming and ranching 
operations into the insurance program’s crop-yield determinations, 
although the benefit seems only calculated to make quantifying 
loss more streamlined with the rest of the program.214  A 
beginning farmer enrolled in the federal crop insurance program 
could, in instances of catastrophic loss or other covered losses, 
record a loss based on the actual loss incurred by the previous 
farmer of the farmland or simply use the option available to other 
enrolled farmers who could not prove actual loss, whichever is 
higher.215  This move for efficiency, rather than for encouraging 
underrepresented stakeholders to participate more in the food 
system, is evidenced by the definition of “beginning farmer or 
rancher,” which differed from that established by the Beginning 
Farmer or Rancher Development Program.216  The amendment 
defined a beginning farmer or rancher as “a farmer or rancher 
who has not actively operated and managed a farm or ranch with 
a bona fide insurable interest in a crop or livestock as an owner-
operator, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper for more than 5 crop 
years, as determined by the Secretary.”217  The five-year threshold 
211  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 12026, 122 
Stat. 923, 1390.
212  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 11016, 128 Stat. 649, 963–64.
213  Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 1508 (b)(5)(E) (2014).
214  Id. § 1508(g)(2)(B).
215  Id. § 1508(b).
216  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 11016, 128 Stat. 649, 963–64.
217  Id. Congress also used a five-year minimum as part of eligibility for farm-
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is likely tied to the provision requiring farmers or ranchers to 
show five years of actual production to prove loss.218
Nevertheless, beginning farmers and ranchers did catch 
a small break in one narrow circumstance regarding transitional 
yields.  Each crop year, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation—a 
sub-agency of the USDA charged with administering the Federal 
Crop Insurance program219—assigns a maximum average 
production per acre to each crop.  This is called the transitional 
yield.220  The transitional yield is used when the farmer or rancher 
does not provide acceptable proof of actual loss of a crop or 
livestock.221  In other words, the transitional yield is the USDA’s 
best guess at how much crop a farmer loses when the farmer is 
unable to prove how much he or she actually lost.  When a farmer 
tries to prove actual loss, the transitional yield is used if the value 
of that crop lost, based on the current or one of the previous years, 
falls below 60 percent of the applicable transitional yield.222  Thus, 
if a farmer records 59 lost crops, but the transitional yield says the 
farmer should have lost 100 crops, then the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation will use the transitional yield.  Generally, farmers 
may recover 60 percent of the transitional yield.223   However, 
the 2014 Farm Bill allowed beginning farmers and ranchers to 
recover 80 percent of it.224
In a similar vein, the 2008 Farm Bill amended the 1985 
Farm Bill to incentivize limited-resource beginning farmers 
or socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers to use the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) by providing 
operating loans in the Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-
224, § 255, 114 Stat. 358, 424.
218  See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(g)(2)(A) (requiring present year plus four previous 
years of recorded losses).
219  Id. § 1503.
220  Id. § 1502(b)(11).
221  Id.
222  Id. § 1508(g)(4)(B).
223  7 U.S.C. § 1508(g)(4)(B)(iii) (2014). 
224  Id. § 1508(e)(2)(E).  
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them payments higher than the standard set for others.225  EQIP 
is a competitively-awarded, voluntary conservation program 
administered by the USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service 
that provides farmers and ranchers with federal funds in exchange 
for implementing efforts to conserve natural resources, like water, 
and air.226  The 2008 Farm Bill allowed beginning farmers of 
limited resources to receive payments above the statutory limit 
for other producers.227  By providing limited resource farmers and 
ranchers greater access to EQIP, Congress formally recognized 
that many beginning farmers had been seeking to or practicing 
conservation agricultural programs, undoubtedly a product of 
community food systems, in which communities seek to improve 
the health of themselves and their environment.228  The 2014 
Farm Bill expanded this program to veterans and reauthorized its 
funding through 2018.229
The gains for beginning farmers and ranchers under 
the Federal Crop Insurance Program and EQIP may be small, 
but Congress including them in these programs is a first step 
in giving these underrepresented stakeholders a foothold in 
economic stability and, thus, greater access to local food-system 
engagement.
One last program of note is the Beginning Farmer and 
Rancher Individual Development Account Pilot Program.  In 
an effort to help low-income beginning farmers and ranchers 
save enough money to invest in farmland, Congress created the 
Beginning Farmer and Rancher Individual Development Account 
225  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 2503, 122 
Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008).
226  Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Natural 
Resources Conservation Serv. (last accessed February 3, 2018), https://
www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip.
227  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 2503, 122 
Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008).
228  For more on limited resource farmers and ranchers, see Limited Resource 
Program Definition, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Natural Resources Cons. Serv. (last 
updated Oct. 17, 2017), https://lrftool.sc.egov.usda.gov/LRP_Definition.aspx.
229  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 2203, 128 Stat. 729 (Feb. 7, 
2014).
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Pilot Program in the 2008 Farm Bill.230  This Farm Bill addition 
required the Secretary of Agriculture to create the New Farmer 
Individual Development Accounts Pilot Program in coordination 
with the Farm Service Agency.231  The pilot program would allow 
qualified low-income farmers and ranchers to set up a savings 
account with a qualified entity, and the USDA would match 50 
percent of the individual contributions to that account.232  The 
money thus earned could be used by the farmer or rancher to 
purchase farmland, crops, or other related expenditures.233  The 
2014 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for this program through 
2018.234 Despite the reauthorization, Congress has not yet 
appropriated funds for this program, and the absence of the grants 
in the 2018 USDA Budget Report suggests the Secretary of 
Agriculture has stopped requesting money to launch it.235  With 
seemingly mixed messages, the USDA National Institute of Food 
and Agriculture remains committed through 2018 to requesting 
applications from the public for grants that fund education about 
this nonfunctional program.236
2. Socially Disadvantaged Farmers
Many of the programs and benefits for beginning 
farmers discussed in the previous section also apply to socially 
disadvantaged farmers and ranchers (SDFRs), but the Farm Bill 
has also created programs specifically for this group of agricultural 
230  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 5301, 122 
Stat. 923, 1147.
231  Id.
232  Id.
233  Id.
234  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 5301, 128 Stat. 649, 839.
235  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FY 2018 Budget Summary 10, https://www.
obpa.usda.gov/budsum/fy18budsum.pdf. On the other hand, the 2017 Budget 
Summary itemized the Development Fund.  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FY 
2017 Budget Summary 16, https://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/fy17budsum.
pdf (“Individual Development Grants”).
236  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric., Beginning Farmer 
and Rancher Development Program: Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Request 
for Applications (RFA) 7 (2018), https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rfa/
FY18-BFRDP-RFA-FINAL.pdf. 
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producers.  Socially disadvantaged groups made their appearance 
in federal agricultural policy with the passage of the 1990 Farm 
Bill.237  Congress defined a “socially disadvantaged farmer or 
rancher” as a member belonging to a “socially disadvantaged 
group.”238  This group was defined as one “whose members have 
been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice because of their 
identity as members of a group without regard to their individual 
qualities.”239  Today, the USDA Office of Advocacy and Outreach 
uses this same definition and provides examples of such recognized 
groups—African Americans, Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, 
Hispanics, Asians, and Pacific Islanders—as well as provides the 
Secretary of Agriculture to determine whether additional groups 
qualify under this definition.240
Congress’ biggest statement of support for SDFRs is the 
Outreach and Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and 
Ranchers (“2501 Program”).  The 1990 Farm Bill created the 
Outreach and Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and 
Ranchers, also called the 2501 Program in reference to the Farm 
Bill section under which the program fell.241  Congress created 
the 2501 Program to encourage and assist SDFRs, and later 
veteran farmers and ranchers, with farm ownership and equitable 
participation in USDA programs.242  Congress mandated that 
the USDA be responsible for administering this program, and it 
permitted the USDA to make grants to and enter into contracts 
with eligible entities able to carry out these outreach, education, 
237  Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624, 
104 Stat. 3359.
238  Id. § 2501(e)(2).
239  Id. § 2501(e)(1).
240  Definitions, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Off. of Advocacy & Outreach, 
https://www.outreach.usda.gov/grants/oasdfr/definitions.htm (last visited 
May 16, 2018).
241  Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624, § 
2501, 104 Stat. 3359, 4062–65.  See also Outreach and Assistance for Socially 
Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers and Veteran Farmers and Ranchers 
Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Off. of Advocacy & Outreach, https://
www.outreach.usda.gov/sdfr/index.htm (last visited May 16, 2018).
242  Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624, 
§ 2501(a)(1), 104 Stat. 3359, 4062.
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and technical assistance efforts.243  Congress authorized funding 
for the 2501 Program through 2018.244  The 2014 Farm Bill 
extended this program to veteran farmers and ranchers.245  The 
2501 Section remains “the only farm bill program dedicated to 
addressing the needs of family farmers and ranchers of color.”246
SDFRs did not reappear again in the Farm Bill until 2002, 
when Congress allocated certain funds for them.  In that year’s 
Farm Bill, Congress amended a subsection of the Consolidated 
Farm and Rural Development Act dealing with the target 
participation rates of federal loans.247  This small amendment 
affected funds related to farm-operating loans.  Specifically, 
federal funds are made available to states in order to help the 
states reach their target participation rates among SDFRs in the 
farm-operating loan programs.  These target rates are supposed 
to be proportionate to the number of SDFRs in each of the state’s 
counties.248  Before Congress passed this amendment, unused funds 
reserved to states to help them implement this loan program were 
reallocated to the states.249  The amendment, however, instructed 
the Secretary of Agriculture to keep those unused funds, instead, 
and use them to satisfy pending applications before reallocating 
the money to the states.250  Although a slight modification, this 
amendment prioritized SDFRs by using already existing funds to 
further support the 2501 Program’s mission of providing SDFRs 
equitable access to USDA programs.251
But in 2008, with the creation of the Office of Advocacy 
243  Id. § 2501(a)(3).  
244  Id. § 2501(a)(4).
245  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12201, 128 Stat. 64, 983–84.
246  Funding Available to Support Outreach to Underserved Farmers, Nat’l 
Sustainable Agric. Coal. (June 27, 2016), http://sustainableagriculture.net/
blog/2501-funding-available. 
247  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5315, 
116 Stat. 134, 384.
248  7 U.S.C. § 2003(c)(2).
249  Id.
250  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5315, 
116 Stat. 134, 384.
251  See id.
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and Outreach, Congress once again made a bold statement of 
support for SDFRs.  When the 2008 Farm Bill created the Office 
of Advocacy and Outreach, it created not only the Small Farms 
and Beginning Farmers and Ranchers Group, discussed above, 
but it also created the Socially Disadvantaged Farmers Group.252 
Congress created this group to carry out the 2501 Program and 
gave it power to oversee and implement other programs related to 
the 2501 Program’s purpose.253
Another statement of support came through the 
establishment of the Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and 
Ranchers Policy Research Center.  The 2014 Farm Bill created the 
center through an amendment to the 1990 Farm Bill.254  Congress 
authorized one grant to an eligible college or university—so-
called 1890 Institutions255—to establish the policy research center 
for the purpose of “developing policy recommendations for the 
protection and promotion of the interests of socially disadvantaged 
farmers and ranchers.”256  The USDA subsequently awarded that 
grant to Alcorn State University.257
Together with several of the programs and displays 
of support of beginning farmers and ranchers, these SDFRs-
exclusive programs show how Congress has continued to localize 
food systems by encouraging and incentivizing more diverse 
representation among agricultural producers.  Often, these 
producers were excluded from such robust participation because 
of race, a lack of wealth, or shallow or nonexistent agricultural 
networks.  Encouraging these groups to again become agricultural 
producers also supports community food systems, since these 
252  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-264, § 1403, 122 
Stat. 923, 981–82.
253  Id.
254  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12203, 128 Stat. 649, 984.
255  See 1890 Land-Grant Institution Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l 
Inst. of Food & Agric., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/1890-land-grant-
institutions-programs (last visited May 16, 2018).
256  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12203, 128 Stat. 649, 984.
257  Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers, Alcorn, https://www.
alcorn.edu/discover-alcorn/socially-disadvantaged-farmers-and-ranchers 
(May 16, 2018).
230 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol. 14
producers generally operate outside of Lyson’s industrial 
agriculture or Hamilton’s Big Food, and they are thus likely to 
search for markets in their local food supply chains.
 
iii. Promotion of Local-Food System Infrastructure
The federal government’s support of local-food-system 
infrastructure is characterized less by large and continuous 
programs, as its support of direct-to-consumer transactions and 
farmers’ market is, and more by hodgepodge policy decisions to 
support various aspects of local decision-making.  Accordingly, 
this section is organized based on the law or program, rather than 
presented as a chronology of evolution.
The most direct federal support of local-food system 
infrastructure is in the form of grants, awarded on a competitive 
basis by the USDA.  Because so many grants potentially support 
the localization of food systems, this not a comprehensive list.258 
Rather, this comprises the most explicit programs.
Through an amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1977,259 
the 1996 Farm Bill established Community Food Projects for the 
purposes of helping low-income people meet their food needs, 
increasing the self-reliance of local communities providing their 
own food, and promoting “comprehensive responses to local food, 
farm, and nutrition issues.”260  Congress funded these programs to 
private nonprofit organizations with grants, administered by the 
USDA, through 2002,261 and it prioritized projects that connected 
different sectors of the food system, including links between 
258  For comprehensive overviews of federal grants supporting local and 
regional food systems, see Office of U.S. Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, 
A Guide to Funding Opportunities and Incentives for Food Hubs and 
Food Systems: How to Navigate the Funding Process (2014), https://
www.gillibrand.senate.gov/download/food-hub-and-food-systems-grant-
guide&download=1; Kate  Fitzgerald et al., The National Sustainable 
Agriculture Coalition’s Guide to USDA Funding for Local and 
Regional Food Systems (2010), http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/6.18-FINAL-Food-System-Funding-Guide2.pdf. 
259  Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913.
260  Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
127, § 25, 110 Stat. 888, 1027. 
261  Id.
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nonprofit and for-profit sectors, supported entrepreneurial 
projects, and encouraged long-term planning projects and multi-
system approaches to problem-solving.262  Each Community Food 
Project received a one-time grant, and Congress expected each 
project to thereafter become self-sustaining.263
The 2002 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for the 
Community Food Projects program through 2007 and expanded 
its scope.264  For example, it specified the sorts of “comprehensive 
responses” the program was intended to support: infrastructure 
improvements and developments, plans for long-term 
solutions, and “innovative marketing activities that mutually 
benefit agricultural producers and low-income consumers.”265 
Additionally, the 2002 Farm Bill provided examples of the multi-
system projects that deserved priority: “long-term planning 
activities, and multisystem, interagency approaches with multi-
stakeholder collaborations, that build the long-term capacity of 
communities to address the food and agricultural problems of 
the communities, such as food policy councils and food planning 
associations.”266  Finally, the 2002 Farm Bill added a provision for 
programs that could innovatively address community problems, 
including loss of farms and ranches, rural poverty, welfare 
dependency, hunger, the need for job training, and the need for 
self-sufficiency by individuals and communities.267
Between 2005 and 2009, the USDA funded 307 Community 
Food Projects in thirty-nine states.268  During this five-year 
period, these projects formed nearly forty food policy councils 
262  See id.
263  See id.
264  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 4125, 
116 Stat. 134, 326–27.
265  Id.
266  Id.
267  Id.
268  Michelle Kobayashi et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., The Activities and 
Impacts of Community Food Projects 2005-2009 3 (2010), http://www.
hungerfreecommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CPF_Activities_
Impacts_2005-09.pdf.
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and network, representing a quarter of all program funding.269  In 
these councils, more than 560 organizations were represented, 
comprising more than 700 individuals.270  Collectively, these food 
policy councils implemented 183 policies, introduced or produced 
383 policies, and began to develop 422 policies.271  The topics 
of these policies were diverse, covering market and economic 
development, consumer access, local-food-system infrastructure, 
communication improvements between local regulating agencies, 
and much more.272
Following the trend set by the previous legislation, the 
2008 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for the Community Food 
Projects program through 2012 and expanded its purview to urban 
areas.273  Specifically, it reserved funding for a Healthy Urban 
Food Enterprise Development Center, a nonprofit organization, 
individual, school, or other qualifying entity, with a  purpose to 
increase underserved-community access to healthy and affordable 
foods, including local foods.274  The Center was required to give 
priority to projects that benefited underserved communities and 
developed market opportunities for small and mid-sized farms 
and ranches.275  Finally, the 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized funding 
for the Community Food Projects program, strengthened its 
commitment to address hunger, and expanded it reach to tackle 
food waste.276
Thus, over the span of eighteen years, Congress created 
and maintained a grant program that directly funded community 
269  Id. at 3.
270  Id. at 18.
271  Id. at 19.
272  Id.
273  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 4402, 
122 Stat. 923, 1135–37.  The 2008 Farm Bill also changed the name of the 
Food Stamp Act of 1977 to the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, thus moving 
the Community Food Projects program into it.  See Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), supra note 180.
274  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 4402, 122 
Stat. 923, 1135–37.
275  Id.
276  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4026, 128 Stat. 649, 810–12.
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efforts to solve local problems.  Notably, with each iteration of the 
Farm Bill, Congress expanded the scope of the Community Food 
Projects program, so that by 2014, local communities could apply 
for federal funding to organize democratic food policy councils, 
build local-food infrastructure, develop marketplaces for local-
food producers and manufacturers, innovate strategies to fight 
hunger and food waste, and coordinate these projects with local 
and state agencies.
In addition to Community Food Projects, Congress 
established the Local Food Promotion Program (LFPP).  The 
2014 Farm Bill expanded the FMPP by creating the LFPP, a 
grant program dedicated to supporting local food systems.277 
The purposes of the LFPP is to increase domestic consumption 
of and access to local foods and to expand market opportunities 
for farmers and ranchers serving local consumers.278  The LFPP 
is administered by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, 
and that agency awards two types of grants in furtherance of 
it: Planning Grants and Implementation Grants.279  Either grant 
may be awarded, through a competitive process, to agricultural 
businesses or cooperatives, producer networks and associations, 
farmers’ market authorities, community supported agriculture 
networks, and others.280  Often bundled with the FMPP, the LFPP 
is distinguished by the USDA based on the food supply chain: 
the LFPP involves non-direct-to-consumer supply chain, and 
the FMPP involves direct-to-consumer marketing.281  Another 
difference between the two programs relates to financing.  Unlike 
the FMPP, the LFPP requires the entity awarded the grant to 
277  Id. § 10003.
278  Id.
279  Local Food Promotion Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. Marketing 
Serv., https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/lfpp (last visited May 
16, 2018).
280  Id.
281  See What AMS Grant Is Right For Me?, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. 
Marketing Serv., https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
Combined%20Grants%20Decision%20Trees.pdf. 
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match 25 percent of the grant’s value.282  In its first year, the LFPP 
funded 184 projects, with grant awards ranging from around 
$25,000 to up to $100,000.283  These figures remained consistent 
through 2017, and they will likely remain so in 2018.
Although less explicit than Community Food Projects and 
the LFPP, farm-to-school programs are hugely important to the 
localization of the food system. Congress expanded local-food-
system infrastructure into schools in 2004 with the passage of the 
Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004.284  This Act 
amended Section 18 of the Richard B. Russell National School 
Lunch Act by adding a provision that expanded access to local 
foods at schools and promoted school gardens.285  Specifically, it 
permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to award grants and provide 
technical assistance to schools and nonprofit organizations for 
projects that, among other things, (1) improved access to local 
foods in schools and other eligible entities, such as through 
farm-to-cafeteria or school garden projects; (2) were designed to 
procure local foods from small and mid-sized farms for school 
meals and support school garden programs; and (3) supported 
farm-based experiential education in local food and agriculture.286 
The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 reauthorized this 
program through 2015 and continued its mission of connecting 
schools and other institutions to local-food systems.287
As part of this broad farm-to-school effort, the 2008 Farm 
Bill also amended the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch 
Act to create an agenda that made it easier for schools and other 
institutions covered by the Act, as well as those covered by the 
282  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 10003, 128 Stat. 649, 940–41.
283  See LFPP 2014 Final Performance Reports, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Agric. Marketing Serv., https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/lfpp/
reports/2014-reports (last visited May 16, 2018).
284  Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-265, § 
122, 118 Stat. 729, 759.
285  Id.
286  Id.
287  Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-296, § 243, 124 Stat. 
2183, 3203.
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Child Nutrition Act of 1966, to procure “unprocessed agricultural 
products, both locally grown and locally raised, to the maximum 
extent practicable and appropriate” and “use a geographic 
preference for the procurement” of these products.288
Building on this stated farm-to-institution language, the 
2014 Farm Bill launched a pilot project for the procurement of 
unprocessed fruits and vegetables to provide participating states, 
among other reasons, flexibility in their local-food purchases by 
allowing “geographic preference, if desired, in the procurement 
of the products under this pilot project.”289  The Secretary of 
Agriculture was tasked with determining which eight states 
would participate in this pilot, and priority was based, in part, 
on the amount and variety of local growers and the demonstrated 
commitment of statewide farm-to-school program efforts.290
Additionally, the 2014 Farm Bill created the Food and 
Agriculture Service Learning Program, which instructed the 
Secretary of Agriculture, working through the Director of the 
National Institute of Food and Agriculture and in coordination 
with other federal agencies, to competitively award $25,000,000 
in grants to eligible entities that “increase knowledge of agriculture 
and improve the nutritional health of children.”291  The purposes 
of this program included increasing food, garden, and nutrition 
education within the host organizations or at schools; adding 
to the momentum of the farm-to-school programs implemented 
under section 18(g) of the Richard B. Russell National School 
Lunch Act; and fostering higher levels of community engagement 
and volunteering opportunities.292  The Secretary of Agriculture 
was directed to give priority to, among others, those entities that 
facilitated a connection between schools and local and regional 
288  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 4302, 122 
Stat. 923, 1126.
289  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4202, 128 Stat. 649, 822.
290  Id.
291  Id. § 4209.
292  Id.
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farmers and ranchers.293  In other words, the Food and Agriculture 
Service Learning Program explicitly promoted and directly 
funded local-food education, local-food-system engagement, and 
community empowerment across the nation. 
Another important structural contribution is Congress’ 
definition of local foods.  The 2008 Farm Bill amended the 
Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act to create USDA 
loans and loan guarantees for locally or regionally produced 
agricultural food products.294  For the first time, Congress 
attempted to delineate local from non-local food by defining 
“locally or regionally produced agricultural food products” as:
[A]ny agricultural food product that is raised, 
produced, and distributed in . . . the locality or 
region in which the final product is marketed, 
so that the total distance that the product is 
transported is less than 400 miles from the origin 
of the product; or . . . the State in which the product 
is produced.295
The Secretary of Agriculture was required to reserve 
at least 5 percent of available funds for this program through 
2012.296  The 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized this program through 
2018 and affirmed Congress’ support of promoting community 
food systems.297
The final important structural contribution is the Local 
Food Production and Program Evaluation program.  While 
Congress places various reporting and evaluation requirements 
on the USDA for many of the programs mentioned in this article, 
the 2014 Farm Bill specifically created the Local Food Production 
293  Id.
294  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 6015, 122 
Stat. 923, 1167–68.
295  Id. See also Marne Coit, Support for Local Food in the 2014 Farm Bill, 
20 Drake J. Agric. L. 1, 2–3 (2015) (“[T]he first federal definition of ‘local 
food’ was provided by the federal government in the text of the 2008 Farm 
Bill.”).
296  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 6015, 122 
Stat. 923, 1167–68.
297  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 6014, 128 Stat. 649, 845.
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and Program Evaluation program.298  This standalone research 
program directed the Secretary of Agriculture to collect data on 
(1) production and marketing of locally or regionally produced 
agricultural food products; and (2) direct and indirect regulatory 
compliance costs that affect the production and marketing of 
these products.299  Congressional concern with the burden of 
forcing small and mid-sized farms to comply with some costly 
requirements of the Food Safety Modernization Act, and thus 
disrupting the local-food-system efforts developing across the 
country, led to the so-called Tester-Hagan Amendment, which 
exempts qualifying farms from produce-safety standards and 
preventative-controls standards.300  Besides collecting data, the 
2014 Farm Bill directed the Secretary to monitor the effectiveness 
of programs designed to promote local-food systems and barriers 
to this promotion because of federal regulations of small-scale 
production.301   Finally, the Secretary was tasked with evaluating 
how local-food systems contribute to improving community food 
security and help communities increase access to food.302  This 
comprehensive report came with various reporting requirements, 
including annual updates to Congress on the progress of the 
report.303  In other words, Congress appeared to take this report 
very seriously and fully expected the USDA to zealously write it. 
The USDA published its report in February 2016.304
As these programs show, with Congress’ support 
communities have become better funded to localize their food 
systems.  Combined, these several programs and benefits to 
local food system transactions, local food system representation, 
298  Id. § 10016.
299  Id.
300  For the efforts of local-food advocates in encouraging Congress to pass 
this amendment, see Schieber, supra note 122, at 247–55; Peter Anderson, 
Comment, Empowering Local and Sustainable Food: Does the Food Safety 
Modernization Act’s Tester-Hagan Amendment Remove Enough Barriers?, 9 
J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 145, 155–57 (2012).
301  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 10016, 128 Stat. 649, 952–53.
302  Id.
303  Id.
304  See Johnson, supra note 114.
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and local food system infrastructure show clear support by the 
federal government to incentivize and legitimize individuals 
and organizations determined to govern their local food supply 
chains.  But even though these various programs acknowledge 
some of the localization momentum occurring through American 
communities, the bill still “fails to adequately address the needs 
of our modern food system,”305 and that modern food system is 
increasingly being shaped at the local level.  These changes have 
undoubtedly come about bit-by-bit, with small adjustments to 
existing programs and quiet additions to existing titles.  By doing 
this, however, Congress has shown a clear willingness to provide 
communities with the funds and framework for developing their 
own community food systems.  With support for transactions and 
marketplaces, traditionally underrepresented stakeholders, and 
necessary infrastructure, future Farm Bills are poised to bring 
about further systemic reform to local food systems, especially 
with respect to policy self-governance and more inclusive 
decision-making mechanisms—the very fiber of community food 
systems.
III.  Toward Deliberative Food Democracy: Framework 
and Federal Agricultural Policies
In Part I, we showed how communities are localizing 
their food systems with a conceptual framework that guides 
these efforts and why such conceptual frameworks have real-
world and measurable benefits for communities.  In Part II, we 
discussed how laws promoting local foods are essentially laws 
promoting community self-governance within their local food 
systems, followed by many examples of how the Farm Bill has 
brought a systematic order to such laws.  Having identified how 
the Farm Bill has contributed to structural and financial support 
of community food systems, we turn in Part III to the democratic 
spirit of these laws and examine how the Farm Bill’s programs, 
implicating deliberative democracy, can advance the goal of 
305  D. Lee Miller, A Seat at the Table: New Voices Urge Farm Bill Reform, 127 
Yale L. J. Forum 395, 398 (2017).
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increasing diverse representation and local decision-making in 
the food system.
The policy ideal, effectively, if not intentionally, 
underpinning the Farm Bill programs in Part II is diverse 
and equitable participation.  Promoting direct-to-consumer 
transactions allows consumers greater decision-making in their 
purchasing options and allows producers to choose how and where 
to market their food products.  Promoting the participation among 
food-system stakeholders traditionally underserved by decision-
making directly contributes to more equitable representation in 
the food-system.  Promoting local-food programs in a variety 
of forms eventually empowers individuals and communities to 
remodel their own food systems.  Democracy, however, requires 
mechanisms.  In order to promote legislation that edifies the 
localization of food systems, these mechanisms must be flexible 
enough to adapt to diverse communities by providing the 
structure for direct participation in decision-making.  Deliberative 
democracy is that political process.
A.  Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democratic theory is an approach to public 
governance that grounds the legitimacy of political decision-
making in, unsurprisingly, deliberation.306 Some traditional 
conceptions of democracy assert that legitimacy arises out of 
vote aggregating, while more modern ideals, often called neo-
liberalism, identify legitimacy in the aggregate signals of private 
economic activity.307 Deliberative democracy, however, promotes 
conversation, discussion, communication, and other forms of 
reflective decision-making as the source of, or best argument for, 
democratic legitimacy.308 
306  See HK Pernaa, Deliberate Future Visioning: Utilizing the Deliberative 
Democracy Theory & Practice in Futures Research, 5 European Journal 
Of Futures Research 13, 13 (2017).
307  Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 Ann. Rev. Pol. 
Sci. 307, 308 (2003).
308  Id. at 308–09; Melissa Mortazavi, Tort as Democracy: Lessons from the 
Food Wars, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 929, 935 (2015).
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According to Professor Simone Chambers, in deliberative 
democracy, “[t]alk-centric democratic theory replaces voting-
centric democratic theory. Voting-centric views see democracy 
as the arena in which fixed preferences and interests compete 
via fair mechanisms of aggregation. In contrast, deliberative 
democracy focuses on the communicative process of opinion and 
will-formation that precede voting.”309 Despite describing this 
as a replacement, one could also view deliberative democracy 
as both a normative theory that argues for more deliberation as 
well as a positive description of how the public forms opinions 
about the issues on which it eventually votes. The identification 
of deliberation as a source of ideas and opinions then lends itself 
to the normative calls for increasing deliberation through new or 
better intuitions.  Professor Chambers agrees that “deliberative 
democracy is not usually thought of as an alternative to 
representative democracy.”310 Deliberative democracy, rather than 
a challenge to other views, is a way to—among other important 
benefits—increase satisfaction with the political process.
Although the formal idea of deliberative democracy 
post-dated his work, John Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism 
dealt with some of the same features.311 Dewey’s philosophy 
called for moving away from absolutist assertions in forming 
government policy.312 Instead of absolutism, Dewey championed 
a communicative process to generate, mold, and settle on public 
goals.313 Like deliberative democracy theorists today, Dewey did 
not expect consensus, but he did expect that the very process 
of communication and reflection would produce, at least, more 
309  Chambers, supra note 310, at 308.
310  Id. at 309.
311  See, e.g., James Bohman, The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy, 6 
J. of Pol. Phil. 400, 400 (1998) (stating that the idea of deliberative democracy 
can be traced back to John Dewey). 
312  Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me, I’m a Pragmatist: A Partially Pragmatic 
Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42 Colum. J. Env. L. 425, 436–439 (2017).
313  See John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems: An Essay In Political 
Inquiry 118 (Melvin L. Rogers ed., Penn State Press 2012).
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satisfying results.314 At base, the ideal of deliberation is not merely 
to shape somehow objectively better public opinions, or public 
opinions on which political decisionmakers can more confidently 
rely. Instead, the ideal is to develop a system of governance that 
produces more satisfaction, despite individual outcomes.315 
In aiming for satisfaction in a pluralist system, deliberative 
democracy is a natural fit for food policy decision-making. The 
Food Movement itself is an immensely diverse category, to 
say nothing of the larger population of American eaters. The 
Movement includes “sustainability, equity, access, economic 
development, fair labor, animal health, food security, human 
health through prevention of foodborne illness and obesity or 
other diet-related illness, hunger relief, environmental protection, 
farm security (in terms of economic resilience), energy efficiency 
and conservation, and more.”316 A goal, therefore, is to fashion 
food policy that can account for this diversity while still producing 
meaningful and satisfying outcomes.  Some legal scholars have 
already begun to merge the concepts of deliberative democracy 
and food policy, focusing primarily on a comparison of broad 
legal regimes such as common law versus administrative law.317 
In this Section, however, we focus not on general principals, but 
on specific strategies and opportunities.
B.  Deliberative Democracy in Food Policy
As the several laws summarized in Part II show, various 
iterations of the Farm Bill have strengthened local food systems 
and community decision-making and participation in food systems 
through grants, loans, research initiatives, outreach efforts, and 
agency programs.  The expansion of these programs and benefits 
through decades of various congressional bodies highlights the 
non-partisan nature of these issues and the realistic opportunity of 
future farm bills to take up these issues with even greater vigor. 
314  Id. at 158–60.
315  Id.
316  Galperin, supra note 18, at 356.
317  Mortazavi, supra note 311, at 929; Galperin, supra note 18, at 356.
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Many of these policies began as victories earned by the lobbying 
efforts of the so-called Food Movement—a coalition of groups and 
individuals competing against the Farm Bloc and Hunger Lobby 
to convince Congress to pay more attention to sustainability and 
social issues in the food system.318  With new bills promoting and 
expanding these policies currently before Congress, the Food 
Movement, as a political coalition, appears to retain its place in 
the fight to gain access to congressional offices.  Consequently, 
it has made the issue of supporting community food systems an 
established and expected one among Congress and the public.
While these and other policies discussed in this Article 
have brought legitimacy to the Food Movement’s political 
influence, they have also created, shaped, and broadened political 
processes that allow more dynamic public participation in the 
food system.  This comes at a pivotal time in the broader food 
movement because “[a]lthough the need for public participation 
in food policy is clearly recognized, there is limited consensus on 
the appropriate mechanisms for promoting it.”319
Deliberative democracy is becoming a component of 
those appropriate political mechanisms.  In the last decade or so, 
scholars have begun identifying various approaches of deliberative 
democracy taking shape in food policy throughout the world.320 
318  See Christopher Bosso, Framing the Farm Bill: Interests, Ideology, 
and the Agricultural Act of 2014 63–66 (2017) (detailing four broad 
coalitions who influenced policy decisions in the 2014 Farm Bill); Jennifer 
Steinhauer, Farm Bill Reflects American Menu and a Senator’s Persistent 
Tilling, N.Y. Times (Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/
us/politics/farm-bill-reflects-shifting-american-menu-and-a-senators-
persistent-tilling.html (mentioning that the 2014 Farm Bill emphasizes 
“locally grown, healthful food” and noting the political popularity of “farm-
to-table . . . national figures[,]” including the National Sustainable Agriculture 
Coalition).
319  Rachel A. Ankeny, Inviting Everyone to the Table: Strategies for More 
Effective and Legitimate Food Policy via Deliberative Democracy, 47 J. 
Social Philosophy 10, 10 (2016).
320  See, e.g., Mortazavi, supra note 311, at 936–38; Jeannette M. Blackmar, 
Deliberative Democracy, Civic Engagement and Food Policy Councils, 2 
Rivista di Studi sulla Sostenibilita 43 (2014) (food policy councils); Julie 
Henderson et al., Evaluating the Use of Citizens’ Juries in Food Policy: A 
Case Study of Food Regulation, 13 BMC Pub. Health 596 (2013) (citizen 
juries); G.C. Barker et al., Can a Participatory Approach Contribute to Food 
Chain Risk Analysis?, 30 Risk Analysis 766 (2010) (general stakeholder 
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These approaches include (1) soliciting public feedback through 
form submissions; (2) consensus conferences; (3) citizens’ juries; 
and (4) local food planning.321
Soliciting public feedback through form submissions, or 
consultation by submission, refers to governmental bodies and 
regulating agencies using the Internet to ask members of the public 
for their views on a specific issue.322  The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regularly solicits the public’s comments on 
the agency’s proposed rules—the so-called notice and comment 
rulemaking process.323  This form of democratic participation in 
the rulemaking process is highly structured.  For example, the 
FDA sought public comments on the agency’s regulation of the 
term “natural” on food labels.324  In its solicitation, the FDA 
provided the public with a comprehensive summary of the issue 
followed by specific questions for which it sought answers.325 
While the comment period was open, the FDA received 7,690 
public comments, from concerned individuals to large food-retail 
companies.326  The ability of any person to submit a comment 
to the FDA is, at least in theory, a political mechanism to allow 
wider participation in the decision-making process of food-system 
rules.  It is unclear, however, to what extent the FDA actually 
participation in otherwise technical decision-making); Gary E. Merchant, 
GM Foods: Potential Public Consultation and Participation Mechanisms, 44 
Jurimetrics 99 (2003) (applying public participation to GM-foods policies); 
Ankeny, supra note 322.
321  Id. at 13–17.
322  Id. at 13.
323  What is the Difference Between the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FD&C Act), FDA Regulations, and FDA Guidance?, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194909.
htm (last visited May 16, 2018).
324  “Natural” on Food Labeling, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.
gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/
LabelingNutrition/ucm456090.htm (last visited May 16, 2018).
325  Use of the Term “Natural” in the Labeling of Human Food Products; 
Request for Information and Comments, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 10, 
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-N-1207-0001. 
326  See User of the Term “Natural” in the Labeling of Human Food Products, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=FDA-
2014-N-1207 (last visited May 16, 2018) (click “View all documents and 
comments in this Docket”). 
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relies on this input.  Back to the “natural” example: the FDA has 
tried numerous times to seek public comment on its regulation 
of the term on food labels.327  After again receiving thousands 
of public comments, the FDA ultimately appeared unresponsive 
to this input and left its rule unchanged and maintained its lax 
enforcement status quo.  This deliberative democratic approach, 
if it can be called that, therefore, suffers from at least three serious 
limitations: the rule-maker narrowly sets the agenda, its use of 
the public input is entirely opaque, and it is free to downplay any 
and all putative consultation it solicits.328  This does not mean the 
democratic value of soliciting public feedback is minimal.  Just 
as torts provide both individual relief and promote policy goals, 
the process here allows the individual to voice his or her own 
concerns, but also allows public access to the catalog, thereby 
providing knowledge-building among the public and government 
agencies, providing accountability of the regulating agency, and 
building a record for judicial review, all of which it accomplishes 
by allowing the public to see what others think.329
Consensus conferences typically comprise a small group 
of non-experts brought together to discuss a controversial issue 
or policy proposal.330  Like consultation by submission, these 
conferences are arranged by one party seeking input from another 
party, such as in 2013, when the FDA convened several groups of 
various stakeholders before finalizing the Produce Safety Rule, 
mandated by the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA).331  This 
was in addition to the legally required notice and comment period 
associated with the proposed rulemaking process.  Specifically, the 
FDA FSMA implementation team met with affected stakeholders, 
327  For a brief overview of the 1991 establishment of the term and FDA’s 
subsequent lax enforcement of its misuse, see Janney v. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 2d 
806, 811–14 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  
328  See Ankeny, supra note 322, at 13–14.
329  See Galperin, supra note 18, at 374–90; Mortazavi, supra note 311, at 936–
38 (2015).
330  Ankeny, supra note 322, at 14-15.
331  Michael R. Taylor, Let’s Keep Talking—and Listening—About Food Safety, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (May 6, 2013), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/
index.php/2013/05/lets-keep-talking-and-listening-about-food-safety.
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especially farmers, to discuss the proposed rules, solicit feedback 
on how to improve those rules, and answer questions.332  The 
conferences ranged from small-group meetings to large public 
forums, in which the FDA “learned that a broad cross-section of 
our industry and consumer stakeholders are eager to push forward 
and look with us to successfully complete this crucial rule-writing 
step in FSMA implementation.”333   Consensus conferences 
have the advantage of bringing together laypeople to share their 
personal insight into the effects of otherwise impersonal technical 
policies.  But the advantage is only so influential; after all, the 
public has no actual leverage over how the policies are made and 
its influence is thus limited to what decision-makers choose to be 
persuaded by.334
Citizens’ juries are similar to consensus conferences, 
but take on the structure of trial juries, including random jury 
selection, cross-examination with a different perspective, and 
compulsory verdict selection.335  These have been used throughout 
the world to explore public attitudes toward genetically modified 
foods (United Kingdom, France, and South Korea), policies 
aimed at reducing childhood obesity (Australia), and consumer 
attitudes toward “organic” food labeling (United Kingdom).336 
Unlike consensus conferences, which rely on volunteers to form 
a group, the randomization of the citizens’ jury pool is a method 
of creating a diverse group of apparently average citizens; as 
a result, any self-selection bias that affects randomization in 
consensus conferences is absent here.337  Moreover, urging jury 
members to inform themselves, deliberate, and make a decision 
is a simple and strong example of deliberative democracy in 
action.338  However, given the time- and resource-intensive 
332  Id.
333  Id.
334  Ankeny, supra note 322, at 15.
335  Id.
336  Id.
337  See id. at 14–16.
338  Id. 16.
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nature of creating and administering citizens’ juries, their model 
is difficult to implement on a routine basis, and, like consensus 
conferences, there is no mechanism for transferring participation 
into policymaking.339  They apparently have not been used in the 
United States.
Local food planning, which is the diverse participation of a 
community in creating a local food plan, has become the approach 
most favored by grassroots organizations and community leaders, 
particularly in the form of food policy councils.340  Each food 
policy council is free to adopt its own mechanisms for engagement, 
but typical formats assign chairpersons or facilitators who guide 
meetings, gather people into informal groups, provide information 
on key policy issues, and assemble the goals of the group based 
on council input.341  Importantly, these representatives are not 
favored as so-called experts. 342  Often, participants represent 
different communities who are stakeholders in the food system 
and thus have interests in certain policy goals, and this especially 
includes stakeholders traditionally underrepresented in decision-
making.343  In 2016, the United States had at least 262 verified 
food policy councils, of which 214 were active, 29 were in 
development, and 19 were in transition.344  At the time of this 
Article’s print, the total number of food policy councils had 
apparently reached 359.345  
As Part II mentions, the majority of these councils found 
support for their existence in the Farm Bill.  Their popularity 
demonstrates, in part, their capacity to be adopted flexibly among 
different communities.  While some cities or municipalities 
339  Id. at 16.
340  Id.
341  Id.
342  Id.
343  Id.
344  Lily Sussman & Karen Bassrab, Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable 
Future, Food Policy Council Report 2016 7 (2017), https://assets.jhsph.
edu/clf/mod_clfResource/doc/FPC%20Report%202016_Final.pdf. 
345  Food Policy Council Directory, Johns Hopkins Ctr. for a Livable 
Future, http://www.foodpolicynetworks.org/directory/online/ (last visited 
May. 24, 2018).
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officially sanction the activities of food policy councils, often 
they are formed outside of governmental activities and comprise 
volunteers.  Thus, they may be formed without the direction of 
an agenda-setter.  Their limitation, however, tends to appear 
in the deliberations, whether officially sanctioned or not.  The 
organization participants usually have “predetermined agendas” 
that “often are opposed to industrialized food in any form . . . .”346
Though these approaches are not the only available 
structures to deliberative democracy in the food system, they 
are the ones most widely experimented with.  Of these, two 
approaches have prevailed in the United States: governmental 
bodies must use consultation by submission as embodied in the 
notice and comment process, for certain policymaking and local 
communities have drifted toward local food planning, evidenced 
by their independently creating hundreds of food policy councils. 
Congress has decidedly taken the latter approach in the latest 
iterations of the Farm Bill, favoring the inclusiveness and self-
empowerment that local food planning offers.  While the USDA 
is now beginning to assist individuals and communities begin to 
democratize their food systems, their experience in doing so is 
not at all new to them.
C.  Roots of Deliberative Democracy in Federal 
Agricultural Policy
Although apparently long forgotten, deliberative 
democracy once held a preferred position among influential 
program administrators at the USDA.  This is embodied in the 
work of agricultural economist and USDA undersecretary M.L. 
Wilson.  In 1935, with the blessing of Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry Wallace, Wilson established the Program Study and 
Discussion (PSD) under authority of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933—the first iteration of the Farm Bill.347  The PSD 
primarily consisted of two programs: group discussions for 
346  Ankeny, supra note 322, at 17.
347  Jess Gilbert, Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and 
the Intended New Deal 105 (Yale Univ. Press 2015).
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farmers and schools of philosophy for Cooperative Extension 
workers.348
The discussion groups “emphasized broad social issues 
of agriculture and public policy.”349  In collaboration with state 
Extension workers, farmers in these groups discussed not only 
specifics of various USDA programs, but they spoke about the 
policy choices of the federal government and about systemic 
issues facing agriculture.350  The schools of philosophy, organized 
by USDA staff, brought together Extension workers (and later 
local planning leaders) at four-day conferences to discuss 
democracy in rural societies and agriculture, although the USDA 
encouraged participants to speak about topics beyond just those 
outlined in the government pamphlets.351  Even within the 
parameters of official discussion topics, the USDA encouraged 
attendees to question federal policy decisions and vocalize their 
criticism.352  The USDA held more than 150 such conferences, 
and the dominant question invoking discussion—What is a 
desirable agricultural program?—was one the USDA knew it 
could not answer on its own.353  Under the direction of Wilson’s 
former philosophy professor, Carl F. Taeusch, the PSD programs 
ultimately comprised more than 3 million rural men and women 
in the discussion groups, tens of thousands of whom were trained 
as discussion leaders, as well as more than 50,000 Extension 
workers and other rural community leaders who attended the 
Schools of Philosophy for Extension Workers.354
Wilson’s emphasis on education was a deliberate one. 
Similar to John Dewey, Wilson believed that democracy was 
348  Id.; see Carl F. Taeusch, Schools of Philosophy for Farmers, in Farmers 
in a Changing World: The Yearbook of Agriculture 1940 1112-19 (U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. ed. 1940). 
349  Gilbert, supra note 350, at 105.
350  Id. at 105–06.
351  Id. at 106; Timothy J. Shaffer, What Should You and I Do? Lessons for Civic 
Studies from Deliberative Politics in the New Deal, 22 The Good Society 
137, 141 (2013).
352  Gilbert, supra note 350, at 106.
353  Id.
354  Id.; Shaffer, supra note 354, at 141.
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more akin to a way of life, rather than a rigidly structured political 
process.355  In the penumbra of the Progressive Era, when federal 
policymakers seemed to rely as much on experts as ordinary 
citizens, Wilson “hoped for a renaissance” across the country 
“in which people would ‘search their souls for the deeper, more 
fundamental philosophical meanings’ and create new models of 
democratic processes.”356  For Wilson, the belief in democracy as 
a successful way of life was based on three assumptions.  First, 
its adherents must believe that the average person was capable 
of making informed decisions; second, democracy requires 
participation by citizens who, in turn, learn the democratic process 
through that participation; and, third, the first two assumptions 
are primarily driven by educational processes.357  For Wilson, “[d]
emocracy required participation—and informed participation was 
based on education.”358  The PSD, therefore, with its educational 
discussion groups and schools of philosophy, were ultimately 
Wilson’s method of reshaping a political institution to encourage 
his vision of a deliberative democracy.
Despite the apparent widespread success of the program, 
the PSD’s eventual demise in 1943 was part of a larger effort 
among established farm organizations to narrow the role of the 
USDA in American agriculture during a time that has been called 
“the bleakest in the history of agricultural politics.”359  When the 
PSD folded, it did so because of pressure from the American Farm 
Bureau Federation and some staff of the land-grant schools, all 
of whom believed the PSD’s democracy-strengthening programs 
in rural America deviated from the USDA’s traditional role of 
simply providing statistical and scientific data to farmers.360  But 
this ostensible realignment of the USDA with its traditional role 
355  Id. at 143.
356  Id. (quoting M.L. Wilson, Facets of County Planning: I. On Using 
Democracy, 1 Land Pol’y Rev. 2, 2 (1939)).
357  Id. at 144.
358  Id. at 143.
359  McConnell, supra note 136, at 97.
360  Shaffer, supra note 354, at 143.
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may not tell the whole story.  By this time, the Farm Bureau had 
already launched attacks against outgrowths of the New Deal 
it could not heavily influence, specifically the Farm Security 
Administration.361
During the years preceding the Great Depression, 
agricultural policy largely centered on prices, and as the economic 
crisis worsened, farm credit was a common subject among farm 
leaders, educators, and administrators.362  Meanwhile, public 
policy was primarily concerned with discovering more efficient 
methods of agriculture and sharing those methods with farmers, 
although tenancy, corporate farming, and soil conservation 
occasionally entered public discussions.363  Nevertheless, the 
established agricultural organizations were principally interested 
in policy that addressed prices, and the Farm Bureau did what it 
could to control agricultural policymaking.364
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, 
the USDA was not generally recognized as being organized to 
address rural poverty, despite the Extension Service’s “long arm 
of the department going out to nearly all the farming counties of 
the nation, in touch with the problems of farmers everywhere and 
ready to help in all their troubles.”365  Yet, rural poverty was a 
rampant problem, like urban poverty, that had to be solved.  Since 
the USDA appeared to be the inappropriate agency to tackle that 
problem, that challenge fell on the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration.366  In addition to fixing rural poverty, the New 
Deal programs sought to support the back-to-the-farm movement 
occurring at the time through a subsistence-homestead scheme.367 
Spearheaded by Wilson, the undersecretary who created the 
PSD and who had played a key role in developing the Extension 
361  See McConnell, supra note 136, at 97–111.
362  Id. at 84.
363  Id.
364  Id.
365  Id.
366  Id. at 85.
367  Id. at 86.
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Service, this scheme became the subject of public policy.368  Soon, 
the National Industrial Recovery Act codified this policy and 
authorized President Roosevelt to turn this scheme into action.369
Rather than focusing almost exclusively on prices, federal 
agricultural policy began to address social issues, specifically 
rural poverty and subsistence homesteads.  By 1935, as the PSD 
was formed, these two programs came under the purview of the 
Resettlement Administration, separate from the USDA, though 
former agricultural undersecretary Rexford Tugwell headed it.370 
Within a couple of years, however, the Resettlement Administration 
merged into the USDA and the controversial Tugwell, in order to 
save his program, resigned.371  As this transition was underway, 
Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 
1937, which primarily assisted farm tenants with becoming 
landowners.372  As a result of this legislation, the Secretary of 
Agriculture dissolved the Resettlement Administration and 
created the Farm Security Administration.373
Eventually, the Farm Security Administration far outgrew 
its predecessor and had become its own “poor man’s Department 
of Agriculture.”374  Through its rural rehabilitation efforts, it 
became an advocate for small farmers planting diversified 
crops, and it resisted foisting on these farmers the efficiency 
methods favored by larger producers.375  It installed loan and 
grant programs that targeted some of these farmers, and the 
Farm Security Administration provided assistance in helping this 
new group of farmers formulate and execute their farm plans.376 
Although facing enormous practical and social challenges, the 
368  Id.
369  National Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-67, § 208, 48 Stat. 195, 205–06.
370  McConnell, supra note 136, at 86.
371  Id. at 88.
372  Id.
373  Id.
374  Id. at 89.
375  Id. at 90.
376  Id. at 90–91.
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Farm Security Administration persevered and advocated for farm 
ownership among small-scale farmers.377
Because the programs from the Resettlement 
Administration originated outside of the USDA, farm organizations 
were unable to influence them as they had been able to influence 
other agricultural programs.  In 1941, the Farm Bureau began 
its attacks, and by 1943, vice-president of the Farm Bureau 
Edward O’Neal insisted that the Farm Security Administration 
clients should stop receiving any federal help because “2,000,000 
smallest farms consumed on the average about one-half of the 
production of these farms and sent only $100 worth of products 
to market.  This group produced only about 3 per cent of the 
marketed crops.  They do not have the land, facilities, or labor 
to produce large quantities of food.”378  Through this argument 
and prompting investigations into alleged program waste and 
violations, the Farm Bureau sought to put an end to the agricultural 
policies it had no voice in shaping.379  By 1946, the Farm Security 
Administration formally ended, and whatever was left of it fell 
under the Farmers’ Home Administration, primarily a veterans’ 
agency at the time.380
The life of these two major agricultural programs—the 
PSD and Farm Security Administration—demonstrate, first, that 
federal agricultural policy has long held multiple identities, and, 
second, one of those identities is the democratization of local 
and regional food systems through promoting self-empowerment 
among diverse stakeholders in agriculture, as well as funding 
economic and social programs to help farmers transition to 
owning small-scale, diversified farms, similar to those powering 
local-food efforts today.  The back-to-the-farm movement of the 
early 20th Century might well have emerged as the farm-to-table 
movement of the early 21st Century.  Regardless, it is clear that 
deliberative democracy has played a critical role in developing 
377  See id. at 91, 93–94.
378  Id. at 106. 
379  Id. at 106–10.
380  Id. at 111.
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federal agriculture policy and has been identified as critical to our 
food system.
IV.  Leveraging the Farm Bill to Support Food 
Localization
As Part III shows, deliberative democracy is an effective 
policy basis for empowering communities to engage more directly 
and inclusively in their food system, and federal agricultural 
policy has a deep history of promoting the determination of 
individuals to participate democratically.  Because of the Farm 
Bill’s established role in promoting community food systems, this 
Part identifies ways in which future Farm Bills should support the 
movement toward localized food democracy.
First, Farm Bills should be utilized to ensure that a wide 
array of stakeholder groups have full access to participate in 
decision-making bodies. Both local and federal boards wield 
authority over issues that are of concern to a wide range of 
stakeholders, yet representation does not currently reflect the 
diverse interests of these stakeholders.  The proposals included 
here would help amplify the voices of stakeholders, thus supporting 
food democracy.  Second, Farm Bills should work towards 
increasing representation of traditionally underrepresented groups 
in Farm Bill programs and food governance.  These groups have 
historically been excluded from full participation in the food 
system; efforts to localize the food system should include these 
marginalized groups so that the entire community is effectively 
represented.  Finally, Farm Bills should continue to bolster local 
food authorities, enabling citizens to have greater direct influence 
over their local food systems.  As discussed earlier, Food Policy 
Councils are multiplying as citizens take an interest in food 
governance.  Future Farm Bills present opportunities to encourage 
the creation and maintenance of such entities. 
A.  Diversifying Representation Among Agricultural 
Producer Stakeholders
In order to be truly representative, the entities that make 
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decisions at each level of government must include all relevant 
stakeholders.  A democratic food system requires that everyone 
have a voice at the table. The following recommendations aim to 
ensure that a diverse array of stakeholder interests are included in 
decision-making processes.
  
i.  Increasing Organized Labor’s Representation at the 
Federal Policy Level
The food system—including production, processing, 
distribution, retail, and service—employs roughly one-sixth 
of workers in the United States.381  These workers face many 
challenges.  Less than 15 percent of food workers earn a living 
wage,382 despite the fact that 40 percent work more than 40 hours 
per week, and 11 percent work more than 60 hours per week.383 
Wage theft runs rampant,384 and over half of workers do not have 
health care coverage of any kind.385  In an unfortunate irony, almost 
one-third of food system workers experience food insecurity386 
and nearly 14 percent depend on food stamps, compared to 8.3 
percent for the general workforce.387  Given the various problems 
that food-chain workers endure, organized labor should have a 
voice in food policy decision-making processes.  Of the dozens of 
advisory committees listed on USDA’s website, though, not one 
focuses on labor issues.388  This is a missed opportunity to directly 
address the interests of the 22 percent of food-system workers 
that are employed in production or processing—over four million 
381  The Food Chain Workers Alliance, The Hands that Feed Us: 
Challenges and Opportunities for Workers along the Food Chain 
1 (2012), https://foodchainworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Hands-
That-Feed-Us-Report.pdf. 
382  Id at 4.
383  Id.
384  Thirty-six percent of food chain workers had experienced wage theft in the 
week previous to being surveyed. Id. 
385  Id.
386  The Food Chain Workers Alliance, supra note 384, at 21.
387  Id. at 68.
388  See USDA Advisory Committees, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.
usda.gov/our-agency/staff-offices/office-executive-secretariat-oes/advisory-
committees (last visited May 16, 2018).
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people389—and to consider the impacts that these segments of the 
food system have on workers further down the chain.
Creating a new labor advisory committee in the Farm Bill 
is just one potential way to include this group of stakeholders in 
policy making.  Another possibility is to integrate representatives 
of organized labor into existing committees.  This approach, which 
could supplement an independent committee, would help ensure 
that labor issues are not overlooked when discussing policies that 
could impact workers.  For instance, the National Agriculture 
Research, Extension, Education, and Economics Advisory Board 
(NAREEEAB) would benefit from the representation of labor. 
NAREEEAB provides advice to the Secretary of Agriculture and 
to land-grant institutions regarding research, extension services, 
education, and economics.390  The Board has twenty-five members, 
each representing a specific category of stakeholders as mandated 
by the 2008 Farm Bill.391  Represented stakeholders include 
commodity producers, nutritional scientists, and consumers—but 
not labor.392  The Farm Bill should be used as an opportunity to 
amend the membership requirements of NAREEEAB to include 
one additional member, from a non-profit representing labor 
interests in agriculture (for a total of twenty-six members). 
Another area where federal policy stands to benefit from 
the representation of labor interests is in the National Organic 
Program (NOP).  In 1990, the Organic Food Production Act 
(OFPA) established the National Organic Standards Board 
(NOSB) to act as a critical advisor to USDA regarding organic 
389  The Food Chain Workers Alliance, supra note 384, at 17.
390  See U.S. Dep’t Agric., Nat’l Agric. Research, Extension, Educ. & 
Econ. Advisory Bd., https://nareeeab.ree.usda.gov/ (last visited May 16, 
2018). 
391  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 7102, 
122 Stat. 923, 1214 (amending Section 1408 of the National Agricultural 
Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977); Membership 
Categories, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Nat’l Agric. Research, Extension, Educ. 
& Econ. Advisory Bd., https://nareeeab.ree.usda.gov/membership/
membership-categories (last visited May 16, 2018).
392  Id. at 369.
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policy.393  The NOSB, composed of fifteen members, issues 
recommendations that serve as the basis for NOP policy.394  The 
NOSB’s responsibilities also include periodically reviewing 
the National List of Allowed and Prohibited Substances, which 
identifies the substances that may be used in organic food 
production, and making formal recommendations to USDA about 
its contents.395 
Like NAREEEAB, the NOSB’s composition is mandated 
by statute to include representatives of certain interest groups. 
For instance, three members must represent public interest or 
consumer groups, while two must own or operate organic handling 
operations.  Under current law, no members are designated 
to represent labor interests.  Fair labor practices are also not 
included as part of organic certification, as USDA claims that 
OFPA does not authorize the inclusion of labor-related standards 
in the NOP.396  Yet, the NOSB’s vision statement aims to “instill[] 
trust among consumers, producers, processors, retailers and other 
stakeholders.”397  Given that farmworkers constitute a key group 
of stakeholders, and that many commenters asked the NOP to 
develop fair labor standards as part of the program,398 the Farm 
Bill should amend the OFPA to both clarify that labor-related 
standards may be included in the NOP and to incorporate labor 
representatives in the NOSB.  Two chairs could be allocated for 
393  Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
624, § 2119, 104 Stat. 3359, 3947–49.
394  Standards: The Groundwork Protecting Organic Integrity, Organic 
Integrity Q. 2 (May 2016), U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.ams.
usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/2016%20Organic%20May%20
Newsletter.pdf. 
395  7 U.S.C. § 6517(d); National Organic Standards Board 
(NOSB), Agric. Marketing Serv., U.S. Dep’t Of Agric., 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/organic/nosb.  
396  National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,547, 80,556 (Dec. 21, 2000) 
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205).
397  Nat’l Organic Standards Bd., NOSB Policy And Procedures 
Manual 4 (2016), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
NOSB-PolicyManual.pdf. 
398  National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,547, 80,556 (Dec. 21, 2000) 
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205).
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representatives of labor: one from a union representing agricultural 
workers, and one from a non-profit focused on labor in agriculture. 
Such an amendment may either raise the total number of chairs 
to seventeen, or it may reduce by one each the number of organic 
farm owners and operators and the number of public interest 
and consumer representatives.  Including labor representatives 
on the NOSB would encourage the Board to revisit labor issues 
and would ensure that workers are not excluded from reaping the 
benefits of the NOP. 
ii.  Improving Specialty Crops Representation at the 
Federal Policy Level
Over the last few decades, specialty crops—including 
fruits and vegetables—have gained prominence in federal 
agricultural policy.399  Specialty crop production now generates 
roughly a quarter of the value of U.S. crop production, to the tune 
of $60 billion per year.400  To advise USDA on policy relating to 
this important area of agriculture, Congress created the Specialty 
Crop Committee (SCC).  The SCC is tasked with studying issues 
that specifically affect the specialty crop industry.  As a permanent 
subcommittee of NAREEEAB, representatives are appointed 
by the Board.401  The only statutory requirement regarding 
membership is that it “shall reflect diversity in the specialty crops 
represented.”402  This standard, while perhaps a worthy goal, is too 
vague to ensure that different groups of stakeholders are included 
in the democratic process. 
Specialty crops are grown by a range of particularly diverse 
stakeholders, who may have unique viewpoints to contribute to 
399  See generally Farm Bill Law Enterprise, Title X: Horticulture 
& Organics (2017), http://www.farmbilllaw.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/Title-10-Horticulture.pdf. 
400  Renée Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., Fruits, Vegetables, And Other 
Specialty Crops: Selected Farm Bill And Federal Programs 1 (2014), 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R42771.pdf.  
 
401  7 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1). 
402  Id.
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policy development.  For instance, small-scale farmers are more 
likely to produce specialty crops than commodity crops,403 perhaps 
because the labor-intensive nature of specialty crop production is 
often not well suited to large-scale production.404  The average 
size of all farms is 1.82 times greater than the average specialty 
crop farm, and over one-third of specialty crop farms have fewer 
than 15 acres.405  In addition, minority farmers disproportionately 
produce specialty crops, as compared to commodities.  For 
instance, in 2012, 63.6 percent of Asian American farmers grew 
fruits and vegetables, compared to just 8.5 percent of white 
farmers.406  The particular issues that affect these groups, such as 
obstacles to accessing loans, therefore affect the specialty crops 
sector as a whole.  However, of the ten members currently on the 
Committee, none specifically represent small-scale or minority 
growers.407  The Farm Bill presents an opportunity to ensure that 
the SCC includes the voices of small-scale and minority farmers, 
who will be able to contribute their distinctive expertise to policy 
research and analysis. 
403  Tamar Haspel, Small vs. Large: Which Size Farm is Better for the 
Planet?, Wash. Post (Sep. 2, 2014),  https://www.washingtonpost.
com/lifestyle/food/small-vs-large-which-size-farm-is-better-for-the-
planet/2014/08/29/ac2a3dc8-2e2d-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html?utm_
term=.5f60314c8255; Solutions: Expand Healthy Food Access, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/food-agriculture/
solutions/expand-healthy-food-access#.WTmbRhPyvVo (last visited May 16, 
2018).
404  Hossein Ayazi & Elsadig Elsheikh, Haas Inst. for a Fair and Inclusive 
Soc. at Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, The U.S. Farm Bill: Corporate Power 
and Structural Racialization in the U.S. Food System 58 (2015), http://
haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haasinstitutefarmbillreport_
publish_0.pdf. 
405  U.S. Dep’t Agric., Nat’l Agric. Statistics Serv., 2012 Census of 
Agriculture: Specialty Crops 2 (2012); U.S. Dep’t Agric.: Nat’l Agric. 
Statistics Serv., 2012 Census of Agriculture: United States Summary 
and State Data 7 (2012).
406  Ayazi & Elsheikh, supra note 407, at 58.
407  Specialty Crops Subcommittee, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Nat’l Agric. 
Research, Extension, Educ. & Econ. Advisory Bd., https://nareeeab.ree.
usda.gov/subcommittees/specialty-crops-subcommittee (last visited May 16, 
2018).
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iii.  Creating Opportunities for Urban Agriculture to Be 
Represented at Federal Policy Level
The previous recommendations have all focused on 
improving committee representation of specific stakeholders, 
including workers, small-scale farmers, and minority farmers. 
Another way to enhance the democratic process is to ensure that 
specialized venues for specific substantive topics exist, such that 
appropriate forums are available for discussion.  To that end, the 
USDA would benefit from the creation of an Urban Agriculture 
Advisory Committee.408  As urban farming gains steam,409 it is 
important to have democratic channels for information sharing 
and policy development dedicated to issues particular to the 
challenges of farming in cities. 
In keeping with the previous recommendations, the 
membership of the suggested Urban Agriculture Advisory 
Committee should include a diverse range of stakeholders.  For 
instance, membership categories could include urban agricultural 
producers, urban food aggregators, experts on farm-to-school 
programs, public health experts, city government representatives, 
urban planners, institutional buyers, and experts on farmers 
markets.  This approach would facilitate deliberation regarding 
urban food policy and enhance food governance more generally. 
In turn, the long-term effect of the committee’s efforts would 
contribute to the localization of food systems by providing 
communities participating in urban farming with additional 
resources to strengthen their work and enhance democratic 
engagement.
  B.  Increasing Representation of Traditionally 
Underrepresented Groups
Inherent in the idea of a democratic food system is an 
408  See S.3420, 114th Cong. § 101 (2016).
409  See, e.g., Elizabeth Royte, Urban Farms Now Produce 1/5 of the World’s 
Food, GreenBiz (May 5, 2015), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/urban-
farms-now-produce-15-worlds-food; Betsy McKay, A Farm Grows in the 
City, Wall St. J. (May 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-farm-grows-
in-the-city-1494813900.  
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understanding that a diverse cross section of the community will be 
able to participate in governance, production, and consumption.410 
The 2018 Farm Bill presents several opportunities to improve this 
aspect of our food system by fostering the inclusion of socially 
disadvantaged farmers and ranchers (SDFRs). Three proposals 
that would improve representation of underrepresented groups in 
the food system are detailed below.  
i.   Matching Representation to Appropriate Demographics
It is not just federal boards and committees that stand to 
benefit from including a more diverse range of stakeholders in 
decision-making processes; local governing bodies should also 
serve to amplify the voices of a variety of stakeholders.  The 
importance of local participation in community food systems 
further underscores the need to ensure that local bodies are 
representative of their constituents.  While the Farm Bill admittedly 
focuses on federal programs, it does still play a role in supporting 
local food systems, as Part II showed. The Farm Service Agency 
(FSA) oversees a county committee system, where members 
comprise a “critical component” of FSA operations.411 These 
committees were first authorized by Congress in the 1930s in a 
push for local democracy, “allow[ing] for grassroots input and 
local administration” of federal agricultural programs.412  Elected 
committee members help deliver FSA farm programs to their 
county and play a role in deciding which programs their counties 
will offer.413 
Recognizing the need for fair representation, Congress in 
the 2002 Farm Bill mandated that county committees be “fairly 
representative” of producers within the area, and authorized the 
410  See supra II.A.2.
411  County Committee Elections, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency, 
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-room/county-committee-elections/ (last 
visited May 16, 2018).
412  Selection and Function of Farm Service Agency State and County 
Committees, 78 Fed. Reg. 13,771, 13,771 (Mar. 1, 2013) (codified at 7 C.F.R. 
pt. 7).
413  Id.
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Secretary of Agriculture both to promulgate guidelines to “ensure 
fair representation of disadvantaged groups” and to insure their 
inclusion through the power of appointment.414  Pursuant to that 
authority, the Secretary may appoint a socially disadvantaged 
(SDA)415 farmer or rancher to committees where no SDA member 
was elected, and the demographics of the county are such that one 
is needed to ensure fair representation.416  This regulation is an 
important first step to ensuring the inclusion in local democratic 
processes.  Unfortunately, the method used to determine which 
counties qualify for an appointed member is flawed.  The 
calculation of countywide demographics, for the purposes of the 
Secretary’s appointment power, is based on the eligible county 
committee voters—essentially, producers—rather than total 
population.417  This approach fails to consider or correct the 
historical discrimination and inequities in agriculture that have 
impacted today’s demographic makeup of farmers.418  Future Farm 
Bills could improve the existing rule by directing the Secretary to 
wield the appointment power based on demographics of the entire 
population of each county or even the entire state, thus ensuring 
that minorities and women are adequately represented on local 
committees even when they have been largely excluded from 
agriculture. 
414  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 
10708(b), 116 Stat. 134, 522.
415  SDA groups are defined as African Americans, American Indians, Alaska 
Natives, Hispanics, Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders and women. Selection 
and Function of Farm Service Agency State and County Committees, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 13,772.
416  Selection and Function of Farm Service Agency State and County 
Committees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 13,773.
417  Id.; see also COC Socially Disadvantaged (SDA) Voting Member and COC 
Advisor Appointments, Notice AO-1673, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,  Farm Serv. 
Agency (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_Notice/
ao_1673.pdf (“An analysis by the National Office determined the counties in 
which the percentage of SDA producers indicates there is a need for increased 
SDA representation.” (emphasis added)).
418  For instance, between 1920 and 1997 the population of African American 
farmers in the U.S. fell from 926,000 to fewer than 20,000—a decline that 
was 2.5 to 5 times steeper than that experienced by white farmers. See Ayazi 
& Elsheikh, supra note 407, at 54–60.
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ii.  Continuing and Expanding Outreach Programs to 
SDFRs
In 2013, in an effort to provide more a more flexible 
financing option, FSA created the Microloan program to “better 
serve the credit needs of several types of farmers: small, beginning, 
veteran, and/or from historically socially disadvantaged groups 
(women/minorities).”419  Although FSA launched the program 
under their authority through the Direct Operating Loan Program, 
Congress permanently authorized the Microloan program in the 
2014 Farm Bill.420 
Following implementation of the Microloan program, 
ERS conducted a study to investigate program outcomes.421  The 
study revealed that the number of new FSA direct loan borrowers 
receiving traditional operating loans fell after the Microloan 
program became available—indicating that the Microloan 
program may have attracted some of those applicants as well 
as additional new borrowers.422  Based on the findings, ERS 
made two conclusions.  First, new borrowers prefer microloans 
to traditional operating loans.  Second, all else being equal, “at 
least some of the new borrowers who received Microloans would 
likely have applied for and received traditional [direct operating 
loans] if the Microloan program did not exist.”423
With this understanding, the ERS proceeded to examine 
the impact of the Microloan program on SDFRs.  ERS found 
that white borrowers received 86 percent of microloans to new 
borrowers in the first two years of the program, although new 
black borrowers over that same period received 25 times more 
419  USDA Microloans for Farmers: Participation Patterns and Effects of 
Outreach, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (last updated Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.
ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=81870.
420  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79 § 5106(a), 128 Stat. 837 (2014), 
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1943(c) (2018).
421  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Microloans for Farmers: Participation 
Patterns and Effects of Outreach (2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/81871/err-222.pdf?v=42761.
422  Id. at 15. 
423  Id. at 18.
2018] Food Localization 263
Microloans than small traditional operating loans.424  Eight 
percent of microloans to new borrowers went to black borrowers, 
and another 7 percent to other minorities.  This represented a 
substantial increase over traditional operating loans of similar 
size from recent years.425
These findings seemed to indicate that the Microloan 
program’s outreach efforts were initially successful.  To examine 
the issue more closely, USDA conducted a controlled experiment 
designed to test the effectiveness of the agency’s targeted messages 
to SDFRs about the Microloan program.426  The results showed 
both that “the outreach increased interest in Microloans and the 
number of borrowers who received them” and that outreach “may 
have strong effects on some subgroups . . . and low effects on 
other subgroups.”427  The study also found that traditional direct 
operating loans are “still an important source of credit for targeted 
farmers.”428
USDA’s findings demonstrate the importance of outreach 
among SDFRs as it relates to loan and grant awareness.  In 
addition, the study’s results suggest that outreach may be 
useful in the context of other programs, as well.  USDA should 
expand broader outreach among SDFRs to increase diversity 
within the food system, and it should consider launching a more 
comprehensive study regarding outreach to determine the most 
effective methods and to identify underserved subgroups that 
could benefit from targeted tools. 
424  Id. at 19.
425  Id. at 19
426  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Microloans for Farmers: Participation 
Patterns and Effects of Outreach 21–24 (2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/81871/err-222.pdf?v=42761.  Drawing from behavioral 
economics, USDA personalized each letter with the recipient’s name, and a 
staff member personally signed each letter.  USDA then sent these letters to 
approximately 144,924 operations in 1,848 ZIP codes. The agency found that 
farmers in ZIP codes receiving the letters expressed much more interest in the 
program than farmers in ZIP codes not receiving the letters.  Id.
427  Id. at 25.
428  Id. at 12.
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iii.  Including Native American Voices
It is undeniable that the Farm Bill greatly impacts Indian 
Country in the United States. More than 50 million acres of tribal 
lands are engaged in food production and agriculture;429 Native 
American or Alaska Natives make up more than 30 percent of 
minority farmers in the country.430 However, the Farm Bill leaves 
much to be desired in terms of supporting Native farmers and 
including Native voices in the democratic process. 
In light of these deficiencies, Native advocates have been 
working towards a better Farm Bill that would include Native 
voices and open up opportunities for Native farmers. Last 
year, the Native Farm Bill Coalition published an impressively 
thorough report brimming with policy proposals that would result 
in a more fair and inclusive Farm Bill.431 The Coalition aims to 
give Native Americans a united voice in advocating for changes 
to the next Farm Bill.432 Stalwarts in this policy arena include the 
Intertribal Agriculture Council (IAC) and the National Congress 
of American Indians (NCAI), both of which are involved in the 
Coalition.433 
As a result of these groups’ research and advocacy, 
Congressional leaders are beginning to pay attention. Senator 
429  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Nat’l Agric. Statistics Service, 2012 Census 
of Agriculture Highlights: American Indian Farmers (2014), https://
www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/
American_Indian_Farmers/Highlights_American_Indian_Farmers.pdf 
430  Kim Baca, Native Communities are Fighting for a More Inclusive Farm 
Bill, Civil Eats (Feb. 26, 2018) https://civileats.com/2018/02/26/native-
communities-are-fighting-for-a-more-inclusive-farm-bill/.
431  Janie Simms Hipp & Colby D. Duren, Regaining Our Future: An 
Assessment of Risks and Opportunities for Native Communities in the 2018 
Farm Bill, Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community (June 2017), http://
seedsofnativehealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Farm-Bill-Report_
WEB.pdf.
432  Native Farm Bill Coalition, Seeds of Native Health, http://
seedsofnativehealth.org/native-farm-bill-coalition/ (last visited Mar. 27, 
2018).
433  Id. (“The Native Farm Bill Coalition is a joint project of the Shakopee 
Mdewakanton Sioux Community’s Seeds of Native Health campaign, the 
Intertribal Agriculture Council, the National Congress of American Indians, 
and the Indigenous Food and Agriculture Initiative to improve Native dietary 
health and food access.”)
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Udall (D-NM) has expressed his support for increased inclusion 
of tribal representatives in Farm Bill discussions,434 while 
Senator Heitkamp (D-ND) recently introduced a bill that would 
permanently authorize a Rural Development Tribal Technical 
Assistance Office within USDA, among other things.435 
Congress should take advantage of the upcoming 
opportunity to democratize our food system by ensuring that 
Indian Country is fully included in Farm Bill programs and 
administration. Many of the Coalition’s recommendations would 
allow Native farmers and ranchers to participate more fully in 
the food system. For instance, the report recommends changing 
the Specialty Crop Block Grant Program to ensure that tribal 
departments of agriculture are eligible for funding and that tribal 
projects do not need to go through state agencies in order to receive 
support.436 Other proposals in the report aim at a different goal: 
including Native voices in food governance and administration. 
These types of recommendations would address the structural 
exclusion of Native interests in decision-making processes. 
Examples include creating of an Interdepartmental Task Force 
on Indian Agriculture437 and mandating tribal representation on 
USDA’s numerous advisory committees.438 Taken together, these 
recommendations would go a long way towards democratizing 
the Farm Bill. 
C.  Supporting Local Food System Governance Structures
434  Baca, supra note 433.
435  Press Releases: Heitkamp Introduces Legislation to Prioritize Native Issues 
in Next Farm Bill, Office of Senator Heidi Heitkamp (Mar. 1, 2018), https://
www.heitkamp.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=4C096269-
910A-43A6-9D73-6425A0F283FA. The Native Farm Bill Coalition has 
endorsed the bill. Id.
436  Hipp & Duren, supra note 434, at 109.
437  Id. at 131.
438  Id. at 132.
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i.  Increasing Coordination Among and Between Federal 
and Local Organizations.
In order to enhance food governance, substantive 
areas—which, as suggested in the previous recommendation, 
may merit specialized attention—should not be entirely siloed. 
Food policy spans a range of issue areas, including agriculture, 
public health, labor, environment, and urban development.  The 
multifaceted nature of food policy is evident in the Farm Bill 
itself, with roughly a dozen titles spanning topics from forestry 
to trade.439  The USDA plays a major role in implementing 
agricultural policy, but many other agencies are also implicated 
in the Farm Bill, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Food & Drug Administration, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the Department 
of Energy.  With so many actors involved, policies are often not 
crafted to complement one another.  For instance, in its public 
health role, the USDA recommends that fruits and vegetables 
comprise half of an individual’s daily diet.440  Yet, a mere fraction 
of farm subsidies—less than 1 percent—is directed at specialty 
crop production.441 
To overcome this coordination problem, the Farm 
Bill could establish a new interagency Food Policy Advisory 
Committee.  Such a committee would facilitate communication 
and information sharing between relevant government agencies, 
and it would include (at a minimum) representatives from the 
agencies mentioned above.  The committee should also have the 
authority to add participants on a temporary or permanent basis, 
as it finds necessary.  Tasks would include studying and making 
recommendations regarding substantial policy proposals that 
439  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014).
440  Mark Bittman et al., How a national food policy could save millions of 
American lives, Wash. Post (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could-save-millions-of-american-
lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html?utm_
term=.d6d51cae42b4.   
441  Id.  See also Agriculture and Health Policies in Conflict, Physicians 
Committee for Responsible Medicine, http://www.pcrm.org/health/reports/
agriculture-and-health-policies-ag-versus-health, (last visited April 18, 2018). 
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implicate multiple agencies.  The committee could also tackle 
the development of a national food policy that would help guide 
agencies, resulting in a more coherent and consistent approach to 
food governance.442    
Horizontal coordination between federal agencies is just 
one piece of the governance puzzle; vertical coordination between 
different levels of government is also crucial.  Food policy is 
both important to the nation as a whole, yet particular to specific 
regions and locales.  Local, state, and regional organizations play 
important roles in shaping agricultural systems, complementing 
the federal policy enacted by the Farm Bill.  Local involvement 
in food policy is an excellent way to support community food 
systems—yet for local entities to truly have a voice, they must 
not be isolated from other decision-making bodies.  Increased 
coordination would serve to strengthen local leadership and 
democracy, and it would capitalize on the wealth of localized 
knowledge that communities possess.  Established methods of 
communication and exchanges of information should therefore 
exist between local, state, regional, and federal entities. 
The Farm Bill can be used as a vehicle to ensure 
that coordination between levels of government takes place. 
Statutory language could mandate federal advisory boards and 
committees, such as NAREEEAB, the SCC, and the NOSB, to 
liaise with local, state, and regional entities, just as the FDA met 
with communities in consensus conferences across the country 
while it was developing its FSMA regulations.443  For instance, 
the committees could be required to hold at least one meeting 
each year specifically for the purpose of hearing testimony from 
representatives of those entities.  They could also be required to 
solicit input from such entities when considering policies that 
will impact local practices.  These requirements, of course, would 
not solve the issue of vertical coordination; however, they form 
442  See generally Mark Bittman et al., A National Food Policy for the 21st 
Century, Medium (Oct. 2015), https://medium.com/food-is-the-new-internet/
a-national-food-policy-for-the-21st-century-7d323ee7c65f.  
443  See supra III.B.
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an important step toward localizing the food system.  To further 
advance coordination, committees could additionally be directed 
to formulate recommendations to streamline the channels between 
levels of government.
ii.  Incentivizing Creation and Maintenance of Food 
Policy Councils
Of course, coordination across levels of government 
can only take place if a robust network of local entities exists. 
Currently, food policy councils serve as the primary vehicle for 
local food democracy.  Food policy councils come in a variety 
of forms, but they essentially serve as forums to deliberate over 
local and regional food issues.444  As Part II showed, the Farm 
Bill has greatly bolstered the existence of these councils.  There 
are hundreds of food councils currently in the United States.445 
Some were formed as part of government agencies, while others 
are independent grassroots networks; some comprise volunteers, 
while others operate on funding from foundatons.446  Food 
policy councils frequently coordinate with government officials; 
indeed, the most effective ones enjoy positive relationships with 
government.447 
Legislators could use the Farm Bill to encourage the 
creation and maintenance of food policy councils, thus supporting 
and strengthening community food systems.  Food policy councils 
often struggle to find sufficient funding.448  To support these 
entities, then, the Farm Bill could include a program to provide 
444  Alethea Harper et al., Inst. for Food & Dev. Pol’y, Food Policy 
Councils: Lessons Learned 19 (2009), https://foodfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/DR21-Food-Policy-Councils-Lessons-Learned-.pdf. 
445  Directory, Food Policy Networks, http://www.foodpolicynetworks.org/
directory/ (last visited May 16, 2018).
446  Harper et al., supra note 447, at 22–3.
447  Id. at 24, 38. 
448  Johns Hopkins Ctr. for a Livable Future, Stories from the Field: 
The Role of Local and State Food Policy councils in Federal 
Policy Making Implementation  1 (2015), https://assets.jhsph.edu/clf/
mod_clfResource/doc/Engaging%20FPCs%20at%20Federal%20Level%20
Draft%20Final.pdf. 
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grants to food policy councils.  This would be more than the 
Community Food Projects program,449 which covers a range of 
issues; rather, this would specifically target food policy councils. 
The program could be modeled on similar programs authorized 
by the Farm Bill, such as the Beginning Farmer and Rancher 
Program,450 which helps fund a variety of projects every year that 
train, provide technical assistance, and educate new farmers to 
ensure their businesses are viable and successful.451  This program 
requires that recipients share the cost of their programs by 
contributing an amount equal to at least 25 percent of the awarded 
funds, and project grants are capped at $600,000.452  Similarly, a 
program to fund FPCs could include a matching condition and a 
cap, thus keeping the total cost low while boosting these crucial 
instruments of food democracy. 
Like many existing Farm Bill programs that support food 
localization, our proposals are attempts to fill those gaps that 
civic agriculture and food democracy recognize as existing and 
being vital to democratization efforts.  By promoting programs 
founded on deliberative democratic principles, our proposals not 
only follow the natural progression of one substantial strand of 
federal agricultural policy, but they provide a theoretical structure 
to many of the programs Congress has already promulgated and 
the USDA has spent countless resources administering.
Conclusion
Increasingly, the Farm Bill is becoming a tool for the 
democratization of the food system as much as it is a tool for 
crop insurance, agricultural credit, nutrition programs, trade, and 
so forth.  More than that, though, Congress has included within 
some of these programs democratic mechanisms that empower 
449  See supra II.B.3.
450  See supra II.B.2.a.
451  Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development Program (BFRDP), U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Inst. of Food & Ag., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/
beginning-farmer-and-rancher-development-program-bfrdp (last visited May 
16, 2018).
452  Id.
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individuals and communities to make decisions about what the 
programs support.  With this steady momentum, the future of 
the Farm Bill looks increasingly more democratic.  And why 
shouldn’t this be the case?  Although deeply flawed by various 
forms of discrimination, the earliest Farm Bills quite explicitly 
sought greater democratic participation in federal farm programs. 
With this long view, the recent flirtations with democratization 
are a return to form rather than a radical departure. 
It is, therefore, time that Congress begin taking these 
trends more seriously.  By adopting some of our proposals 
founded on deliberative democracy, it will add legitimacy and 
structure to a policy that provides countless communities with 
the determination to make their own choices about how their 
food system should look—how the supply chain should function, 
which social issues to fund, and what aspects of the food system 
to experiment with.  That policy is a deliberative food democracy. 
The Farm Bill, bolstered by the many efforts before it, should 
finally make that policy explicit.

uNiverSiTy of ArkANSAS
School of lAw
fAyeTTeville
